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GERMANY'S HIGH SEA FLEET IN THE
WORLD WAR

ADMIRAL SCHEER

Germany's High Sea Fleet
in the World War

By

Admiral Scheer

x^L,

With a Portrait and Twenty-eight Plans

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD

London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne

1920

PREFACE

THE victor has the privilege of writing the story of the war ; for
one mistrusts the vanquished, because he will try to palliate and
excuse his defeats. But we are victors and vanquished at one and
the same time, and in depicting our success the difficult problem
confronts us of not forgetting that our strength did not last out to
the end.

Exceptionally tragic is the fate of our Fleet. It embodied the
sense of power resulting from the unification of the Empire, a sense
which was conscious of its responsibility to provide for the suitable
security of our immensely flourishing political and economical ex-
pansion. By creating a fleet we strengthened our claim to sea-
power, without which the Empire must wither away, we remained
a thorn in the side of the British, and their ill-will was the constant
accompaniment of our growth. The freedom of the seas, which
we strove for in line with our evolution, England was never
willing to grant, even if it had to come to a world-War on the
point.

In the four years' struggle which Germany waged against the
desire of its enemies to destroy it, the Fleet was able, beyond all
foreign expectations, to hold its own, and what is more, it was our
conduct of the naval war that succeeded in forcing the stubborn
enemy to the brink of destruction. But, nevertheless, we have lost
the war, and with the surrender of the German Fleet the expectations
of an independent shaping of our destiny have vanished for long
enough.

To the history of the naval war, as it presented itself to me
and was for some years carried on under my guidance, this book
will add a contribution. I should like, however, along with the
description of my war experiences, to give the assurance to the
German people that the German Fleet, which ventured to boast of

Preface

being a favourite creation of the nation, strove to do its duty, and
entered into the war inspired only by the thought of justifying the
confidence reposed in it and of standing on an equal footing with
the warriors on land. The remembrance of the ifamous deeds which
were accomplished on the sea will henceforth preserve over the
grave of the German Fleet the hope that our race will succeed in
creating for itself a position among the nations worthy of the German
people.

SCHEER.

Weimar, September, 1919.

VI

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction ix

PART I

The First Two Years of the War to the
Battle of the Skagerrak

CHAPT1R

1. The Outbreak of War 8

2. Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation . 13

3. Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive .... 26

4. The English Break into the Heligoland Bight . 42

5. The Autumn and Winter Months of 1914 . . 57

6. Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool, and

the Battle of the Dogger Bank .... 67

7. The Year of the War 1915 87

8. Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity . . 96

9. Enterprises in the Hoofden,* and Bombardment of

Yarmouth and Lowestoft . 113

PART II

From the Battle of the Skagerrak to the
Unrestricted U-boat Warfare

10. The Battle of the Skagerrak 183

11. After the Battle .....•• 174

12. Airship Attacks .....•• 203

* " The Hoofden " is a German term applied to the area of the North Sea that lies
below the latitude of Terscbelling.

vii

Contents

PART III

The U-boat Campaign

CHAPTER PAOE

13. The Military and Political Significance of the

U-boat Campaign 215

14. Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare . . 259

15. Activity of the Fleet during the U-boat Campaign 280

16. The Conquest of the Baltic Islands and the Capture

of Helsingfors 295

17. Our Light Craft in Action, and Advance of our Fleet

to the Norwegian Coast 304

18. The Navy Command 824

Conclusion 358

Index 365

Folding Plans

The Expedition against Sunderland, August 18-20,

1916 Facing p. 180

Plan of the Minefield in the German Bight , 288

viu

INTRODUCTION

THE origin of the world-war lies in the opposition between the
Anglo-Saxon and the German conceptions of the world. On the
former side is the claim to the position of unrestricted primacy in sea-
power, to the dominion of the seas, to the prerogative of ocean-
trade and to a levy on the treasures of all the earth. "We are the
first nation of the world " is the dogma of every Englishman, and
he cannot conceive how others can doubt it.

English history supplies the proof of the application — just as
energetic as inconsiderate — of this conception. Even one of the
greatest eulogists of the English methods in naval warfare — which
best reflect English history — the American, Captain Mahan, made
famous through his book, " The Influence of Sea Power upon
History," characterises it in his observations on the North American
War of Independence, which ended in 1783": " To quote again the
[French] summary before given, their [the Allies — America, France
and Spain] object was ' to avenge their respective injuries, and to
put an end to that tyrannical Empire which England claims to
maintain upon the ocean.' The revenge they had obtained was
barren of benefit to themselves. They had, so that generation
thought, injured England by liberating America; but they had not
righted their wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica. The English fleet
had not received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty
self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the Northern Powers had
been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English Empire over
the seas soon became as tyrannical and more absolute than ever."
Still, England has in process of time understood how to create
an almost universal recognition of its claim. Its whole policy, based
on the authority of its Fleet and the favourable situation of the
British Isles, has always been adapted to the principle that all
that may contribute " ad majortm gloriam Britanniae " is of ad-
vantage also to the progress of mankind.

The principal feature of the English character is markedly
materialistic and reveals itself in a striving for power and profit.
The commercial spirit, which animates the individual Englishman,
colours the political and military dealings of the whole people. Their

ix

Introduction

claims, to themselves a matter of course, went so far always that they
never granted advantages to another, even if their utilisation was
not possible to themselves at the time, but might perhaps be so
later. That has manifested itself most clearly in the Colonial sphere.

The edifice of English world-importance and might has rested
for a hundred years on the fame of Trafalgar, and they have care-
fully avoided hazarding it. They have besides, with skill and
success, left untried no means of accentuating the impression of
power and using it. What we should consider boastful was to the
British only the expression of their full conviction and an
obvious means to their end. In support of this we may mention
such expressions as: "We have the ships, we have the men, we
have the money, too," as well as ships' names, such as Irresistible,
Invincible, Indomitable, Formidable, and many others.

This method, fundamentally, is really as the Poles asunder from
ours, but still it does not fail to leave an impression on many
Germans owing to its pomposity and the customary embroidery of
commonplaces about promoting the happiness of mankind.

On the opposite side Prussia — Germany I Its whole history filled
with struggle and distress, because the wars of Europe were carried
on by preference on its territory. It was the nation of the Cate-
gorical Imperative, ever ready for privations and sacrifices, always
raising itself again, till it seemed at last to have succeeded through
the unification of the Empire in being able to reap the fruits of its
hard-won position of power. The victory over the hard times it
had to pass through was due to its idealism and to its tried loyalty
to the Fatherland under the oppressions of foreign rule. The
strength of our defensive power rested above all things on our
conscientiousness and thoroughness acquired by strict discipline.

In contrast to the inaccessibility of the English island-position
was our Continental situation in the heart of Europe, in many re-
spects without natural defence on the frontiers, Instead of having *
wealth pouring in from all quarters of the globe, we had to toil in
the sweat of our brows to support our people on the scanty native
soil ; and yet we succeeded, in defiance of all difficulties, in elevating
and advancing in undreamt-of fashion the economic status of the
people while at the same time effecting their political unification.

In such a situation and after such experiences, schemes of con-
quest were utterly absent from the minds of the German people.
They sought to find satisfaction for their need of expansion in peace-
ful fashion, so as not to hazard lightly their hard-won position of

x

Introduction

power. That we should be regarded as an unwelcome intruder in
the circle of nations who felt themselves called upon to settle the
fate of Europe and the world was due, apart from the deeply-
wounded vanity of the French, to the mistrust of the British, to
whose way of thinking our harmlessness appeared incredible.

In order to retain our position and to ensure the maintenance of
our increasing wealth we had no other choice than to secure the ability
to defend ourselves according to the old-established principle of the
Wars of Liberation : by efficiency to compensate for what was lacking
in numbers. How could we establish armies superior to those of our
neighbours otherwise than by efficiency ?

iWith the same fundamental motive we turned to the building-
up of our sea power, as, owing to the increased dependence of our
Administration on foreign countries and to the investment of vaster
sums in German property on and oversea, our development
unquestionably required protection.

The intention imputed to us of wishing to usurp British world-
power never existed; our aims were much more simply explained
by the provisions of the Navy Bills of a limited number of ships,
which nowhere approached the English total. Nevertheless England
considered herself threatened and saw in us a rival who must at
any cost be destroyed. That this sentiment prevailed over there
lay indeed less in the fact of the appearance of a sea Power of the
second rank in a corner of the North Sea far removed from the
world-oceans, than in the estimate of its worth. They foresaw the
exercise in it of a spirit of progress which characterised the German
nature, by which England felt herself hampered and prejudiced.

It is not disputed that through our fleet-construction a sharper
note was introduced into our relations with England than would
have resulted from peaceful competition alone, but it is not a
just judgment, nor one going to the foundation of the German-
English relations, if the disaster of the world-war or even of the
unsuccessful result of the war is attributed simply to the building
of the German Fleet. To that end it is necessary to consider the
justification of our fleet-building and the reasons why the war was
lost and what prospects existed for us of winning it. In that way
we shall recognise the decisive r61e which fell to naval power
after this struggle of nations grew into a world-war through
England's accession to the side of Russia and France.

The mere apprehension of falling out with England could not
and dare not form ground for refusing to such an important part

xi

Introduction

of our national wealth as had accumulated in the undertakings bound
'up with our sea interests the necessary protection through a fleet,
which the townsman, dependent on inland activities, enjoyed in the
shape of our army and accepted as quite a matter of course.

The Empire was under an obligation to support and protect in
their projects the shippers and merchants who undertook to dispose
of the surplusage of our industrial energy in foreign lands
and there establish new enterprises bringing profit to Germany.
This connection with overseas was securing us universal benefit in
so far as, by its means, the Homeland was enabled to employ and
to feed all its inhabitants, so that, in spite of the great increase of
population, emigration was no longer required as a safety-valve for
the surplus man-strength. What the maintenance of the man-
strength of a country means when converted into work, the last ten
years and the war-years have shown us quite remarkably.

It is expected of every small State that it should make whatever
efforts lie in its power to justify a claim to consideration of its in-
dependence. On this is based the guarantee, won in the international
life of peoples with the advance of civilisation, that the weaker will
not unjustifiably be fallen upon by the stronger.

The conduct of a Great Power which left its sea-interests with-
out protection would have been as unworthy and contemptible as
dishonourable cowardice in an individual; but it would have been
most highly impolitic also, because it would have made it dependent
on States more powerful at sea. The best army we could create
would lose in value if Germany remained with the Achilles-heel of
an unprotected foreign trade amounting to thousands of millions.
Although the purpose of our competition on a peaceful footing
followed from the modesty of our colonial claims, our policy did
not succeed in removing England's suspicion ; but, considering the
diversity of the claims of both peoples, having its roots in their
world views, all the art of diplomacy could not have succeeded in
so far bridging over the antagonisms that the recourse to arms
would have been spared us.

Was there perchance still another method of creating, for our-
selves the necessary protection against attacks at sea, which did
not bear the provocative character that in England was attributed
to the building of our High Sea Fleet ? Just as the desire for a
German Fleet had for a long time been popular, so has the average
German had little idea of the meaning of sea power and of its
practical application. This is not to be wondered at, in view of the

xii

Introduction

complete absence of national naval war-history. It will hence be
necessary, in order to answer the question whether we chose the
suitable naval armament for the condition of affairs in which the new
Germany saw itself placed, to enter somewhat more closely into
the peculiarities of naval warfare.

It has been held as an acknowledged axiom, proved from war-
history, that the struggle at sea must be directed to gaining the
mastery of the sea, i.e. to removing all opposition which stands in
the way of its free and unhindered use.

The chief resisting strength lies in the enemy Fleet, and a
successful struggle against it first renders possible the utilisation of
the mastery of the seas, for thereupon one's own Fleet can go out
with the object of attacking the enemy coasts or oversea possessions,
of carrying out landings or preparing and covering the same on a
larger scale (invasion). Finally, it can further shut off the enemy
by means of a blockade from every sort of import from overseas and
capture his merchant-ships with their valuable cargoes, until they
are driven off the open sea. Contrary to the international usage
in land warfare of sparing private property, there exists the principle
of prize-right at sea, which is nothing more than a relic of the
piracy which was pursued so vigorously in the form of privateering
by the freebooters in the great naval war a hundred years ago.

The abrogation of the right of prize has hitherto always been
frustrated by the opposition of England, although she herself pos-
sesses the most extensive merchant-shipping trade. For she looks
for the chief effect of her sea power to the damaging of the enemy's
sea-trade. In the course of time England, apparently yielding to the
pressure of the majority of the other maritime States, has conceded
limitations of the blockade and naval prize-rights — with the mental
reservation, however, of disregarding them at pleasure — which suited
the predominant Continental interest of these States. It deserves
especially to be noticed that England has held inflexibly to this
right to damage enemy (and neutral) trade because she was
convinced of her superiority at sea. When our trade-war began,
unexpectedly, to be injurious to the island-people they set all the
machinery possible in motion to cause its condemnation.

It is possible in certain circumstances for the less powerful
maritime States, according to position, coast-formation and ocean
traffic, to protect themselves at their sensitive and assailable points
by measures of coast-defence.

With us this course has found its zealous champions, first on

xiii

Introduction

account of cheapness, partly from a desire not to provoke the
more powerful States, and finally on the ground of strategical
considerations which lay in the same direction as those of the jeune
ecole in France. The idea was to check an opponent by means of
guerilla warfare and through direct attack on enemy trade, but the
only result of the jeune ecole in France has been that the French
Navy has sunk into insignificance. A system of guerilla warfare
remains a struggle with inadequate means, which does not guarantee
any success. England rightly did not at all fear the cruiser-
war on her shipping trade, otherwise she would have given way
on the question of the naval prize-right. As regards coast defence,
we did not consider that policy, as it could nof hinder the English
from harming us, while it in no way affected them, seeing that
our coasts do not impinge on the world-traffic routes, and did not
come within the range of operations.

If the damage caused to one's own sea-trade (including that
of the Colonies) becomes intolerable, as in our own case, means of
coast-defence provide no adequate protection.

If it comes to the point that one must decide antagonisms by
arms, the foremost consideration is no longer "how can I defend
myself ? ' ' but " how can I hit the enemy most severely ? " Attack,
not defence, leads most quickly to the goal.

The best deterrent from war is, moreover, to impress on the
enemy the certainty that he must thereby suffer considerably.

The method adopted by us of creating an efficient battle-fleet,
an engagement with which involved a risk for England, offered not
only the greatest prospect of preventing war, but also, if war could
not be avoided, the best possibility of striking the enemy effectively.
Of the issue of a fleet action it could with certainty be stated that the
resultant damage to the English supremacy at sea would be great
and correspond proportionately with our losses. Whilst we at
need could get over such a sacrifice, it must exercise an intolerable
effect on England, which relied on its sea power alone. How far
these considerations, on which the construction of our Fleet was
based, were recognised as correct on the English side, can be judged
from the tactics of England's Fleet in the world-war, which through-
out the struggle were based on the most anxious efforts to avoid
suffering any real injury.

How our Fleet conducted itself in opposition to this, and
succeeded in making the war at sea an effective menace to England
will be evFdent from the following account of the war.

xiv

PART I

The First Two Years of the War to the
Battle of the Skagerrak

Germany's High Sea Fleet
in the World War

CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

THE visit of an English squadron for the Kiel Week in June,
19 14, seemed to indicate a desire to give visible expression to
the fact that the political situation had eased. Although we could
not suppress a certain feeling of doubt as to the sincerity of their
intentions, everyone on our side displayed the greatest readiness to
receive the foreign guests with hospitality and comradeship.

The opportunity of seeing great English fighting-ships and their
ships' companies at close quarters had become so rare an event that
on this account alone the visit was anticipated with the liveliest
interest. All measures were taken to facilitate the entrance of the
English into Kiel Harbour and make it easy for them to take up
their station and communicate with the shore, and it goes without
saying that they were allotted the best places in the line, close to
the Imperial yacht. Accustomed as we were from early times
to regard the English ships as models, the external appearance of
which alone produced the impression of perfection, it was with a
feeling of pardonable pride that we now had an opportunity of
making comparisons which were not in our disfavour. The English
ships comprised a division of four battleships under the command
of Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, who was flying his flag
in the battleship King George V ., which was accompanied by
Audacious, Ajax, and Centurion, and a squadron of light cruisers,
Southampton, Birmingham, and Nottingham, under Commodore
Goodenough.

While the time of the senior naval officers was fully taken up
with official visits and ceremonies, the juniors largely made use of
the facilities afforded them to visit Hamburg and Berlin by rail.
Friendly relations were soon established between the men, after the

3

Germany's High Sea Fleet

way of seafaring folk, and these were further promoted by games
and festivities to their taste.

The feeling of camaraderie which, as my experience went, had
marked intercourse between German and English naval officers,
as men of similar ways of thought and capacity, up to the year 1895,
had now disappeared as a result of the attitude of hostility
towards our progress which had been displayed by English states-
men, especially in recent years. Every attempt to sham a relation-
ship to which our inmost feelings did not correspond would have
compromised our dignity and lowered us in the eyes of the English.
It is also easy to realise that there could be no question of making
an impression by a full-dress muster of every possible ship. For
this occasion only those of our ships were assembled at Kiel which
were based thereon.

As our Fleet increased, it had become necessary to distribute
the various squadrons between the two main bases, Kiel and
Wilhelmshaven, both with a view to using simultaneously the avail-
able docking facilities and also to keeping the ships' companies in
touch with their nucleus crews on land. The families, too, resided
at the headquarters of these nucleus crews, to which the long-
service men, especially the warrant and petty officers, returned
on receiving a special order and there awaited fresh employment.
The ships spent the unfortunately all too short periods which the
annual training permitted, at their bases.

The disturbing element in this gay and peaceful picture, in which
the only note of rivalry was sounded by competitions in skill in the
realms of sport, was the news of the murder of the Austrian heir,
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Kaiser left Kiel the very
next day and travelled to Berlin. The English ships departed on
June 29, their light cruisers using the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. They
thus had an opportunity of making a close acquaintance with the
new waterway which had only been completed a few weeks before.
Whether it could be also used by our heavy ships was one of their
questions which must be laid to the account of untimely curiosity.
The deepening and widening of the Canal and the construction of
the new locks at the entrances had been completed only just in time.
They had become necessary to permit the passage of the big ships,
the building of which had been imposed upon us by the introduc-
tion of the "Dreadnought" type. The unsuitability of this high-
way for battle-cruisers like the Bliicher and the battleships of the
"Nassau " class had been a matter of much concern to our naval

4

The Outbreak of War

High Command since 1909, on account of the injurious effect on
the strategic situation. It also involved laying an unnecessary
burden on our main base in the North Sea, which could not keep
pace with the growing number of ships assigned to it.

About a week later the Kaiser returned to Kiel, and on July 5
started out for his usual cruise to Norway. As the situation could
by no means be considered reassuring, exhaustive conferences were
held between the Naval authorities in Berlin and the Fleet to discuss
the various contingencies of war. As subsequent events showed,
the most noteworthy of these was the hypothesis that England would
remain neutral in the collision with Russia, and most probably her
Ally, France, with which we were threatened. It was on this account
that the Fleet was allowed to leave for the summer cruise to Norway
at the time provided for in the annual scheme.

This decision, as indeed that of the Kaiser, can only be attri-
buted to carelessness or an intention to show no nervousness. That
intention, in turn, can only have been due to a firm conviction of
England's neutrality.

In the annual scheme the summer cruise represented the high
watermark of the development attained. As a reward for the effort
shown in daily work, the individual training of the ships and the
handling of separate squadrons as well as the whole Fleet, it ended
with a visit to foreign ports instead of a sojourn in our own harbours.

This excursion abroad not only served the purpose of keeping
up interest in the work but also helped us to maintain our political
prestige by showing the flag, especially when an impression of power
was thereby created.

When a single gunboat turned up on a distant shore to show
the German flag there, the foreigner at once professed to regard it
as obvious that this ship was the emissary of the Imperial Govern-
ment which, for the matter of that, had at home an imposing Fleet
and a great Army to secure our position in Europe. A corresponding
display of power on the spot was far more convincing and at the
same time revealed the capabilities of our shipbuilding industry
and refuted the widespread legend that England alone had the best
and largest ships.

In view of the uncertain political situation since the summer of
1909 we had discontinued the practice of sending the whole Fleet,
or substantial parts of it, to great distances such as the Mediter-
ranean, to Spanish or Portuguese harbours, Cape Verde and the
Azores. Thus for our purpose the principal country for us to visit

5

Germany's High Sea Fleet

was Norway, in the numerous fjords of whose coast it was possible
to distribute the ships to the satisfaction of all concerned and avoid
overwhelming the inhabitants with a mass of sailors on leave. The
distribution also made a greater variety of excursions available to
the men, as each ship had its particular place of call.

There had only been one break — in the summer of 1912 — in our
annual visit to the Norwegian coast since 1910. In this year, 1914,
the general political situation required that the visit of the Kaiser
and the Fleet should have its usual objective. A cruise to the coasts
of the eastern Baltic, even a hasty call at our harbours in that region,
does not appear to have been in keeping with the policy we were
pursuing at this critical moment.

With the cruise to Norway we abandoned the chance of sending
our Fleet east and thus bringing pressure to bear on Russia to
induce her to stop her preparations for war. The use of tlhe floating
army, which requires no special mobilisation, is ideal for such a
purpose. In that case Danzig Bay would have offered us a first-
class base, as the larger units could have deployed from there with
extreme ease in contrast to the difficult exits from the estuaries of the
North Sea rivers — the Elbe, Weser, Jade and Ems, while the light
forces attached to the Fleet would have found a fortified base in the
harbour of Neufahrwasser.

How Norway could have been chosen for the goal of our cruise
in the situation at that moment seems incredible and gives one the
impression that we deliberately intended to shut our eyes to the
danger. The chance of appearing with a strong naval force, first
as a demonstration and later in dead earnest, in our eastern waters
was from the start not given the consideration its importance merited.

On July 14 Squadron II, of which I had assumed command at
the beginning of February in the previous year, in succession to
Vice-Admiral von Ingenohl, who had been appointed Commander-
in-Chief of the Fleet, left Kiel Bay to rendezvous off Skagen with
the ships coming from Wilhelmshaven and then carry out extensive
fleet exercises which were principally concerned with the solution
of tactical problems. Through the addition of a third squadron to
the High Sea Fleet these exercises were of particular importance
for this cruise, as this newly-formed third squadron had as yet had
no chance of taking part in combined exercises.

The practical application of theoretical tactics to the circumstances
arising out of battle is inexhaustible and provides fresh material from
year to year.

6

The Outbreak of War

The new squadron required training in that respect. In war
games, indeed, very useful preliminary work can be done in this
department, but that tactical insight which knows how to exploit
a favourable situation is itself first trained on the open sea and in
the last resort it is the sum of the impressions received Which first
enables the commander to come to the right decision in the time
available, which is often only a matter of seconds. For such de-
cisions there are no rules, however valuable certain tactical principles
may be, which have been sanctified by experience.

In the era of sailing ships it was a simple matter, owing to the
slow deployment for battle and the small range of the guns. But
to-day it is altogether different, in view of the great speed of the
ships and the huge range of the guns. The first shells usually
arrive the moment the enemy is seen, and we have known cases in
which the impact of the enemy's projectiles is the first notification
of his being in the vicinity, and he has not become visible until
some time afterwards.

With regard to England, we were faced with a particularly diffi-
cult, indeed almost insoluble problem. We had to deal with our
enemy in such a way as to give greater effect to our smaller calibre
guns at short range and be able to use a torpedo wherever possible.
From the English we had to expect that in view of the greater speed
possessed by their ships of every type and their heavier artillery,
they would select the range that suited them and fight a "holding-
off " action. That, indeed, is exactly what happened in the war.
The necessity of practical training in this department illustrates the
importance of the addition of a third squadron.

Further, Squadron III, comprising our latest battleships, was not
at full strength, but just formed a division consisting of the Prinz
Regent Luitpdld (flagship), and the battleships Kaiser, Kaiserin, and
Konig Albert.- In the course of the winter, beginning at the end
of December, the Kaiser and Konig Albert had been away on a
longish cruise in foreign waters. The ships had paid a visit to our
colonies — the Cameroons and German South- West Africa — visited
the harbours of Brazil and the Argentine, and then passed through
the Straits of Magellan to the west coast of South America and
Chile. The ships had behaved very well on the distant cruise, which
was particularly arduous on account of the long sojourn in the
tropics. In particular, the engine-room personnel had had an
opportunity of becoming thoroughly familiar with the internal
arrangements. On the other hand battle-practice could not be

Germany's High Sea Fleet

carried out to the extent that it was at home, wlhere no diversions
were involved.

At the same time as we were starting on our Scandinavian cruise
the English Fleet had assembled for a great test-mobilisation at
Spithead. It was thus ready and thereafter continued so.

On our way north two French destroyers which we passed on
July 16 so close that we could make out their names — Stilette and
Trombeati— reminded us that the President of the French Republic,
Poincar£, was on his way from Dunkirk to St. Petersburg in the
battleship France, accompanied by the cruiser Jean Bart, and might
pass us at any time. We did not like the prospect of having to
show him the usual courtesies on the high seas — a salute — prescribed
by international usage, so we drew ahead in order to avoid any
chance of a meeting.

Our battle-practice was continued until July 24, on which day
the high cliffs of the Norwegian coast were for the most part
visible, thanks to the clear, fine weather. On July 22 we had
crossed the 60th degree of latitude, which forms the boundary of
home waters, but not for long. We stayed quite a short time in
Norwegian waters, in fact just long enough to allow coaling from
colliers sent to meet us at certain anchorages. My flagship Preussen
and the battleship Schlesien, which together formed one division,
were looked after by the Dutch steamer Willi. The First Division
was in the Nordfjord by Olde, the Second, comprising Hessen and
Lothringen, was also in the Nordfjord, by Sandene, while the other
half of the squadron, the Fourth Division, had called at Molde. In
the same way the battle-cruisers and light cruisers of the Fleet,
as well as the battleships of Squadrons I and II, were distributed
among other inlets, notably the Sogne and Hardanger Fjords. The
very day we left, Saturday, July 25, the news reached us of the
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In view of that we were not at all
surprised to get an order to hold ourselves ready to put to sea
immediately. In the afternoon of the next day, Sunday, we left
for the rendezvous appointed for the whole Fleet, about 250 nautical
miles from the entrance to the Nordfjord.

After the Fleet had assembled the Flag Officers of the squadrons
had a conference on the Fleet-Flagship, at which Admiral von
Ingenohl explained the political situation and the necessity for
our being prepared for tine immediate outbreak of war. He also
told us that England would probably remain neutral. On this
subject we had received a report that King George of England had

8

The Outbreak of War

expressed himself in that sense to Prince Henry of Prussia. Not-
withstanding this, every possible warlike precaution was taken for
the rest of our homeward journey. But the Fleet was divided in
such a way that Squadron I, under the command of Vice-Admiral
von Lans, and comprising the four ships of the " Ostfriesland "
class and the four of the "Nassau" class, with the battle-cruisers,
steamed to Wilhelmshaven through the North Sea, while Squadrons
II and III with the Fleet-Flagship returned to Kiel through the
Kattegat. This distribution of the Fleet is manifest proof of our
confidence that no attack threatened us from the side of England.
It was only in the East that danger was visible, and accordingly it
seemed inadvisable to remove all our big ships from the Baltic.

On July 29 the ships lay in Kiel Harbour and were engaged in
effecting the pre-arranged measures which as a rule precede a regular
mobilisation, measures which were ordered on account of the in-
creasing tension of the political situation.

All our preparations were inspired by the impression tlhat what
we had to face was a war with Russia and France. Fuelling and
taking in supplies took up the whole of July 29. We had not yet
recalled the men on leave, as all hope of the maintenance of peace
had not by any means yet been abandoned. It was only on the
following day tlhat the news became more menacing and England's
attitude more hostile. Squadron III accordingly made preparations
to go through the Canal into the North Sea, while the final steps were
now taken to make the ships ready for the change to battle con-
ditions, which migiht at any time become necessary.

On July 31 the Commander-in-Chief in the Friedrich der Grosse
passed into the Canal on his way to the North Sea. It was obvious
from this step that for us the centre of gravity of the war at sea
now lay in the west. Shortly before his departure I had an inter-
view with Admiral von Ingenohl in which he told me that in case
of war my task with Squadron II would be to deal with Russia.

It is easy to understand that this commission, which put me
in a position to lead and execute the first naval enterprises indepen-
dently, had a great attraction for me. The appointment of a new
Commander-in-Chief for the Baltic in the person of Prince Henry
of Prussia had no material effect on my freedom of action at sea,
once we had set out for enemy waters; and, besides, Prince Henry's
professional knowledge, his whole mode of thought and conception
of responsibility offered a guarantee that his appointment could
only serve a useful purpose. It may here be, said at once that the

9

Germany's High Sea Fleet

royal Commander-in-Chief grasped and carried out in the most
typical fashion the difficult and thankless task of our defensive
operations in the Baltic, for which we disposed of very limited
resources, both as regards numbers and efficiency, after England
had appeared on the scene as the principal enemy. A Russian
invasion like that of East Prussia, which might easily have been
followed by another from the sea, and would have meant the total
destruction of numerous important and beautiful places on the Baltic
coast, was spared us.

But our hopes of an independent Baltic operation were destroyed
the very same day by the order to Squadron II to follow the others
immediately to the North Sea. The High Sea Fleet was accordingly
concentrated in the Jade on August i and at 8 o'clock in the evening
the mobilisation order arrived, which was greeted by the crews of
the ships with loud cheers.

Meanwhile, opinion had veered round completely as to the prob-
able attitude of England, and it was accepted as certain in the
Fleet that she would join the two opponents with whom we had
alone been concerned at the outset. This view corresponded to the
temper prevailing in the Fleet. We were fully aware of the serious-
ness of the situation, and that we should now be faced with a contest
in which an honourable defeat might well be our only prospect.
But nowhere was there the slightest sign of despondency over the
enemy's overwhelming superiority, but rather a burning enthusiasm
and lust of battle, worked up by the feeling of indignation at the
oppression which that superiority had meant, and the conviction
that our duty was now to put in our last ounce of strength lest we
leave the Fatherland in the lurch. The crews needed no special
exhortation to give of their best, for the joy of battle shone in their
eyes. The leaders, calmly weighing up the prospects of battle,
could only feel that the men's confidence in victory encouraged them
to dare to the uttermost. The whole service was carried away by
the feeling that we were under a duty to fulfil the expectations to
which expression had many a time been given in peace.

During its history of barely more than fifty years, the Prussian
and German Fleet had not been permitted an opportunity of match-
ing itself in a serious campaign with European opponents of equal
standing, apart from individual affairs which justified the brightest
hopes. Our ships had shown what they could do mainly in co-
operating in the acquisition of our colonial possessions or maintain-
ing respect for and upholding the prestige of the German flag against

10

The Outbreak of War

the encroachments of half-civilised or savage races. We had no
personal experience of commanding and handling in battle the big-
ships which had recently come into existence. Nor, for the matter of
that, had our most important opponent at sea, England.

The English Fleet had the advantage of looking back on a
hundred years of proud tradition which must have given every man
a sense of superiority based on the great deeds of the past. This
could only be strengthened by the sight of their huge fleet, each unit
of which in every class was supposed to represent the last word in
the art of marine construction. The feeling was also supported
by the British sailor's perfect familiarity with the sea and with
conditions of life on board ship, a familiarity which took for granted
all the hardships inseparable from his rough calling.

In our Fleet reigned a passionate determination not to fall behind
our comrades of the Army, and a burning desire to lay the founda-
tion-stone of a glorious tradition. Our advantage was that we had
to establish our reputation with the nation, while the enemy had
to defend his. We were urged on by the impulse to dare all,
while he had to be careful that he did not prejudice his ancient
fame.

There was only one opinion among us, from the Commander-
in-Chief down to the latest recruit, about the attitude of the English
Fleet. We were convinced that it would seek out and attack our
Fleet the minute it showed itself and wherever it was. This could
be accepted as certain from all the lessons of English naval history,
and the view was reinforced by the statement, so often made on the
English side, that the boundaries of the operations of their fleet lay
on the enemy's coasts. It was also confirmed by an earlier remark
of the Civil Lord, Lee : " If it ever comes to war with Germany the
nation will wake up one morning and find that it has possessed a
fleet." All this pointed to the intention of making a quick and
thorough job of it.

Right up to the last moment in which there was the remotest
possibility of keeping England out of the war everything was
avoided which could have provided a superficial excuse for the exist-
ence of a crisis. The Heligoland Bight was left open to traffic so
far as it was not commanded by the guns on the Island ; elsewhere
there were none which had a sufficient range to stop traffic. We had
never regarded it as possible that the English Fleet would be held
back from battle and, as a "fleet in being," be restricted solely to
blockading us from a distance, thereby itself running no risks.

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The test mobilisation to which I have already referred and the
advanced stage of preparation thus involved also seemed to indicate
that offensive operations were to be expected immediately. This
mobilisation at the same time afforded a proof of the resolve of
the English Government not to be afraid of increasing the existing
tension, and to add the weight of their Fleet, fully prepared for
war, to the concentration of the Russian armies.

CHAPTER II
RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

OUR High Sea Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea. Since
February, 1913, it had been under the command of Admiral von
Ingenohl, who was flying his flag in the battleship Friedrich der
Grosse. The High Sea Fleet was composed of three squadrons,
cruisers and destroyers :

SQUADRON I

Vice-Admiral von Lans (In Command).
Rear-Admiral Gaedecke (Second in Command).

Battleships

Ostfriesland. Thuringen. Helgoland. Oldenburg.

Posen. Rheinland. Nassau. Westfalen.

SQUADRON II

Vice-Admiral Scheer (In Command).
Commodore Mauve (Second in Command).

Battleships

Preussen. Schlesien. Hessen. Lothringen. Hannover.

Schleswig-Holstein. Pommern. Deutschland.

SQUADRON III
Rear-Admiral Funke (In Command).

Battleships
Kaiser. Kaiserin. Kb'nig 'Albert. Prinz Regent Luitpold.

Cruisers

Rear-Admiral Hipper (In Command).

Rear-Admiral Maass (Second in Command).

Rear-Admiral Tapken.

*3

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Battle-Cruisers
Seydlitz. Moltke. Von der Tann.

Light Cruisers.
Koln. Mainz. Stralsund. Kolberg. Rostock,

Strassburg.

Seven Destroyer Flotillas

(In peace these were only occasionally under the orders of the High

Sea Fleet.)

Tenders
Hela (small cruiser of no fighting value). Pfeil. Blitz.

At this point I must say something about the organisation of
the Fleet in order to present a picture of its fighting value. As is
well known, our Navy Bills had provided for a total of 41 battle-
ships, 20 battle-cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 12 destroyer flotillas and
4 submarine flotillas. This fleet was divided into the Home Fleet and
the Foreign Fleet. The nucleus of the Home Fleet was the High
Sea Fleet which was principally concerned with preparing itself for
battle in case of war. In order to devote ourselves wholly to that
purpose and be in a condition to be sent wherever required — that
is, be permanently mobile — it was relieved of all other tasks and
these were assigned to special ships (Training, Gunnery, and
Specialist). The result of this was that a continuously high standard
of preparedness in battle-practice was not to be attained under our
system because every year a portion of each crew went to the Reserve
and had to be replaced by recruits who for the most part came to
the sea service as utter novices. The most varied efforts to tide
over the period of weakness that was thus involved every autumn
had hitherto led to no conclusive results. From our point of view
the fact that this war broke out in summer was thus peculiarly
unfavourable. The training, gunnery and specialist ships were
used for the education of the rising generation of 'officers and
embryo officers (cadets and midshipmen) and the training of gun-
nery, torpedo, and mine specialists, as well as coast survey and
fishery protection. As a rule, these duties were assigned to older
ships which were no longer fit to take their place in the first battle
line. For example, the old armoured cruisers Herta, Hansa, Freya,

x 4

Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

Vineta, and Viktoria Luise were employed as training ships. It
had not been found possible to avoid calling on the modern ships
for the special purpose of gunnery and torpedo practice, although
the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was very reluctant to part with
them because the training of these ships for war purposes was
limited to a very short period of the year. Our weakness in cruisers
with the High Sea Fleet — for the requirements of foreign stations
had to be satisfied as well — was particularly deplorable. We had
abroad a cruiser squadron in Eastern Asia and two cruisers (Goeben
and Breslau) in the Mediterranean, in addition to a few old gun-
boats stationed permanently at various places. The cruiser squadron
under Count Spee consisted of the two battle-cruisers Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau, and the light cruisers Niimberg, Emden,
Dresden, and Leipzig. In this connection importance was attached
to sending the best that we had in the way of light cruisers to foreign
seas. As regards battle-cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which
were a match for any pre-Dreadnought cruiser, had to suffice, while
we had only three battle-cruisers in home waters, as Goeben was in
the Mediterranean, and Derfflinger and Liitzow were not yet ready.
Another battle-cruiser, Bliicher, was being employed in gunnery
practice. With her twelve 21-cm. guns and the speed of 25 knots,
she was considerably inferior in fighting value to the first of the
English battle-cruisers of the "Invincible " class, which dated from
two years later and carried eight 30.5-cm. guns.

Besides the ships commissioned for training and experimental
purposes there were a certain number of other ships in home waters
which, as provided by the Navy Bills, were to form the Reserve
Fleet. As the provisions of the Navy Bills had not yet been worked
out, of these formations only a nucleus in the shape of the battleship
Wittelsbach could be kept permanently in commission. Another ship
of the same class, the Wettin, was used as a gunnery training school,
while the rest were docked and received only as much attention as
was required to keep their engines, structure, and armaments in
proper condition.

On mobilisation, all training and experimental ships stopped
their work and passed under the command of the High Sea Fleet.
Out of the ships in reserve in dock, Squadrons IV, V and VI were
formed. The battleships of the "Wittelsbach " class formed
Squadron IV under the former Inspector of Gunnery, Vice-Admiral
Ehrhard Schmidt ; the ships of the older " Kaiser " class made up
Squadron V (Vice-Admiral Grepow); while the old coast defence

J 5

Germany's High Sea Fleet

cruisers of the " Siegfried " class formed Squadron VI (Rear-Admiral
Eckermann).

Thanks to careful preparation, the ships were put on a war foot-
ing without the slightest hitch. Of course, it took some further
time before the ships' companies of Squadrons IV, V, and VI were
so advanced in training, either as individual units or in combina-
tion, that they could be used for war purposes. With a view to
increasing the peace establishment, the crews of the High Sea Fleet
received on mobilisation an extra quota of men, who joined the ships
in the first days and were a very welcome reinforcement.

While steaming at full speed was seldom permitted in peace
time, in order to economise coal and save the engines, in war a
ship must be in a condition, as soon as she gets to sea, to develop
the utmost capacity of her engines, and so all the boilers must be
used continuously. With a crew of about a thousand men, which
is normal for battleships and battle-cruisers, it is essential to make
allowance for a certain percentage of sick and other casualties. Such
deficiencies were made good by the mobilisation "supplement,"
which amounted to about 10 per cent, of the peace establishment.
As the war proceeded, the system proved its usefulness by enabling
us to let the men go on leave without lowering the standard of the
ships' readiness for battle to a disadvantageous degree. The rein-
forcement was particularly important to the battle-cruisers, which,
in view of their enormous consumption of coal in order to attain
the very highest speed, were not in a position, with the engine-room
complement allowed by establishment, to bring the coal from the. more
distant bunkers to the stokehold, so that help had to be requisi-
tioned from the sailors. As far as possible, the bunkers in the
immediate vicinity of the stokehold were left untouched, in readiness
for action, when not a man on board could be spared from his action
station.

The system of command is a question of special importance to
the organisation of a navy. The bulk of the ships in home waters
were under the command of a single authority, the Commander-in-
Chief of the High Sea Fleet. Of course, the ships at distant
stations abroad could not be under his command, and certain ships
in home waters, operating in a theatre which had no absolutely
direct connection with the operations in the main theatre, had a
Commander-in-Chief of their own. The number of ships combined
under one command must not be so large that their commander
cannot control and lead them in action, for one of the most material

16

Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

differences between fighting on land and at sea is that in the latter
case the commander himself goes into the firing line. But com-
mand goes hand in hand with responsibility for the execution of
all plans, and it was therefore a doubtful policy to establish an
authority above the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet who had the
most important forces under his command. In view of the pecu-
liarities of naval warfare, the higher authority cannot be in a position
to settle beforehand the details of time and method of any particular
enterprise which has been decided upon, in the same way as this is
both possible and essential for the command of operations on land.
However, the demands of the various theatres in which fighting
took place in this war made some central authority necessary which
could distribute the number of ships required for all purposes, and
which could also have strong influence on the conduct of operations
in the individual theatres. The authority for this purpose was the
Naval Staff, in which the preliminary work on the plan of operations
had already been done. The Chief of the Naval Staff had the duty
of laying the proposed orders for the operations before the Supreme
War Lord, to whom the Constitution gave the supreme command
over all our forces on land and sea. After these orders had received
the Imperial approval, the Chief of the Naval Staff had to transmit
them to the Fleet.

The functions of the Naval Staff assumed particular importance
in this war, in which the closest co-operation of the Fleet and Army
for the common end was of quite special importance. The develop-
ment of the Navy, which had grown to the status of a great war
machine in the last decades, had not, however, admitted of the
simultaneous satisfaction of the requirements in personnel which
made themselves felt in all quarters. The working of the Naval
Staff had suffered from this cause in peace time and it produced
its effect in war. In peace the influence of the State Secretary of
the Imperial Naval Administration was paramount, especially when
that office was held by a personality like Grand Admiral von Tirpitz,
who by his outstanding abilities had gained an influence which
no naval officer had ever before exercised in the history of our Navy.
In war, on the other hand, he had no direct influence on the conduct
of operations.

The development of our Navy had not taken place without
numerous differences of opinion about the best method of its con-
struction. At the front and in the Naval Staff the principal require-
ment was considered to be that the existing Fleet should be so
c 37

Germany's High Sea Fleet

complete in all its details, and therefore so ready for war, that all
differences would be made good. The Secretary of State, on the
other hand, who had a great programme in mind and steadily pur-
sued its realisation, attached more importance to having all the
essential elements ready, and as regards secondary matters, trusting
more or less to improvisation if war came before the final develop-
ment of the Fleet had been realised. He accordingly promoted the
construction of battleships and destroyers primarily, bearing in
mind the root principle from which our Navy Bills had sprung, that
with the Fleet we should create a weapon which should be strong
enough to fight against a superior hostile fleet. The course of the
war has proved the soundness of that principle.

Only in one material point were our strategical views based on
an assumption which proved unfounded, the assumption that the
English Fleet, which had kept ahead of ours in its construction at
every stage, would seek battle in the German Bight in the North
Sea, or would force its way to wherever it hoped to find the German
Fleet. On that account we had attached particular importance to
the greatest defensive and offensive powers, and considered we might
regard speed and radius of action as secondary matters. The dif-
ference between our type of ships and that of the English shows
that in both Fleets strategic ideas governed the method of con-
struction. The English were content with less armour, but attached
importance to higher speed and the largest possible calibre of gun
so that they could impose on their opponent their own choice of
battle area.

Side by side with the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea
Fleet a special command was introduced for the Baltic forces. The
commanders of ships in foreign waters! were of course independent
and received their orders through the Chief of the Naval Staff, whose
co-operation in the business of procuring coal and supplies for the
conduct of cruiser warfare could not be dispensed with.

Thus for the first time in German history sea power also was
to play a mighty part in the great fight for existence with which
our nation was faced. As regards the handling of our Fleet, we
had not only to consider how we could bring about the most favour-
able opportunity of winning the victory, but also what tasks, within
the framework of the combined operations, fell to our share. The
strategical plans of the Army had a decisive influence on the
functions of the Fleet. The Navy had the duty of supporting the
Army in its uphill task of fighting a superior enemy on two fronts

18

Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

in such a way that its rear was unconditionally secured against any
danger threatening from the north. So long as it was only a
question of fighting the Dual Alliance the Army was relieved of all
anxiety from that direction, as the Fleet was quite equal to its task.
The Army had made its plans in such a way that victory could be
expected from an offensive, and the full weight of that offensive
would at first be directed to one spot. It followed from this that
at the outset a defensive attitude would be adopted on the other
front, and all preparations for defence would have to be made in
that quarter.

The third front, the sea front, acquired a special importance
when England joined the ranks of our opponents. But so far as
can be seen from the course of the war no material change was made
in the fundamental principles underlying our strategic operations
on land. As I was then only holding the position of commander of
a squadron, I did not know whether, in view of the increasing
hostility of England, the idea was considered of adopting a fresh
joint plan of operations for the Army and the Fleet, which would
be based on the notion of improving our defensive prospects against
England. This could have been obtained by the speediest possible
acquisition of the sector of the French coast which commanded the
Dover-Calais line. In this way the English cross-Channel transport
service, as well as the trade routes to the Thames, would have been
seriously threatened. If only we had realised from the start that
the influence of England's sea power on the course of the war would
be as great as it turned out to be later, to our disadvantage, a higher
importance would have been attached to this question at the outset.
As it happened, the course of the campaign in France forced us into
a position in which we were nothing but the flank protection of the
right wing of our Army which stretched to the sea and therefore
brought us the Flemish coast as our starting point, though nothing
like so valuable, for attacks against England. The Navy had to
spring into the breach and take up the defence against English
sea power. It appeared obvious that the entry of England into the
ranks of our enemies would not divert the Army from its task. The
Army considered it much more obvious that the Navy should support
it by hindering the passage of transports across the Channel.

The protection of these transports was one of the principal
functions of the English Fleet. We could only interfere with it
at the price of a decisive battle with the English Fleet, and even if
the encounter took a favourable course there was no guarantee that

19

Germany's High Sea Fleet

we should attain our end of permanently and effectively interrupting
supplies from overseas. We shall have to go into the feasibility
of such plans at a later stage.

Even without the inauguration of a comprehensive and detailed
plan of operations for the Army and Navy the military situation
required that the movements of the Navy should be adapted to
the progress of the Army's operations lest the failure of some naval
undertaking should put the Army in the dilemma of having to
relax its own offensive or perhaps break it off altogether.

The enemy, too, cannot have failed to realise the importance of
the German Fleet for a favourable development of the war on land.
If the enemy ever succeeded in securing the command of the Baltic
and landing Russian troops on the coast of Pomerania our Eastern
front must have collapsed altogether and brought to naught our
plan of campaign, which consisted of a defensive attitude in the East
and the rapid overthrow of the French Army. The command of
the Baltic rested on the power of the German Fleet. If we had
destroyed the Russian Fleet our danger from the Baltic would by
no means have been eliminated, as a landing could have been carried
out just as easily under the protection of English naval forces if
the German Fleet no longer existed to hinder it. For such a pur-
pose the English Fleet had no need to venture into the Baltic itself.
They had it in their power to compel us to meet them in the
North Sea immediately they made an attack upon our coast. In
view of such an eventuality we must not weaken ourselves per-
manently, as we could not help doing if we attempted to eliminate
the danger which the Russian Fleet represented for us in the
Baltic.

It was all the more probable that the English Fleet would attack
because the combined enemy fleets would then have a free hand
against our coasts. It was improbable that England would seek
battle with the German Fleet — which she was bound to regard as her
primary naval objective — in the Baltic where all the advantages were
on our side.

For this reason the concentration area of our Fleet mas the North
Sea. It was from there that we could threaten the east coast of
England and therefore tie up the English Fleet in the North Sea.
We could always deal in time (by using the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal)
with any attempt of the English to penetrate into the Baltic. At the
outset somewhat weak observation forces had to suffice against the
Russians, and these forces had to try to intimidate the Russians

20

Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

into the same course of action by adopting offensive methods
wherever possible. Mines could do us good service in that respect.
This method of intimidation, however, could only be effective so
long as we could still employ a superior force against the Russians,
and we should abandon that superiority out of hand if we attempted
to seek battle with the English Fleet under unfavourable circum-
stances, because, to say the least of it, the result was doubtful. In
view of the high state of preparedness and the superiority of the
English Fleet probabilities pointed to a failure for us which would
have a fateful effect on the final result of the war.

Apart from the fact that these considerations urged caution,
at the beginning of the war we were without any certain data as
to the whereabouts of the English Fleet, and could only acquire
some by observation of the movements of the enemy. We had to
expect an attack in the greatest possible strength because our un-
favourable strategic situation, which was due to the geographical
formation of the North Sea theatre, put us at a disadvantage at the
outset. Our position in the North Sea suffered from the fact that
for any enterprise we had only one point of exit : in that far corner
which faces the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. From it alone
could the Fleet emerge for an attack, and to it must return again
to seek the shelter of our bases in the estuaries of the Jade and Elbe.
The route round Skagen and the Belt was closed to us, as the Danes
had laid minefields in these waters. The sides of the "Wet
Triangle," the apex of which can be imagined at Heligoland,
ended at Sylt in the north and the mouth of the Ems in the west.
The left bank of the Ems is in Dutch, and therefore neutral,
territory. All movements of ships there could accordingly be
observed and the observation brought to the knowledge of the enemy
in the shortest time. The channel at Sylt is navigable solely for
destroyers and light cruisers, and then only in favourable conditions
of wind and tide.

On the other hand, the east coast of England offered a whole
series of safe anchorages for large ships, indeed for the whole Fleet.
As appears from the map, the English coast takes a westerly
direction the farther north it gets, so that on our attacks against
the northern bases our distance from home is increased, to the great
advantage of the enemy.

While we could be taken in flank from the south if we attacked
the English Fleet, thinking it to be in the north, and taken in the
flank from the north if we made our attack in the south, the English

21

Germany's High Sea Fleet

were in the favourable position that as they approached our coast
they need expect danger from only one quarter immediately ahead,
the German Bight. They could send out submarines against the
one base from which we should have to emerge, to do us all the
damage they could on our way out and home, and need only keep
that one point under observation. That relieved them of the
obligation of detaching special observation forces.

THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET *

FLAGSHIP

Iron Duke.

FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

Marlborough. St. Vincent. Colossus. Hercules.

Neptune. Vanguard. Collingwood. Superb.

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

King George V. Orion. Ajax. Audacious. Centurion.

Conqueror. Monarch. Thunderer.

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

King Edward VII. Hibernia. Commonwealth. Zealandia.

Dominion. Africa. Britannia. Hindustan.

FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Battleships

Dreadnought. Temeraire. Bellerophon. Agincourt. Erin.

Queen Elizabeth. War spite. Valiant. Barham.

, * T he Third Battle Squadron oonsisted of ships of the pre-Dreadnoueht period
TJ 1 ^' Second «rt Fourth Battle Squadrons of « Dreadnought^ In Ihe Four*
Battle Sqvadron the ships from the Agincourt onwards were not ready for sea at the

ou t Dr63.ii (X W5.r,

22

Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

FIRST BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON
Battle-Cruisers .
Lion. Princess Royal. Queen Mary. New Zealand.

Invincible. Inflexible. Indomitable. Indefatigable.

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON.

Shannon. Achilles. Cochrane. Natal.

THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON.

Antrim. Argyll. Devonshire. Roxburgh.

FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON.

Southampton. Birmingham. Nottingham. Lowestoft.
Destroyer Flotillas (number and composition unknown).

The above ships formed The Grand Fleet under the command
of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

THE SECOND BRITISH FLEET.

Flagship.

Lord Nelson.

FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON.

Battleships.

Prince of Wales. Agamemnon. Bulwark. Formidable.

Implacable. Irresistible. London. Queen.

Venerable.

SIXTH BATTLE SQUADRON.

Battleships.

Russell. Cornwallis. Albemarle. Duncan. Exmouth.

Vengeance.

FIFTH CRUISER SQUADRON.

Light Cruisers.

Carnarvon. Falmouth. Liverpool.

2 3

Germany's High Sea Fleet

SIXTH CRUISER SQUADRON.

Drake. Good Hope. King Alfred. Leviathan.

THE THIRD BRITISH FLEET.

Seventh Battle Squadron.

Eighth Battle Squadron.

Eight ships of the "Majestic " class.

Six ships of the "Canopus " class.

Seventh Cruiser Squadron.

Ninth Cruiser Squadron.

Tenth Cruiser Squadron.
Eleventh Cruiser Squadron.
Twelfth Cruiser Squadron.

They comprised older cruisers, such as :

Cressy.

Aboukir.

Hogue. Hawke.

Theseus.

Crescent.

Edgar.

Endymion. Gibraltar.
Royal Arthur.

Grafton.

The Second and Third British Fleets were combined into the
Channel Fleet under a special Commander-in-Chief.

With these enormous forces England was certainly in a position
to make us feel the weight of her sea power. The most effective
method of doing so would be the destruction of our Fleet. This
was also the view of the English Commander-in-Chief at that time,
who put it in these words :

"The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest
manner by destroying the enemy's armed naval forces, and this is
therefore the first objective of our Fleet. The Fleet exists to achieve
victory."*

The English Fleet did not live up to these proud words, in spite
of its strength and the geographical position. Yet our belief that

* In the book published in January, 1919, " The Grand Fleet, 1914-16," by
Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, the tasks of the British Fleet were set out as
follows : (1) To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the seas, this being vital to
the existence of an island nation, particularly one which is not self-supporting in
regard to food. (2) In the event of war to bring steady economic pressure to bear
on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus compelling him to accept
peace. (3) Similarly, in the event of war, to cover the passage and assist any army
sent overseas and to protect its communications and supplies. (4) To prevent invasion
of this country and its overseas dominions by enemy forces.

24

Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

it would act thus was thoroughly justified, and we had to decide
our attitude accordingly.

In the War Orders which were issued to the Commander-in-
Chief of the High Sea Fleet the task before him was framed as
follows : The objective of the operations must be to damage the
English Fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged
in watching and blockading the German Bight, as well as by
mine-laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever
possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a
result of these operations, and all our forces had been got ready
and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our Fleet to seek
battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy. Of course,
if a favourable occasion for battle presented itself before, it must
be exploited. Further, operations against enemy merchant ships
were to be conducted in accordance with Prize Court regulations,
and the ships appointed to carry out such operations in foreign
waters were to be sent out as soon as possible.

The order underlying this plan of campaign was this : The
Fleet must strike when the circumstances are favourable; it must
therefore seek battle with the English Fleet only when a state of
equality has been achieved by the methods of guerilla warfare.

It thus left the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet free-
dom of action to exploit any favourable opportunity and put no
obstacles in his way, but it required of him that he should not
risk the whole Fleet in battle until there was a probability of victory.
Moreover, it started from the assumption that opportunities would
arise of doing the enemy damage when, as was to be expected,
he initiated a blockade of the German Bight which was in accord-
ance with the rules of International Law. It is also to be emphasised
that a submarine offensive was only required "whenever possible."
The achievements of our U-boats absolutely exceeded all expecta-
tions, thanks to the energy with which the command faced the most
difficult problem and the resolution of the commanders and crews,
on their own initiative, to do more than was required of them.

As regards operations in the Baltic, the War Orders to the
Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet contained no instruc-
tions, as a special Commander-in-Chief had been appointed for
this area. If the English Fleet tried to carry the war into the
Baltic, the condition precedent (a favourable opportunity for attack)
laid down in the War Orders to the High Sea Fleet would materialise
in the simplest fashion.

25

CHAPTER III
AWAITING THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE

ON August 2 the Commander-in-Chief had summoned all the
commanders of the three battleship squadrons, cruisers, de-
stroyers and submarines to the flagship, and there explained to them
the task set in the War Orders and his intentions with regard to it.
Instructions had just been received from the Naval Staff that on
the express wish of the Foreign Office no hostile action should be
taken against English warships and merchant ships, as all hope of
England's neutrality had not yet been abandoned. In his desire
to keep England out of the war the Imperial Chancellor had gone
so far as to enter into an obligation, through our ambassador in
London, not to conduct operations in the Channel or against the
north coast of France if England remained neutral. In this way
she would be released from her own obligation to protect the north
coast of France with the English Fleet. The same day, however,
we received subsequent instructions that the English cable com-
munications with the Continent had been broken off, and that we
had to anticipate hostile action on the part of England.

How universal was the conviction that the English Navy would
immediately take the offensive is illustrated by the fact that after
the conference with the Commander-in-Chief the Commander of
Squadron I advised me very strongly to take Squadron II to the
Elbe during the night, instead of waiting till next morning as had
been arranged, as otherwise we might arrive too late. However,
we adhered to the original decision to take up the anchorage
appointed for us in the Elbe the next day (August 3), and, as the
necessary precautions were taken by sending a mine-sweeping
division ahead, the movement was carried out without any mishap.

To take up its anchorage in the Altenbruch Roads, between
Cuxhaven and Brunsbuttel, Squadron II had to pass through the
minefield which had meanwhile been laid at the mouth of the
Elbe. In this river there was a dangerous congestion of vessels
which were trying to get out as fast as they could. Among them
were some English steamers which would not pay attention to

26

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

the warnings of the pilot ship, so that there was a dangerous crush
in this difficult and narrow channel. The English steamer Wilfred
paid for its temerity by running on the mines and was sunk by two
explosions following closely on each other. We thus had an
opportunity of observing a practical demonstration of the effect of
mines. After this occurrence the Commandant of the fortress of
Cuxhaven, who was responsible for the security of the estuary,
gave orders that all ships were to be sent back to Hamburg so that
their knowledge of the position of the minefield should not be turned
to the advantage of the enemy.

The next day brought us the English declaration of war. A
few hours later the first English submarine was reported in the
German Bight. The security of the Heligoland Bight required
prompt information of the enemy's intentions so that we could meet
him in strength with our naval forces without ourselves suffering
from the enemy's counter-measures on our way out. This object
could be attained by submarines or mine-layers of which the latter
could slip out under cover of darkness and sow the exits from the
estuaries with mines. We had also to expect that floating mines
would be sown in the mouths of the rivers with a view to their drifting
up stream with the tide and endangering our ships lying at anchor.
We knew of one type of English mine which drifted with the rising
tide only, sank to the bottom when the tide ebbed and then rose
again and floated farther up stream. Mines of this kind would have
been able to get much farther — in fact to the anchorage of our ships
— instead of drifting backwards and forwards in a limited area
through the action of ebb and flow, and thereby being stranded in
due course.

We had also to anticipate that enemy submarines would penetrate
into the rivers. Although the depth of water was not great the
passage of submarines, when submerged, was by no means im-
possible. It was only later, when the depth charge had been evolved,
that submarines needed greater depth to escape their effect. Even
if the enemy shrank somewhat from such venturesome enterprises
as these, it was enough for him to haunt the neighbourhood of the
estuaries to operate against our big ships the moment we attempted
to gain the open sea.

It is true that we had two types of protection against these
dangerous possibilities; first, the initiation of technical defence
measures such as mines, nets and so forth, and secondly, the
sharpest lookout on the part of the ships engaged in observation

27

Germany's High Sea Fleet

duties. If the enemy tried to bring on an action in the neighbour-
hood of Heligoland — and we assumed he would — we suffered from
the outset under a disadvantage if we had to deploy for it out of
the estuaries. The narrow exits from the Elbe and the Jade
prescribed the line of deployment and compelled the ships to follow
in line ahead, a formation which provides splendid opportunities
for lurking submarines. For this reason prompt knowledge of the
enemy's approach as well as his strength was of particular importance
in enabling us to go out and meet him in the open sea with the
necesary forces. In the first days of August we attained such a
state of preparedness that all the big ships were kept under steam
all day, ready to weigh anchor at any moment. We could not
concentrate in the outer roads because the submarine obstructions
had not yet been laid.

The time from the receipt of a report about the enemy to the
issue of the appropriate orders, and then again from the first
execution of those orders to the arrival at the appointed rendezvous
at sea, was not inconsiderable. According to the state of readiness
of the ships and the choice of anchorage it might take hours, during
which the enemy would continue his approach unimpeded. Thus
arose the necessity of getting the report as soon as possible. But
the greater the distance from Heligoland of the arc which had to
be covered by our reconnaissance and observation patrols, the less
carefully could it be watched. The greater distance either demanded
more ships or involved less reliable information when the line was
held too thinly.

The use of wireless telegraphy came in extraordinarily handy
for intelligence purposes. Unfortunately a large number of the
older destroyers which had now been attached to the mine-sweeping
division had not yet been fitted with this highly ingenious piece of
equipment. The result was that in certain circumstances very
valuable time might be lost.

The establishment of a protective system was entrusted to the
Commander of the scouting forces, Vice-Admiral Hipper, and all
the destroyer flotillas, U-boats, mine-sweeping divisions, aero-
planes and airships were placed under his orders. From these
forces a protective zone was formed which by day consisted of
several circles at varying distances from the lightship "Elbe I."
The outermost line, 35 nautical miles (of 1,852 metres) was
held by destroyers. Six nautical miles behind there were
submarines, and a further six miles back the inmost line was

28

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

patrolled by mine-sweeping divisions. Two to four light cruisers
were distributed behind the two wings of this protective zone, east
and south of Heligoland. At night the U-boats and the destroyers
on the outermost line were withdrawn, and only the inner one was
held. The result of this was that we had all the more destroyers at
hand for nocturnal enterprises.

This whole system, however, was more useful for protection
than for reconnoitring. It did not extend far enough for the latter
purpose. Even if the approach of serious enemy forces at a distance
of fifteen miles was reported from the outermost line, these ships,
by steaming at full speed, could be within range of the fortress
of Heligoland in about an hour and a half. In that time only the
ships lying in the outer Jade could gain the open sea. The ships
lying in the Elbe at Cuxhaven or in the Wilhelmshaven Roads in the
Jade needed longer. If we had depended on this system alone we
should have found ourselves in the condition either of being
surprised by the enemy and having to meet him in insufficient
strength, or having to keep the whole Fleet in a perpetual state of
readiness. The latter alternative was impossible in the long run.
The duties of the destroyers and cruisers in the protective zone and
the necessity of relieving them every few days (for the strain of this
anxious service on the personnel at sea would otherwise have worn
them out) absorbed such a large force of light units that their princi-
pal task of seeking out and attacking the enemy far away in the North
Sea before he got to close quarters with us was seriously affected.

Our commanders were therefore faced with a many-sided problem
which was made more difficult by the limited resources at our
disposal : to avoid any chance of surprise, to prevent the safety
of the Bight being endangered by mines or submarines in such a
way that the Fleet would not have the necessary freedom of move-
ment to get out of harbour, and finally to seek out the enemy
himself in the North Sea and do him as much damage as possible
by guerilla operations. It was, therefore, a very proper decision
to entrust all these tasks to one commander who had to make his
dispositions with an eye to wind and weather, breakdowns, injuries
and the absences these involve, and question of coaling, as well as
the multifarious duties laid upon him. In view of the relatively little
bunker capacity of the smaller ships, it was continuously necessary to
replenish supplies. Their ships' companies also suffered from heavy
weather far more than those of the big ships, and therefore required
relief sooner.

29

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Nor was it a simple matter .to regulate the system of transmission
of orders and intelligence by wireless in such a way as to be certain
of getting messages accurately and promptly, and avoiding confu-
sion through the operations of other stations, especially such as were
in a different sphere of command.

In our situation aeroplanes and airships played a particularly
important part. Unfortunately, their number was very small at the
start. Heligoland was fitted up as an aviation station, but at first
disposed of only five aeroplanes. The number was subsequently
increased to eight. In the early days we had only the one airship,
"L 3," for distance reconnaissance. The most zealous efforts were
made to cruise in all kinds of weather, and so praiseworthy was
the persistence shown that these cruises often extended to within sight
of the Norwegian coast.

Side by side with the organisation of the protective zone, the
organisation of the defences of the North Sea islands, the most
important of which was Heligoland, was completed under the direc-
tion of the Headquarters of the North Sea Naval Stations, Vice-
Admiral von Krosigk, at Wilhelmshaven. It was also the duty of
this authority to carry out the evacuation of the native population,
who did not at all like leaving their island, and arranging their
transfer to the mainland. They had been previously prepared for this
eventuality, and their transport presented no special difficulties.
The establishment of minefields and the substitution of buoys to
mark the war channels for those of the peace-time channels was
also the business of the Naval Stations Headquarters.

Another of its duties was the removal of landmarks which could
be seen far out to sea, and would thus be known to the enemy and
might enable him to find his bearings.

One victim of this bitter necessity was the venerable old church
tower of Wangeroog, the island adjacent to the Jade channel. From
time immemorial it had been an object of affectionate familiarify to
seafarers. It had stood so long that the whole island had
gradually slid past beneath its feet, in consequence of the movement
from west to east which is peculiar to the sands of the North Sea.
It was now so close to the west side of the island that its walls were
washed by the waves.

Harbour flotillas were formed to watch the minefields and guard
the entrances to our own rivers. These flotillas were within the
sphere of action of the fortresses, and therefore were likewise under
the command of the Naval Stations Headquarters. The release of the

30

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

Fleet from such duties definitely proved a sound idea, and thanks
to the understanding and co-operation of all services, all further
requirements which cropped up as time went by were generously
met.

The organisation of the lightship system was of great import-
ance. As soon as war threatened, all the lights in the lightships
were extinguished, and the light-buoys removed, so that the whole
coast was in darkness. It was impossible to do without lights
at night altogether when cruising by the dangerous North Sea coast
and navigating the strong current off the mouths of the Elbe, Weser
and Ems. Further, lights that were easily recognisable had to be
shown to indicate the position of the minefields and the channels
through them. Yet in spite of the difficulties of navigation, dark-
ness had the immense advantage that it enabled us to slip out un-
noticed, and therefore without great risk, so that night time was
preferred for such operations. Of course, the lights must not be
shown a moment longer than was necessary for the purposes of
navigation. Further, it must be possible for incoming ships to
show their lights and be safe against any tricks on the part of the
enemy. The main thing was that the light should be shown
exactly at the right moment. The outer lightships at the mouths
of the Jade and Elbe, which also served as observation stations and
had military personnel, certainly had no easy task in the long and
stormy nights of the four and a half years' war. We depended on
their reliability just as much as on that of all the other posts which
existed to assist the navigation of our Fleet, whether the safety
of a single steamer or that of a whole squadron was at stake.
Special thanks are due to the officers of the Imperial Pilot
Service and its chief, Commander Krause. They were always
reliable advisers to the commanders of squadrons and ships.

Our view of the whole situation and the War Orders issued to
the Fleet made it imperative to get at the outset data as to the
movements of the enemy. While the North Sea islands and the
estuaries were being put into a state of defence, the primary require-
ment was security against surprise. The battleship squadron and
battle-cruisers (at their anchorages) used these few days to prepare
for action. With Squadron II, in the construction of whose ships
less importance had been attached to the use of fireproof material
than in the later ships, it was a question of removing everything that
was dangerous from that point of view and could at all be dispensed
with. This had a very adverse effect on the comfort of the ward-

3 1

Germany's High Sea Fleet

rooms and cabins as well as the men's quarters, in which all the
wooden beams were removed from the thin sheet-iron partitions
as well as the sides of the ship.

The removal of wooden chairs, tables, curtains, tablecloths, easy
chairs and such like, the scraping off of paint which was too thick,
the transfer of clothes and supplies of all kinds to the space under
the armoured decks where they could not easily be got at, took up
a lot of time and produced a good deal of noise and discontent.
However, the work of destruction was carried out with as much
devotion as if it were the enemy himself who was being destroyed,
and in the certain expectation that we should not have to wait long
for the actual meeting.

Although in peace time everything possible had been thought
of which might prove useful or necessary in the emergencies of
action, there were always fresh possibilities of perfecting measures
and preparing for all conceivable occurrences with things such as
rafts, steel nets, anchor cables, lifebelts, and so on. As the Flag
Officers of .the squadron passed from ship to ship in order to super-
vise the work that was in progress and make further suggestions,
they noted what seemed to them useful on any particular ship and
handed the information on to the others.

In this work were associated the newly-joined seamen ratings,
mostly reservists, who had served on the same ships not long before,
and among whom I recognised many old acquaintances, for, with
the exception of a break of one year, I had been with the Fleet con-
tinuously since 1907. My pleasure at meeting them again was
mingled with a feeling of pride at the sight of the manly, healthy,
And robust figures which had developed out of the former recruits
or ordinary seamen. It went to my heart to see with what a straight-
forward sense of duty these men, whose resolve to stand on their
own feet through industry and efficiency was plain to the eyes, had
left behind them everything they loved and cherished in order to be
present when the day came to meet the foe.

We spent the first days of suspense and expectation in this
essential work. The opening days of the war gained a particular
interest from the varying reports of home-coming steamers or our
patrols, the series of false alarms about aeroplanes and submarines,
firing at night, or the showing of lights in improbable directions,
the explosion of mines in shallow spots in the Elbe (phenomena
which subsequently found a natural explanation, though at first
attributed to enemy activity), our isolation from all human inter-

32

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

course — although we could see the cows grazing peacefully on the
banks of the Elbe 300 yards away — and the organisation of the
watches. In the further distance there was no visible sign of any
change in the wonted scenes of peace, for there was still a lively
movement of ships in the Elbe, and every incoming German
steamer had a particularly warm welcome for having succeeded in
getting safely home. But the wireless messages flashing to and
fro might at any moment summon us out to meet the foe.

Preparations for the offensive were not neglected during the days
in which England was making up her mind what her attitude was
to be, and when at 7.47 p.m. on August 4 we received the message,
"Prepare forwarwith England," we also heard the order to theauxili-
ary cruiser Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm to put to sea immediately.
At 9.30 P.M. the auxiliary minelayer Konigin Luise also left the Ems
on the way to the Thames estuary. Thus began the first essay in
cruiser warfare and the introduction of guerilla operations on the
English coast. In the wireless room of the Flagship we listened
hopefully for further news of the progress of the first two enter-
prises against the enemy. Would the great ocean greyhound be
forced back, or would she succeed in getting unchallenged into the
ocean? She remained dumb, and that could justly be taken as a
favourable sign.

The wireless message to the Konigin Luise had run : " Make for
sea in Thames direction at top speed. Lay mines near as possible
English coasts, not near neutral coasts, and not farther north than
Lat 53 ." The task assigned to the Konigin Luise gave little
ground for the hope that she could escape the watchfulness of the
English; but, with a supreme contempt of death, the ship, under
the command of Commander Biermann, held on her way. The
steamer which usually plied in summer to the watering-places of the
North Sea islands was engaged about 11 a.m. next morning by
enemy cruisers and destroyers, and was sunk by a torpedo.

She had had time to sow her mines, however, with the result
that the cruiser Amphion (3,500 tons, launched 191 1), which was
pursuing her, fell a victim to them and followed the Konigin Luise
to the bottom with a loss of 131 men. Thus the first day of the
war (August 5) had brought losses to both sides, and the first attack
on the English coast had been a success for us.

However, the sacrifice it had involved had not been incurred
in vain . It was not merely that it had cost the enemy a new
cruiser. Far more important was the impression that this proof
d 33

Germany's High Sea Fleet

of a bold spirit of enterprise must have made on friend and foe
alike. The situation at the outset thus appeared in such a light
that in view of these aggressive operations the enemy thought
that he could best protect himself by withdrawing to northern waters,
and did not take the other alternative of closing our sally ports
himself. Throughout the whole war not a single mine was sown
in our estuaries, notwithstanding the thousands upon thousands
which were employed in the open waters of the North Sea.

As the next few days passed without incident, and aeroplanes
and airships had made no discoveries, while incoming steamers
reported that English battleships were only to be seen at a great
distance (by Aberdeen) from the German Bight, our business was
now to discover the whereabouts of the enemy and get to close
quarters with him if we were to bring about an equalisation of
strength. For this purpose we had at our disposal the destroyers
and submarines which could be spared from the defensive
organisation of the Heligoland Bight.

Commander Bauer, in command of the U-boats, was con-
vinced that the defensive employment of submarines in a narrow
circle round Heligoland was useless, as there was only a slight
probability that the enemy would approach so close, and even if he
did it was doubtful whether the boats would get a chance to shoot.
The necessity of perpetually coming in and going out of the har-
bour of Heligoland, a difficult process in view of the methods
employed in the defensive system, led to a useless strain on the
material and injury to the boats. He therefore represented to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet that only the offensive use of
U-boats could bring about a change. The number of boats
employed must certainly be larger, but the prospects of success
would be greater still.

The justice of this argument was recognised, and a decision was
taken which was extremely important for the further course of the
war. Nor was there much hesitation in carrying it into execution,
for the U-boats received orders to proceed on August 6 against
English battleships, the presence of which was suspected in the
North Sea. These ships were supposed to be about 200 nautical miles
from Heligoland and charged with the duty of intercepting some
of our battleships which ought to be on their way from Kiel round
Skagen into the North Sea because the passage of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Canal presented too great difficulties Ten U-boats
were assigned to this enterprise, and six days were allowed for it.

34

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

This cruise was to carry the ships across the entire North Sea
and as far north as the Orkneys. The boats were left to their own
devices, as the cruisers Hamburg and Stettin, parent ships of the
U-boat flotilla, could, of course, not accompany it the whole
way. They were only to cover the first run of the boats, a hundred
miles or so, and endeavour to draw off any enemy light craft
from the U-boats in the direction of Heligoland. The sub-
marines themselves were not to pay any attention to such ships, as
their goal was the enemy battleships. It was only for the return
journey that the boats were left a free hand to do the enemy all
the damage they could. The weather being thick and rainy, and
the visibility poor, was not favourable for the enterprise, and indica-
tions pointed to its becoming worse. As the latter eventuality did
not materialise, however, the commander gave the order to put to
sea.

In so great an area, and taking into account the rapid) changes
which experience shows may be expected, it is very difficult to fore-
cast the weather in the North Sea. The decision was, therefore,
a brilliant tribute to the fiery enthusiasm of the new weapon, which
had never been faced with a task of such magnitude in peace. The
course was to be taken in such a way that the submarines, in line
ahead with seven-mile intervals between them, first negotiated a
stretch of 300 nautical miles in a north-westerly direction, then
turned and went back to a line directly between Scapa Flow and
Stavanger, which they were to reach about seventy-two hours after
putting to sea. They were to remain on this line until 6 o'clock in
the evening of the next day — in all about thirty-nine hours — and
then return to Heligoland. One boat had to return when 225
nautical miles from Heligoland, on account of trouble in her Diesel
engines. Two others, commanded by Lieutenant-Commanders
Count Schweinitz and Pohle, were lost. All the rest carried out
their allotted task and were back by August 1 1 .

Nothing was seen of the enemy, with the exception of a four-
funnelled cruiser which emerged out of the mist for a short time.
All that was known of the lost boats was that one of them was still
in wireless communication early on August 8. On the afch the region
in which the U-boats were lying was shrouded in mist, and
the wind was blowing with force 6. It was only on August 15
that we learnt that a large part of the English Fleet had been
in the same area and had there destroyed six German herring-
boats after taking their crews on board. Fog and the amount of

35

Germany's High Sea Fleet

sea that wind of a force 6 means are the most unfavourable condi-
tions conceivable for a submarine, in view of the fact that the
conning-tower is so low down in the water. It is to be assumed
that the missing boats had been surprised by English cruisers in
weather of this kind and rammed before they had time to dive.

It was certainly regrettable that at the very moment of meet-
ing the English Fleet was protected by mist, that two of our boats
had fallen victims, and that this first enterprise, so smartly carried
out, had not been crowned by the success it deserved. The loss of
two boats had no depressing effect whatever on the crews. It rather
increased their determination to do even better.

The course of this six-day cruise cleared the way for the further
exploitation of the U-boat weapon, the great importance of which
lay in its power of elidurance and its independence, two character-
istics which appeared at their true value for the first time in this
cruise under war conditions. In these two respects the U-boats
were superior to all surface vessels in the Fleet. The destroyers, in
particular, were not to be compared with them for their ability
to remain at sea. Their fuel capacity was too small for that pur-
pose, and when going at high speed the consumption of coal
increased out of all proportion. Further, as the big ships needed
the co-operation of the smaller as submarine-screens and mine-
sweepers, these, too, were dependent on their smaller consorts for
the length of time they could remain at sea, especially when they
were in areas in which regard had to be paid to the submarine
danger.

Our naval operations took a decisive turn as a result of this
cruise, and though the change was gradually introduced, it dates
from this enterprise. For that reason it has been described in rather
more detail than would be justified, seeing that a tangible success
was not achieved. The first proof of the ability of the submarine
to remain at sea for a long time had been given, and progress was
made along the lines I have mentioned, thanks to the greatest per-
severance, so that the submarine, from being merely a coastal-
defence machine, as was originally planned, became the most effec-
tive long-range weapon.

The other splendid quality of the submarine is its independence,,
by which I mean that it is not dependent on the support and co-
operation of ships or craft of other types. Whilst a force of surface
ships comprises various classes, according to the presumed strength
of the enemy, the submarine needs no help to attack, and in defence

36

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

is not so dependent on speed as the surface ships, as it has a sure
protection in its ability to dive. This again increases its radius of
action, for whereas a surface ship, meeting a superior enemy, has
no other resource but to make use of its speed — and that means a
large consumption of fuel — diving means a very great economy in
engine-power. In the submarine there is no question of driving
the engines too hard in such a situation, as the boat can escape
from the enemy by diving. The engines need not therefore be
constructed to stand perpetual changes of speed.

It is not surprising that the special importance of these technical
advantages was not recognised until the war came, for they first
came to light thanks to the energy of the personnel, who seemed to
despise all difficulties, although going to sea in these small craft
involves incredible personal discomforts of all kinds. The advan-
tages of the submarine service first became of practical value through
the fact that human strength of will brought men voluntarily to dis-
play such endurance as was shown in our boats. Patriotism was
the motive-power of the ships' companies.

The fact that an English offensive did not materialise in the first
weeks of the war gave cause for reflection, for with every day's grace
the enemy gave us he was abandoning some of the advantage of his
earlier mobilisation, while our coast defences were improved. The
sweep of light-cruisers and destroyers which, starting out star-wise
from Heligoland, had scoured the seas over a circumference of about
ioo sea miles had produced nothing. Yet while the U-boats
were on that cruise to the north which has already been discussed,
four other U-boats went on a patrol about 200 miles west, until
they were on a level with the Thames estuary. They discovered
several lines of destroyers patrolling on about Lat. 52 , but of
larger ships nothing was seen. The impression must have been
forced on the Commander-in-Chief, as indeed all of us, that the
English Fleet was following a strategic plan other than that with
which we were inclined to credit it. It appeared probable that the 2nd
and 3rd Fleets were concentrated to protect the transport of troops
in the English Channel.

The bulk of the 1st English Fleet must be supposed to be in the
northern part of the North Sea, to which our light forces had not
yet penetrated. Further, we had not yet heard anything from the
ten U-boats sent out in that direction, so apparently they too
had seen nothing. Should we now attempt to bring the English
1st Fleet to action? We had at our disposal 13 " Dreadnoughts,"

37

Germany's High Sea Fleet

8 older battleships, 4 battle-cruisers (counting in Blilcher), a few
light cruisers, and 7 destroyer flotillas. With these the Commander-
in-Chief intended to give battle, with full confidence in victory.
What held him back was the reflection that the whereabouts of the
1st English Fleet was absolutely unknown, and it was therefore
questionable whether it could be found in the time at pur disposal —
which could not be more than two days and nights on account of the
fuel capacity of the destroyers. In the meantime, the German Bight
would be without any protection against minelaying and other enter-
prises, and there would be no flank protection on the west. On the
other hand, our ships might suffer losses from the operations of
enemy submarines, for which there would be no compensation in ihe
way of victory if the English Fleet were not found. We knew from
various sources that we had to reckon with English submarines.
Such an attempt was therefore abandoned, and in its place a series
of patrolling and minelaying operations were set on foot which
carried the war right to the English coast in the following
weeks.

With this decision began the trying period of waiting for the
battleship squadrons, and a start was made with the operations
intended to equalise the opposing forces, operations which, apart
from mine successes, rested on the anticipation that our destroyers
would find opportunities for attack in their nocturnal raids. The
lack of scouts — for the new battle-cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, and
Von der Tann could not be put to such uses if they were to be held
ready for battle — made it essential that U-boats should be employed
on reconnaissance duties.

As early as August 14 new tasks were assigned to the U-boats
which had returned from their cruise to the West on the nth;
and, indeed, the boats under the command of LieutenantiOom-
manders Gayer and Hersing were to cross the North Sea from
the Norwegian Coast (by Egersund) in the direction of Peterhead,
while a third U-boat (Hoppe) observed the English forces pat-
rolling before the Humber with a view to securing data for mine-
laying. They brought valuable information about the enemy's
defensive measures, but they had not seen any large ships. The
length of time they had spent under water was remarkable. For
instance, Gayer's ship had been compelled by destroyers to
remain under water six and a quarter hours on August 16, eleven
and three-quarters on the 17th, and eleven and a quarter on
the 18th.

38

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

Let us now cast a glance at the chances for attack which pre-
sented themselves to the enemy. It could not possibly be unknown
to him that the German Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea.
The reports of spies from Holland and Denmark could not have
left any doubt about that. If the English Fleet made a demonstra-
tion against Sylt or the East Frisian Island's it would have compelled
our Fleet to come out of the estuaries unless we were prepared to
allow them a bombardment without retaliation, and they would thus
have an opportunity of using their submarines which were patrolling
at the mouths of the Jade and Elbe. A success for their submarines
would be satisfaction enough for them if we did not follow them
out to sea. They could arrange their approach in such a way that
they took up a favourable position in the early morning hours to
offer battle to our fleet as it came up, or if they appeared with only-
part of their forces they could promptly retire before a superior
German force and limit themselves to the operations of their sub-
marines. The only danger in such an attack lay In the possibility
of a nocturnal meeting with our destroyers. This danger was not
to be overestimated, as the English could plan their entrance into
the German Bight in such a way that our destroyers, which were
dependent on darkness, would be already on their way back to the
Bight at the time the enemy was approaching. Further, no very
serious danger was to be anticipated from our U-boats, as most
of them were away on distant enterprises.

The English High Command, however, must have had a much
higher estimate of the damage our destroyers and U-boats could
do than was actually the case. It appears also that their confidence
in the achievements of their own submarines, which were the founda-
tion for the execution of any such plan, was not very great. At
the outset, therefore, considerations prevailed on both sides which
led, the Commands to hold back their fleets from battle. The over-
estimate of the submarine danger played a most important role.

The German Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Ingenohl, gave
expression to his view of the general situation on August 14 in the
following Order of the Day : —

"All the information we have received about the English
naval forces points to the fact that the English Battle Fleet
avoids the North Sea entirely and keeps far beyond range of our
own forces. The sweep of our brave U-boats beyond the
Lat. 6o° in the north and as far as the entrance to the English

39

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Channel in the south, as well as the raids of our destroyers and
aeroplanes, have confirmed this information. Only between the
Norwegian and Scottish coasts and off the entrance to the
English Channel are English forces patrolling. Otherwise in
the rest of the North Sea not a single English ship has been
found hitherto.

"This behaviour on the part of our enemy forces us to the
conclusion that he himself intends to avoid the losses he fears
he may suffer at our hands and to compel us to come with our
battleships to his coast and there fall a victim to his mines and
submarines.

" We are not going to oblige our enemy thus. But they must,
and will, come to us some day or other. And then will be the
day of reckoning. On that day of reckoning we must be there
with all our battleships.

"Our immediate task is therefore to cause our enemy losses
by all the methods of guerilla warfare and at every point where
we can find him, so that we can thus compel him to join battle
with us.

"This task will fall primarily to our light forces (U-boats,
destroyers, mine-layers and cruisers) whose prospects of success
increase the darker and longer the nights become.

"The bold action of our mine-layer Kbnigin Luise, which
did the enemy material damage before she came to her glorious
end, and the audacious cruises of our U-boaits have already
made a beginning. Further enterprises will follow.

" The duty of those of us in the battleships of the Fleet is to
keep this, our main weapon, sharp and bright for the decisive
battle which we shall have to fight. To that end we must work
with unflinching devotion to get our ships perfectly ready in
every respect, to think out and practise everything that can
be of the slightest help and prepare for the day on which the
High Sea Fleet will be permitted to engage a numerically superior
enemy in battle for our beloved Emperor who has created
this proud Fleet as a shield for our dear Fatherland, in full
confidence in the efficiency whioh we have acquired by
unflagging work in time of peace.

"The test of our patience, which the conduct of the enemy
imposes upon is, is hard, having regard to the martial spirit
which animates all our ships' companies as it animates our army
also, a spirit which impels us to instant action.

40

Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

"The moment the enemy comes within our range he shall
find us waiting for him. Yet we must not let him prescribe
the time and place for us but ourselves choose what is favourable
for a complete victory.

"It is therefore our duty not to lose patience but to hold
ourselves ready at all times to profit by the favourable moment."

4*

CHAPTER IV
THE ENGLISH BREAK INTO THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT

THE nightly cruises from the foremost patrol line by Heligoland
were continued and extended. On August 12 the light cruisers
Koln (Flagship of the First Flag Officer of the destroyer flotillas,
Rear-Admiral Maass) and Hamburg went out with Flotilla VI;
Koln and Stuttgart with Flotillas I and II on the 15th,
and the light cruiser Mainz with the Flotilla VIII on the 16th. As
no enemy was met on any of these enterprises the light cruisers
Stralsund (Captain Harder) and Strassburg (Captain Retzmann)
were sent out to the Hoofden against the destroyer patrol line, the
existence of which had been reported by submarines.

They put to sea on the morning of August 1 1 with two U-boats,
which stood by near Vlieland while the cruisers steamed south to
about the line Lowestoft — Scheveningen. When this was reached
they turned, early on the morning, of the 18th. Shortly afterwards
the Strassburg sighted three enemy submarines, distant about
100 hm. (11,000 yards). These were fired on and one of them seemed
to be hit. Soon after eight destroyers were sighted in a northerly
direction and a light cruiser with another eight destroyers in an
easterly direction, which were in a position to cut off the retreat
of our cruisers. The range, howeyer, did not fall below 100 hm.,
so that no success was obtained on either side. The possibility
that there might be other English forces not far off seemed to
make it imperative for our ships not to lose time in manoeuvring
for attack, for the sixteen destroyers of the enemy had an immense
preponderance of gun-power oyer our cruisers armed only with
10.5 cm. guns. Both cruisers returned home without trouble.

In the second half of August the number of reports of sub-
marines sighted at the mouth of the Ems and in the Heligoland
Bight increased, and very heavy demands were made on the
destroyers to drive them out. On August 21 the light cruisers
Rostock and Strassburg with Flotilla VI made a sweep in the
direction of the Dogger Bank with a view to searching the fishing-
grounds for English fishing-smacks. They also met enemy sub-
marines, one of which fired two torpedoes at the Rostock, but

42

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

both missed. On this cruise six fishing-steamers were destroyed
which were found, well separated, in a circle round Heligoland, and
were suspected of working with English submarines.

As all these cruises pointed to the conclusion that we could
not expect to find considerable enemy forces in the southern half
of the North Sea, our two mine-laying cruisers, Albatros (Com-
mander West) and Nautilus (Commander Wilhelm Schultz) received
orders to lay a minefield at the mouths of the Humber and Tyne.
By day their operations were covered by a light cruiser and a
half-flotilla of destroyers, as mine-layers must be kept out of action
if at all possible. Both ships were able to carry out their commission
undisturbed and laid their mines accurately at the places indicated.
The actual work began at midnight and was favoured by thick
weather. On the way back another six fishing-steamers were sunk.

The previous raids had been favoured by luck inasmuch as the
forces employed, which were anything but strong, had not been
located and cut off by superior forces. Their safety lay in speed
alone. Before support from units lying ready in the estuaries
could reach them it might easily be too late. But for that pur-
pose it was considered inadvisable to have proper supporting forces
hanging about in the Heligoland Bight on account of the submarines
reported there.

August 28th brought us the first serious collision with English
cruisers. The reports taken back by the English submarines as to
our offensive arrangements in the Heligoland Bight must have
decided the English to roll up our patrol line. As the English
dispatches on the events of this day have been published, a clear
idea of the course of the action can be obtained (see plan, p. 44).
My own observations from Squadron II, which lay in the Elbe,
are confined to the wireless messages received. About nine o'clock
in the morning the first of these came in. "In squares 142 and 131
[that is 20 sea miles north-west of Heligoland] enemy cruisers and
destroyers are chasing the 5th Flotilla." *

The Stettin and Frauenlob (light cruisers) were sent out to help.
Two flotillas of U-boats took up station for attack. The remaining
wireless messages from nine o'clock in the morning to five in the
afternoon gave the following picture :

The ships which took part in the action comprised Destroyer

* Naval charts are dTawn squared, to simplify the location of places according to
length and breadth, in degTees and minutes. This facilitates delivery of reports or
commands and the identification of places on the chart. The size of the squares, a
side of which represents five or ten sea miles, is governed by the scale of the chart.

43

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Flotillas I and V, the light cruisers Mainz, Strassburg, Kbln,
Stralsund, Ariadne, Kolberg and Danzig, and two mine-sweeping
divisions.

On the enemy's side were several cruisers of the "Town " class,
armoured cruisers of the "Shannon " type, four battle-cruisers under
the command of Admiral Beatty in Lion, and about thirty destroyers
and eight submarines.

The Heligoland Bight Engagement, August 28, 1914

About six o'clock in the morning one of these submarines had
fired two torpedoes, which missed, at a ship of Destroyer Flotilla
I, which was retiring to the day patrol line. We had no other
information on our side of the further doings of the English sub-
marines on that day; the weather was thick, and as there was
hardly any wind, visibility in the neighbourhood of Heligoland
was only three to four miles. The upper part of the island was
completely shrouded in mist.

44

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

The marine artillery on the island saw nothing of the action
which raged within range of the island in the morning. It was
not possible for our battle-cruisers to put to sea before one o'clock
owing to the state of the tide at the bar of the Outer Jade. Their
intervention came too late. The orders which were issued by the
Flag Officer of the German cruisers proceeded on the assump-
tion that the same weather conditions prevailed outside as in
the Jade, and the cruisers regarded the situation as such that
they would be able to retire in time before a superior force. Un-
fortunately this was not the case. Mainz and Koln, all unsuspecting,
thus came upon English battle-cruisers and fell victims to their
guns. Our plan of surrounding the English forces which had
penetrated by cutting off their retreat to the west with Mainz,
which was in the Ems, while other light cruisers barred the way
in the north, was actually put into execution before a general view
of the whole situation had made it feasible.

Exceptionally high demands were made on the presence ]of
mind of the Flag Officers in command when they saw themselves
faced with more powerful ships than they had expected. The battle-
training of our light cruisers revealed a high standard of efficiency.
In spite of the serious damage to the ships and heavy losses
in personnel, the gun crews served their guns and overcame the
confusion of action with exemplary calm and precision. The bold
intervention of the other ships and the impulse to hasten to where
the thunder of the guns called and bring help, cost us, in addition
to the loss of Koln and Mainz, the loss of the light cruiser
Ariadne, which had been so damaged by fire that the men had to
throw themselves overboard. The question was put whether it
would have been of any avail for our big ships to come out of the
estuary. They could have had no success, and 1 this is obvious enough
in view of the prevailing low visibility.

In the action between the cruisers and destroyers, the light
cruiser Ariadne and the torpedo-boat "V 187," leader of Flotilla I,
were sunk on our side. Most of the ship's company of Ariadne
were saved by Stralsund and Danzig. Half of that of "V 187 " were
taken off by other ships of Flotilla I.

"Wireless communication with 'Koln and Mainz has stopped.
They are both sunk. Two cruisers (Strassburg and Stettin) are
damaged as well as the torpedo-boats D 8, V 1 and T33. Many
dead and wounded. Nothing known of English losses."

After the first news arrived Squadron II was held ready to

45

Germany's High Sea Fleet

raise anchor in case battleships were required to go out in support.
Howeyer, we received no order to intervene.

The surprise of our patrols by the two English cruisers Arethusa
and Fearless, which were escorted by seventeen destroyers of the
"I" class and fourteen of the "L" class (according to English
reports), was a success for the enemy. The intervention of our two
light cruisers Stettin and Frauenlob limited the losses on our
side to one torpedo-boat, "V 187." As soon as the news of the
break-through of light forces was received all other available light
cruisers were sent out to meet them. In the action that now fol-
lowed Arethusa and Fearless were seriously damaged and had to
call in the help of the very strong English force held ready in
support and not yet employed. Its intervention put our cruisers
in an evil plight. Very thick weather made a survey of the whole
situation difficult.

There are some who think that the way in which the light
cruisers went out separately is open to criticism as a piece of temerity.
With the safe withdrawal of Flotillas I and V and the driving off
of the cruisers Arethusa and Fearless as the result of the prompt
and resolute intervention of Stettin and Frauenlob, the English
attack had lost the character of a surprise, and the plan, which
involved a great show of force, had gained but a moderate success
with the sinking of "V 187." On the other hand, was a baffled
enemy to be allowed to withdraw from the Heligoland Bight un-
pursued in broad daylight ?

Four weeks had passed before the first occasion had presented
itself of getting to close quarters with the enemy. Were our ships
to content themselves, the first time enemy light forces appeared,
with hiding in the estuaries and make no attempt to deal with
the enemy, who might perhaps fall into our hands if he were badly
damaged ? The Flag Officers and commanders would have incurred
a serious reproach if they had neglected to make the attempt to get
to close quarters with the enemy. If the impression of the first
meeting had been a feeling of inferiority and the conviction that
we could do nothing but retire before the English, it would have
had an unhappy effect on the spirit of the ships' companies and
the further course of the operations. The effect produced was
exactly the opposite, and we were all burning to avenge the slap
in the face we had received.

The disintegration of the engagement into a number of detached
actions which were fought at close range, owing to the poor visi-

46

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

bility, produced such remarkable examples of the presence of
mind and contempt of death of our men that they deserve better
than to sink into oblivion. I shall therefore give a few extracts
from war diaries.

REPORT OF THE ACTION OF THE FLOTILLA LEADER OF THE
DESTROYER FLOTILLA I, WALLIS — "V 187 "

(Drawn up by Lieutenant Jasper)

"The Flotilla leader ' V 187 ' was on patrol (at 16 knots) about
24 sea miles N.W. to W. of Heligoland on a W.N.W. course.
Shortly after eight o'clock the ship on our right, ' G 194 ' (Lieutenant-
Commander Buss) reported : ' Am chased by enemy armoured
cruiser.' We turned and made for ' G 194.' At 8.20 a.m. in
thick weather, two destroyers came in sight in N.W. about three
miles off, and were reported to S.M.S. Koln by wireless. The
ship bore S.E. to E. and put on speed. The destroyers were kept
in sight. After a short time another four destroyers or cruisers
were observed 1 . Accurate observation impossible owing to failing
visibility. ' V 187 ' now put on full speed and altered course for
Heligoland.

"Meanwhile an order from Koln to Flotillas I and V had been
received, ' Make for shelter of Heligoland.' Simultaneously, four
destroyers, which stood between us and Heligoland, emerged from
the mist on our port quarter about four degrees to 50 hm. away. At
about 40 hm. they opened an intermittent fire. ' V 187 ' turned
south and replied with her after 8.8 cm. gun. The destroyers'
shooting was mostly very poor. Only at regular intervals one gun
fired shells which passed close over our bridge. The Commander
intended to make shooting difficult by altering course and reaching
the Jade or Ems at top speed. The ship ran 28 or 29 miles. The
destroyers had only caught up a little and were now shooting at
about 30 hm. Suddenly an enemy cruiser with four funnels
appeared four points on our starboard bow. She apparently made
a signal with her searchlight to ' V 187 ' or her own destroyers.
Immediately afterwards she fired a series of salvos at 35 to 40 hm.
After the third salvo the shooting was good. As escape was no
longer possible the officer in command decided to close. The
whole ship's company with the exception of the stokers caught
hold of firearms and lifebelts. ' V 187 ' ported her helm and tried
to cut her way through.

47

Germany's High Sea Fleet

"The running action was fought at 12 to 8 hm. The destroyers,
apparently surprised, ceased fire at first, but then they subjected us
to an extremely rapid fire. A shell fell close to the 8.8 cm. gun and
put the crew out of action with the exception of a slightly wounded
petty officer. The forward gun only fired a few rounds after that.

"Another shell fell in stokehold 4 and penetrated the bunkers.
Splinters wounded the stokers, the lights went out, the steam escaped
and the boiler would not fill any more.

"Simultaneously other shots and splinters fell on the bridge. I
turned to starboard with a view to ramming the destroyer immedi-
ately behind us and clearing our way past it.

"Hits now followed one another with rapid succession. Shells
and splinters rained down, and the ship was completely shrouded in
smoke and fumes.

"The forward turbine was hit twice and stopped. Steam, mixed
with black smoke, poured out of the hatches and ventilators.

"Boiler 2 was damaged and boiler 1 had also received hits.

"Some of the bridge personnel had fallen; the ship had little
way on and was listing to port for no obvious reason. The officer
in command, who had been seriously wounded, now gave the order
to sink the ship. I took one of the four explosive charges which
were on the bridge, set it and threw it in the forward turbine room.
The bridge personnel put two others in the forward part of the
ship.

"Meanwhile two other destroyers coming from the north had
joined in the fight. After fixing up the charges I gave orders to
leave the ship on the leeside of the firing.

"I jumped overboard just before (according to my calculations)
the charges would take effect. The rest of the gun crew of the after
gun, which had continued firing to the last (among them Lieutenant
Braune), sprang simultaneously into the water. The destroyers now
ceased fire and sent out boats. Several men were picked up with
lines and buoys. After a few minutes' swimming about I myself
was picked up by an English boat. Just as I was getting in ' V 187 '
went down by the bows. No one could Be seen on deck. The
boat had three other men of the ship's company of ' V 187 ' on
board.

"At that moment a German light cruiser (Stettin) opened fire
on the destroyers. The English boat's crew went on board their
destroyer. I refused to go on board with my three men as I did
not want to be made prisoner. The English destroyer then started

48

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

off at high speed. An English sailor had let go the hawser
apparently in error.

"I then hauled another sixteen survivors into my English boat.

"Another English boat, under the command of an English officer,
was left behind by the destroyers in the evening. It had on board
Lieutenant Braune and several survivors.

"After a considerable time a partially submerged English sub-
marine came from the east towards us.

"It came right up and took on board the English crew of one
boat and Lieutenant Braune. At first I kept away from the sub-
marine and took off my monkey jacket lest I should be recognised
as an officer and taken prisoner. The submarine, which had the
mark ' E 4 ' on the bows and the number ' 84 ' (as well as ' E 4 '
again) on the conning tower, dived and disappeared, half submerged,
in the west.

"Another smaller English boat, which had on board five more
survivors of ' V 187, ' now came up to me. The three boats then
rowed for some considerable time in an E.S.E. direction towards the
German patrol line. They were subsequently picked up by ' G 4 '
and ' G 1 1 .' The more severely wounded of our men were bandaged
on board the destroyers while the boats were sunk. After the
destroyers had picked up six dead and had tried to identify the
spot at which 'V 187 ' went down from the remains of charts and
books, they proceeded to Heligoland. From there the six dead and
forty-four survivors, the latter including seven severely and about
twenty slightly wounded men, were brought to Wilhelmshaven in
the steamer Arngast."

The light cruiser Mainz (Captain Wilhelm Pasche) was sunk on
this day. According to the record made by the First Officer,
Lieutenant Tholens, who was taken as a prisoner to England, the
action developed as follows :

" The order, ' Mainz immediately put to sea and take the reported
English forces in the rear,' reached the ship at 10 a.m. in the Ems.
Thanks to the previous wireless messages from the Wallis Flotilla,
she had steam up in all her boilers and was ready for sea. Mainz
could therefore put out immediately and develop full speed very
quickly. A northerly course was taken at first to cut off the retreat
of the enemy ships. The aeroplane at Borkum, which was placed
at the ship's disposal, was sent on in the same direction. When the
E 49

Germany's High Sea Fleet

ship started from the Ems the weather was calm, the air clear and
visibility good. The conditions for reconnaissance by the aero-
plane appeared to be the best imaginable, but after a short flight
it returned without any results to show. Meanwhile the Mainz
had run into haze. This made a surprise by enemy forces possible.
About half-past twelve the Arethusa, with eight destroyers, appeared
in N.E., moving on a westerly course and distant about 70 hm. To
such a degree had visibility already decreased !

"To bring the enemy under fire with the starboard guns we
turned to port somewhat on a line of bearing N.N.W. Shortly
after the first salvos, to which the enemy ships replied with some
of his guns, the enemy turned off on a northerly course. The con-
ditions for shooting were extremely unfavourable, as the enemy
ships were very difficult to make out in the haze. All the same,
several salvos were very well placed, and hits were certainly
observed on two destroyers, one of which wrecked a bridge and
put out of action everyone on it, including the commander. With
a view to keeping the enemy in sight, Mainz herself gradually
turned on a northerly course. At 12.45 masses of smoke were
suddenly reported in N.W., and a few minutes later revealed three
cruisers of the ' Birmingham ' class. Mainz immediately turned
hard to starboard, and even as she turned the salvos of the new
enemy fell around her, and a few minutes later she received the
first hits. The fire of Arethusa and the destroyers, which had now
apparently passed out of sight, had been without result.

"Our own fire was now directed exclusively at the new enemy „
and simultaneously the latter was reported by wireless. By 12.55
p.m. the enemy cruisers were only distinguishable by the flashes of
their guns. Shortly afterwards even this had ceased, and with it
the hail of enemy shells. Mainz ran 25 sea miles, approximately
S.S.W. in the direction of the eastern Ems, and emitted 1 large
quantities of smoke. Meanwhile almost abreast on our port beam
another cruiser of the ' Birmingham ' class (Fearless) had come
into sight, as well as six destroyers close together and several
others by themselves. In the course of the action which now
developed with these ships and in which several torpedoes were
fired at the Mainz, the helm suddenly jammed at io° to starboard.

" The order, ' Steer from the wheelhouse,' came" through at
the very Same moment as the signal from the quartermaster,
' Port your helm.'' The helm remained jammed, however, as the
"result of an explosion under the wheelhouse. The result was that

So

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

although the steering gear throughout the ship was in working
order, all our efforts to steer the ship were without success. We
could only conclude that a hit under water had given the whole
rudder a bend to starboard. The port engine was stopped.

" Mainz slowly turned more and more to starboard, and thus
came again within range of the first three cruisers of the ' Birming-
ham ' class and the Arethusa, with her eight destroyers. At the
same moment the report reached the bridge that three guns, with
their crews, had been completely put out of action. In the stage
of the action that followed, in which Mainz, with her helm
jammed and going round in a circle to starboard, faced four cruisers
of the ' Birmingham ' class and about twenty destroyers, our own
fire was directed exclusively at the enemy destroyers. Against these
only was a success worth mentioning possible. As several of the
destroyers came quite close, it was possible to observe several hits
upon them.

"Meanwhile casualty had followed upon casualty on the Mainz.
About 1.20 p.m. most of the guns and gun crews were already
out of action. The decks were shot to pieces. The sending up
of ammunition had come to a standstill, and more than once com-
partments under the armoured deck had to be cleared on account
of the danger from smoke and gas. The starboard engine could
only go half speed.

" It was in this condition that about 1.20 p.m. the ship was
struck by a torpedo amidships on the port beam. The effect of
this on the conning-tower was that the whole apparatus for trans-
mitting orders, with the exception of the speaking-tube and
telephones to the central and torpedo rooms, were put out of action.
The commander thereupon gave the order, ' Abandon ship, ship's
company get clear with life-belts,' and left the conning-tower. This
order, however, only reached the nearest action-stations, and accord-
ingly was only carried out in part. As the result of the torpedo we
had stopped firing everywhere. At this moment the First Gunnery
Officer and the Torpedo Officer were in the conning-tower.
The First Officer, who thought that the Commander must
have fallen and knew nothing of his last order, gave orders
to resume firing, and tried to launch some torpedoes. The torpedoes
he fired, one from port at a light cruiser and two from starboard
at destroyers, had no luck, as the enemy ships kept out of torpedo
range. On the enemy's side two battle-cruisers had now intervened
in the action. Whether they also tried to get in a few hits has

51

Germany's High Sea Fleet

never been definitely ascertained. In the Mainz only the first and
fifth starboard guns were now in action."

The picture of the scene below decks after the explosion of the
torpedo is amplified by the following observations of the senior
surviving engineer, whose action-station was by the pumps.

"1.15 p.m. — Hit by a torpedo. The ship staggered, heeled
over quite sensibly and remained thus for a considerable time.
Took even longer to right herself. The emergency lights went
out. All the glass which was not already broken by concussion of
the bursting, shells was now broken. The electric light became dim
and gradually went out. In the end our electric torches were the
only light we had. The engines ceased to revolve. The gauge
already showed that the ship was slowly settling by the head. The
efforts to ascertain where the hole was were without result, as we
could no longer get a reply from any of the compartments. After
a short pause we could hear that firing had been resumed, but when
the firing, and shortly afterwards the hail of enemy shells ceased, we
could not get into touch with any other part of the ship. The
conning-tower, too, did not reply. The water that poured out of the
speaking-tube showed that the water had reached the armoured deck,
and therefore that the flooded compartments must be submerged.

" As the ship was bound to sink very soon, amidships was
now cleared. Between-decks over the armoured deck was so full of
smoke that you could not see a yard ahead. Both the companions
leading up from there were shot to pieces. It was only by scrambling
through the holes made by shells, over the relics of hatches and
lockers, that we managed to get out. The space under the forecastle
was also filled with smoke from right forward as far as over the
second gun.

"As soon as the firing had ceased on all sides the English ships
made the greatest efforts to pick up the survivors. At a summons
from the Mainz, which had not listed at all until about 2 o'clock, a
destroyer came alongside the stern to take the wounded on board.
All the wounded whose cases did not seem perfectly hopeless were
thus removed to the destroyer, assisted by everybody who had not yet
left the ship. About 2.10 p.m. Mainz heeled over to port and sank."

For a last example I will give the report of the action prepared
by Captain Seebohm, commanding the light cruiser Ariadne :

"On the 28th August S.M.S. Ariadne, flagship of the Harbour
Flotilla of the Jade and Weser, was lying in the Outer Jade. On
hearing the sound of guns about 9 o'clock, and more particularly on

52

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

receiving a wireless from Stettin that cruiser support was requested,
Ariadne set a course for Heligoland. Near the Outer Jade Lightship
she met the cruiser Koln, flagship of Rear-Admiral Maass, which
was making west at high speed. Ariadne then took much the same
westerly course as Koln, which had soon disappeared in the haze.
We received further wireless messages from Maim and Strassburg
that they were in action with enemy destroyers.

" Avoiding a certain area where a minefield was suspected, we
steered towards the position of the ships named. Judging by her
wireless reports, Koln appeared to be taking the same course.
About 10 o'clock an enemy submarine was sighted square on our
port beam. It immediately dived, and seemed at first to be
manoeuvring for position, but then suddenly disappeared, so that we
had no chance to fire.

" Shortly afterwards gunfire was heard on our port bow, and we
made straight in that direction. Shortly before 2 p.m. there emerged
from the mist two ships, one of which, on our starboard bow, did
not reply to our signal. It was recognised as an armoured cruiser
so we immediately turned about. The second ship was Koln, which
was being chased and would doubtless have got away if Ariadne
had not appeared. The enemy immediately shifted his fire from
Koln to Ariadne. Ariadne soon received a hit forward which started
a fire in the coal, so that the stokehold had to be abandoned on
account of the danger from smoke. Five boilers were thus put out
of action and Ariadne's speed was reduced to fifteen knots. Behind
the enemy, which, judging by its silhouette, was the English
Flagship Lion, a second English armoured cruiser soon appeared
and joined in the action, firing at Ariadne for about half an hour
at a range of from 45 to 60 hm., at times even from 33 hm. This
last distance is only an estimate, as by now all the recording instru-
ments were out of action. Ariadne received many hits from heavy
guns, among them a whole series aft, which was soon enveloped
in flames. Such of the personnel there as made good their escape
owed it entirely to luck. The fore part of the ship also received
a number of serious hits, one of which penetrated the armoured
deck and put the torpedo chamber out of action, while another
destroyed the sick-bay and killed its personnel. Amidships and the
bridge, strange to say, were almost entirely spared. It is perfectly
impossible to say how many hits in all the ship received. Apparently
many shells passed through the rigging and were thereby detonated.
Others were observed to fall in the water without detonating. Many

S3

Germany's High Sea Fleet

others passed to right and left as Ariadne was running away
from the enemy and offered but a small target.

"The English salvos followed in succession with somewhat long
pauses. The shells produced their effect mainly by starting fires.
All the living quarters fore and aft were immediately in flames.
The tremendous flames made it impossible to extinguish a fire which
had once started. Further, the fire-extinguishers on the armoured
deck had been utterly destroyed.

"About 2.30 the enemy suddenly turned west. I assume that
he could no longer distinguish the Ariadne, which was enveloped
in smoke from the fires. On the Ariadne the undamaged guns were
still being worked and independently of the fire-control, as there
were no means of transmitting orders. Further, the fumes from
the ship made it impossible to see anything from the bridge.

"In spite of the enemy's annihilating fire the ship's company
worked with the greatest calm, as if on manoeuvres. The wounded
were carried down by the stretcher-bearers. All ratings tried to
carry out such repairs as were possible by themselves. The First
Officer was carried away by a shell while between decks with the
repairing section.

" After the enemy turned away I first ordered ' all hands ' to
extinguish the fire. This turned out to be impossible as we could
no longer get aft and the ship had to be cleared forward as well
almost at once. On the order ' Flood the magazine,' the men ran
to the forward magazine. It was ascertained that this was already
under water. It was impossible to get to the magazine aft. A
previous attempt to open the compartments 1 and 2 where some
of the men were still imprisoned proved fruitless, as the deckplates
had been bent by shells. The engine-room and the after boiler-
room had remained uninjured throughout, and the same was true of
the rudder. The telegraph apparatus failed. The cable was ap-
parently cut by an explosion under the conning-tower.

"The heat and smoke made it more and more unpleasant to re-
main on the ship, and it was even worse when the ammunition piled
round the guns began to go off. These explosions, however,
did not do much damage. A large number of small splinters
were scattered which, for example, penetrated the bridge from
below.

"The ship's company assembled in perfect order on the fo'c'sle,
whither the wounded also had been brought. I asked for three
cheers for His Majesty and then the flag hymn and ' Deutschland,

54

The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

Deutschland iiber alles ' was sung. Even the wounded joined in.
One man asked for three cheers for the officers.

"Just before 3 o'clock S.M.S. Danzig (Captain Reiss) came up
and sent boats to us. As has already been mentioned, we had
not suffered so severely amidships and it was therefore possible
to lower the Ariadne's cutters also. The first to be put in the boats
were the wounded, who were lowered from the fo'c'sle with ropes.
As it gradually became impossible to remain on the fo'c'sle the
rest of the ship's company jumped into the sea at the word of
command. Some of the stronger swimmers swam all the way to
the Danzig and Stralsund (Captain Harder), which had also ap-
proached. The non-swimmers, who had lifebelts and rafts, were
picked up by the boats. Meanwhile the fire on the ship — which
was gutted — had died down somewhat, and the explosions were
less frequent. I therefore betook myself to Stralsund with a few
men who had returned in Ariadne's boat, in order to request her
captain to take Ariadne in tow. However, just about this time
Ariadne suddenly heeled over to port and then capsized to
starboard. The keel was visible for some time above the
water."

If it was already known that the Heligoland Bight was in-
sufficiently protected, because our scouting did not extend far
enough, this day brought us the knowledge that a determined raid
of the enemy against our weak forward patrol must inflict loss
upon us every time. By the repetition of such surprises it might
gradually be worn away altogether, while the Fleet got very little
value out of its patrolling operations. The continuous employ-
ment of personnel and material on patrol work in the lengthening
nights weakened both and thereby prejudiced the efficiency for
their main task — to fight the enemy fleet. The unmolested irruption
of the enemy cruisers and destroyers and the complete freedom
of movement they had enjoyed in the Heligoland Bight must be
made much more difficult, as also must the perpetual harassing
operations of English submarines, although the latter had not
hitherto displayed any great skill in torpedo work.

Far-reaching changes were made in both directions. As regards
the patrol service a large number of armed fishing steamers were
secured and prepared with the utmost despatch. They had pre-
viously been employed only in the harbour flotillas, which looked
after the security of the estuaries. Moreover, in the middle of
September two large minefields were laid west of Heligoland, which

55

Germany's High Sea Fleet

increased the danger for the enemy and offered a safe retreat for
our patrols when they were hard pressed.

On September 13 an English submarine, "Eg," succeeded in
torpedoing the cruiser Hela south of Heligoland. The ship took
twenty minutes to sink, so that there was time to save the whole
ship's company, and our losses were limited to three men killed
where the torpedo exploded.

The minefields before Heligoland proved effective, and in con-
junction with progressive defensive measures such as aeroplanes
and the equipment of our patrols with weapons which could be
employed offensively against submerged submarines (such weapons
were wholly lacking at the beginning of the war), kept the inner
area so clear that the danger from submarines came at last to be
quite a rare and exceptional possibility.

56

CHAPTER V

THE AUTUMN AND WINTER MONTHS OF 1914

THE affair of August 28, 1915, could be regarded as the pre-
liminary of some enterprise on a larger scale, an enterprise
in which our Fleet would start at a disadvantage if the enemy held
the initiative. He would thus be able to make full use of his
superiority while we had to undertake the difficult deployment from
the estuaries of our rivers. By choosing his own moment the
attacker had the advantage of previously sending out his submarines
in large numbers to suitable stations. As the result of their fre-
quent visits to the Heligoland Bight, as well as their experiences
in the August action, they must have acquired sufficient data to
be employed effectively.

The defensive attitude imposed on our Fleet was a direct help to
such a plan. To anticipate it it was therefore obvious that our
High Command would desire greater freedom of movement in order
to have a chance of locating parts of the enemy's forces. This could
only be done if the light forces sent out ahead could count on timely
intervention by the whole High Sea Fleet. On the other hand, it
was not the Fleet's intention to seek battle with the English Fleet
off the enemy's coasts. The relative strength (as appeared from
a comparison of the two battle lines) made chances of success much
too improbable. Taking, battleships only, the superiority on the
English side was seven compared with our total number of battle-
ships, thirteen, and therefore more than fifty per cent. Our older
ships of .Squadron II, which dated from the pre-Dreadnought period,
would be opposed to an English squadron composed of ships of
the "King Edward VII " class of equal fighting value.

The Supreme Command attached more importance to the security
of the sea front, which was entrusted to the Fleet, in this early
period of the war than to the damage which it might possibly be
able to inflict on the enemy's fleet. The restrictions imposed on
the Battle Fleet were therefore adhered to.

57

Germany's HighiSea Fleet

The attempts to damage the enemy by guerilla operations were
continued, and in addition cruiser raids against the English coast
and the Skagerrak were planned. The U-boats carried their
operations ever farther afield, and at last they had their first success
on September 8, when "U 21 " (Hersing) sank the light cruiser
Pathfinder at the entrance to the Firth of Forth. This was fol-
lowed by the great feat of Weddigen when, with " U 9," on September
22, he made a bag of the three armoured cruisers Cressy, Aboukir
and Hogue, twenty nautical miles N.W. of the Hook of Holland.

.Weddigen's name was in everyone's mouth, and for the Navy
in particular his achievement meant a release from the oppressive
feeling of having done so little in this war in comparison with the
heroic deeds of the army. But no such victory had been required
to reveal completely the value of the submarine for our war-like
operations, especially after it had given such unexpectedly con-
vincing proof of its ability to remain at sea.

Favourable news came from abroad also. The Emden had
begun her successful operations against English merchant ships in
the Gulf of Bengal,- and in East Africa the light cruiser Konigsberg
had sunk the Pegasus and so avenged the bombardment of Dar-
es-Salaam.

About the middle of September the squadron of older ships
which had been newly-formed at the beginning of the war had so
far progressed in its training that it could be commissioned for
service in the North Sea. The ships were not themselves fit to
take part in a Fleet action, but they could take over part of the
duties of patrolling the estuaries and keeping these open against
attempts at interruption when the Fleet was at sea. However, they
were never employed on this service, for they were not kept long
in commission, as their ships' companies were needed urgently
elsewhere later on. However, the work spent on them had not
been wasted, for they gave the Fleet well-trained men for its new
ships, and their presence in the Baltic in the first weeks)
of the war had the effect of giving our Baltic forces much greater
importance in the eyes of the Russians than was justified by the
facts. This, and possibly, too, their lack of confidence in their own
efficiency, may be responsible for the fact that the Russians refrained ,
from taking the offensive.

On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief had immediately
taken the offensive himself, although all he could promise himself
for a result was the intimidation of the Russian naval forces in

58

Autumn and Winter Months of 1914

the Baltic. In spite of the fact that at the outset he had! only two
light cruisers, Augsburg and Magdeburg, a few torpedo-boats and
some steamers, converted into mine-layers, at his disposal, he did
not wait for the Russians to attack, but, immediately after the
declaration of war, put to sea and bombarded Libau. The bom-
bardment did not do much damage, it is true, but it compelled
the Russians to take a hand in the work of demolition. Moreover,
mines were laid at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland.

Our purpose was completely attained and compensated for the
loss of the light cruiser Magdeburg, which ran ashore in a haze
on August 27 and had to be abandoned. On October n the
armoured cruiser Pallada, which had distinguished itself by shooting
at the Magdeburg when she was stuck fast, fell a victim to our " U 26 "
(Freherr von Berckheim). This success did not fail to have a
paralysing effect on Russian enterprise.

Without going further into the details of the operations in the
Baltic their effect on the general situation at home can be described
as extremely important. Without depriving the Fleet of important
forces and thereby weakening or quite paralysing it, the modest
forces employed kept the Russians in check, so that there was no
bombardment of the German coast from the sea, and traffic in the
Baltic, which was absolutely vital for war purposes, was not in-
terfered with. The observation and security of the southern exit
of the Belt and Sound made it possible for us to use the western
basin of the Baltic for the Fleet's battle practices. Without such
a training area the exercising, of the new units which had been
formed at the beginning of the war would have been very difficult.
In the same way it would have been very doubtful whether we could
have carried out trial trips and the first gunnery tests of newly
commissioned ships.

As the war proceeded the importance of the western Baltic as
an aid to keeping the Fleet ready to strike became a matter of life
and death. Without constant training of an appropriate kind the
standard of gunnery and navigation would have sunk to a precarious
level. When navigating on a raid in the North Sea the attention
of the Flag Officers was fully taken up with the possibility of enemy
counter-measures and more especially with defence against under-
water attack. Half the ship's company were on watch at action
stations and the engine-room complement were on watch down below,
and as their duties required their whole attention it was no good
thinking jf carrying out useful exercises of the whole ship's company

59

Germany's High Sea Fleet

under the direction of the commander. We could only expect victory
in battle if we succeeded in maintaining that standard of training
in which we saw our sole and overwhelming chance of beating the
enemy. A suitable practice area for this purpose was the Baltic,
with Kiel Haven as base. Without this area at our disposal the
development which our submarine weapon subsequently underwent
would have been quite unthinkable.

In view of the importance of this practice area for our
operations and the valuable establishments at Kiel dockyards,
especially the torpedo-establishments at Friedrichsort, on the
efficiency of which the whole submarine war was later to depend,
it appears incredible that the enemy made no efforts to open this
vital vein. At the beginning of the war the mining by the Danes
of the northern and central portions of the Great Belt was in
accordance with the wishes of our Naval Staff that the safety of the
Baltic should) be secured. There may be some question as to
whether the Danes had the right to mine these waters, for they were
an international strait, but the mining, was approved by the English
also, apparently because it fitted in with their plan of not penetrating
into the Baltic. Our Fleet regarded these mines as a great obstacle
to their freedom of movement, for they deprived it of the possibility,
when large ships were sent out on a distant raid in the North Sea,
of bringing them back round the Skagen into the Baltic instead of
keeping them on the single line of retirement to Heligoland. For
political reasons the Naval Staff regarded it as unwise to demand the
opening of the Great Belt by Denmark.

Of the different mine-laying enterprises of the High Sea Fleet
in the autumn months of 19 14 a special mention is due to a cruise
which on October 17 began at the mouth of the Ems and had the
south coast of England for its goal. Four ships of the 7th Half-
Flotilla (Commander Thiele) "S" 115, 116, 117, 119 were employed.
These older boats had been chosen with an eye to the possibilities
of casualties, because they were no longer fit for other duties. The
ships' companies had all volunteered for this dangerous raid. Their
task consisted of laying mines at the entrance to the Downs, the
Channel leading round the S.E. corner of England from Dover to
the mouth of the Thames. The English Admiralty had announced
that navigation of the area between Lat. 51 15' N. and 51 41' and
Long. i° 35' E. and 3° o' E. (that means a strip 35 nautical miles
broad from the English to the Dutch coast) was dangerous on account
of mines. For this reason traffic was compelled to use the open

60

Autumn and Winter Months of 1914

channel close to the land. It was thus under English control, and
the English found their inspection service easier. By mining the
channel leading into the Thames we might expect practically a
stoppage of London's supplies.

England's behaviour in laying mines in the open sea, a policy
made public in this announcement, released us from the necessity
of observing the limits we had hitherto imposed on ourselves of
restricting mine-laying solely to the enemy's coasts, an operation
which was naturally attended with greater danger to the mine-
layer the nearer she approached within reach of the coastal patrol
forces.

The half-flotilla had left the Ems in the early hours of the
morning when it was still dark. Near Haaks Lightship, 15 miles
W. of the southern point of the Island of Texel, it met the English
cruiser Undaunted and four destroyers of the latest type, escape from
which was impossible. As this was realised our ships attacked and,
after a brave defence in an action which was carried on at a range
of a few hundred yards, were sunk. The English saved as many
of the survivors as was possible. After we received the first wireless
message that action had begun, no further news of the torpedo-boats
was forthcoming, and as we had therefore to assume that they had
been lost, we sent out the hospital ship Ophelia to pick up any
survivors. However, the English captured her and made her prize,
charging us with having sent her out for scouting purposes, although
she was obviously fitted up as a hospital ship and bore all the
requisite markings.

The auxiliary cruiser Berlin was sent out into the North Sea the
same night. Her commission was to lay mines off the most
northerly point of Scotland, as we had reason to suspect a lively
movement of warships there. The cruise of the Berlin was favoured
by better luck, for it was one of her mines to Which the battleship
Audacious fell a victim about a week later. She was so damaged
that she had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The English
succeeded in keeping secret for a considerable time the loss of this
great battleship, a loss which was a substantial success for our efforts
at equalisation. When the news leaked out at last its truth was
definitely and decisively denied.

The following points deserve to be remembered in considering
these two enterprises : (1) Mine-laying in the open seas. (2) The
capture of a hospital ship which was engaged in the work of saving
life from the best of motives and observing all the regulations. (3)

61

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The suppression of the news that an important ship had) been lost
in the case of the Audacious.

The behaviour of the English was inspired at all points by con-
sideration for what would serve their military purposes, and was
not troubled by respect for international agreements. But this did
not prevent England from raising loud cries later on when we also
considered ourselves released from our obligation and with far more
justification took action against hospital ships which, under cover
of the Red Cross Flag, were patently used for the transport of troops.
In the case of the Audacious we can but approve the English
attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy, because accurate
information about the other side's strength has a decisive effect on
the decisions taken.

The complete loss of the 7th Half-Flotilla was very painful, and
the Commander-in-Chief has been freely criticised for having sent
it out insufficiently supported. The reply to that is that it is
extremely difficult to decide what " sufficient support " is. Suppose,
in relation to the case under consideration, we say in the light of
after events that if we had had two more cruisers we should have
had a superiority, such a method of reasoning involves a knowledge
beforehand of the strength of the enemy ; otherwise you might have
to bring up your whole fleet at every alarm if you wished to feel
perfectly safe. Besides, risk is of the very essence of war. The idea
is implied even in Moltke's phrase, "Think first." On the other
hand, our failure revealed the importance to our" operations of the
base on the Flemish coast, from which enterprises of this kind were
much more feasible and indeed led to a permanent threat to the
English trade route in the Channel.

In October the enemy submarines outside the Ems and in the
Heligoland Bight were very active. There was hardly a day on
which reports were not received that enemy submarines had been
sighted. Although a good many of these turned out to be false
alarms, their presence was frequently confirmed by the fact that
torpedoes were fired. Apart from the loss of the Hela on Septem-
ber 13, which has already been mentioned, the torpedo-boat " G 116 "
was sunk by a torpedo north of Schiermonnikoog on October 6.
It was possible to save most of the men. On the other hand, the
torpedo-boat "G7" and an incoming auxiliary cruiser which were
attacked in the neighbourhood of Amrum had better luck, as all
the torpedoes fired at them missed.

The annoyance from submarines increased our determination

62

Autumn and Winter Months of 1914

to master them. In October, after the English "E 3 " had fallen
a victim to one of our U-boats, which had been lying in wait all
day for this exceptionally well-handled ship, and several other
English submarines had had unpleasant experiences with our mines
in the neighbourhood of Heligoland, the area of the Bight inside
Heligoland was given a wider berth. Beyond the island, however,
we had perpetually to deal with the watchful activities of English
submarines. Moreover, during the autumn storms the neighbour-
hood of the coasts was particularly unfavourable for navigation.
Our own submarine cruises extended farther and farther afield as
the commanders continued to gain experience, and by exchanging
notes these operations became increasingly effective.

On October 15 "U16" passed Heligoland after a cruise of
fifteen days, and on her return reported that she was still perfectly
effective. This month also witnessed the first cruise round the
British Islands. "U 20 " (Lieutenant-Commander Droescher), which
had been sent out against transports in the English Channel, found
itself compelled, by damage to the diving apparatus, to avoid the
Channel, which was closely patrolled, and therefore returned round
Ireland and Scotland. The cruise took eighteen days in all.

On November 1 the English cruiser Hermes was sunk off Dun-
kirk by the U-boats which were commissioned to hinder the
transport of English troops to the French ports. Unfortunately no
success in this particular direction was achieved.

To assign this task of interrupting the English troopship service
to the Fleet was to make a totally impossible demand, as the losses
it would inevitably involve would be out of all proportion to the
advantage the army would derive from the disturbance to the trans-
port of English troops such a Fleet action might cause. Even if the
presence of our Fleet in these waters held up one or more ships,
the way would be open the minute our Fleet left, and nothing could
be easier than to arrange for ships to put out as soon as news was
received that the enemy had gone. However important a factor
in the war on land England's effort might be, the best way of neutral-
ising it would have been the occupation of the French Channel coast.

If our Fleet went into the English Channel by the Dover-
Calais Straits its tactical situation would be simply hopeless. It
would have no room to manoeuvre against torpedo and mine attack.
Our own destroyers would not have enough fuel, as their radius
of action only just reached as far, and they would then find them-
selves compelled to return. The Fleet would then have had to do

63

Germany's High Sea Fleet

without them or return with them. There could be no question
of the former alternative on account of the danger from submarines,
defence against which was the work of the destroyers, and also
because the destroyers were indispensable for battle. The Fleet
was therefore dependent upon the radius of action of the destroyers.
The appearance of the submarine as a defensive weapon has made
it a necessity in modern times to screen the approach of a fleet
with destroyers. Moreover, it is so important to increase the
offensive powers of a fleet which is inferior in numbers by the
employment of destroyers that these cannot possibly be dispensed
with. If one compares, simply on a map, the position of a fleet
which ventures into the Channel from the Heligoland Bight with
that of a fleet making for the Heligoland Bight from the English
coast — from the Firth of Forth, for example — the advantages and
disadvantages of the prospects on either side are at once apparent.
One fleet is placed as if it were corked in a bottle, while the other
has freedom of movement over the whole area in its rear.

At the end of October Squadron II had visited Kiel dockyard
to effect certain important improvements in armament and the com-
fort of the ships, which had suffered very much from the removal
of everything which was likely to catch fire. This was in the in-
terests of the health of the ships' companies during the winter. The
compartments throughout the ship were insulated in the same way
as those in the newer ships by the use of fireproof material. Living
in ships in which every noise came as a shock from one end to the
other became a severe trial to the nerves as time went by, and in view
of the strenuous hours on watch, was prejudicial to the short period
allowed for rest. The victims will never forget those weeks of the
war in which the tapping of hammers and the scraping of chisels
never ceased from first thing in the morning to last thing at night,
and mountains of wood and superfluous paint vanished from the
ship.

This first visit of a squadron to the Baltic was also to be employed
in various exercises in which cruisers and destroyers were to
participate. It appeared advisable, in view of this, to take advantage
of the presence of the ships for a great enterprise against Libau which
might be very unpleasant as a winter base for enemy submarines, as it
was the only Russian ice-free harbour. While the orders for this enter-
prise were being settled with the Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic
and everyone was burning for the chance of at last firing his first shot,
the news reached us from the North Sea that the bombardment of

6 4

Germany's High Sea Fleet

English coast towns had successfully been carried out on November 3.
Early that morning our battle-cruisers had appeared off Yarmouth
to bombard the harbour and its fortifications while mines were being
laid under their protection. The absence of Squadron II had not
restrained the Commander-in-Chief from taking advantage of the
favourable weather and long nights for this raid, from which we
could anticipate an effect on the defensive attitude of the enemy as
well as the direct influence which the damage to a hostile base would
have on the enemy's operations. It was not found necessary to send
the Fleet out to take up an advanced station at sea in the case of
the short raid to Yarmouth, because the plan was to be based entirely
on surprise under cover of darkness. After returning from this raid
the old armoured cruiser Yorck ran on a mine in a mist in the Jade
and was capsized by the explosion. It was found possible to save
the larger part of the crew.

The raid against Libau was cancelled at the last moment as the
result of an order from the Naval Staff to Squadron II, which was
already on its way. The frequent reports of the activity of English
submarines in the Baltic, which had come in of late, seemed to point
to the wisdom of abandoning the enterprise, as the bombardment by
ships of land targets would certainly offer submarines their very best
chances of attack. The submarine danger was taken very seriously
because we had not yet had sufficient experience and training in the
defence.

On November 6 we received the news of the victory of our cruiser
squadron on November 1 off Coronel on the coast of Chile. Vice-
Admiral Count von Spee had defeated in fair and open fight the
English cruisers Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow and the auxiliary
cruiser Otranto with his ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the
light cruisers Leipzig and Dresden. The two hostile armoured
cruisers were destroyed by a superior fire, while Glasgow and Otranto
escaped under cover of falling night. Great was the enthusiasm over
the fact that the brave admiral had succeeded, in spite of all obstacles,
in leading his ships to a victory which dealt a severe blow to the
tradition of English superiority at sea. This news filled us in the
Fleet with pride and confidence, and we thought in gratitude of those
who, left to their resources in distant oceans, had gained immortal
laurels for the German flag. Unfortunately fate was not to permit
them to see their homeland again. Those who, with their leaders,
rest in the ocean depths by the Falkland Islands, gave us a shining
example of heroism, of devotion to duty.

.66

CHAPTER VI

BOMBARDMENT OF SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL, AND THE
BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK

IN the first months of the war many efforts had been made to
conduct our operations in a way that would cause the enemy
such losses as would enable us to speak of a real equalisation of forces.
But in vain. The results of our mine-laying were unknown, while
the successes of our submarines did not weigh much in the scale,
as the ships they torpedoed had no fighting value. On the other
hand, raids by our cruisers were much more likely to bring consider-
able portions of the English Fleet out of their harbours and thus
give our Fleet a favourable chance of intervening if it kept in close
touch with its cruisers. For this purpose our cruisers would in any
case have to go far beyond the limits of distance they had hitherto
observed — not more than ioo nautical miles from Heligoland. Then
only would our cruisers begin to have some real effect. Within the
limits imposed upon him the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had
described the efforts we had made — cruisers had put to sea, mine-
laying was carried out continuously in spite of the losses we had
suffered, submarines had done far more than was expected of them,
were untiring in their efforts and had penetrated as far as the English
coasts, yet for the Fleet itself these operations had proved a dis-
appointment. Strategical reasons had made it necessary to keep
our Fleet back, and this looked like a want of confidence and affected
the moral of the men, and gradually lowered their belief in their own
efficiency to a regrettable degree. An impressive recital of these
facts with the request that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
should be allowed greater latitude was met with a decided rebuff.
The grounds of this refusal, as communicated by the Naval Staff, ran
somewhat as follows :

"The existence of our Fleet, ready to strike at any moment, has
hitherto kept the enemy away from the North Sea and Baltic coasts
and made it possible to resume trade with neutral countries in the
Baltic. The Fleet has thus taken over the protection of the coast

67

Germany's High Sea Fleet

and troops required for that purpose are now available for use in the
field. After even a successful battle, the ascendancy of the
Fleet under the numerical superiority of the enemy would give way,
and under the pressure of the enemy Fleet the attitude of the neutrals
would be prejudiciously influenced. The Fleet must therefore be
held back and avoid actions which might lead to heavy losses. This
does not, however, prevent favourable opportunities being made use
of to damage the enemy. An employment of the Fleet outside the
German Bight, which the enemy tries to bring about through his
movements in the Skagerrak, is not mentioned in the orders for opera-
tions as being one of the favourable opportunities. There is nothing
to be said against an attempt of the big cruisers in the North Sea to
damage the enemy."

These instructions served the purpose of the further enterprise
against the English coast. On December 15 the big cruisers under
the command of Vice-Admiral Hipper sailed under orders to bombard
the fortified coast towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool and to lay
mines along the coast, for there was constant traffic between the East
Coast ports. Both these places, however, are 150 nautical miles
nearer to the chief bases of the English Fleet in the North of
the British Isles than is Yarmouth. It would, therefore, be much
easier for vessels lying there or cruising at sea in the vicinity
to beat off an attack, and the expedition would probably present
a much greater risk, and a more urgent call for support from the
Fleet.

The 2nd Scouting Division, composed of light cruisers and two
torpedo-boat flotillas, was attached to the 1st Scouting Division of
battle-cruisers. They left the Jade on the 15th at 3.20 a.m., followed
late in the afternoon of the same day by squadrons of battleships. The
hour of departure for both divisions was chosen in order to profit by
the darkness and if possible put to sea unobserved. Judging from
what ensued, this appears to have succeeded. A rendezvous at sea at
54 30' N. Lat. and 7 42' E. Long, was appointed for the squadrons
coming from the Jade and the Elbe. In order to get there I left the
anchorage at Cuxhaven with Squadron II at 4 p.m. From the meet-
ing-place Squadron II took the course ordered by the Commander-in-
Chief— W.N.W. by ^W.-at a speed of 15 knots. As all the
ships were most carefully darkened, nothing could be seen of the
other squadrons. The navigation had therefore to be most accurate
in order that the squadrons might be in their proper places the next

68

Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool

morning. Seven to five nautical miles had been determined on as
the distance between the squadrons from flagship to flagship. The
sailing order of the units was : Squadrons I, III and II. To ensure
the safety of the Main Fleet when under way, the two older
armoured cruisers, Prinz Heinrich and Roon, were placed ahead,
together with a torpedo-boat flotilla. To cover the flanks two light
cruisers were utilised, each with a flotilla. The light cruiser Stettin,
with two flotillas, covered the rear. During the night several fishing
steamers were stopped by the escorting torpedo-boats but released as
non-suspect.

At 5.20 a.m. a torpedo-boat in the vanguard reported four enemy
destroyers in Square 105. This was at 54 55' N. Lat. and 2 10'
E. Long. This spot was about 20 nautical miles north-west of the
appointed meeting-place for the cruisers, to which destination the
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was also steaming. As several
hours must elapse before we could reach our destination, and no
further message followed the first one, we continued on our way. An
hour later there was another message from a torpedo-boat in the
vanguard to the effect that ten enemy destroyers had been sighted and
that flashes from guns were visible. A quarter of an hour later the
same boat reported that a chase had started. Thereupon at 6.45 the
Commander-in-Chief gave the signal for all the squadrons to turn
into a S.E. course as it still wanted an hour and a half to daylight.
By issuing that order he carried out his purpose of avoiding an
encounter with the enemy torpedo-boats and denying them the
opportunity to attack in the dark.

Meanwhile our vanguard had begun to fight with the enemy
destroyers. At 6.58 the light cruiser Hamburg (Captain von
Gaudecker) reported that he had sunk an enemy destroyer. At 7.10
the Fleet turned again to the E.S.E.-J4E. and started on the return
journey.

It had passed considerably beyond the arc from Terschelling
to Horns Reef that shuts off the Bight. Having set out with the
object of supporting our cruisers, there was now no possibility of
carrying out that plan, seeing the great distance that lay between
the two divisions. In this case, therefore, the success of the cruisers'
enterprise was entirely dependent on their taking the enemy by
surprise and avoiding the enemy's superior forces.

Towards daybreak, when our cruisers were approaching the
English coast, the wind rose to such a pitch and the sea ran so high
that the light cruiser Strassburg reported at 7 a.m. that, owing to

69

Germany's High Sea Fleet

heavy seas off the land, firing was no longer possible and the ship
had been obliged to turn on an easterly course. As, under these
conditions, the light cruisers and torpedo-boats could only be a
hindrance to the big cruisers, the Commander-in-Chief decided to
dispatch those vessels in the direction of the Main Fleet, with the
exception of the light cruiser Kolberg, which was to continue laying
mines at the places determined on.

The big cruisers then divided into two groups for the bombard-
ment of the coastal towns, the northern section, the Seydlitz, Moltke
and Bliicher, making for Hartlepool. An officer of one of the U-boats
who had reconnoitred the area beforehand rendered good service
in locating the place. Shortly before they were off Hartlepool the
cruisers were attacked by four torpedo-boat destroyers of the " River "
class that ran out to sea and were brought under fire at a distance
of about 50 hm. The sinking of one destroyer and heavy damage
to another were observed. After firing some torpedoes without any
result, they turned away. We gave up pursuing them so as not to
lose time for the bombardment. The Seydlitz opened fire on the
Cemetery Battery and scored several hits, so that at last the fire was
only returned by one 15 cm. gun and one light gun from the battery.
The Moltke was hit above the water-line, causing much damage
between decks but no loss of life. From the first, the Bliicher came
under a lively fire from the land batteries; she had nine killed and
three wounded by one hit alone. 15 cm. howitzers and light artillery
were used on land ; the Bliicher was hit six times altogether.

The southern group, Von der Tann and Derfflinger, made for
Scarborough which was easily distinguishable. The coastguard
station at Scarborough and the signalling and coastguard stations
at Whitby were destroyed. At the latter place the second round
brought down the signalling flagstaff with the English ensign and
the entire station building as well. The Derfflinger also bombarded
trenches and barracks at Scarborough. As there was no counter-
action it must be assumed that the battery at Scarborough was either
not manned, in proper time, or had been evacuated by the garrison .
The light cruiser Kolberg laid her mines at the appointed place
without much difficulty, although the ship heeled over to 12 degrees
and the tip apparatus (for dropping the mines overboard) drew water.
At 9.45 the cruisers assembled round the Seydlitz and started to
retire in the direction of the meeting-place agreed on with the Main
Fleet. An hour later, at 10.45, a wireless message was received
from the Chief of Reconnaissance with the Fleet that the task

70

Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool

was accomplished and that he was stationed at 54 45' N., o° 30' W.
At 12.30 noon the Stralsund, of the Second Scouting Division,
with Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II attached, sighted a number of enemy
cruisers and, turning in a south-westerly direction, evaded them to
try and join the large cruisers. The English cruisers were again
lost to sight, as the weather was very misty. Soon afterwards
the Stralsund sighted six large enemy ships which were made out to
be battleships of the "Orion" class, and therefore the Second
English Battle Squadron. The Stralsund kept in touch with them
and continued to report on the course and the speed of the enemy.
At 1 p.m. these groups were at 54° 20' N. lat., 2° d E. long. This
report caused our big cruisers to turn off in a north-easterly direction,
as owing to the bad visibility they were compelled to avoid an un-
expected encounter with battleships of superior fighting strength
than that of our own. At that time the position of the two forces
facing each other was approximately as follows :

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Xb ®£> 15 sm

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130 sm. >- H-*

Great disappointment was caused on board my flagship by this
report. If our big cruisers had got into difficulties between the
enemy battle-squadron and other cruisers already reported and still
in the vicinity, our help would be too late. There was no longer
any possibility while it was still day of coming up with the enemy
battle-squadron, which at one o'clock was 130 nautical miles distant
from us. Our premature turning on to a E.S.E. course had robbed
us of the opportunity of meeting certain divisions of the enemy
according to the prearranged plan, which was now seen to have been

7i

Germany's High Sea Fleet

correct. At all events the restrictions imposed on the Commander-
in-Chief of the Fleet brought about the failure of the bold and
promising plan, owing to its not having been carried out in the
proper manner. As we now know from an English source, the
destroyers fired at by the Hamburg were about 10 nautical miles
in front of the Second Battle Squadron which had come down on
a southerly course — the vanguard of which had got into touch with
ours between 6 and 7 a.m.; and since the position at 1 p.m., reported
by the Stralsund, coincides exactly with the English statement, it
proves that at 7 a.m. both the main fleets were only about 50 nautical
miles apart. It is extremely probable that by continuing in our
original direction the two courses would have crossed within sight
of each other during the morning.

The advantage in a battle ensuing therefrom was distinctly on
our side. The English had at their disposal on the spot the Second
Battle Squadron with six ships, the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron
with four ships was within attacking distance, and added to these
were a few light cruisers and the Third Cruiser Squadron attached
to the Second Battle Squadron.

According to his own statement, the English admiral in command
did not leave Scapa Flow with the other ships till 12 noon, after
receiving news of the bombardment at 9 a.m. He could not possibly
have been in time; while the Third English Squadron, which had
been sighted at 10 o'clock, would not have had the advantage over
our Fleet.

On the part of the English, disappointment was felt that coastal
towns had again been bombarded by our cruisers and that they could
not succeed in stopping it, although the necessary forces chanced
to be at sea and had even got into touch with our light cruisers.
This, according to Admiral Jellicoe's account, may have been due
to the fact that the squadrons at sea had received instructions from
him how to act so as to cut off the enemy, but had also had direct
orders from the English Admiralty which were totally different and
which were acted upon by Sir George Warrender, in command of
the Second Battle Squadron.

The weather conditions were remarkable on that day. In the
east section of the North Sea — the area through which our Fleet had
passed — there was a slight easterly wind, no sea running, and perfect
visibility. At the 3rd deg. E. Long, there was a sharply denned
spot where the weather changed. A north-westerly storm raged off
the English coast and the sea was correspondingly rough, making

72

Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool

it extremely difficult to serve the guns even on board the big cruisers.
Between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m., as our Fleet withdrew, an extraordinary
number of drifting mines were observed, more than 70, some of
them already exploded. They must have broken loose from
the big minefield at the entrance to the Canal. It was a lucky
chance that we escaped damage when, on the preceding night,
the ships passed through that area without being able to observe
them. At 8 p.m. on December 16, Squadron II ran into the Elbe
again, and the others returned to the Jade.

The impression that a specially favourable opportunity had been
missed still prevailed, and the chance of another such arising could
hardly be expected.

The behaviour of the English Fleet makes it obvious that our
advance was a complete surprise to them, nor had they counted on
our Main Fleet pushing forward to the Dogger Bank. Otherwise
the English expedition would surely have comprised stronger forces
than merely one battle squadron, a battle-cruiser squadron, and
lighter forces. This combination certainly made them superior to
our cruiser attack but not to an attack by our Fleet. The information
that besides the German ships in action off the English coast a
still greater number were out at sea was communicated to the
English Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at 2 p.m. by the English
Admiralty.

The English received the news through their "directional
stations" which they already had in use, but which were only
introduced by us at a much later period. They are wireless stations
for taking the directional bearings of wireless messages, and in
combination are capable of indicating the direction from which
intercepted wireless messages come and thus locating the signalling
ship's station. The stretch of the English east coast is very favourable
for the erection of these "directional stations." In possessing them
the English had a very great advantage in the conduct of the war,
as they were able thus to obtain quite accurate information as to
the locality of the enemy as soon as any wireless signals were sent
by him. In the case of a large fleet, where separate units are
stationed far apart and communication between them is essential,
an absolute cessation of all wireless intercourse would be fatal to
any enterprise.

Towards the end of December a change was made in the squadron
command. Other ships had been added to Squadron III since the
declaration of war. The Konig, Grosser Kurfiirst and Markgraf

73

Germany's High Sea Fleet

had all made their trial trips. The Kronprinz was very near com-
pletion and on January 2 was enrolled as the eighth ship in the
squadron. I was entrusted with the command of this squadron.
It was no easy matter for me to separate from Squadron II, which
had been under my command for nearly two whole years, as I had
learnt to value the splendid spirit of the crews, who, in spite of the
inferior fighting powers of the ships, made it a point of honour
never to be behindhand in anything. But personal feelings were
not to be considered, and I had to look upon it as a great distinction
that the command of our most powerful fighting squadron was
given to me. The command of Squadron II was taken over
on December 26 by Rear-Admiral Funke, whereupon I left for
Wilhelmshaven to take up my position on the Prinz Regent Luitpold.
The ensuing time was fully occupied in learning to know the
peculiarities of the new class of ship and the standard of fighting
power of each individual vessel, and in judging the personality of
the commanders and the corps of officers. The prevailing conditions
of war made it more difficult to cultivate close relations with them
than would have been the case in peace time. My chief object was
so to train the unit as to make it absolutely reliable for implicit
obedience to commands. I applied, therefore, to the Commander-
in-Chief for an opportunity for a period of training in the Baltic
towards the end of January. This was all the more necessary in view
of the fact that since they were commissioned the four ships of the
" Konig " class had had no practice in torpedo firing.

From a military point of view torpedo firing practice is an urgent
necessity in the training and further development of all torpedo
officers, those who are in charge of the torpedo tubes, and of those
in reserve, in order to prove that the results from the use of
the weapon are equal to expectations. Particular attention must be
given to range practice and angle-discharging, which make a great
demand on the ability of the torpedo men. During the war many
ships were provided with torpedoes with all the latest improvements,
without the crew having had an opportunity to fire them or become
familiar with the handling of them. Experience showed that it was
necessary to test every torpedo that had lain unused for more than
five months to make sure that it would act when needed.

So long as enemy submarines remained in those waters the inner
Bight of the North Sea was not a suitable place for gun-practice;
these craft could not have had a better opportunity for firing their
torpedoes. The mouths of the rivers certainly offered chances to our

74

Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool

gunners of practice on objects passing by, but there was very little
scope for gun practice at long range under fighting conditions. The
necessity of combining the training period with the time required
for unavoidable repairs, as also with the war activities of the Fleet
which called for the participation of the highest possible number of
ships, was a matter of extreme difficulty from the point of view of
organisation.

Before Squadron III could sail for the Baltic there was to be
another enterprise by the Fleet in the North Sea, which, owing to
bad weather, was postponed from day to day. January, 191 5,
opened with most unfavourable weather, and one violent storm
followed rapidly on another. But when, in searching for a passage
for the Fleet through the minefields, it was discovered that many
new ones had been laid down, both north of Amrum and west of
Borkum, and also in the gap between Norderney and the safety
barrier we had put down, the plan for an advance by the Fleet was
abandoned. These mines would first have had to be removed, which
would have been slow work owing to the bad weather. Instead of a
big action by the Fleet, two light cruisers went out to lay mines and
succeeded in placing a barrier 50 nautical miles from the English
coast, close to the mouth of the Humber, presumably just in the
enemy's outgoing course.

Towards the middle of the month the Fleet was kept at a high
pitch of readiness as there was reason to believe the English were
planning a blockade of our estuaries. The idea was extremely
probable, as the poor visibility in winter weather offered the most
favourable conditions for carrying it out. In the Jade particularly
the channel for large vessels was so narrow and so shallow that
the traffic was greatly hindered, especially in the case of certain
vessels. There could be no warding off such an attack by a coast
battery, as Wangeroog was not yet fortified. In any case, we could
not afford to over-estimate the difficulty of carrying out such an
undertaking; in view of the vast amount of material possessed by
England for such a purpose, success in it was by no means out of
the question. The fact that the Fleet would be obliged to push the
undertaking to our very river mouths doubtless formed their chief
reason for not making such an attempt, the success of which would
have been very detrimental to the carrying out of our U-boat and
mining warfare.

On the morning of January 19, an aeroplane having sighted
60 miles north-west of Heligoland numerous English ships bound

75

Germany's High Sea Fleet

on an easterly course, among them several battle-cruisers and close
upon ioo small craft, we made sure that their plan was to be put
into execution. It is quite possible that the aeroplane was mistaken
as to the number and type of the ships, although the report was
confirmed from another source — two U-boats that returned from
sea. However, the torpedo-boats which were sent out to reconnoitre
and to attack at night if necessary saw nothing of the enemy forces,
so they probably had withdrawn early. At any rate we considered
the danger of a blockade to be at an end.

On January 21 Squadron III sailed for the Elbe. During the
passage there was a violent snowstorm which made it very difficult
to locate the mouth of the river. Owing to the rapidly falling
depth of water as shown by the soundings taken, we were forced to
anchor, a manoeuvre carried out in exemplary fashion by the big
ships, in spite of the current and the mist. It showed very
clearly the difference between the navigation of a squadron of such
large vessels and that of Squadron II where the ships had not half
the displacement. The next morning the weather was calm and clear,
and the passage through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was accom-
plished without accident. It took us only 10 hours to cover the long
stretch of 100 kilometres from the lock gates at Brunnsbiittel to the
entrance into the lock at Holtenau in Kiel Harbour.

While the training of Squadron III was proceeding in the Baltic,
jhe first regular cruiser action took place in the North Sea.

BATTLE OF CRUISERS OFF THE DOGGER BANK

After a long period of inaction, the weather being apparently
favourable, the commander of the scouting ships was ordered
on January 23 to reconnoitre off the Dogger Bank with the cruisers
of the 1st and 2nd Scouting Divisions, the First Leader of
the Torpedo-boat Forces, and the Second Flotilla, and there to
destroy any of the enemy's light forces to be met with. They were
to set out in the evening, when darkness fell, and were expected
back the following evening when it was again dark.

The speed of the advance was to be such that the cruisers, at
daybreak on the 24th, would have reached the south-east edge of
the Dogger Bank. It was not intended to push farther on towards
the Bank while it was still dark, otherwise enemy forces might make
their way unobserved in between Heligoland and the cruisers. On
the way there no trade or fishing steamers were to be examined, if

76

Battle of Cruisers off the Dogger Bank

it could be avoided, so as not to be forced to leave any of our torpedo-
boats behind ; but the plan of action for the homeward run included
the examination and, where necessary, seizure of all the fishing
steamers encountered.

The big cruiser Von der Tann was missing from our cruiser
squadron, being in dock for urgently needed repairs, as was also
the light "cruiser Strassburg. The fighting force, therefore, com-

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The Fight off the Dogger Bank

prised the cruisers Seydlitz — the flagship of Rear-Admiral Hipper —
Derfflinger, Moltke and Bliicher, the light cruisers Graudenz,
Stralsund, Kolberg and Rostock, Torpedo-Boat Flotilla V, and
the 2nd and i8th Half-Flotillas. The Graudenz and Stralsund
formed the vanguard, the flanks were supported by the Rostock on
the starboard and by the Kolberg on the larboard side. A half-
flotilla was attached to each light cruiser.

At 8.15 a.m. on the 24th the Kolberg encountered an enemy
light cruiser and destroyers. The enemy's signal of recognition
was answered by the Kolberg turning on the searchlight and shortly
afterwards opening fire, which was returned a few minutes later.
The Kolberg was hit twice and had two men killed. At the same
time she sighted thick clouds of smoke in a west-south-westerly

77

Germany's High Sea Fleet

direction, and the Stralsund also reported to the same effect to the
north-north-west.

The conclusion thus to be drawn was that other and more
numerous forces were lying off the Dogger Bank.

After Admiral Hipper had picked up the Kolberg he assembled
his group on a south-easterly course, as it was still not sufficiently

8 h 20 m Vm. 24 1.1915

Rauchwoiken
Anscheinend & grbBere Schiffe

Rauchwoiken

y^Graudenz
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Zerstorer

Rostock

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^t Kolberg

\Jjps (Vorudergehende WendungaufWest)

Situation at 8.20 A.M., January 24, 1915

light to make out the number and type of the enemy forces. While
the ships were assembling, four cruisers of the "Town" class,
three cruisers of the " Arethusa " class, and a large number of
destroyers were sighted on a parallel course north of our cruisers,
but out of gun range. The Blucher was able to count more than
twenty destroyers. Further clouds of smoke could be seen in their
rear, and the Stralsund reported that at least eight large ships were
observable in a north-north-westerly direction.

Admiral Hipper was bound therefore to assume that at the
rear of these numerous light forces there must be other and

78

Battle of Cruisers off the Dogger Bank

stronger groups of ships, and, as he could not count on any support
from our own Main Fleet, he decided to push on full speed ahead
in a south-easterly direction. The torpedo-boats were sent on ahead.
The Bliicher, being the rear ship, was permitted at discretion to
open fire, as some of the destroyers to the north approached very
near, while the light cruisers with them stood off farther to the
north.

fi h 40 m Vm

Samm&Cn cut/ SO

Aauc/wotAer

\^^ Crtujxfeni

Situation at 8.40 A.M.

At 9.35 a.m., however, five thick clouds of smoke were observed
from starboard in a west to west-north-west direction, which were
soon made out to be from the 1st English Battle-Cruiser Squadron.
They came up at full speed and opened fire at a great distance,
about 200 hm., and, at first at any rate, without reaching our
cruisers.

The naval command at Wilhelmshaven received the first news
of the encounter of our cruisers with the enemy at 8.50 a.m., when
the Seydlitz reported herself as being at 54 53' N. Lat. and 3 30'

79

Germany's High Sea Fleet

E. Long., course S.E., speed 20 knots, and had sighted eight large
ships, one light cruiser and twelve destroyers. The command at
once issued orders for special preparation on board all ships and
torpedo-boat flotillas and assembled them in the Schillig Roads.
As the way to the Bight was open to our cruisers, and they were
in touch with the enemy forces in the rear, it was assumed that so
far our ships were not in any danger. Towards 10.30 a.m. the
squadrons were all assembled in the Schillig Roads, and rah out
to sea at 11. 10, as a wireless message had come from the Admiral
at 11 o'clock, saying he was in urgent need of support. He was
then at 54° 30' N. Lat. and 4 35' E. Long.

These forces were, however, not called upon to take any active
part in the battle, as the further— development of the fighting at
that time showed it to be unnecessary.

Meanwhile the situation of the cruisers had developed as follows :
At 10 a.m. our large cruisers were lying on a south-easterly course,
so that all the ships could open fire from the starboard on the English

IO h ll m Vm

1 I. Battle cruiser

\
\

r

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■v

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Position at 10.11 A.M
80

Battle of Cruisers off the Dogger Bank

large cruisers. Our light cruisers and both the flotillas were ahead
of our large cruisers, slightly on the starboard side.

The enemy battle-cruisers came up very rapidly, and must have
made a speed of at least 26 knots.*

Our 1st Scouting Division was not favourably situated, owing
to the prevailing east-north-east wind. There was nothing for
it, however, but to keep to the south-east course, leading to the
Bight, as the main direction for the fighting. The chances of
support from our own forces were greater there, and the farther we
could succeed in drawing the enemy into the Bight the greater
prospect there would be of setting torpedo-boats on him during
the ensuing night. Any other course leading farther south or still
farther west would not greatly have improved the smoke conditions,
but would from the first have placed the enemy battle-cruisers in a
frontal position. On the other hand, a north-easterly course, so
as to have the wind ahead, would have carried our forces straight
up against the enemy destroyers, and thus offered them a good
opportunity for attack. Soon after 10 o'clock our large cruisers
opened fire at 180 hm. ; the enemy manoeuvred so as to avoid our
fire. At the same time our cruisers also turned about between
E.S.E. and S.E. to a S. course. The range for the leading ship,
the Seydlitz, varied between 180 to 145 hm. The enemy had
separated and formed two groups, the leading one having three,
and the other two ships, f

They were trying, to keep at the farthest firing distance. Soon
after the fighting began the Seydlitz was badly hit and both her
after turrets, with their two 28-cm. guns, were put out of action,
while fires were caused in them by the exploding ammunition. The
gunners in both turrets were killed, and the turrets themselves
jammed and put out of action, Owing to the fire, which took
a long time to extinguish, the munition chamber had to be flooded.

Meanwhile some of the light cruisers and destroyers were
steaming up on the larboard [port] side, so that the near ships
could fire on them occasionally. In doing so Bliicher, the last ship,
hit and heavily damaged a destroyer. At 11.30 the enemy appeared
to be drawing nearer; at the same time the Bliicher reported engine
trouble and dropped slowly to the rear.

* The English, commander, Admiral Beatty, boasted in his report that his ships
had achieved a speed of 28.5 knots.

+ According to an English account, the Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New
Zealand and Indomitable.

G 81

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The order " Flotilla clear for attack " was then sent to the
torpedo-boat leader. At 11.45 tne leading enemy ship, with a
heavy list on, turned off and drew out of the line. The ship
following after her passed the leader, so as to keep up the running
fight. The other enemy battle-cruisers followed at irregular dis-
tances. At 12 o'clock our cruisers turned towards the enemy, and
the torpedo-boats were ordered to attack. The enemy battle-
cruisers then turned at once to a northerly course to evade the

-

n h 55 m Vm

0t Qtikfytr

^^ L Battle crulter

Position at 11.55 A.M.

torpedo-boats and to turn on the Blucher, which had been left
behind. In view of this manoeuvre the torpedo-boats were recalled
from the attack.

Our cruisers now took up a southerly course, intending to open an
encircling fight with, the enemy, and if possible render help to the
Blucher. But both turrets on board the Seydlitz, with two-fifths of

82

Battle of Cruisers oft the Dogger Bank

the heavy guns, were definitely out of action, and the ship's stern was
full of water which had spread to the other parts from the flooding of
the munition chamber, so the Admiral of the cruisers therefore de-
cided to profit by the increased distance caused by the enemy's
manoeuvre to turn again to S.E. and break off the fight. At 1.45
the enemy was lost to view, the Seydlitz being then 25 nautical
miles north of the mouth of the Elbe.

12 h

Mittag

/ *'

Bluchtr

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Position at 12 noon

At 3.30 p.m. the forces that had run out from the Jade joined the
returning cruisers and together entered the rivers.

Besides the explosion and the list on the leading enemy ship, many
other hits and a big fire on the second ship were observed. Several
officers asserted positively that they had seen one of the large cruisers
sink, which gave rise to the report that it was the battle-cruiser Tiger.
Contradictory reports from an English source appeared later in the
Press and confirmed the opinion that the English wished to conceal
the fact. The airship "L 5," which was hovering over the spot,

83

Germany's High Sea Fleet

reported that only four large ships were seen to withdraw. The
torpedo-boat "V 5," Lieut.-Commander von Eichhorn, which, after
being recalled from the attack, had dropped out from between the
two fighting lines, fired two torpedoes at 70 hm., and thereupon
observed the withdrawal of a battle-cruiser. There seems no obvious
reason why the English cruisers should so soon have stopped fighting
after their leader fell out and when the number of our cruisers had
already dwindled to three, unless it was because our guns had
severely handled them.

On our side we deplored the loss of the Bliicher. Very soon after
her engines were damaged another shot caused an explosion and
a fire amidships, apparently in the big ammunition chamber, situate
in that part of the vessel. It was observed how to the very last the
ship's guns on both sides fired on the battle-cruisers which concen-
trated their fire on that one ship, as did also the numerous enemy
light cruisers and destroyers, for whom the wrecked ship was a wel-
come target, until at 1.7 p.m. she turned over and sank. The sur-
vivors of the crew were picked up by English destroyers and other
ships that were at hand, among them being the gallant commander,
Captain Erdmann, who unfortunately died afterwards while a
prisoner in England of pneumonia, the result of the immersion in the
cold sea after his ship had gone down. The Derfflinger and Kolberg
were slightly damaged; the Seydlitz was badly hit a second time on
her armoured belt, the plate being pressed into the ship's side and
causing a leakage. The first shell that hit her had a terrible effect.
It pierced right through the upper deck in the ship's stern and
through the barbette-armour of the near turret, where it exploded. All
parts of the stern, the officers' quarters, mess, etc., that were near
where the explosion took place were totally wrecked. In the reloading
chamber, where the shell penetrated, part of the charge in readiness
for loading was set on fire. The flames rose high up into the turret
and down into the munition chamber, and thence through a
connecting door usually kept shut, by which the men from the
munition chamber tried to escape into the fore turret. The flames
thus made their way through to the other munition chamber, and
thence again up to the second turret, and from this cause the entire
gun crews of both turrets perished almost instantly. The flames
rose as high as a house above the turrets.

Up to 12 noon there had been no prospect of the torpedo-boat
flotillas making a successful attack; the distances were too great.
The torpedo-boats would have been obliged to get within 100 hm.

84

Battle of Cruisers off the Dogger Bank

of the enemy to secure an opportunity of firing. When the distances
were reduced and there was an opening for attack the enemy turned
away and gave up the fight. At that time Admiral Beatty, leader
of the English battle-cruisers, was not in command. From informa-
tion received later, it appeared he had stayed behind on the Lion,
and had then boarded a torpedo-boat to hurry after his ships, but
did not reach them till they were returning.*

The spot where the Bliichetr was sunk is at 54 25' N. Lat., 5 25'
E. Long. When Admiral Hipper decided to break off the fight he,
according to his report, was guided by the conviction that it would be
of no avail to send help to the already sinking Bliicher, and in view
of the enemy's superior strength would only involve us in further
losses. The fighting had lasted more than three hours, and the
Seydlitz had only 200 rounds of ammunition for the guns. The
Naval Command fully recognised that no objection could be raised
to the conduct of the forces in the battle, or to the tactical measures
adopted, and also approved of the decision, hard though it was, to
abandon the Bliicher to her fate.

If our battle-cruisers, by turning round and risking the three
remaining cruisers, had approached the Bliicher, then unnavigable,
they would have entangled themselves in the most unfavourable
tactical position imaginable, as their own torpedo-boats would
have been astern of them, while the enemy would have had his
light cruisers and destroyers directly ahead, and could have used
them for a torpedo attack. The result was, therefore, more than
doubtful; there would probably have been heavy casualties without
corresponding loss on the other side, and the Bliicher could not
possibly have been saved.

The enemy's behaviour obviously shows that it was his intention,
relying on the heavier calibre of his guns, to carry on the fighting
at the greatest distance, to knock out the central guns (15-cm.) of our
ships, and above all to keep themselves beyond the range of our
torpedoes. It would have been easy for him to draw nearer, as was
proved when he steamed up so quickly. His superior speed enabled
him to select the range at his own pleasure. In spite of superior
guns and the more favourable position of the English line, their

♦Admiral Beatty says in his report: "I followed the squadron with the utmost
speed on the destroyer Attack, and met them at noon as they withdrew to the north-
north-west. I went on board the Princess Royal and hoisted my flag at 12.20 p.m.,
when Captain Brock informed me of what had happened after the Lion fell out, how
the Bliicher was sunk, and the enemy battle-cruisers very much damaged had
continued their eastward course." His report does not mention any reason for their
not having pursued the damaged German cruisers.

85

Germany's High Sea Fleet

firing in the protracted running fight was not very successful when
we take into consideration that three of their ships each had eight
34-cm. guns and the two others each eight 30.5-cm. guns. Opposed
to them on our side were two ships each with ten 28-cm. guns, the
Blucher with twelve 2i-cm., and the Derfflinger with eight 30.5-cm.
It is not surprising that the Blucher was destroyed by gun-fire; her
armour plating was not very thick, and, being the last ship of our
line, most of the enemy's fire was concentrated on her.

However regrettable was the great loss of life on board the
Seydlitz through the fire spreading to the munition chamber of each
turret, a valuable lesson had been learned for the future in dealing
with reserve ammunition, and it was applied in subsequent actions.

The unexpected presence of the English ships on the morning
of the 24th leads to the conclusion that the encounter was not
a matter of chance,, but that our plan in some way or other had
got to the knowledge of the English. The leader of our cruisers,
seeing so many ships assembled, must have considered it extremely
probable that still more forces were behind. Whether there was
any other reason for such a concentration cannot be maintained with
certainty. It may possibly be that it was connected with the conduct
of the English on the 19th, or with preparations for a new action.

As we know from the English accounts, the Lion was not able
to reach harbour under her own steam but was taken in tow by the
Indomitable during the afternoon, and towed to the Firth of Forth.
The question as to whether our flotillas that stood by the cruisers
could have kept in touch with the enemy so as to attack at night
must be negatived, as they would not have had sufficient fuel. As
regards the flotillas assembled in the Jade, when the news of the
encounter reached them the enemy was already so far ahead as to
exclude the prospect of a successful night attack.

This first serious fight with large ships which the Fleet had had
the opportunity of participating in proved that the fighting prepared-
ness of the ships as regards the training of all on board was on a
very high level, that the ships were handled in a correct and reliable
manner, and that the serving of the guns, the signalling, and the
transmission of orders from ship to ship during the fight, as well
as the measures necessitated by leakages, had all worked admirably.
Everywhere the behaviour of the crews was exemplary. The case
of the Seydlitz (Captain von Egidy), from which ship, in spite of
the fierce fire raging on board, the command of the whole unit
was calmly maintained, deserves special emphasis.

86

CHAPTER VII

THE YEAR OF THE WAR 1915

ENTERPRISES at sea are doubtless in a greater measure
dependent on chance than those on land, owing largely to the
lack of reliable information of the enemy's movements and the
rapidity with which a situation changes. Therefore absolute liberty
of action is essential to the officer in command of the operation within
the prescribed limit of the objective. The general aim of our Fleet
may be summarised as follows : not to seek decisive battle with the
entire English Fleet, but to test its strength against separate
divisions.

If, however, the burden of responsibility of the officer in command
is to be complicated by suggestions and instructions restricting the
operation of his plans, the possibility of a successful result will be
greatly lessened. The lack of tangible results from the various
enterprises by the Fleet may be attributed to that cause, and no blame
can be attached to the leader, whose whole character was a guarantee
that, trusting implicitly to the powers of those under him, he
would make a determined use of them.

When a change was made in the chief command early in!
February, 1915, the entire Fleet was unanimous in its regrets
that the departing chief, Admiral von Ingenohl, who was highly
esteemed and respected by all his officers, had not been able to
obtain any great results.

The command was given to Admiral von Pohl, the former Chief
of the Naval Staff. Whilst acting in the latter capacity,
Admiral von Pohl had brought about the U-boat trade-war on
England, which on February 4th was notified under the form of
a declaration that the waters round England were to be included
in the war zone. The use of the U-boat in this connection opened
up a new field for the conduct of naval warfare and might prove
of the greatest importance on the issue of the war. The neces-
sity of resorting to it arose from the nature of the English method
of conducting naval warfare, and will be discussed in detail in
a later section.

The action of the Fleet under Pohl's leadership coincided with

87

Germany's High Sea Fleet

the views held by him when Chief of the Naval Staff — that
the maintenance of the Fleet intact at that stage of the war was
a necessity. His plan was by frequent and constant advances
of the entire High Sea Fleet to induce the enemy to operate in the
North Sea, thus either assuring incidental results or leading to a
decisive battle under favourable conditions to ourselves, that
is to say, so close to our own waters that, even if the actual battle
were undecided, the enemy's total losses, owing to the longer
route home with his damaged ships, would be much greater than
ours.

He therefore determined to make such advances with the
strongest possible forces at every possible opportunity. There
was to be no lack of important units, such as torpedo-boats
or indispensable fighting vessels, whether battleships or battle-
cruisers. The advances were not to be pushed farther forward
than was compatible with the plan of fighting closer to our
own than to the enemy waters; therefore, they did not extend a
greater distance than could be covered in a night or a day.
Owing to our shortage of cruisers, our scouting was inadequate
and had to be supplemented by aerial means. Before any en-
counter with the enemy, and during an advance, every precaution
had to be taken to prevent our being exposed to any damage
from submarines; moreover, a careful search for mines, the
driving away of enemy submarines from our coastal waters,
precautions to be observed by torpedo-boats against submarine
attacks, and the highest possible speed while under way, were
all matters of the greatest importance. Besides the preparedness
of the Fleet, fine weather was a primary necessity to the fulfil-
ment of all plans of this kind, and thus it was not always possible
to make a forward movement.

During the months of February and March, therefore, only
two advances were made, while in the more favourable period of
April and May there were four. But in none of these enterprises
was there any encounter with the enemy. They were carried out
in a westerly to north-westerly direction from Heligoland at a
distance of about 100 to 120 nautical miles, thus presenting a
considerably wider area for our airships, but they failed to locate
the enemy. On May 18, during one of these advances, the light
cruiser Danzig, when forty-five nautical miles from Heligoland,
ran into a minefield, but was able to reach dock under her own
steam.

88

The Year of the War 1915

Whenever the news of our putting to sea reached the enemy,
as we gathered from his wireless messages and certain other means,
he began to make a move, but he never left the northern part
of the North Sea. The enemy thus left to us that area of the
sea in which our movements took place, and we observed a similar
method of procedure with regard to him, so that a meeting between
the two Fleets seemed very improbable. If it was the enemy's object
to entice us nearer to his coasts, he failed to achieve it; we did
not favour him by adapting our course of action to suit his
pleasure. Admiral von Pohl considered that a big surplus of forces
was necessary for an offensive of that kind, and if it was available
for the enemy it certainly was not for us.

Although there seemed little prospect of an advance for our Fleet,
the Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the danger from submarines
that it involved, never ceased in his reconnoitring efforts, for only
by such means could efficiency in the navigation of the ships be
secured and familiarity gained with the dangers of the submarines
and mines.

The Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that the enemy would
suffer most from the U-boat and mine-warfare ; but after the U-boat
trade-war was started, very few of those boats could be told off
to seek out the English Grand Fleet. An advance of mine-laying
steamers to the English bases in the north could only lead to
needless sacrifice of the boats.

The auxiliary cruiser Meteor, under the command of Captain
von Knorr, certainly made two successful trips, but the ship was
lost on the second. At her christening she had received the
name of the gunboat commanded by that officer's father, Admiral
von Knorr, of many years' service, which in 1870 had distinguished
herself in a fight with the French cruiser Bouvet, off Havana. On
May 30 this new Meteor had gone to the White Sea, returning
thence to Kiel on June 20, bringing in several prizes. In
August a fresh expedition was made to the Moray Firth with
the object of laying mines off this English naval station. Just
as she had completed the greater part of this task, the Meteor
was seen by an English guardship, the Ramsay, which was at
once torpedoed and sunk. Captain von Knorr rescued four officers
and thirty-nine of the crew, and then started to return. The sink-
ing ship had managed to call up help, so that in the course of
the next day the Meteor found herself encircled by English
cruisers. The captain, with his crew and his prisoners, transferred

89

Germany's High Sea Fleet

just in time to a Swedish sailing-vessel and sank his ship. The
enemy, on arriving, took no notice of the Swedish ship, and when
a Norwegian vessel came along Knorr handed over the prisoners
to her, as it would have been impossible for so many to remain
on board the Swede for any length of time. The crew from the
Meteor were taken on board a ship sent to meet them off Sylt.

The different advances made during the summer months did
not impress the Fleet with the idea that any serious effort was
contemplated of getting at closer quarters with the enemy and
challenging him to action, although the addition made to the forces
of the now complete Squadron III rendered us more than ever
capable of chancing it. Even among the Naval Staff under
Admiral Bachmann the opinion prevailed that the policy of hold-
ing back the Fleet was being carried too far. But no one there
would issue an order that would involve greater risk than the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Fleet, guided by his acquired convictions,
was himself inclined to run.

The restrictions enforced by the previous Command, not to
expose the Fleet to serious losses in the gaining of a prescribed
objective, had meanwhile been swept away. The Fleet Command
had merely been notified that the necessary caution, by means of
reconnaissance, must be observed in all enterprises, and that action
should be broken off if unfavourable conditions arose.

So far as the Fleet was concerned, the general situation of the
war had altered very much to our advantage through the successes
achieved by the Army on the Eastern Front. For the Fleet the
only object in the war lay now in fighting English power at sea,
for there was no longer any question of a Russian landing on our
Baltic coast.

The situation, indeed, had veered round directly opposite, and the
question was whether we should threaten the Russians with a land-
ing. Our squadron IV was therefore detached and sent to the
Baltic at the beginning of June. It was composed of the ships
of the " Wittelsbach " class, under the command of Vice-Admiral
Schmidt. Scouting Division IV and Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VIII
were also detached from the Fleet for the Baltic, and placed
at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief there. Any important
naval action with a view to defeating Russia was, as already
pointed out, quite purposeless. On account of the enormous area
of that Empire, the cutting off of imports by sea could not inflict
any mortal injury. Any maritime enterprises would be in the

90

The Year of the War 1915

nature of support to the operations of the army, by ensuring safety
in the use of the more suitable sea route for the transport of troops
and war material to the Gulf of Riga, or when the town itself was
taken by the army, then to protect it against attacks from the
sea.

The Russians, who had always shown great skill in their use
of mines, had laid down masses of them in the Gulf of Riga. The
removal of such a minefield to enable a division of our ships to enter
the Gulf was a difficult undertaking. Meanwhile the occupation
of Libau afforded a very desirable point of support. The actual
forcing of the Gulf of Riga began early in August.

An opportunity was thus provided of proving whether England
was willing to attempt an entry into the Baltic in order to assist
her Allies. In that case we would be compelled to move our
forces stationed in the east to the west portion of the Baltic. In
anticipation of the necessity of quickly transferring large divisions
of the Fleet to the Baltic, Squadron III was moved to the
Elbe, whither the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, on board
the Friedrich der Grosse, had also betaken himself so as to be
ready if required to assume command in the Baltic.

But the English had no intention of altering their line of action ;
they continued to rely on the effectiveness of their barriers. They had
withdrawn the line of guardships at the north entrance to the North
Sea in the direction of the Faroe Islands, as a permanent patrol of
the line from the Shetland Isles to the Norwegian coast was con-
sidered too dangerous owing to our U-boats. The loss of the
cruiser Hawke and the attack on the Theseus, carried out by
"U29," under command of Lieut.-Commander Weddigen — after-
wards killed — induced them to change their guard system and to
depend chiefly on auxiliary cruisers. They had also succeeded in
forcing neutral shipping to submit to examination at their naval
base in the Orkney Islands.

The U-boat trade-war, which was thought to be our most
effective counter-measure against the blockade, had started
bravely, but owing to America's protests soon took on a very
modest form. The obligation imposed on the U-boats, first to make
sure whether they were dealing with neutral steamers or not, was
bound inevitably to lead to many casualties on account of the mis-
use of flags by the English.

In the middle of July two more valuable boats, " U 23 " and
"U36," were lost. The only survivor from the latter was a petty

91

Germany's High Sea Fleet

officer of the name of Lamm ; he had been entrusted with the task of
bringing in as prize to the Elbe the American ship Pass of Balmaha,
bound for Archangel with cotton, which had been captured when
going round Scotland. He succeeded in achieving this purpose,
although on arriving at Cuxhaven we discovered, to our great sur-
prise, that an English officer and four men were on board. They
had been kept secure during the voyage by this one German petty
officer, and were then handed over as prisoners.

Although in this instance the prize was brought in successfully,
there was no general possibility of the U-boats being able to spare
any of their crew to bring larger ships into a home port. On the
west coast of the British Isles the U-boat trade-war entirely ceased
from the middle of September.

In August our torpedo-boats notified a success during a night
attack. On August 18, Flotilla II, Captain Schuur, returning from
a reconnaissance trip, encountered north of Horns Reef an English
flotilla consisting of one light cruiser and eight destroyers. The
visibility conditions on our side were so excellent that, apparently
unobserved, our craft approached the enemy to within 3,000 metres.
Three torpedoes fired from the leading boat hit and sank the
English cruiser and the destroyer next to her. The other destroyers
made off, probably thinking they had got into a minefield.

A raid on London carried out the same night by the new air-
ships "L " 10, ii and 14, and the favourable news received
from the Baltic theatre of war of the successful bombardment of
the Slava in the Gulf of Riga and the destruction of several gun-
boats and torpedo-boats, added greatly to the day's success.

The Fleet's Baltic enterprise was broken off at the end of August,
as at that time the Army had no troops available to support the
entrance of the Fleet into the Gulf of Riga, and no importance
was attached then to the possession of the town. Besides the
desired opportunity of confronting the enemy with the Fleet, the
investigation of conditions to be reckoned with in the conduct of
the war, in relation to the' conquest two years later of the Baltic
Islands, was of importance. Apart from the loss of some of our
lighter craft while engaged in searching for mines, the battle-
cruiser Moltke was the only vessel to be damaged. She was hit in
her bow by a torpedo. About 450 tons of water poured into the
vessel, which, however, was able to pass through the Kaiser-
Wilhelm Canal and make for a repairing dock at Hamburg, where
the damage was made good in a few weeks' time.

92

The Year of the War 1915

Owing to a difference of opinion between the heads of the Navy
and the Government concerning the conduct of the U-boat warfare,
a change in the post of Chief of the Naval Staff was effected
early in September. Admiral Bachmann returned to his former
post as Chief of the station at Kiel, and was replaced by
Admiral von Holtzendorff.

The latter, in January, 1913, resigned the command of the Fleet,
which he had held during the previous three years. A brilliant
officer, of a very active mind, and possessed of great eloquence
and personal charm, he was a splendid seaman, who, by virtue
of the varied positions he had held, could look back upon an
unusually long spell of foreign service. He was a chivalrous and
amiable personality in whose character courtesy was a prevailing
quality. It was a known fact, however, that he was not on
friendly terms with the State Secretary, Grand-Admiral von
Tirpitz. Strained relations between the two persons who were
called upon to control the Navy in time of war could not serve to
further the cause, in spite of the best intentions of both parties,
which one was bound to assume. The association, however, involved
no change in the fundamental views respecting the Fleet's duties in
the war.

In September the Fleet again advanced in the direction of the
Hoofden, and at the same time mines were laid by the light
cruisers. Fresh minefields were discovered which in part were
noticeable from having mines attached near the surface.* These
new mines lay in the centre of the arc from Horns Reef to Borkum.
Taken in connexion with previously discovered minefields closer
inland off the North and East Frisian Islands, the conclusion was
arrived at that the English purpose was to encircle that part of the
Bight with mines. According to reports from steamers, a number
of English ships, five large ones among them, had been met with
the day before in that district.

The opening of the great Anglo-French autumn offensive on
the Western Front, together with the news that the English Fleet
was also taking part, kept our Fleet in a perpetual state of tension,
although no opportunity was offered for any action, as the report
proved to be untrue.

In September our airships "L " 1, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16 were able

* These are mines which through some error in reckoning the depth of the
water, instead of reaching the desired depth below the surface, have floated up again
sufficiently to be seen, and are therefore the more easily avoided.

93

Germany's High Sea Fleet

to carry out a very effective raid, when all the airships reached
London and returned safely in spite of very strong counter-action.

Greater activity on the part of the Fleet during the autumn months
was prevented owing to the ships of Squadron III being forced
to remain for a long time in dock in order to be fitted with range-
finders and because, on most of the ships, the bearings of the
screw shafts had to be renewed. Owing to the ships lying so con-
stantly in the sandy waters of the Jade basin they had suffered far
more than was the case in peace time, when they were either out in
the open sea or were lying in the clear and calm waters of the
harbour.

In October the Fleet attempted an advance in the usual way
and in a northerly direction, but did not get beyond the latitude
of Horns Reef, where the wind rose so high as to make aerial
reconnaissance and the use of torpedo-boats doubtful, and the
enterprise was broken off.

During the months of November and December the separate
units in turn were given opportunity for gun practice in the Baltic.
This break in the monotonous outpost duty on the Jade was a very
welcome one for the crews, although it by no means signified a
lessening of daily duty, as the time at their disposal had to be used
to the utmost advantage so as not to prolong unnecessarily their
absence from the North Sea. Whilst at Christmas a short frost set
in, opening a prospect of carrying out the Commander-in-Chief's
plan of an enterprise into the North Sea, the weather soon changed
again, and lasting well into January there ensued a period of
bad weather that prevented expeditions of any kind, even searches
for mines.

On January 8, 1916, Admiral von Pohl was taken seriously ill and
transferred to a hospital ship, whence he was later conveyed
to Berlin for an operation. He never recovered and died on
February 23. In him the Navy lost an officer of quite exceptional
steadfastness and devotion to duty; one who exacted much from
himself and who was entirely wrapped up in his calling. As
commander and squadron chief he distinguished himself by sea-
manlike assurance in manoeuvres and a correct grasp of the tactical
situation, so that under his leadership in battle the best results
might have been expected. His highest ambition was to live to
see it, but it was not to be granted to him.

Thanks to the confidence in me of the All-Highest War-Lord,
I was appointed to deputise for Admiral von Pohl, and represented

94

The Year of the War 1915

him until my formal appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the
High Sea forces was issued on January 18.

In the first place I procured information respecting enterprises
that were proceeding and those in prospect. The bad weather pre-
vented their being carried out, with the exception that one steamer
bound for East Africa undertook, without any escort, to set out
on the voyage, hoping to get through best under those conditions.
The auxiliary cruiser Moeive, commanded by Count zu Dohna,
had shortly before, with U-boat escort, safely reached the North
Atlantic, but we had had no further news of her.

1 begged to have Captain von Trotha, commander of the battle-
ship Kaiser, as my Chief of Staff, and Captain von Levetzow,
commander of the large cruiser Moltke, as Chief of the Operating
Division. I had previously served for a long time with both those
officers, and they both declared themselves ready to take over their
new duties. It appeared to me an important matter to make a
change in these posts and thus show the Fleet my complete in-
dependence in that and all matters. All other members of the Fleet
Staff retained their positions. They comprised : Captain Hans
Quaet-Faslem, Captain Dietrich Meyer, Lieut .-Commander Heuin-
ger von Waldegg as Admiral's Staff Officer of the Operating
Division; Captain Paul Reymann, Admiral's Staff Officer for
torpedo- and U-boats; Captain Walther Franz, Admiral's Staff
Officer for Artillery; Captain Wilke, Fleet Navigation Officer;
Captain Bindseil, Flag-Lieutenant for Wireless Telegraphy;
Lieut. Commander Weizsacker, Flag-Lieutenant; Chief Naval En-
gineer Schutzler, Fleet Engineer; Chief Naval Surgeon Dr. Cudden,
Fleet Surgeon; Chief Naval Chaplin Klein, Catholic Priest to the
Navy; Stollhof, Chief Councillor to the Navy; Coster, Staff Pay-
master to the Navy; Paul Wulff, Secretary to the Fleet. I feel
deeply indebted to all these gentlemen for the devoted and un-
tiring assistance they rendered to the Fleet and to myself in their
respective posts.

My very special gratitude is due to Rear-Admiral von Trotha,
my Chief of Staff, on whose prudent and circumspect judgment
I invariably relied. He supplemented in the happiest manner the
keen and eager leader of the Operating Division, Captain von
Levetzow. They were both upright men with independent views
based on much learning, who stood by their opinions, were closely
linked in faithful comradeship, and formed a circle to which I look
back with pride and gratitude.

95

CHAPTER VIII

PREPARATIONS FOR INCREASED FLEET ACTIVITY

AFTER taking over command of the Fleet my first and most im-
portant task was to draw up a plan for the future tactics of the
High Sea Fleet and to work out a programme of operatfons. The
success hitherto of the conduct of naval warfare lay in the effect pro-
duced by the existence of the Fleet, the coastal defence, the influence
exercised on neutrals, and the support given to the Army. The
conviction that English maritime power was a serious menace to
our capability of resistance seemed to make it imperative that, if
a successful issue of the war were to be expected, it must be
waged far more energetically against that adversary. There was
no question of England giving in unless she was made to feel
the pressure of war at home much more forcibly than hitherto
had been the case. After having carried out her transport of troops
from overseas on a much larger scale than was anticipated, thereby
imposing on the country great sacrifices both of money and men,
her determination for war was bound to increase, in order to reap
the benefits of those efforts and to compensate for the blunders
made, such as the surrender of Antwerp and the abandonment of
the Dardanelles enterprise. So far, the war, for England, was
merely a question of money and men. There was no lack of either,
thanks to the support from the Colonies, the systematic manner
in which volunteers were pressed into Kitchener's Army, and the
ruthless employment of coloured auxiliaries.

Thus England was better able to stand the war for a lengthened
period than we were, if the hunger blockade were to continue to
oppress the country. The English public never thought of urging
the Fleet to more active warfare ; its object was achieved without its
being weakened or being forced to make undue sacrifices. The
nation readily understood this, especially when it was made clear
to them that the Fleet had succeeded in keeping open those over-
seas communications on which the country was so dependent. This
fact was specially brought into prominence by the destruction of
our cruiser squadron off the Falkland Islands.

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Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

The danger from the U-boat warfare, which at first appeared
serious, was reduced to slight importance owing to the mutual
interests with America. But when the danger really was recog-
nised, England prepared to ward it off, and did splendid work
in this connection. On our part, the conduct of naval warfare in
1915 was less satisfactory. Even though we succeeded in prevent-
ing the neutrals from joining our opponents, it always remained
an open question to what cause it could be attributed. If the utility of
our High Sea Fleet were not made more distinctly manifest, then
its deeds were not sufficient to justify its existence and the vast
sums exacted from the resources of our people for its mainten-
ance. The principal task stood out clearly defined — to punish
England in such a way as to deprive her speedily and thoroughly
of the inclination to continue the war. That might be expected
if success could be achieved either by a blow at her sea power centred
in her Navy, or at her financial life — preferably both.

The continued numerical superiority of the English Fleet
from the beginning of the war kept us at a disadvantage; but,
from a purely tactical point of view, our Battle Fleet, by the addi-
tion of four ships of the " Konig " class, was very differently
organised from formerly, when Squadron II had to form part of
the fighting line and was confronted in battle with "Dreadnoughts"
with which it could not possibly cope. From the beginning of 1915
we also had had a double squadron of "Dreadnought" ships at our
disposal (Squadrons I and III) and were therefore better able to avoid
bringing the ships of Squadron II into a situation in battle where
they must inevitably have suffered losses. Certainly the English
had added greatly to their fighting powers by ships of the "Queen
Elizabeth" class which must have been ready early in 1915. They
carried guns of 38-c.m. calibre, were strongly armour-plated, and
had a speed of 25 knots, in all of which they were nominally the
same as our battle-cruisers, whereas in the strength of their attack
they appeared to be vastly superior to all our vessels.

The then prevailing conditions of strength kept us from seek-
ing a decisive battle with the enemy. Our conduct of the naval war
was rather aimed at preventing a decisive battle being forced
on us by the enemy. This might perhaps occur if our tactics
began to be so troublesome to him that he would try at all costs
to get rid of the German Fleet. It might, for instance, become
necessary, if the U-boat war succeeded again in seriously threaten-
ing English economic life. Should the English thus manoeuvre for
h 97

Germany's High Sea Fleet

a decisive battle, they could fix the time so as to allow the full use
of their vast superiority, whereas some of our ships would be either
under repair or otherwise unfit for service, or absent in the Baltic
for exercises, of which the enemy would be well informed.

But for us to get into touch with the English Fleet, a definite and
systematic operation would have had to be carried out with the
view of compelling the enemy to give up his waiting tactics and
send out forces which would provide us with favourable conditions
of attack. The methods previously employed had failed. Either
they were undertaken with inferior forces — in the case of an
advance by cruisers the Main Fleet could not intervene in time
to be of use — or else, as in most of the 191 5 enterprises, they had
not pushed on far enough for an encounter with important units of
the enemy Fleet.

If we wished to attempt an effective and far-reaching offensive, it
was necessary that we should be masters in our own house.
The waters of our coast must be so controlled that we could be
left free to develop and have no fear of being surprised and called
out against our will. With the exception of the Fleet, we had
nothing that the enemy could attack, as unfortunately our maritime
trade had been put down from the beginning. The enemy, how-
ever, was still vulnerable in so many places that it was surely
possible to find ample opportunity to make him feel the gravity of
the war !

The ways and means of effecting this were the U-boat trade-
war, mines, trade- war in the North and on the open seas, aerial
warfare and aggressive action of the High Sea forces in the North
Sea. The U-boat and aerial warfare had already started; the three
other factors were to be operated in combination. The activities in
the near future were laid down in a programme of operations
submitted to the Naval Staff and their general sanction obtained.
Above all things, every leader, as well as each commander, was to
be told his part, so as to facilitate and encourage independent action
in accordance with the combined plan.

The first and most important task was the safety of the German
Bight. Fresh rules were laid down dealing with the action of
the Fleet when in the Bight, and instructions issued concerning
protection and outpost duty. Arrangements were also made as
to action under an enemy attack which would save waiting for
lengthy orders in an urgent emergency, and would render it
possible for all subordinate officers to play the part expected of

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Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

them in such an event. The aim of the organisation was to keep
the Bight clear by means of aeroplanes, outpost flotillas, mine-
sweeping formations, and barrier-breakers, and regular reconnais-
sance, guard, and mine-searching service was established. The
outpost-boats were to form a support for the active protective craft in
the North Sea, be sufficiently strong to meet a surprise hostile
attack and always ready to pick up at sea any forces returning
to harbour. The command of the protective services was, as
hitherto, retained by the Chief of the Reconnaissance. The
actual aerial reconnaissance in the vicinity was undertaken by
aeroplanes and airships from the stations at List — on the island of
Sylt— Heligoland, and Borkum. The North Sea Outpost Flotilla,
the Coastal Defence Flotilla from the Ems, and boats of the Harbour
Flotilla, were ready for guard service; their duties consisted chiefly
in driving away enemy submarines. As a rule, the following
positions were occupied: —

The List Group : The waters off List (to keep neutral fishing
boats out of German coastal waters).

The North Group : The Amrum Bank passage.

Line i : The Heligoland — Hever Line.

Line 2 : The Heligoland — Outer Jade Line.

The Outer Group : The Jade — Norderney line and the barrier
opening at Norderney.

Heligoland boats: North and West of the island.

Jade boats: Off the Jade.

S. Group : Three boats (chiefly intended to fight enemy sub-
marines, or for other special duties, as, for instance, the cutting of
cables).

The chief object of these outpost boats was to search the Inner
German Bight for enemy submarines, for which purpose they set
out every day in groups from the lines where they were stationed.
The service of the outpost boats, some eighty fishing steamers,
was so arranged that half were on duty for three days and then had
three days off. The Ems Coastal Defence Flotilla had the guarding
of the waters off East and West Ems, and westward to about
6 degrees E. Longitude. The Harbour Flotilla boats joined in
when there was a chase after submarines which might have shown
themselves at the mouth of the river. A torpedo-boat flotilla stationed
on the Ems also did duty when required, and helped further to
ensure the safety of the sea area off the Ems.

99

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The regular mine-sweeping service consisted of two Mine-
sweeping Divisions and one Auxiliary Flotilla. The latter was
composed of vessels that had only been requisitioned for the purpose
since the war, and were mostly trawlers. They were specially
suitable for the North Sea, owing to their sea-going qualities, but
we lost several of them because of their deep draught. When a
mine-sweeping division was off duty the crews were billeted
at Cuxhaven, while the men on leave from the half-flotilla of the
Auxiliary Flotilla were quartered at Wilhelmshaven. For their
mine-sweeping duties all those boats were armed in order that they
might be prepared to fight submarines. As soon as hostile sub-
marines were sighted within their area they had to stop their mine-
sweeping and take part in the chase.

The barrier-breaker service consisted of three groups of barrier-
breakers to every four steamers, internally constructed so as to ,
enable them to keep afloat should they strike a mine. At the
outbreak of war we had no apparatus whatever for sweeping up
mines and protecting the steamers. Every effort was made, how-
ever, to invent such an apparatus, which, as soon as it had been
tested, was at once supplied to the barrier-breakers and the mine-
searching division.

Special credit is due to Captain Walter Krah, Chief of the
Auxiliary Mine-Flotilla, who profited by much practical experience
and was successful in his efforts to avert unnecessary losses in his
flotilla. It was the duty of the barrier-breaker group to protect
the navigation of certain channels, chiefly those where our mine-
laying divisions had been at work, and to make sure that no mines
had been laid by the enemy in the interval. The activity of our mine-
layers could not be entirely concealed from the enemy. When they
were working in the inner section of the Bight, the enemy submarines
had every opportunity for their observations, and the farther
the mine belt was pushed out in the North Sea the nearer it drew
to the area of English observation planes. The English were in
advance of us with the Curtis plane, a hydroplane which, even with
a considerable sea running, was able to keep on the water and
so husband its strength.

The search for, and the chasing of, hostile submarines was
principally the business of the torpedo-boats. The outpost boats
had, of course, to keep a look-out for submarines, and had to
follow up on any occasion when there was a chance of fighting
them; but they had not the speed, nor were their numbers

ioo

Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

I

sufficient to carry out a systematic search and pursuit. The torpedo-
boats of the outpost service were told off for that purpose. The
same flotillas were employed when there was a question of warding
off the submarines from any ships or units engaged in special
enterprises. The safety of the German Bight at night — to ensure
which the guardships were too far apart besides being inadequate in
armament — was further ensured by torpedo-boat patrols taken from
the outpost service which cruised along the line of guardships and
the shores of the German Bight.

In order not to keep the entire Fleet constantly under steam and
thus overtire both men and machinery and use up material to no pur-
pose, and yet provide that they should be ready with considerable
forces for any enemy enterprises, an outpost service was organised.
In the Jade there lay always in readiness a squadron of battleships,
two battle-cruisers, a cruiser-leader of torpedo-boats, and a torpedo-
boat flotilla; a scouting division of light cruisers were in the
Jade and the Weser, a torpedo-boat flotilla in Heligoland harbour,
half the ships of Squadron II in the Cuxhaven Roads, at Altenbruch ;
and, if sufficient torpedo-boats were available, another torpedo-boat
half-flotilla was stationed on the Ems or in List Deep (at Sylt) —
constituting approximately half the total forces of the High Sea
Fleet. The ships were kept clear to put to sea from their station
three-quarters of an hour after the order reached them. The torpedo-
boat flotilla at Heligoland was held ready to run out immediately,
and the flotilla on the Jade three-quarters of an hour after receipt
of an order.

The outpost forces were under the command of the Senior Naval
Commander stationed on the Jade. In the event of a sudden enemy
attack, his duty was to arrange independently for the necessary
measures of defence, and to exercise the command. If the High
Sea Command had any duty to assign to him, it was restricted
to a suggestion or general directions, as, for instance, to station
torpedo-boats at such and such a place at daybreak, leaving the rest
to be carried out by the Chief of the U-boat forces.

The other ships, not belonging to the outpost service, lay, half
of them in harbour (about a fourth part of the fleet), the other half
remaining on the inner roads at Wilhelmshaven or Brunsbuttel.
The torpedo-boats off outpost duty were always allowed to enter
harbours. The ships off duty had to seize that opportunity to carry
out such necessary repairs as could be done by their own men;
ships that had been long in dock for refitting and repairs were

IOI

Germany's High Sea Fleet

regarded as being in the same category. The usual preparedness
of ships lying in the inner roads and in harbour was fixed at three
hours. But whenever news came which seemed to necessitate the
calling out of the ships, orders were issued to hurry the preparations,
the entire crew remained on board, and the ships kept ready, on
receipt of further orders, to weigh anchor at once.

These far-reaching measures for the protection of the German
Bight were, above all, intended to ensure that the Fleet should be
able to take up a position in line if it was deemed advisable to pass
out in expectation of an enemy attack. General regulations were
issued for two eventualities; the one, in case information and
messages were received announcing an impending hostile attack, and
the other, in case the enemy came entirely unexpectedly. It was not
long before there was an opportunity to test them in practice.

Finally the defence resources of the German Bight were improved
by adding to the already existing minefields, partly by laying them
adjacent to those laid by the enemy, which he was forced to avoid.
The intention of establishing a safe area for assembling within
the line Horns Reef — Terschelling, was soon carried out, as the
enemy laid his minefields in still further concentric rings outside
that line.

Constant navigation and firing exercises by separate units as
well as by the assembled Fleet, were carried on within this zone,
and they were very rarely interrupted by an alarm of submarines.
The dispatch of units for practice in the Baltic was no longer so
necessary, and the readiness of the Fleet for action was perceptibly
improved.

Heligoland, which at the beginning of the war was our advanced
outpost, had thus assumed the character of a point of support in
the rear, from which radiated a free zone extending over a radius
of 120 nautical miles. Unfortunately the island never had occasion
to use her excellent armament on the enemy. But the newly con-
structed harbour was of great service to the light forces of the Fleet,
besides which the possession of the island was indispensable in
order that a fleet might be able to leave our estuaries.

Even though security from enemy attacks was necessary and
called for immediate action, nevertheless a still more important
duty was that of attacking and injuring the enemy. To this end
various enterprises were started. Foremost among these were
nocturnal advances by light forces in the boundary area of the
German Bight in order to destroy enemy forces stationed there, the

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Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

holding up of suspicious craft, and readiness to afford help to
airships raiding England, which always took place at night. These
advances were carried out by several flotillas led by an escorting
cruiser. They were supported by a scouting division of light
cruisers sent either to the Ems or to a certain quadrant in the North
Sea. The battle-cruisers were told off to the Schillig Roads, or
deployed in line at sea ; all other outpost ships were held in strictest
readiness, and all measures were taken to ensure the speedy
intervention of vessels lying in the Roads. In this way, the entire
Fleet was kept in a certain state of tension, and unvarying alertness
in view of eventualities at sea was maintained in order to be prepared
at once to take part in the proceedings.

A further system of enterprise was to prolong these nocturnal
sallies till daybreak in order to patrol a more extended area,
in which case the entire Fleet had to be at sea as a support. The
furthest advanced flotillas received support from Scouting Divisions
I and II which, reinforced by one or two flotillas, followed them at
a suitable distance. The extension of such enterprises was designed
to reach to the Skagerrak and the Hoof den.

Finally ; other important enterprises were planned, such as the
bombardment of coastal towns to exercise a still greater pressure
on the enemy and induce him to take counter-measures which would
afford us an opportunity to engage part or the whole of his Fleet in
battle under conditions favourable to ourselves.

In all these enterprises the co-operation of the Naval Corps
in Flanders was desirable by stationing their U-boats along the
nearest stretch of coast and thereby supporting the Fleet. This
was carried out regularly, and with the greatest readiness.

The employment of our U-boats was of fundamental importance
for our warfare against England. They could be used directly
against English trade or against the English naval forces. The
decision in the matter influenced the operations very considerably.
It was not advisable to embark on both methods simultaneously,
as most probably neither would then achieve success. Also the
poor success resulting from our U-boat action on English warships
in the North Sea seemed to point to a decided preference for trade-
war. In military circles, there was no doubt that success in trade-
war could only be looked for if the U-boat were empowered to act
according to its own special methods ; any restrictions in that respect
would greatly reduce the chances of success. The decision in the
matter lay in the political zone. It was therefore necessary that

103

Germany's High Sea Fleet

the political leaders should recognise what we were compelled to
do to achieve our war aim. Hitherto our politicians, out of anxiety
with regard to America or in order not to exasperate England to
the utmost, had not been able to decide on energetic action against
England in the naval war. The naval authorities, however, should
have known what they had to reckon with in order to be able to beat
down England's resistance. It was also their duty to protest against
enterprises specially unsuited to the U-boat, which inevitably led to
useless sacrifices.

The restricted form of U-boat warfare against English mercantile
ships, adopted in the course of 1915, was extremely unsatisfactory.
The damage caused thereby to her trade could be borne by England,
and, on the other hand, the only result to us was vexation and
disappointment, for our Fleet could obtain no support for its
own enterprises from the U-boats. Co-operation with separate
units or with the entire Fleet could not be sufficiently well
organised to prove dependable for certain operations. First
of all, only temporary ^co-operation was possible in the case
of enterprises by the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when
each unit had a special duty, to be mutually supplemented
but without exacting any tactical union. If, for instance, there was
the intention to bombard a certain coastal town, it might be assumed
that English fighting forces would at once rush out from different
harbours where they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers
of their peace. If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where
it was presumed there were enemy ships, they would probably have
had a chance of attacking.

Tactical co-operation would have been understood to mean" that
on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of encountering
the enemy, having the fixed intention of leading up to such an
encounter, numbers of U-boats would be present from the beginning
in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as certain rules have
been evolved for the employment of cruisers and torpedo-boats in
a daylight battle to support the activity of the battleship fleet, so
might an opportunity have been found for the tactical employment of
the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been done in that respect,
and it would have been a very risky experiment to take U-boats
into a battle without a thorough trial. The two principal drawbacks
are their inadequate speed and the possibility of their not
distinguishing between friend and foe.

The first-mentioned method, however, offered the most varied

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jPreparations for Increased Fleet Activity

possibilities, and consideration was given as to what would be the
most desirable way to station U-boats off enemy harbours; how
they could be used in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank
protection, or otherwise render assistance.

In order to gain assurance in the use of U-boats and secure a
basis for the activity of the Fleet, I went, in February, to Berlin to
a conference with the Chief of the Naval Staff, in which Prince
Henry of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic forces, also
took part.

The result of this conference was the decision to come to
close grips with England. Our chief maritime elements were to
be centred absolutely in the North Sea, and the greatest restriction
put on all active measures in the Baltic. Shortly afterwards an
unrestricted U-boat warfare was to be instituted and the Naval
Command was to make the necessary preparations. March i was
the date on which it was intended to begin, as General von
Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, recognising the importance
of England's contribution to the hostile resisting forces, had given
up his previous scruples concerning the unrestricted U-boat warfare.

On January 31, nine airships set out for an attack on England :
"L " 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21. On this occasion Liverpool
was reached for the first time, where doubtless large quantities of
war material from America were stored. Several other large factory
towns in central England were also bombed, which they hardly
expected although they were of great importance on account of their
output of munitions and war material. A cruiser on the Humber
was hit and badly damaged, which, according to subsequent
information, was the new light cruiser Caroline (3,810 tons). The
farther such air-raids spread over the country the greater would be
the efforts made to defend the most important places, involving the
withdrawal from the principal scene of war of guns, airmen, gunners
and munitions to protect England from danger from the air.

Although the chief objective of every air-raid was London, where
the Admiralty controlled the whole Naval war, and where the
docks and the mouth of the Thames represented many other
important objectives, to destroy which was highly necessary for the
continuation of the war, still wind and weather did not always allow
of its being attained. Sometimes during the flight of the airships
they would be obliged to deviate from their plan of attack for other
reasons than wind and weather. Therefore all airships that went
up were given a general order to attack England in the south, centre

105

Germany's High Sea Fleet

and north. "South" signified the Thames, "centre, " the Hurnber,
and "north," the Firth of Forth. These three estuaries were the
main points of support for the English Fleet, and were amply
provided with all kinds of naval and mercantile shipbuilding works.
The direction of the attack, whether south, centre or north, was
determined by the wind, as the airships usually had the wind
against them in going, in order, on the return journey, to have it
behind in case they had to cope with damage or engine trouble.

Commander Odo Lowe, "L 19," never returned from an attack
made during the night of January 31 — February 1, 1916. On the
return journey the airship, owing to fog, found itself over Dutch
territory, and was fired at, not being at a very great altitude. Owing
to the damage done, when it again came over the water it was un-
able to rise on account of a strong northerly wind, and so was
forced to come down at about 100 nautical miles from the English
coast, in a line with Grimsby. It was seen there in a sinking
condition by a steam trawler (King Stephen) which, although within
hailing distance, allowed the helpless crew to perish in the waves.
This shameful deed was publicly acclaimed by an English bishop —
a strange manifestation of his Christian principles ! The behaviour
of that bishop is so typical of English mentality that it is worth while
adding a short comment on it. Two points are invariably and
entirely lacking in English views on the war : they never admit
the "necessity of war " for their opponent and never recognise the
difference between unavoidable severity and deliberate brutality.
The Englishman thinks it quite justifiable to establish a blockade
in the North Sea which exposes his naval forces to a mere minimum
of danger, and pays no heed to the rules of International Law.
That the consequence of the blockade was to bring starvation
on the entire German nation — the step indeed was taken with that
avowed purpose — does not in the least affect his feelings for
humanity. He employs the means that serve his war aims, and no
objection could be raised did he allow the same to hold good for
the enemy. But instead — whether in conscious or unconscious
hypocrisy is an open question — he raises indignant opposition to
all counter-measures. Our air-raids caused injury to civilians. It
was inevitable, when institutions serving war purposes were so
close to populous districts — perhaps with a view to secure protection
for them. To the Englishman, it was of no moment that the airship
crews exposed themselves to the greatest personal danger in thus
fighting for their suffering Fatherland. Accustomed as he was to

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Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

carrying on a war with hirelings, and mostly abroad, he considered
any personal encroachment on his comfort as a crime against
humanity and made a terrible ado to increase favour for his cause.
English behaviour in the mine-war is an example of this.

At the second Peace Conference at the Hague, Satow,* an English
delegate raised a violent protest against a decision authorising the
laying of mines in the open sea, in view of the danger to neutral
shipping. In spite of this, an extensive area at the eastern egress
from the Channel was mined by the English. Success in war,
in their view, stood higher than their former principles and professed
consideration for the neutrals. Our mine-warfare along the English
coast was cried down as a terrible crime, although it is distinctly
allowed by the Hague regulations. The same hypocrisy concerning
what the rights of war conceded to the one or the other belligerents
is also prevalent in English professional literature. According to
English ideas it is quite right and correct that the English Fleet,
in spite of its double numerical superiority, does not consider it
necessary to advance to the German coast. But when the weaker
German Fleet refrained from committing what obviously would
have been military errors, it was ascribed to lack of courage. When
the English Fleet, as we see later, had in battle, in spite of twofold
superiority, twice as many losses as the weaker adversary, it was
still termed an English victory ! What has become of all common
sense? After this digression we must resume.

One of the first enterprises on the newly-drawn-up programme
of operations was an encounter during the night of February 10 — 1 1
with English guardships off the Dogger Bank; they were in all
probability stationed there in connection with our airship raids,
either to give warning of their approach or to give chase on their
way back. Torpedo-Boat Flotillas II, VI and IX, led by Captain
Hartog, the First Leader of torpedo-boats, while patrolling at night
came across a new type of English vessel which they at first took
to be a cruiser, but finally decided it was a new vessel of the
" Arabis " class. After a brief exchange of shots, the vessel was
sunk by a torpedo; the commander, some officers and 28 of the
crew were saved and taken prisoners. A second ship was also hit
by a torpedo and observed to sink. The ships had only recently
been built, were of 1,600 tons, had a crew of 78, slight draught,
and a speed of 16 knots.

On February 11 <an order from the Chief of the Naval Staff

* Right Hon. Sir E. Satow.
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Germany's High Sea Fleet

was sent to the Fleet regarding the action to be observed towards
armed enemy merchantmen. At the same time a "Note from the
Imperial German Government on the Treatment of Armed Merchant-
men " was published in the Press. This Note contained uncontestable
proof, gathered from instructions issued by the English Government,
and various other sources, that the armed English merchantmen
had official orders whenever they saw and were close to German
U-boats, maliciously to attack and wage ruthless war on them. The
Note concluded with the following notice :

Berlin, February 8, 1916.

" 1 . Under the circumstances now prevailing, enemy mer-
chantmen carrying guns have no longer the right to be
considered as such. German naval forces will therefore, after
a short respite in the interests of the neutrals, treat such ships
as belligerents.

"2. The German Government notifies the neutral Powers
of the conditions in order that they may warn their subjects to
desist from entrusting their persons and property to armed
merchantmen belonging to the Powers at war with the German
Empire."

The order to the naval forces, which out of consideration for the
neutrals was not to come into force until February 29, was as
follows : " Enemy merchantmen carrying guns are to be considered
as warships and destroyed by all possible means. The officers must
bear in mind that mistaken identity will lead to a breach with the
neutrals and that the destruction of a merchantman because she
is armed, must only be effected when the guns are clearly
distinguished."

This new announcement from the Government, in which the
Chief of .the Naval Staff evidently had a share judging from
his order to the Fleet, came as a surprise to me and appeared as
though it were a reversal of the policy of unrestricted U-boat
warfare which on February 1 had been promised for certain within a
month, and which it now seemed doubtful would be carried out. The
order imposed upon the officers that they should "distinguish" the
guns made action very difficult for the U-boat officers, and it was
they who were chiefly concerned. For at the distance necessary
to secure this evidence the enemy, if he vindictively opened fire,
could hardly miss. But if a U-boat when submerged were in a
position to attack a steamer, and could only fire a torpedo when there

108

Germany's High Sea Fleet

was no doubt that she carried guns, the opportunity would almost
always be lost.

I made known my objections to the order, both verbally and
in writing, when I had occasion in the course of the month to
go to [Berlin; a violent north-westerly storm, which set in on
February 16 — 17 had stopped all operations in the Fleet. I
was informed that the intention shortly to open the unrestricted
U-boat warfare still held good. An order to that effect sanctioned
by the Emperor was already drawn up ; it merely remained to fill in
the date of starting. This appeared to me of the greatest importance,
and, as meanwhile the Emperor had announced his intention of
visiting the Fleet on February 23, I took that to mean that I need
no longer entertain any doubts.

On the appointed day, at 10 A.M. His Majesty went on board
the flagship Friedrich der Grosse lying in dock at Wilhelmshaven
ready to put to sea. Besides his own personal suite, he was accom-
panied by Grand Admiral Prince Henry of Prussia, the Secretary
of State of the Imperial Naval Department, Admiral von Tirpitz, and
the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral von Holtzendorff. It was
the second time during the war that the Emperor had visited the
Fleet. A little more than a year before the Emperor had introduced
to the Fleet my predecessor in command. I had occasion to give
a long report on the situation in the North Sea and also to express
my opinion on the conduct of the war, for which I took as basis
the matter of the unrestricted U-boat warfare. The Emperor
agreed with my statements and interpreted them to a meeting of
admirals and officers, when he spoke in laudatory terms of the
activities and deeds of the Navy during the previous year and gave
an explanation of the orders that had caused the Fleet to be held
back. His Majesty then took the opportunity to remark that he
fully approved of the order of procedure submitted to him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

This announcement was of great value to me, as thereby, in the
presence of all the officers, I was invested with authority which
gave me liberty of action to an extent I myself had defined. The
intentions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet were thoroughly
understood in this circle, as I had discussed in detail the programme
of operations and had handed it in writing to those whom it
concerned. The date for beginning the unrestricted U-boat warfare
was, however, still uncertain. When I put the question to him, the
Emperor remarked that he could not be influenced by the military

no

Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

suggestions only, though he recognised that they were justified, as
besides his position as Chief War Lord, he was also responsible
as Head of the State. Were he now to order the unrestricted U-boat
war, it would probably meet with approval in the widest circles, but
he must be careful that the entry into war Of America on the side
of the enemy did not give rise to consequences that might outweigh
the advantages of unrestricted U-boat warfare.

When convinced that this decision could not then be altered,
and not knowing what the political counter reasons were, and since
it was the business of the Naval Staff to come to an understanding
with the Imperial Administration, I selected two U-boats to test
the effect of the war under the new conditions in the war zone
off the west coast of England, in order that a judgment might be
formed for further plans. The commanders of the boats, "U32"
(Baron von Spiegal) and "U 22 " (Hoppe), gave me a verbal report on
their return on March 18. "U 22 " had sunk four steamers, with about
10,000 tons of cargo, three times as many neutral ships, but had
been forced to let two passenger steamers get through. Owing to
bad weather and damages "U 22 " had no success. Meanwhile other
U-boats were on the way to operate with the same intent. The
success of their activities had not then been reported.

A wireless message on March 3 from the auxiliary cruiser Moewe
was a surprising and joyful piece of news. She reported being
stationed south-west of the Norwegian coast, and asked to be en-
rolled in the High Sea forces. This opportunity of practically
testing the newly established outpost service was most opportune.
It was a point of honour for the Fleet to preserve the intrepid and
successful raider from a disastrous end off a home harbour. But
great was the anxiety, as the Moewe had reported clouds of smoke
sighted in clear weather, and evidently, from the appearance, be-
longing to a group of warships, but the distance was then too great
to proceed to her assistance. The enemy, however, did not turn his
attention to our cruiser, which endeavoured to give off as little smoke
as possible, and when night fell had not been molested. Acting
on the warnings given her, she happily escaped the further danger
of striking any of the numerous English mines, that were unknown
to her, between Horns Reef and Amrum Bank. Such ample pro-
tection was afforded her by a dense fog that she passed our first
outposts unnoticed. But the fog lifted at the right moment to
allow the ships sent out to meet her to escort her in triumph into
the Jade, where she received a splendid welcome. The prudent

m

Germany's High Sea Fleet

and resolute behaviour of the commander, Count zu Dohna, his
firm belief in the success of his undertaking — lightly called "luck "
by some, though really based on the intrepid courage of the man,
which spread to the entire crew — did not fail to make a deep
impression on all of us who, on the first evening after his return,
listened to the \ ivid description of his adventures. From January i
to February 25, 1916, the Moewe captured 15 steamers, of a total
tonnage of 57,835 tons. The first news received of her activities
was the arrival of the prize Appam, under Lieut. Berg, of the
Naval Defence, at Norfolk (Virginia), carrying the crews of the
seven steamers sunk up to then. Further news of the Moewe' s
activities was the announcement that the steamer Westburn, under
command of Badswick, had been taken into Teneriffe. After
taking his 200 prisoners into port, he sank his ship the next
day before the eyes of the English armoured cruiser Sutlej that was
lying in wait, so that the prize might not fall into her hands. And
now the Mcewe had got back to us in safety ! We considered her
most important success to be the sinking of the King Edward, the
flagship of the 3rd English Battle Squadron, which, on January 3,
struck a mine laid by the Moewe, and owing to the damage caused,
sank between Cape Wrath and the west ingress to the Pentland Firth.
This encouraged our hopes that the Greif, an auxiliary cruiser
sent out a few days previously under Captain Tieze, would have
an equally successful trip. Unfortunately, news came to hand a
few weeks later that she had been held up on the English guard-
ship line between the Shetlands and Norway, and after a fierce
fight had succumbed, but not until she had torpedoed and sunk
the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara, a vessel three times her size. This
first encounter, in which the Greif had already suffered severely,
attracted a second auxiliary cruiser, the Andes, and the light
cruiser Comus, which came up with two destroyers and joined in
the fight. Faced by such superior forces, Tieze, after a fierce
fight lasting two hours, left the ship, with the surviving members
of the crew, and sank her. While the English at first took part
in the rescue of the crew, the Comus, according to the statements
of prisoners since returned home, again opened fire on the life-
boats and rafts, asserting that a U-boat had been sighted. The result
was that several others were killed, the commander among the num-
ber. Commander Nevetzky, First Lieut. Weddigen, and Lieut.
Tiemann, had already been killed in the battle. About two-thirds
of the crew were taken prisoners by the English.

112

CHAPTER IX

ENTERPRISES IN THE HOOFDEN, AND BOMBARDMENT
OF YARMOUTH AND LOWESTOFT

ON March 5, the day after the return of the Moewe, the High Sea
Fleet, under my command, carried out the first of its greater
enterprises, partaking of the nature of a more extended advance. The
idea prompting this move was to attack the enemy light forces
that were constantly reported in the Hoofden, and thus attract
support from the English harbours to the south, and if possible
force them between the pincers formed by our advanced cruisers
and the Main Fleet following in the rear. At daybreak the distance
between the battleships arid the cruisers was approximately 30
nautical miles. The cruisers were then to advance from a position
Terschelling Bank Lightship S.S.E. 15 nautical miles to the
Hoofden, and push on to the northern boundary of the English
minefield. The battleships were to follow the course of the cruisers
up to 10 a.m., when they would have reached latitude 53" 30', pn>
vided that in the meantime our action had not been checked by
intervening circumstances. Squadron II (the older battleships) did
not form part of this expedition, but was held ready, with a mine-
sweeping division, to secure the safety of the Bight, in order to
keep the return route open for the Fleet. Two flotillas accompanied
the cruisers; the others were with the Main Fleet. To ensure the
safety of the proceeding an airship was allotted to the Chief of
Reconnaissance, while other airships were to reconnoitre early the
following day in the sector north-west of Heligoland as far distant
as 200 nautical miles, to protect the flank and rear of the Fleet.
Should the weather the preceding night be favourable for airships,
advantage was to be taken of it. This was carried out, and led to
a very effective bombing of the important naval yards at Hull, on
the Humber.

A graphic picture of the attack is given in the description by
one of the airship commanders who took part, Captain Victor
Schulze, on board the "L 11," but who has since died the death
of a hero. He writes :

1 113

Germany's High Sea Fleet

"Our orders were: 'March 5, in morning, "Ln," with
"L13" and "L 14," to attack England in the north.' At noon
(on 4th) an ascent was made with the object of attacking the naval
yard at Rosyth. In consequence, however, of an ever-increasing
strong north-north-west wind, bringing heavy snow and hailstorms
with it, it was decided on the way to seek out the munition factories
at Middlesbrough instead of proceeding to Rosyth. The only
shipping traffic noticeable was limited to a few fishing-boats off
the Dogger Bank. Following the throwing out of benzine casks,
the airship, towards 10 p.m., was fired at through a thin bank of
clouds, but without success, and the incident was not worth noticing.
At 10.45 P - M - the English coast was crossed between Flamborough
Head and Spurn Head at Hornsea, which led to the belief that
the north wind was stronger. The ship now steered northwards
over the distinctly visible snow-clad coast. Wherever the landscape
was not hidden from view by heavy snow-clouds visibility was
good. The upper line of cloud was at a height of 2,000-3,000 m. ;
above, the sky was bright and starry. Violent hailstorms again
came on, the ship became coated with ice, and although all water
was discharged and the temperature of the air was 16 degrees, she
could not rise above 2,000 m. Not until just before the attack, and
after a further discharge of benzine, did she achieve a somewhat
risky 2,300 m. The antennae and the ends of the metal props in
gondola and corridor glistened through the snow and hail with balls
of light — St. Elmo's fire. The gondola and platform were thickly
covered with snow. When the weather cleared at 1 a.m., it appeared
from the position of the ship that to steer further north would be
fruitless with the velocity of the wind at 12 doms (doms — 2 metres
per second).

"Meanwhile the course of the Humber was now distinguishable
in the snowy landscape further south, offering a very favourable
chance of attack. The town of Hull was well darkened, but from
where ' L 1 1 ' was stationed we could easily make out the dropping
of bombs from ' L 14 '. Fresh snow-clouds then interfered with the
view, but I had time to spare and remained at my post until the
clouds cleared away in an hour's time. At 2 a.m. ' Lii ' opened
the attack and first dropped some bombs on Hull to induce the
defence batteries and searchlights to disclose their position, for if
that failed the ship could not have attacked against so strong a
wind. The town remained quiet and dark, but at that moment the
clouds cleared away and disclosed the following picture. The town

114

Germany's High Sea Fleet

and environs were white with the freshly-fallen snow. Although
plunged in darkness the town lay sharply defined under the starlit
sky with its streets, blocks of houses, quays and harbour basins just
below the airship. A few lights moved in the streets. The ship,
taking a northerly course and with all her engines at high pressure,
was poised over her objective and stood by. For twenty minutes,
following my instructions, bombs were dropped quite composedly
on the harbour and docks and the effect of each bomb carefully
watched. The first bomb hit the quay, knocking a great piece
out of it; a second hit the middle of the dock-gate of a harbour
basin. The bomb fell so accurately on the gate that it might have
been taken for a shot deliberately aimed at it. Buildings fell
down like so many houses built of cards. One bomb in particular
had a tremendous effect. Near the spot where it exploded houses
kept falling on each side until at last a huge black hole stood
out on the snowy ground near the harbour. A similar large black
spot in the neighbourhood was apparently caused by ' L 14 '. People
were seen through the telescope running hither and thither in the
light of the flames. Ships that had been hit began moving about in
the harbour. All counter-action at and round Hull was limited
to a few weak searchlights that failed to find the ship, and to some
isolated firing. While the bombs were being dropped, the airship
ventured up to 2,700 m.

"When fully convinced of the excellent effect of the bombs
dropped on Hull, I decided to drop the remainder on the
fortifications at Immingham which, as I had already noticed, had
been heavily bombed by ' L 14 '. The airship made for Immingham
with the last five explosive bombs and was received at once by four
strong searchlights and very lively gun-fire. The searchlights tried
in vain to find the ship through the light clouds just passing over,
for although it was brightly lit up by them they always moved
farther away. South of the searchlights on the bank the batteries
were using much ammunition. From 40 to 50 fiery lights or fire-balls
were scattered round the ship on all sides, above and below. The
height these missiles reached was reckoned at 3,000 m. or more. The
first explosive bomb that fell among the searchlights extinguished
first one and then all the others. No other results were observed.
Towards the end of the attack on Hull the fore engine was put
permanently out of action by the stoppage of the water gauge and
the consequent freezing of the oil and water pipes at a temperature
of 19 degrees; at Immingham the aft engine was out of action for

116

Enterprises in the Hoofden

half an hour. The coast was crossed at 2.40 a.m. on the return
journey. Again heavy snow and hailstorms accompanied by
electric disturbances were encountered. In the space of three
minutes a sudden squall carried the ship upwards from 2,400 to
3,200 m., 250 m. above our previous highest altitude. Coming down
shortly afterwards the elevating gear got out of order, but the ship
was worked by the crew as well as could be until the damage was
repaired, though we were forced to rise again to 3,200 m. At 5 a.m.
the rear engine gave way again and, owing to the freezing of oil
and water, stopped altogether shortly before we landed. At 7 a.m. we
met the First Scouting Division of Squadrons I and II 30 nautical
miles north-north-west of the Terschelling-Bank Lightship. At
2 p.m. we landed safely at Nordholz. The ship was quite able to
fly again."

The airship did the trip in 26 hours; it must be mentioned in
this connection that the crew of a raider is so limited that all the men
have to be on duty the whole time.

The Naval Corps in Flanders supported the Fleet's enterprise
by stationing 12 U-boats off the English south-east coast. In spite
of good visibility, there was no encounter with the enemy. The
expedition, therefore, was only useful for the purpose of practising
unity of command, and the handling of individual ships under
circumstances likely to arise during an offensive engagement of any
big unit. The return voyage was made an occasion for different
exercises in manoeuvring the Fleet in fighting formation until we
were compelled to withdraw, alarmed by the sighting of enemy
submarines, for which the Fleet at Terschelling would have
presented a good target. After our return all opportunity for further
operations was put a stop to for a time owing to the bad weather,
and to high east and north-east winds which our airships only just
succeeded in escaping.

The dismissal of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz as Secretary of
State of the Imperial Admiralty which was announced to the
Fleet Command on March 18 aroused great sympathy, not only
in view of his services in connection with the many-sided develop-
ment of the Fleet through long years and in all branches of maritime
service, but because, in these critical times for the country, much
anxiety was aroused at the thought of being deprived of the services
of a man who had shown himself to be a genial personality and of
unwavering energy. This change in the conduct of the Naval

117

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Department, in particular, gave rise to grave fears as to the prompt
carrying out of resolute and adequate U-boat warfare.

At the beginning of March the decision in this connection had
again been postponed for four weeks. The Fleet was therefore
bound all the more to aim at active action against the enemy, and
every attention was given to that purpose by the new Fleet
Command. \

Meanwhile the English, by an unexpected attack, provided us
with the opportunity of testing our preparations. The repeated
air-raids, and particularly a very big and successful one on London
on February i, roused them to make an effort to seek out and
destroy these troublesome raiders in their own homes. The hangars
at Tondern were the nearest. There had been no further attack on
this group since the first unsuccessful one on Christmas Day, 1914.
On March 25, in very unfavourable weather for flying — so much so
that our own scouting machines did not go up owing to fog
and snowstorms — an attack was made at 9.30 a.m. by some torpedo-
boat destroyers on our outpost group at List. They sank two
fishing steamers that could have reported the attack, but were them-
selves Obliged to withdraw before our aeroplanes which had gone
up from List, and which dropped bombs on the enemy, hitting
the destroyer Medusa. She was abandoned later on in a sinking
condition. The English report gave out that the loss of the Medusa
was owing to a collision with the destroyer Laverock.

Various reports were made by our aeroplanes, from which we
gathered that an aerial attack had started from two vessels carry-
ing aeroplanes, which were supported by battle-cruisers, light
cruisers and destroyers. We were not able at once to determine
what the intention was — whether there was to be a simultaneous
attack from the west on the hangars at Hage (south of Norderney),
or whether we were to expect an encircling movement of the enemy
against our forces sent northwards, in an effort to force them to come
out. The counter-action of our aeroplanes and the bad weather
compelled all the five English airmen to come down. Two of them
were picked up by one of their own torpedo-boats; the other three
were taken by our aeroplanes. They did not succeed in doing any
damage.

The English attack caused great commotion among our out-
post forces, as well as among all the other ships, which at once
got ready to put to sea, until the further purpose of the enemy was
revealed. Our cruisers and several flotillas went in pursuit of the

118

Enterprises in the Hoofden

retiring enemy, who evidently did not attach much importance to
the rescue of the airmen ; but the weather becoming still worse,
we were unable to get near the ships. There was an encounter
that night between our torpedo-boats and English light cruisers,
when the English cruiser Cleopatra succeeded in ramming and
sinking one of our torpedo-boats, " G 194," which had crossed
her bows by mistake.

During these nocturnal proceedings another torpedo-boat,
"S 22," Commander Karl Galster, struck a mine 55" 45" North
Lat., and 5" 10" East Long. This boat broke in two at once; the
fore-part sank quickly, the remainder floated for about five minutes
and then suddenly went to the bottom. The hurrahs from the
crew, led by the commander, proved that they stood firm at their
posts to the very last. Torpedo-boat "S18" immediately tried
to render assistance, but the wind and the high sea running made
it impossible, and in spite of every effort only ten petty officers
and seven of the crew were saved. We learned from the English
report that the same night the Cleopatra was also run into by the
English cruiser Undaunted, the latter receiving such heavy damage
that she had to be towed into harbour. An English wireless inter-
cepted during the night stated that a warship, together with
destroyers, had tried to take a damaged English destroyer in tow,
and it might be presumed that the ships would proceed northwards
by night and return again at daybreak when there would be the
possibility of encountering and capturing certain units of the enemy.
Squadron II and Scouting Divisions I and IV were ordered
to proceed to 55" 10' N. Lat. and 6" o' E. Long., whither Squadrons
I and II would follow; the flagship was with Squadron III. At
6.30 a.m. the cruisers reported that the sea was so rough that
an engagement was impossible; the push was therefore given up
as hopeless. We heard later that the same reason had induced
the English to abandon the destroyer Medusa and return home
very much battered by the storm.

At the end of March, by way of reprisal for the attempt to
injure our aerial fleet, our airships enjoyed a very successful series
of expeditions which, aided by a combination of favourable weather
and dark nights, resulted in five successive attacks. It is difficult
for airships to bring back an exact statement of their successes
owing to the great altitude at which they fly, and also to the
darkness and their exposure to anti-aircraft defences. The reports
issued by the English official censor were* therefore, the only means

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

of ascertaining the extent of the damage done, which was often
represented as being of little importance in order to calm the fears
of the population. But it is certain that at the time the uninter-
ruptedly recurring raids caused a great feeling of panic, as the
destruction in London itself surpassed anything ever before known.
On our side, for the first time, we had to deplore the loss of an airship,
brought down by enemy anti-aircraft guns. "L15," Commander
Breithaupt, was forced down on to the water at the mouth of the
Thames after the airship's gondola had been repeatedly hit by
shells. The crew, two officers and sixteen men, were rescued
by English boats and taken prisoner; they did not, however,
succeed in towing in the airship, the destruction of which had been
provided for. It is worthy of note, that in the night of the 2nd-3rd
the Firth of Forth was reached for the first time, and ships lying
there and buildings along the Firth were attacked. Bad weather
set in again on April 6 and put an end to this exceptionally suc-
cessful period. "Ln" took part more than once in the attacks
^nd its commander has given the following description :

"Order : ' L n,' together with ' L 14,' to attack England south
or centre on morning of April 1st.' At 12 noon an ascent was
made for the purpose of attacking England in the south, but
owing to the wind soon veering round to north-west, the centre of the
coast was made for. There was lively traffic among steam-trawlers
off the Dogger Bank, and the English wireless was distinctly
heard at work. In spite of throwing out two casks of benzine,
the temperature of the air did not allow of the ship rising above
2,200 m.; at 10 P.M. the English coast was reached south of the
Tyne. While trying to bomb the docks on the Tyne and cross
the coast, the ship was greeted with violent firing, which came from
the whole coastal area north and south of the river. To draw
back and seek the required weather side for the attack would have
occupied several hours with the prevailing wind (W.N.W., 5-7
doms.) I decided not to cross the batteries on account of not
being very high in relation to the firing, and also because of slow
progress against the wind and the absolutely clear atmosphere
up above. I fixed, therefore, on the town of Sunderland, with its
extensive docks and the blast furnaces north-west of the town.
Keeping on the weather side, the airships dropped explosive bombs
on some works where 6ne blast-furnace was blown up with a terrible
detonation, sending out flames and smoke. The factories and dock

120

Enterprises in the Hoofden

buildings of Sunderland, now brightly illuminated, were then
bombed with good results. The effect was grand ; blocks of houses
and rows of streets collapsed entirely ; large fires broke out in
places a-nd a dense black cloud, from which bright sparks flew high,
was caused by one bomb. A second explosive bomb was at once
dropped at the same spot; judging from the situation, it may have
been a railway station. While over Sunderland, the airship was
caught by a powerful searchlight and was pelted with shrapnel and
fire-balls, but to no purpose. The concussion from a shell burst-
ing near the airship was felt as though she had been hit. After
leaving the town, two other searchlights tried to get the ship, but
only with partial success. Then followed slight firing, apparently
with machine-guns. The last explosive bombs were droppedwith good
aim on two blast-furnace works in the neighbourhood of Middles-
brough. On returning, we again saw numbers of steam trawlers off
the Dogger Bank. At 10 a.m., April 2nd, we landed at Nordholz."

The day following " L 1 1 " again set out for a raid on England
in company with "Li'j," and reported as follows:

"Owing to the expected warm temperature of the air, only five
mechanics and forty-five bombs were carried; the spare parts were
limited; two machine-guns and a landing-rope were left behind,
and the supply of benzine very sparingly measured out, as both
going and coming back the wind was expected to be behind us.
The ascent was made at 2.30 p.m. The flight was so rapid that
the last bearings* taken showed that the English coast would be
reached near Sheringham at about 10.30 p.m. As the atmosphere
was becoming still thicker, it was impossible to distinguish any-
thing beyond a few dim lights. As the coast could not be made
out at the expected time, I turned by degrees out of my previous
course W. j4 S. to S.W. to S., presuming that the wind would
have gone further south on land. Finally, however, the bearings,
taken at 1.10 a.m. revealed the surprising fact that the slight
W.S.W. wind blowing had risen to 8-10 doms. When, there-
fore, we found at 2.45 a.m. that the ship was over the land, a further
advance towards London became purposeless. Moreover, on ascer-
taining the exact position, it was too late, and in view of the

* To ascertain its position wireless signals are sent out from the airship, picked
up at two different stations, and registered on the map. The position fixed is then
transmitted to the airship by wireless. The whole proceeding occupies the shortest
space of time, but when several airships are on an expedition together the wireless
must be worked most carefully to avoid mutual misunderstandings and mistakes.

121

Germany's High Sea Fleet

strength and direction of the wind, to turn off towards the moath
of the Humber. So long as the darkness lasted, I determined to
try for some objective in the county of Norfolk. Norwich, which
was in complete darkness, could not be made out.

"Towards 3.55 a.m., after 'L 11 ' had crossed the coast close to
the west of Yarmouth, violent gun-fire was observed through the
mist in the rear. A turn was made, and altogether thirteen well-
aimed bombs were dropped on the place where the firing came
from. We had to give up the idea of staying longer on the coast
as at the altitude of the airship day was already beginning to break.
The return journey, as was anticipated, was favoured at a high
altitude by a fresh W.S.W. wind. At 10 a.m. we landed at
Nordholz."

On April 5, "L 11 " with "L 13" and "16" again went up for
a raid on the English Midlands. An account of this expedition will
serve to give the reader some idea of the strain and exertions to
which our airships' crews were exposed on such occasions.

' "At 9.45 p.m. the airship crossed the distinctly visible coast
south of Flamborough Head and took a course for Sheffield. When
over Hull to the north the airship was found to be over several newly-
erected batteries with four very strong searchlights, which caught
up the ship easily in the very clear air; whereupon, from 10.10 to
10.30 an unusually heavy firing with shells and shrapnel was kept
up. The aim was good; many shells burst quite close to the air-
ship, causing the frame to shake violently. The next battery was
at once attacked and silenced by explosive bombs. Being at the
low altitude of 2,300 metres and in such clear air it was not
considered advisable to continue to pass over the numerous
other batteries, so we turned round intending to take a southerly
course outside the coast in order to rise higher when the moon had
gone down and to proceed inland. In setting off, the rear engine
was put out of order through worn-out crank bearings. The com-
mander decided, therefore, to put himself on the lee side of the
north-north-east wind and look for Hartlepool. The line of the
coast and the course of the rivers were just as plainly visible as
on the map. North and south of Flamborough Head there was
much shipping activity. Several neutral vessels were distinguishable
by the bright lights above their neutrality marking.

"At 2 a.m., just off Hartlepool, the fore engine gave out. The
attack on the town was abandoned, and it was decided on the
way back to destroy a large iron factory at Whitby. Even from

122

Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

the high altitude of the airship, the factory appeared to be a very
extensive establishment with many brightly illuminated blast fur-
naces and numerous buildings. It was situated on the shore and
had steam extinguishing apparatus. The airship hovered suffi-
ciently long over this factory to drop carefully aimed bombs.
The distinctly visible result consisted not only in the utter de-
struction of the furnaces and buildings through fire and explosion,
but there were also heavy explosions in the darker sections of the
factory, which led to the conclusion that the entire establishment
had been destroyed. At 10.30 a.m. the airship got into a dense fog
on the return journey, and with a view to safer navigation went
over land and made good her way at 50 m. altitude, landing at
Nordholz at 3 p.m. in clear weather."

No ships were sent up by Captain Strasser, the Commander of
Airships, on April 6. His estimate of the weather conditions proved
quite correct, for in the course of the afternoon the slight north-
easterly wind veered round to the east and when night came a
regular storm was blowing. While the air raids of the previous
night were proceeding several torpedo-boats started out from
Horns Reef in a north-west and westerly direction and kept the out-
post forces in constant activity. It led, however, to no engagement
with the enemy.

From April 13 to April 19 the Fleet was kept in constant ex-
pectation of an English attack, news having been received that
one was pending. But the enemy did not show himself.

Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

On April 24, Easter Monday, the Fleet put out on an im-
portant enterprise which, like that in the beginning of March, was
directed towards the Hoofden, but was to be extended farther so as
to force the enemy out of port. I expected to achieve this by bom-
barding coastal towns and carrying out air raids on England the
night the Fleet went out. Both these actions would probably result
in counter measures being taken by the enemy that would give our
forces an opportunity to attack. On the occasion of the advance
of March 5 — 6 the enemy preferred withdrawing all his forces into
port, as we learnt afterwards from intercepted wireless messages,
as soon as he had news of our advance, either through agents or
from submarines in the North Sea.

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

The news we obtained from the enemy had repeatedly announced
strong enemy forces in the northern section of the North Sea under
the Norwegian coast ; forces had also been sighted in the Hoofden
and harbours on the south-east coast of England so that an oppor-
tunity would probably occur for our Fleet to push in between
those two divisions of the enemy Fleet and attack with equal strength
that section which should first present itself. It was, therefore,
obvious that the most suitable direction for attack would be towards
the south-east counties of England. If the enemy then wished to cut
off our return he would have to move into the neighbourhood of Ter-
schelling Bank, where the waters were favourable for offering battle.
With luck we might even succeed in attacking the enemy advancing
from the Hoofden on both sides; on the south with the forces told
off to bombard the coast and on the north with the Main Fleet.

Lowestoft and Yarmouth were the only coastal towns it was in-
tended to bombard. Both were fortified and were important military
points of support for the enemy — Lowestoft for mine-laying and
sweeping; Yarmouth as a base for the submarines whence they
started on their expeditions to the Bight. The destruction,
therefore, of the harbours and other military establishments of both
these coastal towns was a matter of great military importance, apart
from the object of the bombardment in calling out the enemy. Simul-
taneous air-raids on southern England would offer the advantages
of mutual support for the airships and the sea forces. The airships
would reconnoitre for the forces afloat on their way to and fro,
while the latter would be able to rescue the airships should they
meet disaster. It was also hoped there might be an opportunity
for trade-war under prize conditions.

All the available High Sea forces were assembled, including
Squadron II, and the Chief Command of the Naval Corps in
Flanders was enjoined to keep his available U-boats in readiness.
The Naval Corps also offered to station two U-boats east of Lowes-
toft to facilitate the advance; they did excellent service in assisting
the bombardment. The U-boats at the disposal of the High Sea
Command were placed in a position to attack the Firth of Forth
and the southern egress from the Firth was closed by a U-minelayer.

Eight of the newer airships were selected for the raid and three
older ones were ordered to hold themselves in readiness on the second
day in the rear of the fleet for reconnoitring. If at all possible, the
bombardment was to take the towns by surprise at daybreak, in order
to prevent counter-measures by the enemy, such as calling up sub-

124

Germany's High Sea Fleet

marines from Yarmouth to protect the coast. The forces intended
to accompany the cruisers had to endeavour to keep, not actually in
the Hoofden, but in the open waters west and north of Terschelling
Bank in case it should come to a fight, as that was the only position
where liberty of action in all eventual developments could be
ensured. The bombardment of both the coastal towns was entrusted
to the battle-cruisers. They were supported by Scouting Division
II and two fast torpedo-boat flotillas (VI and IX). The Main
Fleet, consisting of Squadrons I, II and III, Scouting Division
IV, and the remainder of the torpedo flotillas was to accompany
the battle-cruisers to the Hoofden until the bombardment was over,
in order, if necessary, to protect them against superior enemy
forces.

At noon on the 24th all the forces, including the airships, started.
The course led first through the south opening in the barrier at
Norderney and then north, round a minefield laid down by the
English out of sight of the Dutch coast, and into the Hoofden where
the bombardment was to open at daybreak and last for about thirty
minutes. At 4 p.m. the movement received an unwelcome set-back
owing to a message from Rear-Admiral Bodicker, leader of the
reconnaissance ships, that his flagship, the battle-cruiser Seydlitz
had struck a mine and her forward torpedo compartment was
damaged. The ship was thus debarred from taking part in the
expedition; she was still able to do 15 knots and returned
to harbour under her own steam. The leader was, therefore,
obliged to hoist his flag in another cruiser. The route on which the
ship had struck the mine had been searched and swept last on the
night of the 22nd and 23rd and had been constantly used by light
forces on their night patrols.

Owing to this occurrence the battle-cruisers behind the Seydlitz
stopped and turned according to agreement, awaiting further orders
in case they, too, should come across mines. As the Seydlitz turned
to follow them in order to transfer the admiral to the Lutzow, two
of the ships simultaneously reported the track of a torpedo and
submarines. With that danger so near it would not have been
advisable to attempt to stop the ship and transfer the admiral to
another; and as the cruiser was already badly damaged, it would
have been dangerous to expose her to still further injury. The
Seydlitz continued, therefore, on her westerly course and the Chief
of Reconnaissance on board a torpedo-boat reached the Lutzow later
and there resumed his duties. The Seydlitz was escorted on her

126

Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

homeward way by two torpedo-boats and " L 7 " and reached the
harbour without further misadventure.

In consequence of this incident, the Fleet Command thought
fit to alter the intended course, and the only alternative was to
take the route along the coast of East Friesland. The weather being
so very clear, it would have to be borne in mind that in following
that route the ships could be observed from the islands of Rottum
and Schiermonnikoog and the news probably dispatched farther.
Unfortunately this lessened the chance of carrying out a surprise
bombardment of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, but there was no reason
on that account to give it up altogether. Relying on aerial re-
connaissance, further developments might be expected and the
enterprise was continued.

Towards 8 p.m. a wireless message from the Naval Staff con-
firmed what the Naval Corps in Flanders had already reported at
noon, that since 6 a.m. numerous enemy forces had been assembled
off the Belgian coast, at the mouth of the Scheldt; it was not possible
to divine their intention, but very probably it was connected with a
bombardment of the coast of Flanders. It was welcome news for our
Fleet to hear of the assemblage of enemy forces there. Another
wireless announced that on the morning of the 23rd large squadrons
of English warships of all types had been sighted off Lindesnaes,
the south-west point of Norway. I could count, therefore, on my
presumption that the English Fleet was divided into two sections
being correct.

At 9.30 p.m. a message was sent us from Bruges that according
to an intercepted English wireless all patrol boats had been ordered
back to port. This showed that the meeting of our battle-cruisers
with English submarines during the afternoon had resulted in their
sending news of our movements.

Shortly before daybreak reports were received from the airships
of the results of their attack. They were obliged to fight against
unfavourable wind conditions, and bad visibility over the land;
they also met with strong counter-action. The six air-ships taking
part had raided Norwich, Lincoln, Harwich and Ipswich and had
been engaged with outpost ships. None had been damaged and
they were then in the act of returning home. At 5 a.m. our large
cruisers approached the coast off Lowestoft. Good support was
afforded them by the U-boats placed in position by the Naval Corps.
The light cruiser Rostock, which formed the flank cover for the
battle-cruisers, reported enemy ships and destroyers in a west-

127

Germany's High Sea Fleet

south-west direction. But as the light was not good enough to open
fire, Admiral Bodicker proceeded to bombard the towns. This was
carried out at a distance of from ioo — 130 hm. Excellent results
were observed in the harbour and the answering fire was weak. A
north-west course was then taken to proceed with the bombardment
of Great Yarmouth and to engage the ships reported by the Rostock.

Meanwhile the Rostock, supported by the light cruiser Elbing,
had kept in touch with the enemy forces in the endeavour to bring
them nearer to the battle-cruisers. The ships in question were four
modern light cruisers and about twelve destroyers. As soon, how-
ever, as they caught sight of our battle-cruisers they turned at full
speed southwards. We opened fire on them at a distance of 130 hm.
until they were beyond our range. Many hits were observed, and
on one of the cruisers a big fire was plainly visible. The high
speed kept up by the enemy made pursuit useless. The cruisers then
shaped their course in the direction of our Main Fleet and reported
that their task was accomplished.

During the bombardment of the two coastal towns, the light
cruiser Frankfurt sank an armed patrol steamer by gunfire. A
second one was sunk by the leader of Torpedo-boat Flotilla VI,
"G41," the crew of which were rescued. From what the latter
stated she was the King Stephen, of evil repute, which had
allowed the crew of the airship "L 19 " to perish. These men
certainly denied most emphatically that they were on the trawler
then, and laid the blame on a former crew. They contradicted them-
selves so constantly, however, that the captain and the engineer
grew very suspicious, and as the steamer had been used for war
service the crew were made prisoners.

At 5.30 a.m. "La," reported being chased by aeroplanes in a
south-westerly direction. When the fleet was sighted the airmen
departed, probably to announce the approach of our ships, which
at that time were steaming on a south-westerly course to meet the
cruisers. At the same moment "L 11 " and "L 23 " came in sight;
they had not been able to discover the enemy. At 6 a.m., therefore,
when the cruisers had reported the conclusion of the bombardment,
Terschelling Bank was made fbr according to plan. Towards
7.30 a.m. the Naval Corps in Flanders reported that the English
ships assembled there had been ordered by wireless, which was
intercepted, to return. The English destroyers were to finish coaling
and then move on to Dunkirk.

An approach, therefore, on the part of the enemy was not to be

128

Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

looked for from that quarter. The only hope now left was that
enemy forces might be encountered off Terschelling. As we drew
near to that zone, the Fleet was constantly obliged to evade sub-
marine attacks, but no other enemy forces were met.

The return trip passed without further incident. Two neutral
steamers, as well as some smaller vessels were stopped and searched
for contraband goods. The enemy, hearing of the advance of our
forces, withdrew all his ships from the Belgian coast and made no
effort to locate us. It appears from subsequent English statements
that the English Fleet had put to sea the day before for one of the
usual North Sea expeditions, and it would be interesting to find out
whether it could have had an opportunity of crossing our path in
the Bight.

When the Seydlitz was docked a hole of 90 sq. m. was found
in her, through which about 1,400 tons of water had poured into
the ship. Eleven of the men had been killed at their post in the
torpedo chamber. In spite of the considerable quantity of ammunition
stored there, no further explosion occurred or the disaster would
have been far greater.

Early in May the weather conditions were such as to allow of
a. resumption of the air raids on England. But this favourable
phase in the weather was not of so long duration as in the preceding
month, which was quite exceptional. Two raids were carried out
in which eight airships took part. " L 20 " was lost in the second raid
as a strong south-westerly wind had arisen, and the airship, owing
to engine trouble, was unable to reach the home coast. The captain,
Commander Stabbert, made, therefore, for the Norwegian coast,
where he came down with his damaged airship in the neighbour-
hood of Jaderen, where the crew alighted and were interned. Then
ensued a period of short nights which caused a cessation in the
airships' raiding activities as the hours of darkness were not enough
to afford them sufficient protection, and it was also obvious that
latterly the defensive measures had become much more effectual.
But the Fleet made good use of the airships for all reconnoitring
purposes in connection with important enterprises, which gained in
value through co-operation with the U-boats and on which all the
more energy had to be expended since the trade-war by the U-boats
had been stopped since the end of April.

Just as we were proceeding to Lowestoft a wireless message was
received from the Chief of the Naval Staff, to the effect that trade-
war by U-boats was only to be carried out now in accordance
J «9

Germany's High Sea Fleet

with prize regulations. This was the result of the American protest
in the case of the Sussex disaster. As I could not expect the U-boats
to carry on a war of that description owing to the heavy casualties
that might be expected, I had called back by wireless all the boats
engaged in the trade-war, and subsequently received approval of
this action in high quarters. It was left to me until further notice
to employ the U-boats in purely military enterprises. This helped
still further to protect the German Bight, as definite areas could now
be continuously occupied and we could expect early reports of
enemy movements ; we also hoped to find opportunities to attack the
enemy submarines employed as guard-ships. The experiences of
our U-boats confirmed the danger caused by the enemy submarines,
which, appearing unexpectedly, had come to be very unpleasant
adversaries, and we intended, therefore, to make use of our boats
for defence purposes.

130

PART II

From the Battle of the Skagerrak to the
Unrestricted U-boat Warfare

CHAPTER X
THE BATTLE OF THE SKAGERRAK

THE bombardment of April 25 had not failed to make an impres-
sion in England. The expectation that the fleet was bound to
succeed in warding off all German attacks on British shores
had repeatedly been disappointed. On each occasion the English
main fleet had arrived too late — in December, 1914; in January,
1915 ; and now again this year — so that, to the great annoyance
of the English, the German "raiders" got away each time un-
punished. Wherefore Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
felt called upon to announce publicly that should the German ships
again venture to show themselves off the British coast, measures had
been taken to ensure their being severely punished. However, we
were ready to take our chance.

The question was whether it would be advisable to include
Squadron II in an advance which in all probability would involve
us in a serious battle. Early in May I ordered the squadron tem-
porarily into the Jade Basin that I might have an opportunity
of discussing with the Squadron Commander the action to be
observed in battle under the most varied conditions. Military
reasons entered into the question as to whether the squadron should
be taken out or left behind, as well as consideration for the honour
and feeling of the crews, who would not hear of being reduced,
themselves and their ships, to the second class. For battleships
to have their activity limited absolutely to guarding the German
Bight without any prospect of getting into touoh with the enemy —
to which they had been looking forward for a year and a half — would
have caused bitter disappointment; on the other hand, however,
was the responsibility of sending the ships into an unequal fight
where the enemy would make use of his very best material. I
cannot deny that in addition to the eloquent intercession of Rear-
Admiral Mauve, the Squadron Commander, my own former con-
nection with Squadron II also induced me not to disappoint it
by leaving it behind. And thus it happened that the squadron
played its part on May 31, and in so helpful a manner that I never
had cause to regret my decision.

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

The repairs on the Seydlitz, damaged on April 24, were not
completed until the end of May, as the reconstruction of the mine-
shattered torpedo tubes necessitated very heavy work. I had no
intention, however, of doing without that battle-cruiser, although
Vice-Admiral Hipper, Chief of the Reconnaissance Forces, had
meanwhile hoisted his flag in the newly repaired battle-cruiser
Liitzow (Captain Harder, formerly on the Stralsund). The vessels
belonging to Squadron III were also having their condensers
repaired, as on their last trip there had been seven cases of damaged
machinery in that squadron. The advantage of having three
engines, as had each of these ships, was proved by the fact that
two engines alone were able to keep up steam almost at full speed;
at the same time, very faulty construction in the position of the
engines was apparent, which unfortunately could not be rectified
owing to limited space. Thus it happened that when a condenser
went wrong it was impossible to conduct the steam from the engine
with which it was connected to one of the other two condensers,
and thus keep the engine itself working. It was an uncomfort-
able feeling to know that this weakness existed in the strongest
unit at the disposal of the Fleet, and how easily a bad accident might
result in leakages in two different condensers and thus incapacitate
one vessel in the group !

The object of the next undertaking was a bombardment of the
fortifications and works of the harbour at Sunderland which,
situated about the middle of the East coast of England, would'
be certain to call out a display of English fighting forces as pro-
mised by Mr. Balfour. The order issued on May 18 in this
connection was as follows :

"The bombardment of Sunderland by our cruisers is intended
to compel the enemy to send out forces against us. For
the attack on the advancing enemy the High Sea Fleet forces to
be south of the Dogger Bank, and the U-boats to be stationed for
attack off the East coast of England. The enemy's ports of sortie
will be closed by mines. The Naval Corps will support the under-
taking with their U-boats. If time and circumstances permit, trade-
war will be carried on during proceedings."

The squadrons of men-of-war had made over the command
of prizes to the torpedo-boat flotillas, as torpedo-boats are the best
adapted for the examination of vessels, but have not a crew large
enough to enable them to bring the captured vessels into our ports.
The First and Second Scouting Divisions were placed at the

i34

The Battle of the Skagerrak

disposal of the Chief of Reconnaissance, and the Second Leader of
the torpedo-boats with Flotillas II, VI, and IX. Scouting
Division IV* and the remainder of the flotillas were with the
Main Fleet. Sixteen of our U-boats were told off for the positions
of attack, with six to eight of the Flanders boats. On May 15
they started to reconnoitre in the North Sea, and from May 23 to
June 1 inclusive were to remain at the posts assigned to them,
observe the movements of the English forces, and gain any in-
formation that might be of use to the Fleet in their advance; at
the same time they were also to seize every opportunity to attack.
Provision was also made for the largest possible number of our
airships to assist the enterprise by reconnaissance from the air.
The fact that the U-boats could only remain out for a certain period
put a limit to the execution of the plan. If reconnaissance from
the air proved impossible, it was arranged to make use of the U-boats,
and so dispense with aerial reconnaissance.

As the weather each day continued to be unfavourable and the
airship commander could only report that it was impossible to
send up any airships, the plan was so far changed, though with-
out altering other preparations, that it was decided to embark on
a campaign against cruisers and merchantmen outside and in the
Skagerrak, with the expectation that the news of the appearance
of our cruisers in those waters would be made known to the enemy.
With this object in view, they had been told to keep in sight of
the coast of Norway, so that the enemy might be notified. In
further describing the course of this undertaking, which led to the
Battle of the Skagerrak, I shall keep strictly to the official report
I sent in.

In judging the proceedings it must be borne in mind that at
sea a leader adapts his action to the events taking place around
him. It may possibly reveal errors which can only be accounted
for later by reports from his own ships or valuable information from
enemy statements. The art of leadership consists in securing an
approximately correct picture from the impression of the moment,
and then acting in accordance with it. The writer of history can
then form a tactical inference where obvious mistakes were made, or
where a better grasp of the situation would have led to a more
advantageous decision. In this event a certain reticence should be

* The Third Scouting Division, which contained the oldest armoured cruisers,
Print Adalbert, Prim Heinriek, and Roon, had long since been handed over to the
commander of the Baltic forces, as, owing to their lack of speed and inferior armour-
plating, the vessels were not suitable for use in the North Sea.

135

Germany's High Sea Fleet

observed in making definite assertions that a different movement
would have been more successful, for armed efficiency plays the
chief part in success and cannot be determined with mathematical
precision. I have in mind one hit that did so much damage
to our battle-cruiser Seydlitz on January 24, 1915, that one almost
came to the conclusion that such ships could not stand many shots
of such heavy calibre, and yet the following battle proved the
contrary. At all events, a good hit can seal the fate of a ship, even
one of the strongest. A naval battle may be open to criticism as
to why it happened thus, but anyone who asserted that it might
have happened otherwise would be in danger of losing his case.

1
The Advance

On May 30, as the possibility of a long-distance aerial recon-
naissance was still considered uncertain, I decided on an advance
in the direction of the Skagerrak, as the vicinity of the Jutland
coast offered a certain cover against surprise. An extensive aerial
reconnaissance was an imperative necessity for an advance on
Sunderland in the north-west, as it would lead into waters where
we could not allow ourselves to be forced into giving battle. As,
however, on the course now to be adopted, the distance from the
enemy points of support was considerably greater, aerial recon-
naissance was desirable, though not absolutely necessary. As
already stated, our U-boats were in position, some of them in fact
facing Scapa Flow, one boat off Moray Firth, a large number
off the Firth of Forth, several off the Humber and the remainder,
north of the Terschelling Bank, in order to be able to operate
against enemy forces that might chance to come from a south-
westerly direction. The combination of our total forces taking
part was as follows :

A list of warships which on May 30 to June 1, 1916, took part
in the Battle of the Skagerrak and the operations connected there-
with":"

Chief of the Fleet: Vice-Admiral Scheer in Friedrich der Grosse.
Chief of Staff: Captain von Trotha (Adolf).
Chief of the Operating Section: Captain von Levetzow.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Quaet-Faslem (Hans).
Commander of " Friedrich der Grosse " : Captain Fuchs (Theodor).

136

The Battle of the Skagerrak

Squadron I

Chief of Squadron: Vice-Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt, Ostfriesland.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Wegener (Wolfgang).
Admiral: Rear-Admiral Engelhardt, Posen.

Ostfriesland: Captain von Natzmer.
Thiiringen: Captain Kiisel (Hans).
Helgoland: Captain von Kameke.
Oldenberg: Captain Hopfner.
Posen: Captain Lange.
Rheinland: Captain Rohardt.
Nassau: Captain Klappenbach (Hans).
Westfalen: Captain Redlich.

Squadron II

Chief of Squadron: Rear-Admiral Mauve, Detdschland.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Kahlert.

Admiral: Rear-Admiral Baron von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels,
Hanover.

Deutschland: Captain Meurer (Hugo).
Pommern: Captain Bolken.
Schlesien: Captain Behncke (Fr.).
Schleswig-Holstein: Captain Barrentrapp.
Hannover: Captain Heine (Wilh.).
Hessen: Captain Bartels (Rudolf).

Squadron III

Chief of Squadron: Rear-Admiral Behncke, Konig.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Baron von Gagern.
Admiral: Rear-Admiral Nordmann, Kaiser.

Konig: Captain Briininghaus.
Grosser Kurfiirst: Captain Goette (Ernst).
Markgraf: Captain Seiferling.
Kronprinz: Captain Feldt (Constanz).
Kaiser: Captain Baron von Kayserling.
Prinz Regent Luitpold: Captain Heuser (Karl).
Kaiserin: Captain Sievers.

137

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Chief of the Reconnaissance Forces: Vice-Admiral Hipper, Lutzow.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Raeder (Erick).

Scouting Division I

Seydlitz: Captain von Egidy (Moritz).
Moltke: Captain von Karps.
Derfflinger: Captain Hartog.
Lutzow: Captain Harder.
Von der Tann: Captain Zenker.

Leader of Scouting Division II : Rear- Admiral BOdicker, Frankfurt.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Commander Stapenhorst.

Scouting Division II

Pillow, : Captain Mommsen.
Elbing: Captain Madlung.
Frankfurt: Captain von Trotha (Thilo).
Wiesbaden: Captain Reiss.
Rostock: Captain Feldmann (Otto).
Regensburg: Captain Neuberer.

Leader of Scouting Division IV : Commodore von Reuter, Stettin.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Weber (Heinrich).

Scouting Division IV

Stettin: Captain Rebensburg (Friedrich).
Miinchen: Captain Bocker (Oskar).
Frauenlob: Captain Hoffmann (Georg).
Stuttgart: Captain Hagedorn.
Hamburg : Captain von Gaudecker.

Torpedo-Boat Flotillas

First Leader of the Torpedo-Boat Forces: Commodore Michelsen,

Rostock.
r Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Junkermann.
Second Leader of the Torpedo-Boat Forces: Commodore Heinrich,

Regensburg.
Chief of Flotilla I: Commander Conrad Albrecht, "G39."
Chief of 1st Half -Flotilla: Commander Conrad Albrecht, "G 3p."
Chief of Flotilla II: Captain Schuur, "B 98."

138

The Battle of the Skagerrak

Chief of 3rd Half-Flotilla: Captain Boest, "G 101."

Chief of 4th Half-Flotilla: Captain Dittamar (Adolf), "B 109."

Chief of Flotilla III: Captain Hollmann, "S 53."

Chief of 5th Half-Flotilla: Commander Gautier, "V71."

Chief of 6th Half -Flotilla: Commander Karlowa", "S 54."

Chief of Flotilla V : Captain Heinecke, "G 11."

Chief of gth Half -Flotilla: Commander Hoefer, "V2."

Chief of loth Half-Flotilla: Commander Klein (Friedrich), "G8."

Chief of Flotilla VI: Captain Max Schultz, "G41."

Chief of nth Half -Flotilla: Commander Riimann, "V 44."

Chief of 12th Half-Flotilla: Commander Laks, "V69."

Chief of Flotilla VII: Captain von Koch, "S 24."

Chief of 13th Half-Flotilla: Commander von Zitzewitz (Gerhard),

"S i 5 .' J
Chief of 14th Half-Flotilla: Captain Cordes (Hermann), "S 19."
Chief of Flotilla IX: Captain Goehle, "V 28."
Chief of 17th Half-Flotilla: Commander Ehrhardt, "V27."
Chief of 18th Half -Flotilla : Captain Tillessen (Werner), "V30."

Submarines

Leader of the Submarines : Captain Bauer, Hamburg.
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Liitzow (Friedrich).

"U24" — Commander: Lieut. Schneider (Rudolf).

"U32" — Commander: Lieut. Baron Spiegel von und zu Peckel-

sheim. *
"U 63 "—Commander : Lieut. Schultze (Otto).
"U66" — Commander: Lieut, von Bothmer.
" U 70 " — Commander : Lieut. iWiinsche.
"U43" — Commander: Lieut. Jiirst.
"U44" — Commander : Lieut. Wagenfiihr.
"U52" — Commander: Lieut. Walther (Hans).
" U 47 " — Commander : Lieut. Metzger.
"U45" — Commander: Lieut. Hillebrand (Leo).
"U22" — Commander: Lieut. Hoppe.
" U 19 " — Commander : Lieut. Weizbach (Raimund).
"U B 22 " — Commander : Lieut. Putzier.
"UB21" — Commander: Lieut. Hashagen.
"U 53" — Commander: Lieut. Rose.
"U 64 "—Commander : Lieut. Morath (Robert).

i39

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Airships

" L i i " — Commander : Captain Schutze (Viktor).

"L17" — Commander: Lieut. Ehrlich (Herbert).

"L14" — Commander: Lieut. Bocker.

"L21" — Commander: Lieut. Dietrich (Max).

"L23" — Commander: Lieut, von Schubert.

" L 16 "—Commander : Lieut. Sommerfeldt.

"L13" — Commander: Lieut. Prolt.

"L9" — Commander: Captain Stelling.

"L22" — Commander: Lieut. Dietrich (Martin).

" L 24 " — Commander : Lieut. Koch (Robert).

Vice-Admiral Hipper, Chief of the Reconnaissance Forces was
ordered to leave the Jade Basin with his forces at 4 a.m., May 31,
to advance towards the Skagerrak out of sight of Horns Reef, and
the Danish coast, to show himself off the Norwegian coast before
dark, to cruise in the Skagerrak during the night, and at 'noon the
next day to join up with the Main Fleet. The ships under his
command comprised the Scouting Division I and II. To the
latter was attached the light cruiser Regensburg, flagship of
the Second Leader of the torpedo-boats; under his command were
the Flotillas II, VI, and IX. The Main Fleet, consisting of
Squadrons I, II, and III, of Scouting Division IV, the First
Leader of torpedo-boats, in the Rostock, and Torpedo-Boat Flotillas
I, II, V, and VII, were to follow at 4.30 a.m. to cover the
reconnaissance forces during the enterprise and take action on
June 1 . The sailing order of the battleships was as follows :
Squadron III in van, Squadron I following, and Squadron II in
the rear.

The Konig Albert was absent from Squadron III, having been
incapacitated a few days previously through condenser trouble.
Notwithstanding the loss of this important unit, I could not bring
myself further to postpone the enterprise, and preferred to do with-
out the ship. Squadron II was without the Preussen, which had
been placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic
forces to act as guard-ship at the south egress from the Sound.
Lothringen was deemed unfit for service. Scouting Division IV,
and the Leader of Torpedo-Boats in the light cruiser Rostock,
together with the Torpedo-Boat Flotillas I, II, V, and VII, were
attached to the battleships.

To the west of the Amrum Bank a passage had been cleared

140

The Battle of the Skagerrak

through the enemy minefields which led the High Sea forces safely
to the open sea. Visibility was good, with a light north-westerly
wind, and there was no sea on. At 7.30 a.m. "U 32" reported at
about 70 miles east of the Firth of Forth, two battleships, two
cruisers, and several torpedo-boats taking a south-easterly course.
At 8.30 a second wireless was received stating that she had intercepted
English wireless messages to the effect that two large battleships
and groups of destroyers had run out from Scapa Flow. At 8.48
a.m. a third message came through from "U66" that about 60
nautical miles east of Kinnairel [sic, ? Kinnaird Head], eight enemy
battleships, light cruisers, and torpedo-boats had been sighted on a
north-easterly course.

These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's purpose.
But the varied forces of the separate divisions of the fleet, and their
diverging courses did not seem to suggest either combined action
or an advance on. the German Bight or any connection with our
enterprise, but showed a possibility that our hope of meeting with
separate enemy divisions was likely to be fulfilled 1 . We were,
therefore, all the more determined to keep to our plan. Between
2 and 3 p.m. "L" 9, 14, 16, 21 and 23 ascended for long-distance
reconnaissance in the sector north to west of Heligoland. They
took no part in the battle that so soon was to follow, neither did
they see anything of their own Main Fleet, nor of the enemy, nor
hear anything of the battle.

2
The First Phase of the Battle : Cruiser Engagement

At 4.28 p.m. the leading boat of the 4th Torpedo-Boat Half-
Flotilla, "B 109," reported that Elbing, the west wing cruiser on
the Chief of Reconnaissance's line, had been sent to examine a
steamer about 90 nautical miles west of Bovbjerg, and had sighted
some enemy forces. It was thanks to that steamer that the engage-
ment took place ; our course might have carried us past the English
cruisers had the torpedo-boat not proceeded to the steamer and thus
sighted the smoke from the enemy in the west.

As soon as the enemy, comprising eight light cruisers of the
"Caroline" type, sighted our forces, he turned off to the north.
Admiral Bodicker gave chase with his cruisers. At 5.20 p.m. the
Chief of the Reconnaissance then sighted in a westerly direction
two columns of large vessels taking an easterly course. These soon

141

Germany's High Sea Fleet

showed themselves to be six battle-Cruisers, three of the "Lion"
class, one "Tiger," and two "Indefatigables," besides numbers of
lighter forces. The Chief of Reconnaissance called back Scout-
ing Division II, which he had sent to give chase in the north,
and prepared to attack. The enemy deployed to the south in fight-
ing line. It was Vice-Admiral Beatty with the First and Second
English Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, consisting of the Lion, Princess
Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger, New Zealand, and Indefatigable. That
the enemy deployed to the south was a very welcome fact for us,
as it offered the possibility of inducing the enemy to fall back on
his own main fleet. The Chief of Reconnaissance therefore followed

if »

w /

<**

Order

of Sailing

the movement, manoeuvred to get within effective firing range, and
opened fire at 5.49 p.m., at a range of about 130 hm.*

The fighting proceeded on a south-easterly course. The Chief
of Reconnaissance kept the enemy at effective distance. The bat-
teries fixed their aim well ; hits were observed on all the enemy ships.
Already at 6.13 p.m., the battle-cruiser Indefatigable, the last in the
line of the enemy cruisers, sank with a terrible explosion caused by
the guns of the Von der Tann. Superiority in firing and tactical
advantages of position were decidedly on our side up to 6.19 p.m.,
when a new unit of four or five ships of the "Queen Elizabeth " type,
with a considerable surplus of speed, drew up from a north-westerly
direction, and beginning at a range of 200 hm., joined the fight-

* Earl Beatty gives the range at about 18,500 yards.
142

The Battle of the Skagerrak

ing. It was the Fifth English Battle Squadrpn.* This made the
situation critical for our cruisers. The new enemy fired with extra-
ordinary rapidity and accuracy, with the greater ease as regards the
latter that he met with almost no .opposition, as our battle-cruisers
were fully engaged with Admiral Beatty's ships.

At 6.20 p.m. the fighting distance between the battle-cruisers
on both sides was about 120 hm., while between our battle-cruisers
and those with Queen Elizabeth the distance was something like

Position at 5.49 P.M.

180 hm. At this stage Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX was the only one of
the flotillas under the Chief of Reconnaissance that was in a posi-
tion to attack. The Second Leader of Torpedo-Boats, Commodore

Heinrich, on board the Regensburg, and some few boats belonging
to Torpedo Flotilla II, were getting up steam with all speed in a
diagonal line from the Chief of Reconnaissance's furthest point.

* According to English accounts, it comprised the Barham, Warsfite, Valiant,
and Malaya. Mention is made of four ships only. According to various observations
on our side (by Squadron III and the leader of Scouting Division II), ithere were
five ships. If Queen Elizabeth, or a similar type of ship, was not in the unit,
it is possible that another recently built man-of-war replaced her.

H3

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The cruisers of Scouting Division II, together with the remain-
ing torpedo flotillas, were forced by the "Queen Elizabeths" to
withdraw to the east to escape their fire and had, therefore, in spite
of working their engines to the utmost, not been able to arrive in
position at the head of the battle-cruisers.

In view of the situation, the Second Leader of the Torpedo-
Boats ordered Torpedo Flotilla IX (whose chief, Captain Goehle,
had already decided on his own initiative to prepare to attack) to
advance to the relief of the battle-cruisers.

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Position at 6.20. P.M.

At about 6.30 p.m. Torpedo Flotilla IX proceeded to attack,
running through heavy enemy firing. Twelve torpedoes were fired
on the enemy lines at distances ranging between 95 — 80 hm. It was
impossible to push the attack closer on the enemy, as at the same
time that Flotilla IX got to work, eighteen to twenty English
destroyers, covered by light cruisers, appeared on the scene to
counter-attack and beat off our torpedo-boats. The result was a
torpedo-boat fight at close range (1,000 — 1,500 m.). The Regensburg,
together with the boats of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II that were with her,
and the centrally situated guns on the battle-cruisers, then joined in
the fight. After about ten minutes the enemy turned away. On
our side "V27" and "V29" were sunk, hit by shots from heavy
calibre guns. The crews of both the boats were rescued in spite of

144

The Battle of the Skagerrak

enemy fire, by "V26" and "S35." On the enemy side two, or
perhaps three, destroyers were sunk, and two others so badly
damaged that they could not get away, and fell later into the hands
of our advancing Main Fleet. The enemy made no attempt to rescue
the crews of these boats.

During the attack by the torpedo-boats, the English battle-
cruisers were effectively held in check by the Scouting Division I
with heavy artillery, which at the same time manoeuvred so
successfully that none of the numerous enemy torpedoes observed by
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX hit their objectives. Towards 6.30 p.m. a
powerful explosion was observed on board the third enemy cruiser —
the Queen Mary. When the smoke from the explosion cleared away
the cruiser had disappeared. Whether the destruction was the
result of artillery action or was caused by a torpedo from the battle-
cruisers or by a torpedo from Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX can never be
ascertained for certain, but most probably it was due to artillery
action which caused an explosion of ammunition or oil on board
the enemy vessel. It was not until night that I heard of the
destruction of the two battle-cruisers.

The attack by Flotilla IX had at all events been successful in
so far that for a time it checked the enemy's fire. Admiral Hipper
took advantage of this to divert the cruisers to a north-westerly
course and thus secure for himself the lead at the head of the
cruisers in the new phase of the fight. Immediately following on
the attack by the torpedo-boats, the German Main Fleet appeared
on the scene of battle just in the nick of time to help the recon-
naissance forces in their fight against considerably superior numbers.

3
The Second Phase of the Fight : The Pursuit

At 4.28 p.m.* about 50 nautical miles west of Lyngoig, on the
Jutland coast, the first news of the sighting of enemy light forces
was reported to the Main Fleet proceeding in the following order :

Squadrons III, I, II, the flagship at the head of Squadron I,
on a northerly course, speed 14 knots — distance between the vessels,
7 hm., distance between the squadrons, 35 hm., the torpedo-boats

* In comparing the time given in the German and English accounts it must be
remembered that there is a difference of two hours, for the reason that we reckon
according to summer-time in Central Europe, while the difference between ordinary
Central Europe and Greenwich time is one hour. Therefore 4.2S German time
corresponds to 2.28 English time.

K MS

Germany's High Sea Fleet

as U-boat escort for the squadrons, the light cruisers of Scouting
Division IV allotted to the Main Fleet to protect their course.

At 5.35 the first report was sent that heavy forces had been
sighted. The distance between the Chief of Reconnaissance and
the Main Fleet was at that time about 50 nautical miles. On receipt
of this message, the fighting line was opened (that is, the distance
between the squadrons was reduced to 1,000 m., and between the
vessels to 500 m.), and the order was given to clear the ships for
action.

In the fighting line the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet is not tied
to any fixed position. When there is a question of leading several
squadrons it is not advisable to take up a position at the head of the
line, as it is not possible from there to watch the direction in which
the fight develops, as that greatly depends on the movements of
the enemy. Being bound to any such position might lead to the
Commander-in-Chief finding himself at the rear instead of at the
head of his assembled line. A position in the centre or at a third
of the line (according to the number of units) is more advantageous.
In the course of events the place of the eighth ship in the line for
the flagship has been tested and approved of.

During the whole time that fighting was going on I had a clear
look-out over the whole line and was able to signal with great
rapidity in both directions. As the fighting line of the warships
was more than 10 km. long, I should not have been able to over-
look my entire line from the wing, especially under such heavy
enemy firing.

The message received at 5.45 p.m. from the Chief of Reconnais-
sance that he was engaged with six enemy battle-cruisers on a south-
easterly course showed that he had succeeded in meeting the enemy,
and as he fought was drawing him closer to our Main Fleet. The
duty of the Main Fleet was now to hasten as quickly as possible
to support the battle-cruisers, which were inferior as to material,
and to endeavour to hinder the premature retreat of the enemy.
At 6.5, therefore, I took a north-westerly course at a speed of 15
knots, and a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly
course in order to place the enemy between two fires, as he, on his
southerly course, would have to push through between our line
and that of the battle-cruisers. While the Main Fleet was still
altering course, a message came from Scouting Division II that
an English unit of warships, five ships (not four!) had joined in the
fight.

146

The Battle of the Skagerrak

The situation thus was becoming critical for Scouting Divi-
sion I, confronted as they were by six battle-cruisers and five
battleships. Naturally, therefore, everything possible had to be
done to get into touch with them, and a change was made
back to a northerly course. The weather was extremely clear,
the sky cloudless, a light breeze from N.W., and a calm sea. At
6.30 p.m. the fighting lines were sighted. At 6.45 p.m. Squadrons
I and III opened fire, while the Chief of Reconnaissance, with
the forces allotted to him, placed himself at the head of the
Main Fleet.

The light enemy forces veered at once to the west, and as soon
as they were out of firing range turned northwards. Whether
the fire from our warships had damaged them during the short
bombardment was doubtful, but their vague and purposeless hurry-
ing to and fro led one to think that our fire had reached them and
that the action of our warships had so surprised them that they did
not know which way to turn next.

The English battle-cruisers turned to a north-westerly course;
Queen Elizabeth and the ships with her followed in their wake,
and thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers.
In so doing, however, they came very much nearer to our Main
Fleet, and we came on at a firing distance of 17 km. or less.
While both the English units passed by each other and provided
mutual cover, Captain Max Schultz, Chief of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla
VI, attacked at 6.49 p.m., with the Eleventh Torpedo-Boat Half-
Flotilla. The result could not be seen.

The fighting which now ensued developed into a stern chase;

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Position at 6.55 P.M

'47

Germany's High Sea Fleet

our reconnaissance forces pressed on the heels of the enemy battle-
cruisers, and our Main Fleet gave chase to the Queen Elizabeth and
the ships with her. Our ships in Squadron III attained a speed
of over 20 knots, which was also kept up on board the Kaiserin.
Just before fire was opened she had succeeded in repairing damage
to one of her condensers. By the Friedrich der Grosse, the Fleet
Flagship, 20 knots was achieved and maintained. In spite of this,
the enemy battle-cruisers succeeded soon after 7 o'clock in escap-
ing from the fire of Scouting Division I. The Queen Elizabeth
and her sister ships also made such good way that they were only
under fire from the ships of Scouting Division I and of the
Fifth Division (First Half of Squadron III). The hope that one
of the ships pursued would be so damaged as to fall a prey to our
Main Fleet was not fulfilled, although our firing was effective, and
at 7.30 p.m. it was seen that a ship of the "Queen Elizabeth " type
after she had been hit repeatedly, drew slowly put of the fighting
line with a heavy list to leeward. Two modern destroyers, the
Nestor and Nomad, were all that fell to the share of the Main Fleet ;

X

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Position at 7.15 P.M.
148

The Battle of the Skagerrak

they were hit and badly damaged in the attack by Torpedo-Boat
Flotilla IX, and were overtaken and sunk by us ; the crews were taken
prisoner.

At 7.20 p.m., when the fire from Scouting Division I and
from the ships of the Fifth Division appeared to grow weaker, the
leaders of the Fleet were under the impression that the enemy was
succeeding in getting away, and gave orders to the Chief of Recon-
naissance and to all the fighting forces "to give chase." Mean-
while, the previously clear weather had become less clear ; the wind
had changed from N.W. to S.W. Powder fumes and smoke from
the funnels hung over the sea and cut off all view from north and
east. Only now and then could we see our own reconnaissance
forces. Owing to the superior speed of Beatty's cruisers, our own,
when the order came to give chase, were already out-distanced by
the enemy battle-cruisers and light craft, and were thus forced, in
order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner circle and adopt
the enemy's course. Both lines of cruisers swung by degrees in
concentric circles by the north to a north-easterly direction. A
message which was to have been sent by the Chief of Reconnais-
sance could not be dispatched owing to damage done to the principal
and reserve wireless stations on his flagship. The cessation of
firing at the head of the line could only be ascribed to the increas-
ing difficulty of observation with the sun so low on the horizon,
until finally it became impossible. When, therefore, enemy light
forces began a torpedo attack on our battle-cruisers at 7.40 p.m.,
the Chief or Reconnaissance had no alternative but to manoeuvre
and finally bring the unit round to S.W. in an endeavour to close
up with the Main Fleet, as it was impossible to return the enemy's
fire to any purpose.

4
The Third Phase of the Fighting.:" The Battle

I observed almost simultaneously that the admiral at the head
of our squadron of battleships began to veer round to* starboard in
an easterly direction. This was in accordance with the instruc-
tions signalled to keep up the pursuit. As the Fleet was still divided
in columns, steering a north-westerly course as directed, the order
"Leader in Front" was signalled along the line at 7.45 p.m., and
the speed temporarily reduced to 15 knots, so as to make it possible
for the divisions ahead, which had pushed on at high pressure, to
get into position again.

140

Germany's High Sea Fleet

As long as the pursuit was kept up, the movements of the
English gave us the direction, consequently our line by degrees
veered round to the east. During these proceedings in the Main
Fleet, Scouting Division II, under Rear-Admiral Bodicker,
when engaged with a light cruiser of the "Calliope" class,* which
was set on fire, sighted several light cruisers of the "Town " class,
and several big ships, presumably battleships, of which the
Agincourt was one. Owing to the mist that hung over the water,

Schlachlkr.

t

*****

Position from 7.43 to 8 F.M.

it was impossible to ascertain the entire strength of the enemy.
The group was at once heavily fired on, returned the fire, discharged
torpedoes, and turned in the direction of their own Main Fleet.
No result could be observed, as artificial smokef was at once

* According to English accounts the light cruiser Chester was badly damaged.
Her casualties were 31 killed and 50 wounded, and she had four holes just above
the water-line.

t Artificial fog or smoke, prepared by a special process at the largest dye-works,
and supplied to all the lighter forces to enable them to withdraw from the fire of
superior forces.

The Battle of the Skagerrak

employed to protect the cruisers. In spite of the fog the Wiesbaden
and Pillau were both badly hit. The Wiesbaden (Captain Reiss)
lay in the thick of the enemy fire, incapable of action.

The Chiefs of the 12th and 9th Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotillas who
were stationed behind the cruisers, recognising the gravity of the
situation, came to the front. Both came under fire from a line of
numbers of big ships on a N.W. course, and fired their torpedoes
from within 60 hm. of the enemy. Here, too, it was impossible to
observe what success was achieved, as dense clouds of smoke hid the
enemy from view directly they veered round. But both the above-
mentioned commanders reckon that they met with success, having
attacked under favourable conditions.

While this encounter with the advance guard of the English
Main Fleet was taking place, we, on our flagship were occupied
debating how much longer to continue the pursuit in view of the
advanced time. There was no longer any question of a cruiser
campaign against merchantmen in the Skagerrak, as the meeting
with the English fighting forces which was to result from such action
had already taken place. But we were bound to take into considera-
tion that the English Fleet, if at sea, which was obvious from the
ships we had encountered, would offer battle the next day. Some
steps would also have to be taken to shake off the English light
forces before darkness fell in order to avoid any loss to our Main
Fleet from nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks.

A message was then received from the leader of Scouting Divi-
sion II that he had been fired on by some newly arrived large
ships. At 8.2 p.m. came a wireless: "Wiesbaden incapable of
action." On receipt of the message I turned with the Fleet two
points to larboard [port] so as to draw nearer to the group and
render assistance to the Wiesbaden. From 8.20 onwards there was
heavy fighting round the damaged Wiesbaden, and good use was
made of the ship's torpedoes. Coming from a north-north-westerly
direction, the "Queen Elizabeth" ships and also probably Beatty's
battle-cruisers attacked (prisoners, however, stated that after 7.0 p.m.
the latter took no part in the fight).

A fresh unit of cruisers (three "Invincibles" and four "War-
riors") bore down from the north, besides light cruisers and
destroyers. A further message from the torpedo-boat flotillas which
had gone to support Scouting Division II, stated that they had
sighted more than twenty enemy battleships following a south-
easterly course. It was now quite obvious that we were confronted

151

Germany's High Sea Fleet

by a large portion of the English Fleet and a few minutes later their
presence was notified on the horizon directly ahead of us by rounds
of firing from guns of heavy calibre. The entire arc stretching from
north to east was a sea of fire. The flash from the muzzles of the
guns was distinctly seen through the mist and smoke on the horizon,
though the ships themselves were not distinguishable. This wa3
the beginning of the main phase of the battle.

\

\«0 km

i
i
•

Position at ;6.16 P.M.

There was never any question of our line veering round to
avoid an encounter. The resolve to do battle with the enemy stood
firm from the first. The leaders of our battleship squadrons, the
Fifth Division turned at once for a running fight, carried on at about
13,000 m. The other divisions followed this movement on orders
signalled from the flagship. By this time more than a hundred
heavy guns had joined in the fight on the enemy's side, directing fire
chiefly at our battle-cruisers and the ships of the Fifth Division (the
"Konig" class). The position of the English line (whose centre we
must have faced) to our leading point brought fire on us from three

15a

The Battle of the Skagerrak

sides. The "Queen Elizabeths" fired diagonally from larboard
[port] ; the ships of the Main Fleet, which Jellicoe had brought up,
from the forecastle starboard. Many shots were aimed at the
Friedrich der Grosse, but the ship was never hit.

During this stage of the fight the cruisers Defence, Black Prince,
and Warrior came up from the north, but were all destroyed by the
fire from our battleships and our battle-cruisers. Fire from the
Friedrich der Grosse was aimed at one of the three, which in a huge
white cloud of steam was blown into the air, at 3,000 m. distance.
I observed several enemy hits and consequent explosions on the
ships at our leading point. Following the movement of the enemy
they had made a bend which hindered free action of our Torpedo-
Boat Flotilla II stationed there.

I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were still farther
forward. Owing to the turning aside that was inevitable in
drawing nearer, they found themselves between the fire of both
lines. For this reason I decided to turn our line and bring it on to
an opposite course. Otherwise an awkward situation would have
arisen round the pivot which the enemy line by degrees was passing,
as long-distance shots from the enemy would certainly have hit
our rear ships. As regards the effectiveness of the artillery, the
enemy was more favourably situated, as our ships stood out against
the clear western horizon, whereas his own ships were hidden by
the smoke and mist of the battle. A running artillery fight on a
southerly course would therefore not have been advantageous to
us. The swing round was carried out in excellent style. At our
peace manoeuvres great importance was always attached to their
being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to
ensure the working of the signals. The trouble spent was now
well repaid; the cruisers were liberated from their cramped
position and enabled to steam away south and appeared, as soon
as the two lines were separated, in view of the flagship. The torpedo-
boats, too, on the leeside of the fire had room to move to the attack
and advanced.

While the veering round of the line was proceeding, two boats
of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla III ("G88" and "V73") and the leading
boat of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla I ("S 32 ") had attacked. The remain-
ing boats of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla III had ceased the attack on an
order to retire from the leader. The weakening of the enemy fire had
induced the First Leader to give the order, being persuaded that the
enemy had turned away and that the flotilla, which would be urgently

i53

Germany's High Sea Fleet

needed in the further development of the battle, would find itself
without support. Owing to the shortening of the line at the head,
the boats of the other flotillas were not able to attack. One division
(Torpedo-Boat Flotillas IX and VI) had just returned from the
8 o'clock attack. The enemy line did not follow our veer round.
In the position it was to our leading point, it should have remained
on, and could have held us still further surrounded if by a simul-
taneous turn to a westerly course it had kept firmly to our line.

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Explo(ion

Position at 8.35 P.M.

It may be that the leader did not grasp the situation, and was afraid
to come any nearer for fear of torpedo attacks. Neither did any of
the other officers on the enemy side think of holding firmly to our
line, which would have greatly impeded our movements and
rendered a fresh attack on the enemy line extremely difficult.

Immediately after the line was turned the enemy fire ceased
temporarily, partly because the artificial smoke sent out by the
torpedo-boats to protect the line — the battle-cruisers in particular —
greatly impeded the enemy's view, but chiefly no doubt on account
of the severe losses the enemy had suffered.

Losses that were observed for certain as sunk wereT a ship of
the "Queen Elizabeth " class (name unknown), a battle-cruiser

'54

The Battle of the Skagerrak

(Invincible), two armoured cruisers (Black Prince and Defence), the
light cruiser Shark, and one marked "O 24." Heavily damaged and
partially set on lire were: One cruiser (Warrior, sunk later), three
light cruisers, three destroyers (of which the Acasta was one).

On our side "V48" was the only destroyer sunk, the Wies-
baden was rendered incapable, and the LUtzow so badly damaged
that the Chief of Reconnaissance was subsequently compelled at
9 p.m. to leave the ship under the enemy's fire, and transfer to
the Moltke. The leadership of Scouting Division I was thus
made over to the Derfflinger (Captain Hartog) until 11 p.m. The
other battle-cruisers and the leading ships of Squadron III had
also suffered, but kept their place in the line. No one reported
inability to do so; I was, therefore, able to reckon on their being
fully prepared to fight. After the enemy was forced to cease firing
on our line steering S.W., he flung himself on the already heavily
damaged Wiesbaden. The ship put up a gallant fight against the
overwhelmingly superior forces, which was clearly to be seen as
she had emerged from out of the clouds of smoke and was distinctly
visible.

It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy
followed us our action in retaining the direction taken after turn-
ing the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the
event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be
compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action
enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would
therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less
was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving
it to him to decide when he would elect to meet us the next morning.
There was but che way of averting this — to force the enemy into
a secotiB. battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel
his torpedo-boats to attack. The success of the turning of the
line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided
me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The
manoeuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans
for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate
the breaking loose at night. The fight of the Wiesbaden helped
also to strengthen my resolve to make an effort to render assistance
to her and at least save the crew.

Accordingly, after we had been on the new course about a
quarter of an hour, the line was again swung round to starboard
on an easterly course at 8.55 P.M. The battle-cruisers were ordered

Germany's High Sea Fleet

to operate with full strength on the enemy's leading point, all
the torpedo-boat flotillas had orders to attack, and the First Leader of
the torpedo-boats, Commodore Michelsen, was instructed to send his
boats to rescue the 'Wiesbaden's crew. The boats told off for this
purpose were compelled to relinquish the attempt. The Wiesbaden
and the boats making for her were in the midst of such heavy fire
that the leader of the torpedo-boats thought it useless to sacrifice
his boats. In turning to go back "V73" and "G88" together
fired off four torpedoes at the "Queen Elizabeths."

The battle that developed after the second change of course
and led to the intended result very soon brought a full resumption
of the firing at the van which, as was inevitable, became the same
running fight as the previous one, in order to bring the whole of the
guns into actions This time, however, in spite of "crossing the T,"
the acknowledged purpose was to deal a blow at the centre of the
enemy line. The fire directed on our line by the enemy concentrated
chiefly on the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Division. The ships
suffered all the more as they could see but little of the enemy beyond
the flash of fire at each round, while they themselves apparently
offered a good target for the enemy guns. The behaviour of the
battle-cruisers is specially deserving of the highest praise; crippled
in the use of their guns by their numerous casualties, some of them
badly damaged, obeying the given signal, "At the enemy," they
dashed recklessly to the attack.

The conduct of Squadron II (Rear-Admiral Behncke) and
the action of the ships of the Fifth Division are equally worthy
of recognition. They, together with the battle-cruisers, bore the
brunt of the fight, and thus rendered it possible for the torpedo-boat
flotillas to take so effective a share in the proceedings. The sys-
tematic procedure of our ships in the line was a great help to the
flotillas on their starboard side in opening the attack. The first to
attack were those ahead with the cruisers, the boats of Flotillas VI
and IX. Next came Flotillas III and V from the Main Fleet.
Flotilla II was kept back by the Second Leader of torpedo-boats,
for fear it might be left unprotected behind VI and IX. This
action was justified by the course of events. The 1st Torpedo
Half-Flotilla and a few boats from Flotillas VI and IX were occupied
in covering the damaged Liitzow. There was no longer any oppor-
tunity for an attack by Flotilla VII which had been in the rear of
our fighting line. As they advanced Flotillas VI and IX were
met by the heavy enemy fire that until then had been directed

iS6

j The Battle of the Skagerrak

against the battle-cruisers; they carried the attack to within 70 hm.
against the centre of a line comprising more than twenty large
battleships steering in a circle E.S.E. to S., and opened fire under
favourable conditions. In the attack "S 35 " was hit midships and
sank at once. All the other boats returned, and in doing so sent
out dense clouds of smoke between the enemy and our own Main
Fleet. The enemy must have turned aside on the attack of Flotillas

Queen Elizabeths

jr

IT.Hjft'—

Position at 9.17 P.M.

VI and IX. Flotillas III and V that came after found nothing but
light craft, and had no opportunity of attacking the battleships.
The action of the torpedo-boat flotillas had achieved its purpose.

At 9.17 p.m., therefore, the line was again for the third time
swung round on to a westerly course, and this was carried out at
the moment when the flagship Friedrich der Grosse was taking
a southerly course close by the turning point. Although the signal
to swing round hung on the starboard side and was being carried
out by the neighbouring ships, I made the Chief of the Friedrich
der Grosse carry out the turn to larboard [port].

i57

Germany's High Sea Fleet

This might have led the ships following behind to think that
there was a mistake in the signalling. But my intention to get
through and save the ships in front of the Friedrich der Grosse
from a difficult situation in carrying out the manoeuvre was rightly
understood by Vice-Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt in the Ostfriesland,
the Leader of Squadron I. He did not wait, therefore, for the
carrying out of the movement from the rear — which is the general
rule to avoid all danger of collision — but himself gave the lead
in the turning of his squadron by starting the turn to starboard

(Jtcteslond

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KShigO*

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Swinging Round to Starboard

with the OMffjiesland— and thus forced his ships round!- This
action was a very satisfactory proof of the capable handling of the
ships and the leaders' intelligent grasp of the situation.

After the change to a westerly course the Fleet was brought
round to a south-westerly, southerly, and finally to a south-easterly
course to meet the enemy's encircling movement and keep open
a way for our return. The enemy fire ceased very soon after we
had swung round and we lost sight of our adversary. The enemy's
casualties at this stage of the fighting cannot be given.

Excepting the effects of direct hits which we were able to confirm
from the flames of explosions, the enemy has only admitted the
damage to the Marlborough by torpedoes.* On our side all the ships
were in a condition to keep up the speed requisite for night work (16
knots) and thus keep their place in the line.

* Admiral Jellicoe admits that torpedoes reached his line, but claims to have
escaped further damage by the clever handling of his ships. Our assumption that
he had already turned back before the attack by the torpedo-boats is thus confirmed.

The Battle of the Skagerrak

5
Night Movements and Battles

Twilight was now far advanced, and it was only by personal
observation that I could assure myself of the presence and external
condition of those ships that chiefly had been under fire, and
especially that the Liitzow was able to keep with the unit. At 9.30
the battle-cruiser was seen to larboard [port] of the flagship, and had
reported that she could do 15 knots. The report made by
the torpedo-boat flotilla as to the enemy's strength and the
extension of his firing line made it quite certain that we had been
in battle with the entire English Fleet. It might safely be expected
that in the twilight the enemy would endeavour by attacking with
strong forces, and during the night with destroyers, to force us over
to the west in order to open battle with us when it was light. He was
strong enough to do it. If we could succeed in warding off the
enemy's encircling movement, and could be the first to reach Horns
Reef, then the liberty of decision for the next morning was assured
to us. In order to make this possible all flotillas were ordered to be
ready to attack at night, even though there was a danger when day
broke of their not being able to take part in the new battle that
was expected. The Main Fleet in close formation was to make for
Horns Reef by the shortest route, and, defying all enemy attacks,
keep on that course. In accordance with this, preparations for the
night were made.

The Leaders of the torpedo-boats were instructed to arrange night
attacks for the flotillas. At 9.20 a southerly course was ordered.
In changing to this course Squadron II had fallen out on the star-
board side as the leading ship of Squadron I fell into the new course,
not being able to fix the position of Squadron II, Owing to the
latter's inferior speed it fell behind the ships of Squadrons III and I
in the last part of the day's battle. Squadron II now attempted,
at full speed and manoeuvring to larboard [port], to resume its
place in front of Squadron I, which was its rightful position, after the
Fleet had been turned. It came, therefore, just in time to help our
battle-cruisers that were engaged in a short but sharp encounter with
the enemy shortly before it was quite dark. While Scouting Divi-
sions I and II were trying to place themselves at the head of our
line they were met at 10.20 by heavy fire coming from a south-
easterly direction. Nothing could be seen of the enemy beyond
the flash of the guns at each round. The ships, already heavily

i59

Germany's High Sea Fleet

damaged, were hit again without being able to return the fire to any
purpose. They turned back, therefore, and passed in between
Squadrons II and I to leeward of the firing.

The head of Squadron I followed the movements of the cruisers,
while Squadron II (Rear-Admiral Mauve) stood by and took
the enemy's fire. When Squadron II became aware that the failing
light made any return fire useless it withdrew, thinking to attract the

enemy to closer quarters with Squad-
ron I. The enemy did not follow, but
ceased firing.

Almost at the same time the
Leader of Scouting Division IV.
Commodore von Reuter, under similar
conditions, had been engaged in a
short encounter with four of five
cruisers, some of them ships of the
" Hampshire " class.

Following on this attack, we
took a south-easterly course which
The Situation at 10.30 p.m. was at once seen to be necessary

and adopted by Squadron I, bring-
ing Squadron II again on the starboard side of the Fleet. In
view of the fact that the leading ships of the Main Fleet would
chiefly have to ward off the attacks of the enemy, and In order that
at daybreak there should be powerful vessels at the head, Squadron II
was placed in the rear. At n p.m. the head of the line stood at
36" 37' North latitude, and 5" 30' East longitude. At 11. 6 p.m. the
order for the night was "Course S.S.E. J^ E, speed 16 knots."

Out of consideration for their damaged condition, Scouting
Division I was told off to cover the rear, Division II to
the vanguard, and the IVth to cover the starboard side. The
Leaders of the torpedo-boat forces placed the flotillas in an E.N.E.
to S.SjW. direction, which was where the enemy Main Fleet could
be expected. A great many of the boats had fired off all their
torpedoes during the battle. Some were left behind for the protection
of the badly damaged Liitzow; others were retained by the flotilla
leaders in case of emergency. The rescue of the crews of the
Elbing and Rostock was due to that decision.

The Second, Fifth and Seventh, and part of the Sixth and Ninth
were the only Flotillas that proceeded to the attack; the boats had
various nocturnal fights with enemy light forces. They never

160

The Battle of the Skagerrak

sighted the Main Fleet. At 5 a.m. on June 1 "L24" sighted a
portion of the Main Fleet in Jammer Bay. It was as we surmised
— after the battle the enemy had gone north. Flotilla II, which
had been stationed at the most northerly part of the sector, was forced
back by cruisers and destroyers, and went round by Skagen; at
4 o'clock when day broke the other flotillas collected near the Main
Fleet.

The battleship squadrons proceeded during the night in the
following order : Squadron I, Flagship of the Fleet, Squadron III
and Squadron II. Squadrons I and II were now in reversed
positions; that is to say, the ships previously in the rear were now
at the van .

Other attempts to bring the admirals ahead were abandoned
owing to the darkness and lack of time. The conduct of the line
was entrusted to Captain Redlich on the Westfalen. The enemy
attacked from the east with both light and heavy forces during
the night almost without ceasing. Scouting Divisions I and II
and the ships in Squadron I in particular were to ward off
the attacks. The result was excellent. To meet these attacks in
time, bring the enemy under fire and by suitable manoeuvring evade
his torpedoes, demanded the most careful observation on board the
vessels. Consequently the line was in constant movement, and it
required great skill on the part of the commanders to get into position
again, and necessitated a perpetual look-out for those manoeuvring
just in front of them. Very little use was made of the searchlights.
It had been proved that the fire from the attacking boats was aimed
chiefly at these illuminated targets. As our light guns and the
navigation control on the ships were close to the searchlights, and
because of the better view to be obtained the officers and men on duty
there would not take cover^ several unfortunate casualities occurred.
On board the Oldenburg the commander, Captain Hopfner, was
severely wounded by a shell, and several officers and many of the
crew were killed.

Utterly mistaking the situation, a large enemy cruiser with four
funnels came up at 2 a.m. (apparently one of the "Cressy" class),
and was soon within 1,500 metres of Squadron I's battleships,
the Thiiringen and Ostfriesland. In a few seconds she was on
fire, and sank with a terrible explosion four minutes after opening
fire. The destruction of this vessel, which was so near that the crew
could be seen rushing backwards and forwards on the burning deck
while the searchlights disclosed the flight of the heavy projectiles

L 161

Germany's High Sea Fleet

till they fell and exploded, was a grand but terrible sight.
Squadron I . reported during the night that after carrying out an
evading manoeuvre the Nassau had not returned in her place, and
as she did not answer a call it was feared she had been torpedoed.
Towards morning, however, there was a faint wireless from her
reporting that she was standing by the Vyl Lightship at Horns Reef,
and during the night had rammed and cut through a destroyer.
After this exploit the commander preferred not to return to our
darkened line but made for the morning's rendezvous.

A careful estimation showed that during the night one battle-
cruiser, one light cruiser and seven destroyers were sunk on the
enemy's side, and several battle-cruisers and destroyers badly
damaged. The 2nd Division of Squadron I at the head of the line
were specially successful in the defence they put up against torpedo
attacks, as they themselves accounted for six destroyers.

On our side the old light cruiser Frauenlob, the battleship
Pommem and "V4" were sunk; Rostock and Elbing were
abandoned and blown up. At 12.45 A - M - the Frauenlob (Captain
Georg Hoffmann), during a fight between Scouting Division IV
and four cruisers of the " Town " class, was hit by a torpedo and,
according to the accounts of the few survivors, went down fighting
to the last.

The Pommem (Captain Bdlken) was torpedoed at 4.20 a.m. and
went down with a violent explosion. Unfortunately none of the
crew could be saved, as the wreckage drifted away so quickly that
nothing was seen on the water by a ship following at 500 m.
distance.

At 4.50 A.M. "V4" struck an enemy mine; the crew was not
saved. At 1.30 a.m. the Rostock and Elbing to the larboard [port]
of the head of Squadron I were engaged in a fight with destroyers,
but had finally to withdraw from the enemy's torpedoes and break
through Squadron I's line, so as not to impede the firing
from the ships of the line. While doing this the Rostock was
hit by a torpedo, and the Elbing and Posen collided. Both cruisers
were put out of action. The Rostock kept afloat till 5.45 A.M., but
as enemy cruisers were then sighted she was blown up, the entire
crew and the wounded having previously been taken off by the boats
of Flotilla III. The crew of the Elbing was also taken over by a
boat belonging to Flotilla III. The Commander, Captain Madlung,
the First Officer, the Torpedo Officer and a cutter's crew remained on
board to keep the ship afloat as long as possible. When, however,

162

The Battle of the Skagerrak

enemy forces were sighted at 4 a.m. the Elbing was also blown up.
The remainder of the crew got away in the cutter and were
subsequently picked up by a Dutch fishing-smack and returned
home via Holland.

The Liitzow was kept above water until 3.45 a.m. The Kb'nig,
the rear ship of the Fleet, lost sight of her at 11.13 p.m. The vessel
was at last steered from the stern. All efforts to stop the water
pouring in were fruitless; the fore part of the ship had been too
badly damaged, and she had at last 7,000 tons of water in her. The
screws revolved out of the water, and she had to be given up. The
crew with all the wounded were taken off by the torpedo-boats
"G40," "G37," "G38" and "V45," and the Liitzow was sunk
by a torpedo. Altogether the four boats had 1,250 men from the
Liitzow on board. Twice they encountered enemy cruisers and
destroyers, but on each occasion, led by the senior officer, Com-
mander Beitzen (Richard), they attacked and successfully made their
way into the German Bight. In the last engagement "G40" had
her engines hit and had to be towed.

When this report reached the Main Fleet the Second Leader of
Torpedo-Boats on the Regensburg turned at once, regardless as to
whether he might meet with superior English forces or not, and took
over the towing party. "S32," Leader of Flotilla I (Captain
Frohlich), was hit in her boiler at 1 a.m. and rendered temporarily
useless. By feeding the boiler with sea water the captain succeeded,
however, in taking the boat into Danish waters. From thence she
was towed through the Nordmann Deep by torpedo-boats dispatched
to her assistance.

These events prove that the English Naval forces made no effort
to occupy the waters between the scene of battle and Horns Reef.

It was only during the night that there was opportunity for the
ships to report on the number of prisoners they had on board and
to gather from them some idea of the enemy's losses. Then I
learned that the Warspite, which we had observed to be badly
damaged in the battle, was sunk. Among other vessels reported
sunk were the battle-cruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and
Invincible. This was all news to me, and convinced me that the
English losses were far more considerable than our own.

On arriving at Horns Reef at 5 a.m. I decided to remain there
and await the Liitzow. I had not then heard of her fate. From
11.30 p.m. on, the vessel had been able to do 13 knots. The
last report from, her was at 1.55 a.m. — transmitted by convoy-boat

163

Germany's High Sea Fleet

" G 40 " — stating that she was making very slow way, that the means
of navigation were limited, that the gun power was reduced to a
fifth, course south, station E 16. At 5.30 a.m. came a message that
the Liitzow had been abandoned at 4 a.m.

After that I had no difficulty in drawing my own conclusions.
As the enemy did not come down from the North, even with light
forces, it was evident that he was retiring, especially as nothing more
could be seen of him notwithstanding that his torpedo-boats were
about until dawn.

The Situation on the Morning of June i

"L" 11, 13, 17, 22 and 22 had gone up during the night for an
early reconnaissance. At 5.10 a.m. "L ii " reported a squadron of
twelve English battleships, numerous light craft and destroyers on a
northerly course about the centre of the line Terschelling — Horns
Reef, and immediately afterwards enemy battleships and battle-
cruisers north of the first unit. The airship was heavily fired at but
kept in touch until compelled to retire and lost sight of the enemy
in the thick atmosphere. The airship's reports taken from its war
diary are as follows :

Reconnaissance Trip of " L 11 " on June 1, 1916

"On June 1 at 1.30, after midnight 'Ln' went up at
Nordholz with the following orders : As fourth airship to cover
flank of High Sea forces, course N.W. to W. by Heligoland. Full
crew on board, fresh south-westerly wind, visibility limited owing
to ground fog and later to a fog-like atmosphere high up extending
over 2 or at most 4 nautical miles. Heligoland was not visible
through the fog. At 5 a.m. clouds of smoke were seen north of the
ship in Square O 33 B and were made for. At 5.10 it was possible
to make out a strong enemy unit of twelve large warships with
numerous lighter craft steering north-north-east full speed ahead.
To keep in touch with them ' L 11 ' kept in the rear and sent a
wireless report, circling round eastwards. At 5.40 a.m. east of
the first unit the airship sighted a second squadron of six big
English battleships with lighter forces on a northerly course ; when
sighted, they turned by divisions to the west, presumably to get into
contact with the first unit. As this group was nearer to the Main
Fleet than the first one, ' L 11 ' attached itself to it, but at 5.50 a

164

The Battle of the Skagerrak

group of three English battle-cruisers and four smaller craft were
sighted to the north-east, and, cruising about south of the airship,
put themselves between the enemy Main Fleet and ' L 1 1 .' Visibility
was so poor that it was extremely difficult to keep in contact. For
the most part only one of the units was visible at a time, while,
apparently, the airship at an altitude of 1,100 — 1,900 m. was plainly
visible to the enemy against the rising sun.

"At 5.15, shortly after sighting the first group of battleships, the
enemy opened fire on the airship from all the vessels with anti-
aircraft guns and guns of every calibre. The great turrets fired
broadsides; the rounds followed each other rapidly. The flash from
the muzzles of the guns could be seen although the ships were
hidden by the smoke. All the ships that came in view took up the
firing with the greatest energy, so that ' L 1 1 ' was sometimes
exposed to fire from 21 large and numbers of small ships. Although
the firing did not take effect, that and the shrapnel bursting all
around so shook the ship's frame that it seemed advisable to take
steps to increase the range. The firing lasted till 6.20 a.m. At
that time the battle-cruisers bearing down from S.W within close
distance of ' L 11 ' forced her to retire to N.E. to avoid their fire.
At the same time the visibility became worse and the enemy was
lost to view.

" ' L 11 ' again took a northerly course and went as low down as
500 metres, in the hope of better visibility. It was impossible to see
beyond 1 to 2 nautical miles, and as under these conditions no
systematic plan for keeping in contact could be made, N. and S.
course was followed so as to keep between the enemy and our own
Main Fleet. The enemy did not come in sight again.

"At 8 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet
dismissed the airship, and ' L 1 1 ' returned. On the way back the
ship came across a number of our own torpedo-boats exchanging
bases, and messages were given for further transmission. The
airship remained close to those boats as far as Sylt. Landed at
Nordholz at 2 p.m."

At 4 a.m., 50 nautical miles west of Bovbjerg, "L24" sighted
a flotilla of enemy destroyers, was fired at and returned the fire
with bombs, then got away further north, and at 5 a.m. discovered
a unit of twelve ships in Jammer Bay, steaming rapidly to the
south. It was impossible to keep in contact for further reconnais-
sance as there was a bank of cloud as low down as 800 m.

From the Main Fleet itself no signs of the enemy were visible

165

Germany's High Sea Fleet

at daybreak. The weather was so thick that the full length of a
squadron could not be made out. In our opinion the ships in a
south-westerly direction as reported by "L u " could only just have
come from the Channel to try, on hearing the news of the battle,
to join up with their Main Fleet and advance against us. There
was no occasion for us to shun an encounter with this group, but
owing to the slight chance of meeting on account of visibility con-
ditions, it would have been a mistake to have followed them. Added
to this the reports received from the battle-cruisers showed that
Scouting Division I would not be capable of sustaining a serious
fight, besides which the leading ships of Squadron III could not
have fought for any length of time, owing to the reduction in their
supply of munitions by the long spell ot firing. The Frankfurt,
Pillau and Regensburg were the only fast light cruisers now avail-
able, and in such misty weather there was no depending on aerial
reconnaissance. There was, therefore, no certain prospect of
defeating the enemy reported in the south. An encounter and the
consequences thereof had to be left to chance. I therefore abandoned
the idea of further operations and ordered the return to port.

On the way back, west of List, the Ostfriesland, at 7.30 a.m.,
struck a mine, one that evidently belonged to a hitherto unknown
and recently laid enemy minefield. The damage was slight;
the vessel shipped 400 tons of water, but her means of navigation
did not suffer, and she was able to run into harbour under her own
steam. I signalled, "Keep on." The last ships passed through
the area without coming across further mines.

Several submarine attacks on our returning Main Fleet failed
entirely, thanks partly to the vigilance of the airmen who picked
up the Main Fleet over List, and escorted them to the mouth of the
river. During the course of the day all the ships and boats were
safely in their haven, Special mention must be made of the
bringing-in of the Seydlits (Captain von Egidy) badly damaged at
her bows. That the vessel ever reached the harbour is due to the
remarkable seamanship of her commander and crew. Finally she
was run astern into the dock at Wilhelmshaven.

The U-boats lying off English harbours were told to remain at
their posts a day longer. At 6.20 p.m., 60 miles north of
Terschelling, the "U46" came across a damaged vessel of the
"Iron Duke" class (the Marlborough). She was, however, so well
protected that it would have been impossible to get within firing
distance of her. A torpedo was fired, but failed to reach the

166

The Battle of the Skagerrak

objective. Among the U-boats lying off enemy harbours the " U 21 "
on May 31 and "U22" on June 1 both succeeded in hitting a
destroyer. In each case, however, the sinking could not be observed
owing to enemy counter-action. Besides this, one 01 our mine-
layers, occupied in laying mines west of the Orkney Islands,
achieved an important success. The English armoured cruiser
Hampshire (11,000 tons) struck one of these mines on June 5 and
sank; with her perished Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener and all
his Staff.

LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES

According to careful estimation made by us the enemy lost :

Tons.

1 Dreadnought of "Queen Elizabeth" class... y . ... 28,500^

3 Battle-cruisers (Queen MdYy^Mdefatigable and Invincible) 63,000 dm

4 Armoured Cruisers (Black Prince, Defence, Warrior and

one of the " Cressy " type) 53<7 00

2 Light Cruisers 9,000

13 Destroyers i5>°°°

Total 169,200

We lost:

y

Tons.

1 Battle-cruiser (Lutzow •*) / 26,700

1 older Battleship (Pommerr$ ... ..y ... ^ 13,200

4 Light Crtfisers (Wiesbaden, Elbmg, Rostock and

Frauenlob) , I7>i50

5 Torpedo-boats 3,68o

Total 60,730

The enemy's were almost complete losses, whereas we had
rescued the crews of the Lutzow, Elbing, Rostock and half of those
of the torpedo-boats.

* In my first report of the battle sent to the Admiralty at Berlin the loss of the
Lutzow was mentioned. The announcement of this loss was suppressed by the
Naval Staff, though not at my request. The enemy could not have seen the ship
go down. In the interests of naval warfare it was right to suppress the news.
Unfortunately the secrecy observed produced the impression that it was necessary to
enlarge our success to that extent.

167

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Our losses in personnel amounted to : 2,400 killed; 400 wounded.

The enemy's losses may be estimated at over 7,000 killed.

According to a list which he added to his report of June 18, 1916,
Admiral Jellicoe endeavoured to exaggerate our losses in the
following manner :

Battleships or Battle-Cruisers

Correct facts.

2 Battleships, "Dreadnought" type (certain) none

1 Battleship, " Deutschland " type (certain) one

1 Battleship or Battle-cruiser (probable) one

1 Battleship, "Dreadnought" type (probable) none

Light Cruisers

4 Light cruisers (certain) ;. ... four

1 Large ship or light cruiser (certain) none

Torpedo-Boat Destroyers

6 Torpedo-boat destroyers (certain) five

3 Torpedo-boat destroyers (probable) none

Submarines

1 Submarine (certain) none

3 Submarines (probable) none

With regard to the submarines he was totally mistaken, as none
took part in the battle. I sent my final impressions of the battle
in a written report of 4/7/16 to H.M. the Emperor as follows:

" The success achieved is due to the eagerness in attack, the
efficient leadership through the subordinates, and the admirable
deeds of the crews full of an eminently warlike spirit. It was only
possible owing to the excellence of our ships and arms, the systematic
peace-time training of the units, and the conscientious development
on each individual ship. The rich experience gained will be care-
fully applied. The battle has proved that in the enlargement of
our Fleet and the development of the different types of ships we
have been guided by the right strategical and tactical ideas, and
that we must continue to follow the same system. All arms can
claim a share in the success. But, directly or indirectly, the far-

168

The Battle of the Skagerrak

reaching heavy artillery of the great battleships was the deciding
factor, and caused the greater part of the enemy's losses that are
so far known, as also it brought the torpedo-boat flotillas to their
successful attack on the ships of the Main Fleet. This does not
detract from the merits of the flotillas in enabling the battleships
to slip away from the enemy by tfheir attack. The big ship —
battleship and battle-cruiser — is therefore, and will be, the main
strength of naval power. It must be further developed by increasing
the gun calibre, by raising the speed, and by perfecting the armour
and the protection below the water-line.

" Finally, I beg respectfully to report to Your Majesty that
by the middle of August the High Sea Fleet, with the exception
of the Derfflinger and Seydlitz, will be ready for fresh action. With
a favourable succession of operations the enemy may be made to
suffer severely, although there can be no doubt that even the most
successful result from a high sea battle will not compel England
to make peace. The disadvantages of our geographical situation as
compared with that of the Island Empire and the enemy's vast
material superiority cannot be coped with to such a degree as to
make us masters of the blockade inflicted on us, or even of the Island
Empire itself, not even were all the U-boats to be available for
military purposes. A victorious end to the war at not too distant a
date can only be looked for by the crushing of English economic
life through U-Boat action against English commerce. Prompted by
the convictions of duty, I earnestly advise Your Majesty to abstain
from deciding on too lenient a form of procedure on the ground that
it is opposed to military views, and that the risk of the boats would
be out of all proportion to the expected gain, for, in spite of
the greatest conscientiousness on the part of the Chiefs, it would
not be possible in English waters, where American interests are so
prevalent, to avoid occurrences which might force us to make
humiliating concessions if we do not act with the greatest
severity."

I followed up my report on the battle with a more detailed
account on July 16, 1916, after Admiral Jellicoe's report had
appeared in the English Press. I quote here from the above-
mentioned account :

" Admiral Jellicoe's report, published in the English Press,
confirms as follows the observations made by us :

169

Germany's High Sea Fleet

i

Grouping of the English Forces

Under Vice-Admiral Beatty :

ist and 2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadrons.
5th Battle Squadron ("Queen Elizabeths"),
ist, 2nd and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons,
ist, 9th, 10th and 13th Destroyer Flotillas.

Admiral Jellicoe led :

ist, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons (Fleet Flagship at the head of

4th Battle Squadron).
3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron (" Invincibles ").
ist and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons.
4th Light Cruiser Squadron.
4th, nth and 12th Destroyer Flotillas.

2
Intervention in the Battle by the English Main Fleet

" When he first had news that the enemy was sighted, Admiral
Jellicoe was north-west of Admiral Beatty 's forces. He thereupon
advanced at full speed in column formation on a S.E. course, put
the ist and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons for reconnaissance at the head
of his formation, and sent forward the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron
(apparently reinforced by the Agincourt *), to support Admiral
Beatty. The 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron passed east of Admiral
Beatty's leader at 7.30 p.m. ; they heard in the south-west the thunder
of guns, and saw the flashes, sent out the light cruiser Chester to
reconnoitre, and themselves took a N.W. course. Shortly before
8 o'clock the Chester encountered our Scouting Division II and was
set on fire by them. After pursuing the Chester, Scouting Division
II came across the 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron, which opened fire
on them. The attacks at 8 p.m. by our Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX
and the 12th Half-Flotilla were launched against this 3rd Battle-
Cruiser Squadron.

"Admiral Beatty sighted the 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron at
8.10 p.m., and at 8.21 p.m. had it ahead of the ist and 2nd Battle-
Cruiser Squadrons he was leading.

"At 7.55 p.m. Admiral Jellicoe sighted the fire from the guns.

* Observed by Scouting Division II.
170

The Battle of the Skagerrak

It was impossible for him to make out the position of our Fleet.
The difference between his and Admiral Beatty's charts added to
the uncertainty in judging of the situation. The report says it was
difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. At 8.14 p.m. the
battleship squadrons turned east into the line between the 1st and
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadrons and the 5th Battle Squadron. At
8.17 p.m. the 1st Battle Squadron opened fire on the leaders of

if
X /

-/**

y'

ft OroS

Position of English Forces at 8 p.m.

our ships of the line. Up to 10.20 p.m. those squadrons, with some
few pauses, took part in the fighting.

" Shortly before the battleship squadrons arrived, the 1st Cruiser
Squadron, together with light forces from the Main Fleet, joined
in the fighting. At 8.50 P.M., therefore, between our first and
second blows, Admiral Beatty put the 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron
in the rear of the 2nd. At 9.6 p.m. the leaders of the battleships
made for the south. The total impression received by us of the
battle is made more complete by the statements in the English
Press, and is not altered.

171

Germany's High Sea Fleet

3
The Enemy's Action during the Night

"At 9.45 p.m. Admiral Beatty had lost sight of our forces. He
sent the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons to reconnoitre in
the west, and at 10.20 p.m. went to their support with the 1st and
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, also on a westerly course. Imme-
diately after came the encounter described in my report with the
leading ships of our Main Fleet, consisting of Scouting Divi-
sions IV and I and Squadron II. The fact that our
forces turned westward must have led the English Admiral
to assume that our Main Fleet had taken a westerly course, and
made him follow in that direction. The faot that we at the same
time put Squadron II in the rear, and with the new leader,
Squadron I, again took a S.E. course, resulted in Admiral
Beatty's forces passing west in front of us and ultimately losing
contact. It was obvious that after the battle the English Main
Fleet was divided into two. Admiral Jellicoe's report makes no
mention of this. The one portion, consisting of large battleships
and light craft, took apparently northerly and easterly courses, as
one group of ships was sighted by ' L 24 ' at 5 a.m. on June 1 in
Jammer Bay, close under land. It may perhaps have been both
those rear squadrons which made off on the attack by our Torpedo-
Boat Flotillas VI and IX, and then apparently lost touch with the
Main Fleet.* The other portion, under Admiral Jellicoe, consisting,
according to observations by ' Lu,' of eighteen large battleships,
three battle-cruisers (probably the 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron) and
numerous light forces, had, up to 10.46 p.m., been steering south
and then south-west. It would appear, from intercepted English
wireless messages, that he covered 15 nautical miles. Based on these
courses and the speed, he must have crossed our course at midnight,
10 to 15 nautical miles in front of us, and have taken later a course
to the centre of the line Horns Reef — Terschelling, where he was
seen at 5 a.m. by ' L 11 ' on a N.N.E. course.

4
The Consequence of the Enemy's Action during the Night

"Admiral Jellicoe must have intended to resume the battle with
us at dawn. It is inexplicable, therefore, why a portion of the

* According to Admiral Jellicoe's book, one group of battleships did not rejoin
him till 6 p.m. on June 1.

172

The Battle of the Skagerrak

Main Fleet made for Jammer Bay during the night. Nor can it
be understood how it was that the enemy's light forces, which were
engaged with our Main Fleet up to 4.36 a.m. and thus were in touch
with us the whole night, could find a way to inform Admiral Jellicoe
and Admiral Beatty of our course and navigation. But even apart
from that, it must be assumed that the fire from our guns and the
enemy's burning cruisers and destroyers would have pointed out the
way to the English Main Fleet. In any case it is a fact that on the
morning of June 1 the enemy's heavy forces were broken up into
three detachments ; one in the North, a second with Admiral Beatty
in the North-west, and the third with Admiral Jellicoe South-west
of Horns Reef. It is obvious that this scattering of the forces — which
can only be explained by the fact that after the day-battle Admiral
Jellicoe had lost the general command — induced the Commander to
avoid a fresh battle."

i73

CHAPTER XI
AFTER THE BATTLE

ON June i at 3 p.m. the Friedrich der Grosse anchored in the Wil-
helmshaven Roads. Meanwhile the crews on all our ships had
attained full consciousness of the greatness of our successes against
the superior enemy forces, and loud and hearty cheers went up as
they steamed past the flagship of their leader. Though they had
been under such heavy fire, very little external damage on the ships
was apparent; none keeled over or showed an increased draught.
On a closer inspection, however, considerable damage was dis-
closed, but the armour-plating had so thoroughly served its
purpose of protecting the vital parts of the ships that their navigating
capabilities had not suffered. The Konig and Grosser Kurfiirst
went into dock as their anchor cables had been shot away. The
battle-cruisers were also docked to find out to what extent repairs
would be necessary. In their case the exterior damage was con-
siderably greater. It was astonishing that the ships had remained
navigable in the state they were in. This was chiefly attributable
to the faulty exploding charge of the English heavy calibre shells,
their explosive effect being out of all proportion to their size. A
number of bits of shell picked up clearly showed that powder only had
been used in the charge. Many shells of 34- and 38-cm. calibre had
burst into such large pieces that, when picked up, they were easily
fitted together again. On the other hand, the colour on the ships'
sides, where they had been hit, showed that picric acid had been
used in some of the explosive charges. A technical Commission
from the Imperial Naval Department made a thorough investigation
of the effects of the shots in order to utilise the experience gained.
We arrived immediately at one conclusion — a final decision on the
much-debated question of protective torpedo-nets for the Fleet to the
effect that the nets must be done away with. On most of the ships
they were so damaged as to make it impossible to remove them
after the fighting; they hung, for the most part, in a dangerous
fashion out of their cases and it was a wonder that they did not get
entangled in the propellers, an occurrence which, during the battle —
or at any time for that matter — might have greatly inconvenienced

i74

After the Battle

the Fleet. The total impression produced by all the damage done
was that by their splendid construction our ships had proved to be
possessed of extraordinary powers of resistance.

The next step was to make arrangements for the repairing of the
ships as the docks at Wilhelmshaven were not able to cope with all
the work, and it was essential that the Fleet should be brought as
quickly as possible into a state of preparedness for action. The
Wilhelmshaven yard was entrusted with the repairs of the Seydlitz,
and the ships of Squadron I, of which the Ostfriasland — owing to a
mine explosion — and the Helgoland — hit above the water-line — had
to be placed in dock. The Grosser Kurfiirst, Markgraf, and Moltke
were sent to Hamburg to be repaired by Blohm & Voss and the
Vulcan Works. The Konig and the Derfflinger, after the latter had
been temporarily repaired in the floating-dock at Wilhelmshaven,
proceeded through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to the Imperial Yard
and Howaldt's yard at Kiel.

The Imperial Dockyards at Kiel under the management of Vice-
Admiral von Henkel-Gebhardi, and those at Wilhelmshaven under
Rear-Admiral Engel, as well as the private yards occupied on repairs,
deserve the greatest credit for the excellent work done in restoring
the Fleet.

If the English Fleet had fared as well as the English Press
accounts led us to believe we might count on their immediately
seizing the opportunity for a great attack. But it never came off.
Our efforts were centred on putting to sea again as soon as possible
for a fresh advance. By the middle of August the Fleet was again
in readiness, with the exception of the battle-cruisers Seydlitz and
Derfflinger. But a new ship, the Bayern, had been added to the
Fleet, the first to mount guns of 38 cm.

Immediately after the battle joyful messages and congratulations
on the success of the Fleet poured in from all divisions of the army
in the field, from every part of the country and from all classes of the
people. I welcomed with special gratitude the many sums received
towards the support of the families of the fallen and wounded,
which showed in a touching manner the sympathy of the donors,
and which, in a very short space of time, reached the sum of one
million marks.*

The first honour paid to the Fleet was a visit from His Majesty
the Emperor on June 5, who, on board the flagship, Friedrich der

* The fund, called " The Skagerrak Gift," is now administered by the Imperial
Naval Institute, Berlin.

175

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Gross, made a hearty speech of welcome to divisions drawn from
the crews of all the ships, thanking them in the name of the Father-
land for their gallant deeds. In the afternoon the Emperor visited
all the hospitals where the wounded lay, as well as the hospital
ship Sierra Ventana, where lay Rear-Admiral Behncke, Leader of
Squadron III, who was wounded in the battle, and who was able to
give the Emperor a detailed account of his impressions while at the
head of the battleships. Several of the German princes also visited
the Fleet, bringing greetings from their homes to the crews and
expressing pride in the Fleet and the conduct of the men. The
Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and of Oldenburg came
directly after the battle and were followed very soon after by the
Kings of Saxony and Bavaria.

All this afforded clear proof that no other organisation in the
Empire was so fitted to signify its unity as the Navy, which brought
together in closest contact those belonging to all classes in the
Fatherland and united them by common action in fortune and
misfortune. Apart from the inspection of the ships, these visits also
offered an opportunity of gaining information respecting the general
duties of the Fleet and the plans for the impending battle that was ex-
pected, for, as those visits proved, the battle had! greatly enhanced
the interest in the Fleet throughout the whole country.

The development of the battle and its lessons were thus sum-
marised by me at the time :

"The battle was brought about as a result of our systematic
efforts to attract the enemy out of his retirement, especially of the
more drastic operations which culminated in the bombardment of
the English coast. England's purpose of strangling Germany
economically without seriously exposing her own Fleet to the
German guns had to be defeated. This offensive effort on our
part was intensified by the fact that the prohibition of the U-boat
trade-war made it impossible for us to aim a direct blow at England's
vital nerve. We were therefore bound to try and prove by all
possible means that Germany's High Sea Fleet was able and willing
to wage war with England at sea and thus help to establish
Germany's claim to independent overseas development.

"The German idea incorporated in the founding of the Fleet
had to hold its own in battle in order not to perish. The readiness
to face a battle rests on the fundamental idea that even the
numerically inferior must not shirk an attack if the will to con-

176

After the Battle

quer is supported by a devoted staff, confidence in material, and a
firm conviction of perfect training.

"A preliminary fight between cruisers lasting about two hours,
which proved the superiority of our guns, was followed by the
engagement with the vastly superior enemy Main Fleet. The
clever attempts made by the English to surround and cut us off
from home by their Main Fleet were turned into a defeat, as we
twice succeeded in pushing into the enemy formation with all our
strength, and in withdrawing from the intended encircling move-
ment. In spite of various attacks during the night we forced a
way for ourselves to Horns Reef, and thus secured an important
strategical point for the following morning.

"The enemy suffered twice as much material loss and three
times as many losses in personnel as we did. English superiority
was thus wrecked, for the Fleet was unable to keep in touch with
us at the close of the day-battle and its own formation was
broken.

"After an encounter with our leading ships, as darkness came
on the English battle-cruisers lost touch with us in a mysterious
way. They advanced into an empty North Sea.

"At the end of the battle the English Main Fleet had lost
touch with its other units and they only came together again the
following day at 6 p.m.

"After a continuous, and for the English very disastrous, night's
fighting, Jellicoe did not seek us out the following morning, although
he possessed both the power and the requisite speed to do so.

"We have been able to prove to the world that, the English
Navy no longer possesses her boasted irresistibility. To us it
has been granted to fight for the rights of the German Nation on
the open seas, and the battle proved that the organisation of our
Navy as a High Sea Fleet was a step in the right direction. The
German national spirit can only be impressed on the world through
a High Sea Fleet directed against England. If, however, as an
outcome of our present condition, we are not finally to be bled to
death, full use must be made of the U-boat as a means of war, so
as to grip England's vital nerve."

I expressed these views to the Imperial Chancellor, who visited
the Fleet on June 30 in company with the Under-Secretary of
State, von Stumm, and laid great emphasis on them in my report
of July 4, as I noticed from communications from the Chief of

M 177

Germany's High Sea Fleet

the Naval Staff and the Naval Cabinet that efforts were on foot
for resuming the U-boat warfare in its inadequate form. The
Imperial Chancellor gave me a detailed but gloomy picture of the
situation which forced him for the time to ward off any further
enemies from Germany, who, he was convinced, would soon show
themselves on the proclamation of unrestricted U-boat warfare. I
explained to him the military reasons which would render ineffectual
the carrying on of the U-boat war on a cruiser basis.

Whether political circumstances would permit us to employ the
most effective weapon against England was, however, a matter for
the Cabinet to decide, and for my part as Chief of the Fleet I
would not attempt to exert any pressure in that direction, as that was
the business of the Naval Staff. But I could not approve of
carrying on the U-boat campaign in a milder form, for that would
be unsatisfactory from every point of view. The Imperial Chan-
cellor agreed with me, but declared, for various reasons, that he
could not embark on a course of unrestricted U-boat warfare,
because it was impossible to avoid incidents which might lead to
complications, and the result would be that the fate of the German
nation might lie in the hands of one U-boat commander. Before
leaving Wilhelmshaven he met at dinner all the admirals then
stationed there, and on this occasion he expressed the hope that in
this war we should succeed in making good use of all the weapons of
the Navy.

After this visit, however, it became abundantly clear to me that
for the time being we were hardly likely to resume the active U-boat
campaign against English commerce. In a long interview with
the Imperial Chancellor that afternoon, I gathered from his remarks
that he was very anxious not to incense England further, or to
provoke that country to "war to the death."

Very soon all sorts of rumours arose concerning this visit : the
Chancellor had gone with the object of persuading the admirals
to weaken their attacks upon the British; he had more especially
objected to the airship raids. All these reports were absolutely
unfounded, for these matters were never touched upon, and more-
over, I could not have considered it within his province to give me
advice as to the manner in which war was to be waged.

Until the active operations of the Fleet were resumed, the tor-
pedo-boats continued their efforts to get in touch with the enemy.
As the base in Flanders offered better opportunities for this, while
the Fleet was restricted in its activities, a flotilla was despatched

178

After the Battle

there. This arrangement was continued later. At first detachments
of the various flotillas were sent in turn, in order as far as possible
to afford all boats the opportunity of becoming familiar with the
methods of attack from that point. Later on, it appeared more
advantageous to place a single flotilla for this purpose under the
control of the Naval Corps, so as to make full use of the knowledge
they had acquired of the local conditions.

At the beginning of August it was possible to resume the
air raids again, as the nights had by then grown darker. The first
attack was made in the night of the 2nd and 3rd, and was directed
upon the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. London, too,
was extensively bombed. In the night of August 8th — 9th there
was another attack, this time upon the Midlands; and at the end
of the month, in the night of August 24th — 25th, there was a third
raid upon the City, and the south-west district of London, as well
as upon Harwich, Folkestone and the roads at Dover. One army
airship took part in this. In spite of active opposition the airships
returned safely from all three expeditions.

We learnt that the English defences had been decidedly im-
proved, which rendered our attacks more difficult. The greater the
effort England made to maintain her army on the Continent and in
the other theatres of war, in order to do her part in forcing the
decision against us on land, the more embarrassing she must have
found it to organise a strong defence against airships.

Between these two periods of attack the airships were placed at
the service of the Intelligence Department in connection with an
attack which was planned as soon as the ships had been made ready,
and which was to be again directed towards Sunderland. No change
in the strategic disposition of the English Fleet had been observed.
The U-boat campaign against commerce in the war-zone round
about England was still in abeyance, and the U-boats were ready
to be used for military purposes. These two weapons, the airships
and the U-boats, would, I thought, make up for the superiority of
the English Fleet in other respects.

The disposition of U-boats outside British ports on May 31 in
accordance with the plan we had adopted had resulted in no success
worth speaking of; it was bound to fail if the English Fleet was
already at sea when the flotilla put out. Nor was their method of
attack satisfactory. Before the Firth of Forth each of the seven
U-boats which had been dispatched thither had a certain sector
assigned to it, and these sectors radiated from a central point at the

179

Germany's High Sea Fleet

mouth of the estuary. The nearer the boats came to the estuary,
the nearer they approached each other in the neighbourhood of this
central point, so that they were liable to get in each other's way, or
mistake one another for hostile craft. If they stood farther out to
sea, the distance between them was increased and they lost their
formation, thereby making it easier for the enemy to get through.

The matter was, therefore, reconsidered, and new arrangements
made which promised greater success. Trial was first to be
made of the method of a movable base line in the direction of the
probable approach of the enemy, on which line the U-boats were
to take up positions. The boats in commission in the middle of
August were divided into three groups, two of which consisted of
boats belonging to the Fleet, and the other of boats attached to the
Naval Corps in Flanders. The two former were first to take up
positions indicated in the accompanying plan by "U-Line I " and
"U-Line III." In this way they afforded protection to the Fleet
on either flank when proceeding to attack. The U-boats of the Fleet
took up a position of defence for flank and rear against possible
attacks from the Channel. In addition to the Lines I and III, other
positions had been provided, which the boats were to take up either
after a certain interval of time, or upon a prearranged signal. In
order that the boats should be directed in accordance with the aims
and movements of the Fleet, the officer commanding the U-boats
was on board one of the battleships for the duration of the Fleet's
attack.

The following was the plan for this enterprise against Sunder-
land : The Fleet was to put out by night, to advance through the
North Sea towards the English coast, so that the line of U-boats
might come into action, if required. If no collision with the enemy
occurred, and there were no indications that the English Fleet would
cut off our retreat from the sea, the ships were to push on to the
English coast and bombard Sunderland at sunset. After the bom-
bardment, while the Fleet returned in the darkness to the German
Bight, the U-boats were to take up their second positions in the
direction of the probable approach of the enemy, if, as was expected,
he should come up as a result of the bombardment.

On August 18, therefore, at lo p.m., the Fleet put to sea from the
Jade and set out upon the course indicated in the diagram.

Squadrons III and I took part in full force ; to Squadron II had
been assigned the duty of protecting the German Bight. The
cruisers were stationed at a distance of 20 nautical miles in advance of

180

7

PFAlR I

— >■— — III! - '

T

&e

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST SUNDERLAND, AUGUST 18—20, 1916

After the Battle

the Fleet and were to maintain this distance throughout the advance .
They were reinforced by the following battleships: The Bayern,
which had only newly joined the Fleet after the battle of the Skager-
rak; the Grosser Kurfurst and the Markgraf, because Scouting
Division I was short of two battle-cruisers still under repair. A
further reason for the reinforcement was the possibility that the
fast squadron of " Queen Elizabeth " ships might have joined the
English battle-cruisers. The distance of 20 nautical miles between
our cruisers and the main body of the Fleet was to ensure immediate
tactical co-operation in the event of our meeting the enemy, and to
prevent the Cruiser Division, together with the three valuable battle-
ships which had been assigned to it, from possibly failing to join up
with the two other squadrons.

Thanks to the clear weather which prevailed during the advance
on the following day, August 19, the smoke of the cruisers was
visible all the time. Eight airships, among them three of a new
and improved type, had taken up their positions encircling the Fleet.
I hoped by this means to be able to get early news of the approach
of any considerable English force within the area covered by the
airships. The advance of the Fleet took place according to plan
along the course indicated in the sketch, up till 2.23 p.m.

At 5.30 A.M. our advance guard met a submarine, which in-
duced me to manoeuvre the Fleet so as to evade this danger. Never-
theless, the submarine succeeded in getting within striking distance
of the last ship of our line. At 7.5 a.m. the Westfalen reported that
she had been hit amidships on the starboard side. Though the ship
was not seriously damaged, I nevertheless feared that if she were
struck by another torpedo she might be sunk, so I gave up the idea
of her going on with us. The Westfalen was able to return to the
Jade under her own steam, and on her way was attacked a second
time, but the torpedo missed. In the course of the morning various
items of information as to enemy movements were received from the
airships and U-boats. The positions of the various fighting units
and groups of the enemy that were notified, are indicated in the
diagram.

At 8.30 a.m. the "L 13 " sighted two destroyer flotillas and behind
them a cruiser squadron proceeding at full steam on a south-westerly
course, and at 10.40 a.m. some small cruisers with three flotillas on
a north-easterly course were seen. At our chief wireless station at
Neuminster, owing to the many messages intercepted, they con-
cluded that the English Fleet was at sea, and informed us to this

181

Germany's High Sea Fleet

effect. "U53" — Lieutenant-Commander Rose — sighted three large
battleships and four small cruisers at 10.10 a.m. on a northerly
course, and towards noon "L 21 " announced hostile craft on a north-
easterly course. At 1.40 p.m. "U 52 " reported that she had sighted
four small hostile cruisers on a northerly course at 9 a.m., and had
sunk one of them. Thus the line arrangement had already proved
effective. But from all the information received no coherent idea
of the counter-measures of the enemy could be formed. We could
safely assume that he was aware of the fact that we had put to
sea, for the submarine that had hit the Westfalen had had ample
time since 7 a.m. to send messages to England. Up to this time the
remaining airships had reported no movement of larger forces, and
the visibility in the locality of the Fleet justified the assumption that
our airships commanded a clear view over the whole sea area.

At 2.22 p.m. the "L 13 " reported that at 1.30 p.m. it had sighted
in the south strong enemy forces comprising about 30 units, on a
northerly course in Square 156, and I determined to advance against
these forces. The Cruiser Division was called up, and when they
had joined us, they were pushed forward in a south-easterly direction
in column formation. At 2.30 p.m. another report came from the
"L 13 " that the hostile forces were now in Square 144 on a course
north by east, that they consisted of 16 destroyers, small and large
cruisers and battleships. If we and they continued on our respective
courses, we might expect to encounter them in two hours. The
Scouting Division and Torpedo Flotilla II were sent ahead
to reconnoitre. At 3.50 p.m. the "L 13" reported that it had lost
touch with the enemy forces because it had been forced to turn aside
from its course in order to avoid thunderstorms. Unfortunately the
airship failed to get into touch with them again. I hoped, however,
soon to get news of the enemy from our ships, since, according to
our reckoning, it was now the hour when the encounter should take
place; but I received no information from them. Either the enemy
had changed his course, because he was disquieted by the presence
of the airship which he assumed was scouting for the Fleet, or the
airship, owing to its unreliable navigation, had incorrectly reported
his position.

The bulk of the fleet continued to advance until stopped by
the minefields in the south. It being then 4.35 p.m., our course was
altered to E.S.E., and we began our return journey. There was
no further prospect of coming up with the enemy in the south, and
it had grown too late to bombard Sunderland. While the Fleet

182

After the Battle

was moving in a south-easterly direction, reports came in from
"U 53 " and two airships, "L n " and "L31," which indicated that
strong enemy forces had assembled at a spot about 60 nautical miles
north of our course, and were steaming in such a direction that
they would have met the main portion of our Fleet had it held on
its course. "U53" had followed the hostile fleet until 4.30 p.m.,
when she lost sight of it as it was on a southerly course. Later, at
9 p.m., by chance she again met the enemy sliips, which were then
on a north-westerly course. At 10.45 P - M - tms enemy squadron
passed within range of "U 65," so that this boat had a chance to
attack, which it accepted and succeeded in damaging a large battle-
ship with her torpedoes. The British Fleet then disappeared in a
northerly direction under full steam.

Another of our U-boats, "U66" (Lieutenant-Commander von
Bothmer) encountered six battle-cruisers and a number of small, fast
cruisers towards 6 p.m. ; these were steaming, when first seen, south-
east, but later on their course was north-west. She succeeded in
hitting a destroyer with a torpedo which sank her, and badly
damaged a small cruiser of the "Chatham " class with two torpedoes.
This same group was also sighted by the "L31."

From reports received at 6 p.m. from "U53 " and "L31," it was
apparent that the British Main Fleet discontinued its advance to the
south about 6 o'clock and turned back in a north-westerly direction.
As to the movements of the hostile craft reported by "L 13 " at 2.23
p.m., nothing further was discovered, except that from 7.40 p.m.
onwards six small cruisers and two destroyer flotillas accompanied
the main German force on its easterly course until darkness fell.
They were first reported by " L 1 1 " and then sighted by our ships
as their funnels and masts were just visible above the horizon. There
was no doubt but that the English light craft must have recognised
our big ships with their heavy smoke-clouds, and as they kept on
the same course it was to be inferred that they would keep in touch
with us until there was a chance of making a night attack. I had
to decide whether or not I should send our light cruisers and torpedo-
boats against them to drive them off, and I relinquished the idea of
doing so, because I reckoned that the English would have the advan-
tage of us in speed. Moreover, I thought that after our lucky experi-
ence on the night of June 1, I might run the risk of a combined
night attack. But so as not to be surprised by torpedo-boat attacks a
strong guard of torpedo-boats was placed in our van, for the return
journey by night. The English torpedo-boats, however, did not take

183

Germany's High Sea Fleet

advantage of this favourable opportunity to make a night attack upon
our whole fleet. To our great surprise, "Ln" reported at 8.10
P.M. that the enemy was sheering off in a south-easterly direction,
and that at 10.10 P.M. he had turned completely and disappeared
from view. Probably these light craft belonged to the group first
reported by "L 13," and had separated from the battleships.

No further special incidents occurred during our return journey.
The cruiser attacked by "U66" was met by "U63" the -next day
while she was being towed into port. " U 63 " attacked the towing
convoy, which had strong protection,- and succeeded in sending
two torpedoes into the cruiser, which then sank. The protecting
destroyers immediately gave chase to "U 63"; one of them ran her
down and rammed her slightly, without, however, doing any serious
damage. "U66" sent the following report of her encounter with
the enemy : At 5 p.m. she sighted small cruisers, two destroyer
flotillas, and in the rear six battle-cruisers, all on a south-easterly
course, and she managed to attack a four-funnel destroyer, appar-
ently of the "Mohawk" class. Shortly after being torpedoed the
destroyer lay with her stern projecting from the water, while her
deck was submerged as far as the third funnel. A little later the
whole cruiser squadron returned. "U 66 " then attempted an attack
on the small cruisers, that were now in the rear, steaming 25 knots.
She got within range of a cruiser of the "Chatham" class, and
struck her first in the forecastle and then in the turbine room. The
ship stopped at once and lay with a strong list. Kept under water
by the hostile destroyers, it was two and a half hours before "U 66 "
found an opportunity to attack for the second time. Shortly before
firing this torpedo, our U-boat sighted a destroyer 300 metres away
bearing down upon her at full steam. The U-boat quickly sub-
merged. Immediately after a loud explosion occurred above the
boat, the lights went out, the gratings burst off two hatches, the
hatch-covers sprang open so that the water poured in fore and aft,
but luckily they were closed again by the pressure of the water. The
boat was chased by destroyers until dark, and was then out of sight
of the cruiser.

"U65," which encountered the English Fleet towards evening,
made the following report. In the twilight she saw the English Fleet
approaching on a westerly course. Its formation was three divisions
in single line abreast, of which two comprised seven or eight large
battleships, and the other five ships of the "Iron Duke" and
"Centurion" classes, and a group of three battle-cruisers, one of

184

After the Battle

which belonged to the "Indefatigable" class. The first squadron
proceeded on a N.W. course, and the others followed; the battle-
cruisers, bringing up the rear, were disposed about 500 metres to
port. Pushing forward at full speed, "U 65," at an estimated range
of 3,000 metres, fired four torpedoes at the leading battle-cruiser.
The U-boat was half submerged, and the observers in the conning-
tower. After a lapse of some three minutes, the time required by a
torpedo to traverse a distance of 3,000 — 4,000 metres, a column of
fire, 20 metres wide and 40 metres high, rose behind the stern funnel
of the last battleship and was visible for about a minute, while the
funnel itself, white hot, was clearly discernible through the flames.
At the same time there was a violent escape of steam. The fire lasted
one minute. When the ship became visible again only the hull,
without funnels or masts, was to be seen, whereas the silhouettes
of the ships near by, with their funnels and masts, were clearly
visible. This attack was made at 10.45 p.m., Lat. N. 55 25', Long.
W. o° 30'. The commander, the officer of the watch, and the U-
boat pilot were all unanimous in their description of this pheno-
menon. After this the U-boat had to submerge very deeply, as
the Main Fleet was surrounded by a considerable number of
destroyers (about forty). The only difference of opinion among the
observers was as to whether the ship that had been hit was the last
battleship of the 3rd Squadron or the leading battle-cruiser.

The disposition of our U-boats in a movable line had met with
the desired success, and certainly was more advantageous than
stationing them outside the enemy ports of issue, a proceeding
which must be worthless if the ships were at sea beforehand. The
U-boats also accomplished good service in scouting on this occasion,
and the perseverance with which "U53 " clung to the enemy was
especially praiseworthy. Unhappily, her speed was not sufficient
to enable her to follow the enemy all the time.

The reports from the airships were not entirely reliable, chiefly
because they were only eight in number and were expected to keep
such a large area in view. Scouting by airships is, in any case,
somewhat negative in character, since the fleet is only informed by
them that the main hostile fleet is not within their field of vision,
whereas the important thing is to know where it actually is.

Although on this occasion the expected naval action with the
enemy did not take place, and we had to content ourselves with
the modest success of two small cruisers destroyed and one battle-"
ship damaged, while on our side the Westfalen received injuries,

185

Germany's High Sea Fleet

yet we had conclusively shown the enemy that he must be on the
watch for attacks by our Fleet. From English reports received sub-
sequently we know that the British Admiral, when he ran up against
our line of U-boats, felt as if he were in a hotbed of submarines
and consequently quickly retired to the north.

There was a possibility that we might have joined battle with
the enemy fleet at 4 p.m., if the report of "L 13" had not induced
me to turn south with a view to attacking the ships sighted in that
direction. The main object of our enterprise was to defeat portions
of the English Fleet; the bombardment of Sunderland was only a
secondary object, merely a means to this end. Therefore, when an
opportunity seemed to offer to attack hostile craft in the south, I had
to seize it and not let it slip.

A similar enterprise was planned for the beginning of September.
The disposition of the U-boats was again based on the idea of pro-
tecting our flanks. But this time there was to be a modification,
because with the single base-lines there was no guarantee that the
U-boats on the line would be sure of a chance to open fire if the
enemy should run into the line. The enemy's protective craft were
in a position to prevent that U-boat which first sighted the enemy
from attacking, and the other U-boats of the line would be too far
away to take a hand. A new disposition was consequently made,
in which only the enemy's probable direction of approach was taken
into account; the U-boats covered a larger area, altogether 100
nautical miles, and were placed in three rows, opposite the gaps
between the leading craft. Unfortunately, we were prevented from
carrying out this plan because unfavourable weather made scouting
impossible.

When, at the beginning of October, orders were given to carry
out the same scheme, a new obstacle arose, owing to the issue of
instructions from the Supreme War Council for an immediate re-
sumption of the U-boat campaign against commerce. Lacking U-
boats, I was forced to adopt quite a different scheme; instead of
making for the English coast and luring the enemy on to our line
of U-boats before the actual battle took place, I had to make a wide-
spread advance with torpedo-boats to take stock of the commercial
traffic in the North Sea and capture prizes. The Fleet was to serve
as a support to the light craft that were sent out. As I was not in
a position to reinforce the fighting power of the Fleet with U-boats,
I had to try and choose the battle-ground so that we might join
battle under the most favourable conditions to ourselves as possible.

186

After the Battle

Judging by the experience gained in the Battle of the Skagerrak,
the position with regard to wind and sun must play an important
part in the outcome of the artillery battle; again, the interval of
time before darkness fell after the commencement of the battle was
important, since the enemy had strong reserves at his disposal which,
as yet untouched, could enter the fight when our ships were already
damaged.

The sinking of the Pommern had unfortunately proved that this
class of ship could not be risked in heavy fighting, owing to their
being insufficiently protected against the danger of being sunk. The
tactics of the British made it unlikely that our Squadron II would be
able to take part in another big battle, on account of its artillery and
its old type of torpedo, which had a range of less than 6,000 metres.
I did not, therefore, take these ships with me, but assigned to them
, the duty of guarding the German Bight in the absence of the Fleet.
When the Fleet went out in this way, a torpedo flotilla was sent
on ahead to the probable vicinity of the guard-line of English sub-
marines, the object being to keep the latter under water and so
prevent them from giving too early a warning of our approach.

On October 10 the Fleet advanced according to this plan to the
centre of the North Sea, but the torpedo-boats were unable to go
as far afield as had been arranged, owing to adverse weather con-
ditions. There was no encounter with the enemy.

The resumption of the U-boat campaign against commerce,
which was to begin early in October, had to be supported as far
as possible, even though it was little to the taste of the Navy,
and had also been adversely commented upon by Admiral von
Schroder, the head of the Naval Corps in Flanders.

After our sortie on October 19, two torpedo-boat flotillas were
sent to Flanders, and from that base they were to attack the guard-
boats at the entrance to the Channel, so as to make it easier for our
U-boats to get through. The First Leader of the Torpedo-Boats,
Commodore Michelsen, was sent to Flanders for the same purpose,
and to gather information about the local conditions there. On
October 23, 1916, the Flotillas III and IV started for Zeebrugge,
which they reached without incident before dawn on October 24.
The carrying out of these voyages to and from Heligoland and
Zeebrugge marks the change in the development of conditions
between that time and October, 191 4, when the seven half-flotillas
were sent out from Ems and utterly destroyed. From now on,
there was frequent traffic between these points, as the flotillas were

187

Germany's High Sea Fleet

changed and new boats were sent to Flanders. As a rule the
movements took place without incident, so that they came to be
looked upon more and more as ordinary trips and not as risky
enterprises.

On the night of October 26-27, the two flotillas, reinforced by
the half-flotilla attached to the Naval Corps, carried ,out an
attack on the ships guarding the entrance to the Channel and on the
transports west of this line. According to previous observations,
the boats on guard consisted of a few destroyers, but chiefly of
small craft and trawlers, some of which had nets. These were
always a very great hindrance to our U-boats when they wanted
to get through, for they were forced to go under water and thus
run the risk of getting entangled in the nets. An advance farther
west beyond this line was an enterprise in which strong opposition
was always to be expected. Even if our boats succeeded in reaching
the line of guard-ships unnoticed,, from the moment the Admiral in
command at Dover heard of our approach, we had to reckon that
in a short time strong forces would be assembled in the Straits
between Dover and Calais.

A glance at the map will show that vessels which penetrated
farther west could be cut off from their base at Zeebrugge both
from Dover and Dunkirk; so they could, if they went to the
southern end of the Downs to attack the mouth of the Thames.
For this reason the half-flotilla in Flanders was not strong enough
to carry out such expeditions unaided.

The following orders were issued relative to any ships that might
be met with :

Ships without lights crossing the Channel were to be regarded
as military transports and torpedoed without warning; ships with
prescribed lights were to be treated according to prize law, unless
they were convoyed by warships or became involved in a fight
by their own fault.

Torpedo-Boat Flotillas III and IX and the Flanders Half-
Flotilla set out at 6.30 p.m. from Zeebrugge ; Commodore Michelsen
was on board the leading boat of the Fifth Half-Flotilla. It
was a clear starlit night, with a new moon. The surprise of
the enemy was complete. The results we achieved were : eleven
hostile guard and outpost ships sunk, and some other guard-ships
badly damaged, from one of which ten men were taken prisoners.
Besides this two enemy destroyers were sent to the bottom, and
an English steamer, the Queen, was sunk, eight miles south

188

After the Battle

of Folkestone. This steamer, according to English information,
was a transport, but she declared herself to be a packet-boat. She
could make 25 knots. On our side we sustained no loss. The
only damage done was to a torpedo-boat with which a rudderless
and burning guard-ship collided while her engines were still running.

As usual this surprise resulted in greater watchfulness on the
part of the enemy. Commercial traffic eastward bound from the
Channel was stopped, and aeroplane reconnaisance to observe move-
ments in Zeebrugge harbour were considerably increased. When
therefore in the afternoon of November 1 our boats intended to repeat
the enterprise, everything pointed to the fact that the enemy was
informed of our intentions, so that it was probable the blow would
either miscarry or be turned into a reverse. Consequently when
the flotillas had been at sea for some hours, and flash signals had
shown that the enemy was on the watch, they were recalled. In
these circumstances it was not desirable to keep the two flotillas
any longer at Zeebrugge, especially as the nights were getting
lighter and on that account unsuitable for such enterprises. Flotilla
III was, therefore, sent back to Wilhelmshaven. Nevertheless,
we decided to keep similar raids in mind, since the sudden appearance
at considerable intervals of torpedo-boat flotillas in the Channel
and near the south-eastern coast of England might bring about
favourable results.

One difficulty connected with the sending out of large numbers
of torpedo-boats from Zeebrugge was, that in order not to expose
them to aerial bombardment, they were not allowed to lie by the
Mole, but sent up to Bruges. This entailed very considerable delay,
on account of the lock, for it took 2^ hours to get four torpedo-
boats through.

As soon as they left Bruges harbour it was not possible, as
a rule, to conceal the movements of the boats from the enemy.

The behaviour of the enemy after the battle of the Skagerrak
showed clearly that he intended to rely entirely on economic pres-
sure to secure our defeat and would continue to keep his fleet in
the northern waters of the British Isles. Nothing but serious
damage to his own economic life could force this opponent to
yield, and it was from him that the chief power of resistance of
the hostile coalition emanated. As English economic life depended
on sea trade, the only means of getting at it was to overcome the
Fleet, or get past it. The former meant the destruction of the
Fleet, which, in view of our relative strength, was not possible.

189

Germany's High Sea Fleet

But so long as the Fleet was not destroyed, we could not wage
cruiser warfare — which alone could have badly damaged British
trade — on a large scale. The U-boats, however, could get past
the Fleet. Free passage to the open sea had been gained for these
in the naval action on May 31, for the English Fleet stayed far
North and did not dare to attack our coast and stamp out the
U-boat danger at its source.

The recognition of this necessity to attack British trade as the
only means of overcoming England, made it very clear how in-
timate was the connection between the conduct of the war by
land and by sea.

The belief that we could defeat England by land had proved
erroneous. We had to make up our minds to U-boat warfare as
the only means we could employ that promised a measure of
success. The ultimate decision was left to the Supreme Army
Command, which was taken oyer on August 30, 1916, by Field-
Marshal von Hindenburg. After the discussions with Roumania,
however, it did not seem advisable to the Supreme Command to
begin an unrestricted U-boat campaign at once, in view of the
fact that no additional troops were available in the event of neutral
nations, such as Holland and Denmark, joining the enemy.

On October 7 the Fleet Commanders received the order to resume
cruiser warfare with U-boats in British waters, and also to send
four U-boats to the Mediterranean, where submarine warfare had
been carried on during the summer months with quite good results.
In September the Chief of the Naval Staff had been of opinion
that the general situation would permit of the full development of
the U-boat campaign at latest by the middle of October. I had
counted on the co-operation of the U-boats with the Fleet up to that
date.

When, however, orders came through that the economic war
against England was to be resumed in a modified form, although
it was known that I considered the scheme to be useless, there was
no chance of my opposition having the least effect in the face of
this definite order, and in view of the fact that the Supreme Army
Command considered it as a matter of principle. Unfortunately,
I could adduce no great successes achieved by the Fleet in con-
junction with the U-boats, and I could hardly take the responsi-
bility of prolonging the immunity which British trade had enjoyed
since the end of April.

The support to be given by the Fleet to this form of warfare

190

After the Battle

became a question of increasing importance, as the enemy recog-
nised the danger of the U-boats, and strained every nerve to get
the better of it. A curious incident early in November emphasised
the necessity for the co-operation of the Fleet in this phase of the
war. On November 3 at 8 a.m. "U30," then on her way home
and about 25 miles north-west of Udsire (an island off the south-
west coast of Norway), reported that both her oil engines were
not working. The question for the Fleet was^ how to get help to
this boat so as to enable it to reach the Norwegian coast? A
few hours later there was a report from "U20," commanded by
Lieutenant-Commander Schwieger, who was returning from a three
weeks' long distance trip off the west coast of England, that he
had hastened to the assistance of "U30." The two boats then
continued their journey in company, first to the latitude of Lindes-
naes and then on November 3, at 10 p.m., they made for Bovsbjerg,
on the coast of Jutland, where "U30" could be met by tugs.
The charts of both boats, compared at frequent intervals, indicated
that the next day at 10 p.m., they should be about 15 miles from
Bovsbjerg. Towards 7 p.m. on November 4 a fog came up, and
at 8.20 p.m. both boats ran aground. As appeared later, they lay
5 sea miles north of Bovsbjerg ; they had steered considerably more
to the east than, according to their observations, they thought they
were doing,, and in the fog, they had not been able to see the land
properly. After two hours " U 30 " succeeded in getting clear
by reducing her load by about 30 tons, but she was no longer
able to submerge freely, and could not be steered under water.
Her commander remained in the neighbourhood of "U 20." This
boat, owing to the prevailing swell, had got on the farther side
of a sandbank, and in spite of efforts continued throughout the
night, was unable to get off. The Fleet received the news of
their stranding soon after 10 p.m. Hostile patrols of cruisers and
destroyers had repeatedly been reported in the neighbourhood of
Bovsbjerg, so it seemed desirable to send a considerable protecting
force with the light craft which were despatched thither. The Danes
would certainly notice the stranded boats at dawn, and we might
assume that the news would quickly find its way to England,
and that in consequence enemy ships which happened to be near
by would hasten to the spot. It was not to be supposed that the
whole English Fleet would just happen to be at sea, but single
groups might well be cruising in the neighbourhood. Assistance
must, therefore, be as swift and as well protected as possible. The

191

Germany's High Sea Fleet

officer in command of the scouting craft received the order to
send the Fourth Half-Flotilla of Torpedo-boats ahead immediately,
and to cover them with the Moltke and Squadron III. If we did
not succeed in getting "U 20" off quickly, it was to feared that
the Danish Government would intervene and intern her. At 7.20 a.m.
on November 4 Commander Dithmar arrived on the scene of the
accident with the Fourth Half-Flotilla. The leading vessel anchored
500 metres from "U 20." A strong swell was running from the
south-west, which increased greatly in the course of the morning,
and caused a ground swell on the sandbank. Three times attempts
were made to tug the U-boat off, and each time the ropes and
chains broke. "U 20," in spite of all efforts and favourable con-
ditions^ — it was high tide at 11 a.m. — did not budge. She lay too
high on the shore. As further efforts seemed hopeless she was blown
up, her crew taken on board and the return journey was begun.

The cruisers and Squadron III, in the meantime, had followed
to the spot and patrolled near by until the attempts at rescue were
abandoned. At 1.5 p.m. the Grosser Kiirfiirst, and immediately
afterwards the Kronprinz, were each hit by a torpedo just as the
squadron was executing a turning movement. Both torpedoes must
have been fired by a submarine. The submarine itself was not
sighted, owing to the waves ; the course of the torpedoes was not
observed until it was too late to avoid them. The Grosser Kurfurst
was hit in the steering gear and the helm on the port side rendered
useless. The Kronprinz was hit under the bridge and sustained
only slight damage in her bunkers and gangway. The Grosser
Kurfurst, which at first had to fall out because of her difficulty in
steering, was able to follow the squadron later at 19 knots, and the
Kronprinz was able to keep her place in the line, steaming at 17
knots.

Upon receipt of the news of this incident, His Majesty the
Emperor expressed the opinion that to risk a squadron for the sake
of one U-boat, and in so doing almost lose two battleships, showed
a lack of sense of proportion and must not occur again. Now this
dictum might easily have imposed too great a restraint upon the
Fleet merely for fear of submarines. We should have lost the con-
fidence in our power to defend the Bight which we had gained as
a result of the sea fight, and which became manifest when we sent
these scouts 120 nautical miles from Heligoland, a distance which
had hitherto been regarded as the ultimate limit to which our Fleet
could advance.

192

After the Battle

On November 22 I received a summons to General Headquarters
at Pless, and had the opportunity to submit my view of the case to
His Majesty, to which he gave his concurrence. It was as follows :

"In view of the uncertainty of naval warfare, it is not possible
to determine beforehand whether the stakes risked are out of pro-
portion or not. England, threatened anew by the U-boat campaign,
as the increase in shipping losses in October clearly proved, is very
anxious to allay popular anxiety on the score of this new danger.
No better means to achieve this can be imagined than the news
that they had succeeded in destroying a German U-boat close to
the German coast. If, in addition to this, the number of the U-boat
were ascertained — in this instance ' U 20/ which had sunk the
Lusitania — this would indeed be glad tidings for the British Govern-
ment. On the other hand, the dangers that threaten our U-boats
on these expeditions are so great that they are justified in demand-
ing the utmost possible support that our Fleet can give them in case
of need. On no account must the feeling be engendered amongst
the crews that they will be left to their fate if they get into difficul-
ties. That would diminish their ardour for these enterprises on
which alone the success of the U-boat campaign depends. Moreover,
English torpedoes have never yet proved fatal to our big ships, a
statement which was again confirmed in this case.

"The temporary loss of the services of two ships while under
repair is certainly a hindrance, since, for the time being, the Fleet
cannot undertake any considerable expedition. But, on the other
hand, incidents such as occurred on the occasion of the stranding of
these boats afford the junior officers an opportunity to develop their
independence. There is no doubt that in this case a few torpedo-
boats would have sufficed to drag the stranded U-boats free and
tow them home. But if they had been surprised by a larger force
of English boats that happened to be passing, or had been notified
of their whereabouts, then further losses were possible, and the
expedition would have failed in its aim. You can only make each
expedition as strong as the means at your disposal at the moment
permit. Fear of loss or damage must not lead us to curb the
initiative in naval warfare, which so far has lain mainly in our
hands.

"The bombardment of the enemy coast, airship attacks, the U-

boat campaign, as well as the sea-fight itself, have shown that our

Fleet has hitherto taken the offensive to a far greater extent than the

English Fleet, which has had to content itself entirely with defensive

n 193

Germany's High Sea Fleet

action. Apart from a few unsuccessful aeroplane raids — the last was
on October 21 of this year and made no impression — the English
Fleet cannot boast of its achievements. The whole organisation for
holding the Fleet in readiness is directed towards affording every
enterprise the greatest possible security, and towards leaving out of
account those ships which have come to port for necessary rest. It
is of great value to uphold this principle, because in the course of the
U-boat campaign, upon which, in my opinion, our entire naval
strategy will sooner or later have to be concentrated, the Fleet will
have to devote itself to one task — to get the U-boats safely out to sea
and bring them safely home again. Such activities would be on pre-
cisely the same lines as the expedition to salve 'U20.' To us
every U-boat is of such importance, that it is worth risking the
whole available Fleet to afford it assistance and support."

While at Pless I took the opportunity of making myself known
to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, and also to have an interview
with General Ludendorff. I discussed the U-boat campaign with
both officers, and it was agreed that if the war should drag on for
so long, February 1, 1917, was the latest date at which to start the
unrestricted U-boat campaign, that is to say before England could
revictual.

The Field-Marshal, however, added that now that matters had
taken such a favourable turn in Roumania, he could not for the
moment face the possible complications that the declaration of un-
restricted U-boat warfare might entail, although, at the same time,
he was convinced that it was the right step to take. He went on to
say that he had charged our ambassador at the Hague, Herr von
Kuhlmann, on his honour, to give his candid opinion as to Holland's
attitude, and had received a definite assurance that an aggravated
form of the U-boat campaign would force Holland to come in
against us.

It was of great importance to me, to have found complete under-
standing of the circumstances and conditions of our naval warfare
at Headquarters, and to be assured that those in authority were
determined not to let the suitable moment slip for the employment
of all means that would lead to a speedy termination of the war.

In order to resume cruiser raids on the open sea, the auxiliary
cruisers Moewe and Wolf were sent out at the end of November,
the former under the officer who had commanded her on her first
cruise, the latter under Captain Nerger, and both reached the high
seas without hindrance from the enemy.

194

After the Battle

The peace proposals of Germany and her Allies, made on Decem-
ber 12, had little prospect of finding acceptance with our enemies;
but the fact that they had been made would tend to simplify the
situation and, in case of refusal, to rouse the will of the people to
strain themselves to the uttermost for the final conflict. There was
no hope of yielding on the part of those who had recently come
into power in England — Lloyd George, with Carson as First Lord
of the Admiralty. Thus the die was cast in our country for the
employment of the most extreme measures, which it had been Beth-
mann's policy hitherto to avoid.

Towards the end of the year I regrouped the High Sea Fleet
and took Squadron II out of the tactical group. One ship, the
Lothringen, had already been put out of commission, and another
ship of this same squadron was permanently needed to guard the
Sound in the Baltic and had to be relieved from time to time. Thus
for one reason and another (e.g. repair work) the squadron only
consisted of five, or even fewer, ships. The fighting value of the
ships had decreased with age, and to take them into battle could
have meant nothing but the useless sacrifice of human life, as the
loss of the Pommern had already proved. The creation of a new
U-boat fleet demanded numerous, efficient young men, with special
technical knowledge, and these could only be drawn from the Fleet.
As Squadrons IV, V, and VI had already been disbanded for similar
reasons, the reduction of Squadron II was only a question of a short
time, as we were bound to have recourse to their crews. The U-boat
flotilla had by this time a greater number of officers than all the large
battleships of the Fleet.

When the two new battleships, the Baden and Bayern (with
38-cm. guns), joined up, it was possible to dispose the battleships
in the High Sea Fleet in the following manner :

Baden, Flagship of the Fleet.

Squadron I — Vice-Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt*.

Ostfriesland. Thiiringen. Heligoland. Oldenburg.

Posen. Rheinland. Nassau. Westfalen.

Squadron II — Vice-Admiral Behncke.
Konig. Bayern. Grosser Kurfurst. Kronprinz.
Markgraf.
J 95

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Squadron IV — Rear-Admiral Mauve.

Friedrich der Grosse. Konig Albert. Kaiserin.

Prinzregent Luitpold. Kaiser.

When in column formation, Squadrons III and IV formed a
division and Squadron I was divided into two divisions. These
three squadrons had their headquarters in the Jade. Squadron II
lay in the Elbe when, as was often the case, it was not sent to the
Baltic to provide target-ships for the torpedo-boat flotillas and
U-boats which practised there, and to undertake manoeuvres in
common with them.

The chief duty at this time was to protect the Bight when the
Fleet put to sea. During the winter the number of large battleships
in the English Fleet had been materially increased, and by the spring
of 1917 we should have to reckon with 38 large battleships (of which
14 had 38 cm. guns) and 10 battle-cruisers (of which 3 had 38 cm.
guns). On our side we had 19 battleships (two with 38 cm.
guns) and five battle-cruisers whose biggest guns were 305 cm. In
place of the Liitzow, which had been lost, we had the Hindenburg.
This relative strength indicated, from a tactical point of view,
the desirability of our making as much use as possible of the advan-
tages to be derived from the short days and long nights of winter.
The long nights afforded our torpedo-boats good chances of success
and prolonged the time during which our Fleet could approach
unperceived. On the other hand, the short days had this advantage :
that we could time a battle so that our munitions did not give out
and so that the enemy could not bring up fresh reserves against our
damaged ships.

At the close of 1916 the idea prevailed among the commanders
of our Fleet, that England, anxious about her future, and .pressed
by her Allies, intended to develop greater activity at sea. The fall
of the old Ministers, and the change in the command of the Grand
Fleet might be looked upon as steps to prepare the way for this.

It was decided that the U-boats were to carry on the campaign
against commerce in accordance with Prize Law during the winter,
and a number of these were detailed for special duty off the east
coast of England. It was possible to connect these up with an
advance of the Fleet, whenever a fair number of U-boats was ready
to put to sea or had been at sea a short time. By the middle of
January we had ten ready for this purpose, and they received orders,

196

After the Battle

in addition to their campaign against trade, to take up two lines
south-west of the Dogger Bank on a certain date, when the Fleet
was to undertake an advance to the west, south of the Dogger Bank.
Support by the U-boats of the Naval Corps was arranged for in
the usual way. The bad weather which prevailed in January pre-
vented the realisaton of this scheme, which was again to depend on
airship scouting.

As we had to reckon on the possible failure of airship scouting
within the time available for such an enterprise — boiler-cleaning in
the flotillas, repairs on the wharves and the preparedness of the
U-boats also influenced our arrangements — another plan was drawn
up in which the weakness of airship scouting was not of such
importance as to necessitate the abandonment of the enterprise on
that account. This was not to be carried out until March, and was
to take place during the light nights at the period of full moon —
which would last until March 12.

The idea was to make a raid into the Hoofden to interfere with
the convoyed traffic between England and Holland — from Rotterdam
to the Thames. In the meantime unrestricted U-boat warfare had
commenced on February 1, but our U-boats could not get at this
traffic very well. At night it was difficult for them to get an oppor-
tunity to open fire, especially when the vessels were protected, and
by day the shallowness of the water made submarine attacks im-
practicable, especially if the accompanying ships used depth charges.
As the crossing took so short a time, and moreover could be carried
out by night, this traffic was exposed to no risks worth speaking of
and there was a noticeable increase on this route.

Our boats were to advance to a line Schouwenbank — Galloper,
make a night raid through the Hoofden, and then at 6 A.M. steam
in a northerly direction to meet the Main Fleet which would follow
them. The Main Fleet itself, consisting of Squadrons I, III and IV,
was to lie off Braune Bank at 6 a.m., and for that purpose would
have to leave the Jade at 2.30 p.m. on the previous day. It was not
expected that the enemy would notice our putting to sea in the after-
noon before dusk. Success in this case depended entirely on sur-
prise, for otherwise the steamers would simply postpone their
journey. The raid by night through the Hoofden was designed to
cover the whole area.

The officer commanding the scouting craft had at his disposal
Scouting Divisions I, II, and IV — with the exception of two
small cruisers which had to remain as vanguard with the Main Fleet

197

Germany's High Sea Fleet

— and 22 torpedo-boats. In view of the large number of boats
taking part, it was necessary to choose a light night for the enter-
prise, so that the ships should not foul each other, and should be
free to act so as to hold up the steamers.

Though the heads of the Fleet enjoyed complete independence
in organising and arranging their operations, they nevertheless had
to inform the Naval Staff of them. This was imperatiye, if only
because all information was collected and we might consequently
receive valuable hints in good time. In this case it was especially
important for us to know whether there was any news of the Anglo-
Dutch traffic, and if so, what. The remark in my orders to the
effect that the enterprise was to be carried out even if air-scouting
were lacking gave rise to direct intervention on the part of the All
Highest, who declared we were on no account to do without air-
scouting.

The stormy spring weather made it extremely doubtful whether
we could carry out the plan under these conditions, and in fact, when
the time fixed for the enterprise arrived, the weather was quite un-
suitable for airships and thus the scheme collapsed.

In a petition to the Kaiser, I clearly showed that from a military
point of view my plan was practicable, and urgently requested him
to withdraw his restriction, pointing out that such a restriction even
in one direction only, would paralyse the power of a leader to carry
out an enterprise which he had carefully planned, and which was
well within the scope of the Fleet. The only reply I received was
that the order had been issued after due consideration and must
stand. I did not carry away the impression that when this decision
was arrived at the Chief of the Naval Staff had presented the
point of view of the Fleet with sufficient emphasis to dissipate the
Supreme War Lord's fears — which was a pity. These fears were
probably due to the idea that now that our ultimate success was
entirely dependent on the results of the U-boat campaign, there must
be no deviation from the course on which we had embarked, or any
risk incurred which might force the Fleet to give up its support of the
U-boats, before the goal had been reached.

It must be admitted that in principle these considerations were
sound, for events might occur — e.g. the loss of the U-boat base in
Flanders — which would confront the Fleet with tasks for which it
would require all its strength. On the other hand, there was the
consideration that every successful fight stimulates the confidence of
those who take part in it. In a Fleet there are numbers of men

198

After the Battle

who, in a certain sense, are merely onlookers in a fight, who are
unable to join in as individuals, as soldiers do on land, and thus
develop each man's pride in having "done his bit." On the other
hand, in a sea fight, perhaps to a greater extent than anywhere else,
the intervention of an individual may have a decisive influence, if
he has the presence of mind to ward off some great danger by re-
solute and skilful action, and thereby save the whole ship and her
crew and ensure victory for his side.

So long as there is no actual fighting, these men, who take no
immediate and active part, are very apt to criticise the initiative and
resolution of the leaders of the Fleet and of individual ships. They
want no cravens at their head, for they know that cowardice in their
leaders may prove fatal to themselves and because each man feels
in a measure responsible for the ship to which he belongs. When
battle is once joined, ship against ship, each man's strength
must be strained to the utmost, whether he be a member of
a gun-crew or a stoker, a munition man or a man on look-out
duty who gives timely warning of the course of a torpedo. Co-
operation on the part of all these, of whom no single one can be
dispensed with, is absolutely essential in an action if success is to
be achieved.

The Fleet had little rest in 1917, even though the success of its
activities was barely apparent. It found expression in the effect of
the U-boat campaign, for the work of the Fleet was from that time
onward chiefly directed to the support of the campaign.

The U-boat could only prove effective against British trade if
the boats succeeded in going to and fro unharmed between their base
and their areas of activity. To achieve this, strong opposition on the
part of the enemy in the North Sea had to be overcome. This oppo-
sition was planned on a large scale. We know from Lord Jellicoe's
own lips that at the beginning of 19 17 he had ordered 100,000 mines
to be placed round the Heligoland Bight, and we were very soon to
feel the effect of this. The belt of mines which curved round from
Terschelling to Horns Reef grew closer and closer. At the same
time our mine-sweeping operations were subjected to closer scrutiny
on the enemy's part, so that very often, by the sowing of fresh mines
in the path we had cleared, the work of many days was undone in a
single night. As the enemy laid his mines in concentric circles west
of the line originally laid, the area over which our mine-sweepers
had to work was constantly enlarged. Unhappily we never had the
luck to catch the enemy mine-layers at their work, which they

i99

Germany's High Sea Fleet

probably mostly undertook when darkness shielded them, at any rate
when the mines were not laid by submarines.

To explain what might appear to be crass incompetence on our
part, we may remark that, so far as we know, the enemy's efforts in
this direction met with little more success. I remember that on the
return of one of our submarine mine-layers I was told that this
boat had laid her two thousandth mine on this journey. How many
difficulties she must have overcome before that work was achieved !
The cruiser Hampshire, on which Lord Kitchener went down, was
sent to sea in a heavy storm in the belief that in such weather little
danger was to be apprehended west of the Orkneys from mines or
U-boats; and yet one of our boats (Lieutenant-Commander Curt
Beitzen) had been at work, and had made use of the opportunity
provided by the bad weather to lay the mines to which this ship
was to fall a victim. We, too, often noticed that after stormy days,
when the mine-sweepers' work had to be interrupted, new mines had
been laid in places which had been cleared just before the storm
began.

Another difficulty that our mine-layers had to contend with was
that they had to lay their mines quite near the British coast or the
entrance to ports, where closer watch was kept and defence was
more effective than in the open North Sea. There, at a distance of
ioo sea miles from Heligoland, we had to keep watch on what was
being done at night on the extreme edge of the wide curve which
stretched from the East Frisian coast right up to Jutland. The great
distance at which the mine-sweepers had to work made it necessary
for us to send a strong protective force with them, for fear they
should be surprised by a squadron of destroyers, which were greatly
superior to them in armament and speed, and would make short
work of them. A few attempts at catching them unawares had
been made by the English, but these had been so half-hearted
that our boats had got away with very slight damage and loss.
After we had opened fire, the enemy ships soon gave up the
pursuit.

We could, however, not rely on the mine-sweepers getting off
so lightly on every occasion. The more the English felt the un-
pleasant effects of the U-boat campaign, the more they would be
likely to make great efforts to combat the U-boat danger in all its
manifestations, wherever they had a chance. Only our light cruisers
could afford effective protection to the mine-sweepers, because their
guns were superior to those on the English destroyers. Just so

200

After the Battle

many torpedo-boats were assigned to them as appeared necessary
for their protection from submarines. If we had had to protect the
mine-sweepers by torpedo-boats alone, we should have had to employ
the latter in greater numbers than was compatible with their other
duties. From the very beginning of the war the importance of the
work of mine-sweepers was recognised, and much time and care were
devoted to developing these flotillas and equipping them with
increasingly better material.

Instead of the old boats that had been turned out of the torpedo
service, which found a place in our first mine-sweeper flotillas, and
the trawlers which were used provisionally to assist in this work,
new craft were built specially designed for mine-sweeping; more-
over, they were built in such numbers that in the course of 19 17
almost all the mine-sweeping divisions were provided with them.
We also had large demands for similar craft from the Baltic,
where they were needed to enable us to maintain commercial traffic,
and the more so as the offensive activities of the Russians were
entirely devoted to mine-laying operations.

The development of seaplane activity in the North Sea afforded
good support to the mine-sweepers. At the beginning of the war
the number of really efficient seaplanes was so small as to be of
no value, for the only seaplane station we then had at Heligoland
boasted but five machines, to which after a time three more were
added. Both pilots and observers had to be trained. Thanks to
the energy of those at the head of the Air Service (Rear Admiral
Philipp as Chief of the Naval Air Service and Captain Brehmer as
officer commanding the North Sea Seaplane Division), this arm of
the service developed tremendously and rendered us invaluable ser-
vices as scouts, thereby relieving the fighting forces on the water
of a great burden.

Bases for seaplanes were constructed on the North Sea at List
(Sylt), Heligoland, Norderney, Borkum and, in addition to these, at
Zeebrugge and Ostend. Further, the small cruiser Stuttgart was
arranged as a seaplane carrier, after the necessary experiments had
been made on the auxiliary cruiser Santa Elena, and when, as the
flying machines were perfected, it seemed desirable not to confine
their activities to the coast of the North Sea, but to make use of them
at sea as well. This development of flying became necessary,
and was encouraged by the urgent need of the mine-sweeping
service.

Thus the requirements of the U-boat campaign demanded many-

201

Germany's High Sea Fleet

sided service from the Fleet ; this applied more particularly to officers
and men, for in addition to the existing Navy a second one had to be
created for submarine warfare, one which had to be developed out
of the old Navy sailing on the water, and which was dependent on
it in every respect, although it represented an absolutely new
creation.

202

CHAPTER XII
AIRSHIP ATTACKS

ON the outbreak of war the Navy had at its disposal only three
airships, "L 3," "L4" and "L5," of 15,000 cb.m. capacity.
The last Zeppelin built during the war bore the number "L 71," and
its capacity was 62,000 cb.m. These figures express the gigantic
development which the airships underwent. The airships placed
at the service of the Fleet were almost all of the Zeppelin type.
The firm of Schiitt-Lanz built a few ships as well, which at first
were only used experimentally, but subsequently were put to prac-
tical use.

Probably no arm of any service has suffered such severe losses
as our airships, with the exception of the U-boats. Out of 61
Zeppelins which were assigned to the Fleet in the course of the war,
17, with their whole crews, were destroyed by the enemy, namely
"L " 7, 10, 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 39, 43, 44, 48, 53, 59, 62 and 70.

Twenty-eight airships were lost through stranding and other
accidents, such as the burning of sheds in consequence of explosion.
The crews of these were all saved, though in six instances they were
made prisoner. Six ships had to be placed out of service as being
useless; at the end, ten were still left in a condition fit for use.

Owing to the ever-increasing defensive measures of the enemy
the airships at the front were built in two sizes, the types being
"L50" and "L 70."

The chief distinctive features of the former were five motors,
each of 260 h.p., and such as could develop sufficient speed even in
the highly rarefied atmosphere of the upper strata of the air; four
propellers, all coupled directly to the shafts (the two rear motors
are coupled to one propeller); a central gangway, 196.5 m. long;
a breadth of 239 m. ; a gas capacity of 55,000 cb.m. ; a speed of
30 metres per second (about 1 10 km. per hour) ; a load of 38 tons.

Type "L 70 " : Seven motors, each of 260 h.p.; six propellers;
central gangway, 21 1.5 m.; greatest diameter, 239 m. ; volume of
gas, 62,000 cb.m. ; speed, 35 metres per second (equal to 130 km.
per hour) ; load, 43 tons.

The "L50 " carried a crew of 21, and "L 70" one of 25, among

203

Germany's High Sea Fleet

whom were i Commander, i Officer of the Watch, i Quarter-Master,
i Chief Artificer-Engineer, 2 men for lifting gear (Yeomen of
Signals,) 2 men for the balancing gear (Boatswains), 2 Motormen
(stoker petty officers) for each motor, 1 Sailmaker, 1 Petty Officer
Telegraphist, and 1 Ordinary Telegraphist for the wireless
installation.

They carried two machine-guns, and later on a 2-cm. gun as
well. The supply of bombs consisted of incendiary bombs of 11. 4
kilo weight, and explosive bombs of 50, 100, and 300 kilos.

In order to gain some idea of the difficulties encountered by
airships, it may not be out of place to make a few general remarks
on the navigation of these ships.

Their main task was scouting. That is why they were retained
during the war as a weapon by the Navy; the Army had no use
for them. The development of the aeroplane produced a keen com-
petitor and a dangerous opponent. The Flying Service could not,
at first, overcome the difficulty of covering the great distances which
scouting at sea entailed. It was a question of flying over large
sea areas, such as the North Sea, and providing the Fleet with trust-
worthy information and reports. Flights of twenty-four hours and
longer had to be reckoned with, and no flying-man could hold out
for so long.

The great load that the airship could carry, combined with its
high speed, made it especially suitable for purposes of attack. The
dangers to which the airship itself was exposed were best overcome
by assigning to the crews some definite task for furthering the war,
for which they gladly risked their lives. Any activity which did
not bring them into contact with the enemy would not have satisfied
them for so long a period as the duration of the war, and this would
have hindered the development of this arm of the service.

When navigating on the water you steer for a goal which lies in
a horizontal plane, on the surface of the water; the airship has to
negotiate a second dimension due to differences in height. And
this it is which presents such great difficulties in aerial navigation.
In contradistinction to the aeroplane, the load, including its own
weight, carried by an airship is not borne by motor power, dynamic
lifting power, but by gas-tight cells filled with a gas lighter than
air.

Hydrogen of specific gravity 0.07, which was used for filling,
gave a ship of 55,000 cub.m. capacity a lifting power of 64,000 kilos.
Of these, 26,000 kilos, in round numbers, were taken up by the

204

Airship Attacks

weight of the unloaded airship itself, so that the load she could
carry would be 38,000 kilos, i.e. 38,000 kilos can be packed into
the ship before she will float in the air, being neither heavier nor
lighter than air. The weight of the crew, stores of benzine and oil,
spare parts, supplies of oxygen for the passage through high alti-
tudes, and bombs amounted to about 10,000 kilos; the remainder,
about 26,000 kilos, is available for water ballast. This is most
essential in order to neutralise such influences as affect unfavourably
the carrying power of the ship. At first, when ascending, the
upward pressure of the atmosphere ceases; the gas pressure in
the cells becomes proportionately greater. In order to equalise the
pressure, every gas-cell is provided with a safety-valve through
which the superfluous gas escapes; in this event, carrying power
is consequently diminished; the ship becomes too heavy. To
remedy this, a proportionate weight of water must be thrown out,
so that the ship recovers her equilibrium. As a standard of measure-
ment, we may state that for every 100 m. that she rises the ship
loses 1 per cent, of her carrying power, that is 640 kilos.

Temperature, both of the air and the gas, also exerts an influ-
ence. Cold air is heavier than warm, whereas the lifting power
of the gas, on the contrary, is increased by warmth and diminished
by cold. In this respect the following law obtains : a change of one
degree in the temperature increases or diminishes the carrying power
by about 240 kilos. The commander must, therefore, constantly
keep an eye on the temperature and judge by the changes what the
behaviour of his ship is likely to be.

The weight is also affected by the amount of moisture that collects
on the ship's envelope when passing through clouds ; ice is also easily
formed if the temperature becomes sufficiently low. The additional
weight on the ship due to rain may amount to 3,000 kilos, and
owing to ice as much as 5 — 6,000 kilos. The heat of the sun's rays
and the strong draught caused by rapid progress soon make the
deposit due to rain disappear. Ice has the further disadvantage that
pieces of it may be hurled through the envelope by the revolving
propellers and may possibly pierce the cells so that gas escapes.

Further, since hydrogen is highly explosive, and when mixed
in certain proportions with air becomes very dangerous, care must
be taken to prevent fire or electric sparks from coming into contact
with escaping gas. But the gas escapes of its own accord when the
cells are deflated — when in rising the limit of elasticity of the cells
is reached, and when the cells are injured, either by pieces of

205

Germany's High Sea Fleet

ice or by hostile projectiles. If the hostile missiles generate flames,
as incendiary weapons do, then the ship is inevitably destroyed.

Care is needed, too, in thunderstorms. It is best to avoid clouds
charged with electricity. If you cannot go round them you should
go under or over them. When rising to get over them, in no circum-
stances must you rise to such a height that the gas completely fills
the cells, for owing to the diminished pressure of the air the super-
fluous gas is bound to escape and a flash of lightning striking this
gas mixture will immediately destroy the ship by fire. There is
no danger if the ship is struck by lightning if no gas is escaping,
so long as the framework is intact. The framework of aluminium
is connected throughout the ship, and acts as a conductor for light-
ning, which passes out by the stern." Instances in which this has
happened have been quite frequent ; but such experiences, of course,
are better avoided if it is possible to do so.

As regards the height at which the gas completely fills the cells,
the following should be noted : When a ship has risen above this
height and has let off gas and then descended again, the remaining
gas is insufficient to fill the cells completely ; it only fills the upper
part of them, while the lower part remains empty. The ship is
then no longer buoyant. The higher the ship has risen, the less
gas the cells contain upon descent; it is forced to come down to
earth. In this case more water-ballast must be discharged. The water
is distributed in ballast-bags along the entire length of the ship.
The valves of these bags are connected by wires with the steering
car. Every bag holds 1,000 kilos. The commander is in a position
to release any quantity of water desired,, from whatever part of the
ship he thinks proper. Fore and aft of the ship there are another
four bags each containing 250 kilos, which can also be opened
from the steering car. These differ from the others in that when
opened they discharge their contents instantaneously, whereas the
others let the water run out slowly. When the ship needs to be
lightened suddenly, the containers fore and aft are used, e.g. for
a sharp rise when attacked by aeroplanes, or when a cell has been
emptied owing to damage by a missile or some other accident, and
one end of the ship suddenly becomes heavy ; and also when land-
ing with a "heavy " ship.

Below the ship and at the sides the cars are hung. The fore-
most and largest of these contains the steering-gear in front, next
to that the wireless installation, and at the rear a motor. The last
car, which hangs on the central line of the ship, carries two motors

206

Airship Attacks

which both connect with one propeller. The cars at the side each
carry one motor.

As soon as there are no guiding objects in sight, such as land,
lightships, or one's own warships, by which the ship's position
may be ascertained, navigation becomes very difficult, because of
the leeway when the wind blows at an angle to the course of the
ship. That is where wireless telegraphy comes in ; the installation
is such that the ships can be called up by directing stations, their
whereabouts calculated, and their position reported to them by
wireless.

The airship stations were so placed that they lay as near as possible
to the coast, and had a sufficient extent of level ground for ascend-
ing and landing; but they had to be placed sufficiently inland to
obviate the danger of an unexpected attack from the sea. The
Navy possessed the following airship stations on the coast of the
North Sea : Nordholz near Cuxhaven, Ahlhorn near Oldenburg,
Wittmundshaven (East Friesland), Tondern (Schleswig-Holstein).
Hage, south of Norderney, was abandoned.

The ideal airship hangar is a revolving shed which can be
turned according to the direction of the wind. Unfortunately, we
possessed only one such shed, that of Nordholz, as it involves a
great deal of time and uncommonly large expense to build them.
The problem of building material had also to be faced in the course
of the war. Most of the sheds were placed in a position suitable to
the prevailing wind in the neighbourhood. It is not possible to
take an airship into or out of a shed if the wind blows across its
path at a speed of more than 8 metres per second.

This consideration, and the fact that airship attacks had to be
made during the time of the new moon, occasioned the long pauses
between the raids, pauses which often gave rise to the impression
that other influences had led to the abandonment of these activities.
This was not so. From the date of the first airship raid on England,
on January 15, 1915, no regulations were made limiting the offensive
action of the airships. So far as London was concerned, we had
orders at first only to attack such establishments as were immediately
connected with military work, such as arsenals, docks, batteries
and so forth. But this limitation could not be adhered to in the
long run, partly because of the difficulty of discovering, these par-
ticular places, partly because just round London the defences
were especially intense. But it never was the object of an airship
raid to attack defenceless dwelling-places. Their aim always was

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

to destroy those establishments which, either directly or indirectly,
served some military purpose : munition factories, arsenals,* stores,
docks, wharves, etc. Airships frequently returned from their expe-
ditions with their full complement of bombs, because they had not
been able to make out such targets with sufficient certainty. It
would have been easy enough for them before returning to get
rid of their bombs and drop them on any place over which they
happened to fly, if they had wanted to kill harmless citizens.

Once the airship was in the air there were no further difficulties
except such as arose from thunderstorms or very high winds; just
as at sea, very bad weather hinders and circumscribes the activities
of ships. The revolving shed is a factor of the utmost importance
for the future of the airship.

While the U-boats were at full swing at their work of destroying
English commerce, the airships with dogged perseverance did their
best to contrive their attacks on the island. In March, 1917, a raid
was made by five airships. Two of them reached London. In
consequence of a considerable freshening of the wind, the return
journey became very difficult. "L 2 " was forced to descend in
Juteborg, "L 35 " in Dresden, "L 40 " and "L 41 " came down to
their shed at Ahlhorn. "L 39 " (Commander, Lieutenant-Commander
Rob. Koch) was driven by the storm to the south-west, passed over
the enemy lines in France, and, according to a wireless message from
the Eiffel Tower, was shot down at Compiegne. Her crew perished
in the flames.

A raid which was started in April had to be abandoned because
on the outward journey the weather became unfavourable.

May again presented an opportunity for a successful raid which
took place in the night of May 23 — 24. The following took part in
it: < 'L4o,""L 4 2,""L43," <, L44"and"L 4 5." Captain Strasser,
the Head of the Airship Service, was on board the "L44." The
officer commanding the airships made the following report :

"Towards 1.45 a.m. we crossed the coast near Harwich; cloudy
sky with breaks in it. A number of searchlights tried in vain to pick
up the ship. Very little gunfire ; no aeroplanes. In consequence of
three motors missing simultaneously, did not carry out attack on
London, as ship lost height rapidly, but dropped bombs to amount
of 2,000 kilos on Harwich. Shortly after attack all engines began
to miss, ship travelled like a balloon for three-quarters of an hour
over enemy country and fell from 5,700 m. to 3,900 m. After this

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Airship Attacks

till 10 a.m. travelled with one motor only going, from 10 A.M. with
2-3 motors; landed at Nordholz 7.20 p.m. ' L 43 ' had to pass
through severe thunderstorms with extraordinarily heavy hail-
showers on return journey. Lightning struck ship in forepart and
ran along the framework without doing any damage."

The next attack v/as on June 17. "L42," "L43," "L44" and
"L45" took part in it. The raid on London was again prevented
owing to the shortness of the night, because detours had to be made
to avoid several thunderstorms. "L42" could not reach London,
and at 3 a.m. expended her entire ammunition on Dover. There
was severe gun-fire during the attack, but the searchlights could not
hold the ship for long owing to heavy mist. The bombs fell on
their targets. Violent explosions at intervals of 10 minutes followed
one detonation; whole districts of houses seemed to be hurled into
the air; fires could be observed for a long time afterwards. Shortly
after the raid the ship was pursued and violently bombarded by
light craft, apparently torpedo-boats or small cruisers.

From " L 42 " it was observed that one of our ships was being
attacked by an airman. The airship was at a height of 4,500 — 5,000
metres, with the airman 300 — 500 metres above her. As "L43"
(Lieutenant-Commander Kraushaar) did not return from this jour-
ney, we were forced to assume that the airman had destroyed her.
Later reports from England confirmed this.

On August 30 the Ordre pour le Merite was conferred on Captain
Strasser. I took the opportunity of handing him this distinction
personally, and for that purpose went to the airship station at
Ahlhorn, 20 km. south of Oldenburg, which had been erected during
the war and was now the chief base of the airships.

It is to Captain Strasser 's credit that he developed Count
Zeppelin's invention to military perfection, and made the airship
a weapon of great efficiency, besides rousing the enthusiasm of the
crews of the airships by his example. He was the life and soul
of the whole and made everyone under his command share his
conviction that airships had a great future before them. He was
particularly gifted in estimating meteorological conditions. He had
an almost prophetic instinct for the weather. How often we have
had to apologise mentally to him, when in apparently favourable
weather the airships did not go out; for he was always right, and
shortly afterwards there was invariably a change in the weather
which would have endangered the ships and made their return im-
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Germany's High Sea Fleet

possible. But he recognised no such thing as insurmountable diffi-
culties; the stronger the enemy's defence grew, the more energetic-
ally did he concentrate on counter-measures. Thus he sent his ships
up higher and higher, and ultimately they worked at an altitude of
6,000 metres — a height which was considered impossible at the
beginning of the war. For this he needed elbow-room and sym-
pathetic co-operation in his technical suggestions. His organisation
of the airship service did not immediately place him in such a
position as to get his demands satisfied quickly enough. Moreover,
he was hampered by all sorts of difficulties connected with technical
administration. Those in command of the Fleet, however, did not
rest until the organisation had been changed so that he could have
free play in the conduct and development of the airship service.

Captain Strasser took part in most of the airship raids, although
permission was often given him very grudgingly. The loss of air-
ships was so considerable that I was always afraid that one of these
days he would not come back, and he was too valuable to the airship
service for such a risk. But just because the difficulties always grew,
I had to admit that he was right in considering it necessary to see
for himself what conditions were like on the other side, so as to
judge what he could demand of his crews and how he could improve
the efficiency of the ships.

An attack in October, 1917, brought about the loss of five air-
ships out of the eleven which set out. This was due to such a
strong head wind setting in that four ships were blown far over
into France, and one, though it reached Middle Germany, was lost
in landing. The six others, thanks to their timely recognition of
the change in the weather conditions, came home safely. The in-
dividual ships had more than the usual difficulty in determining their
positions, because the angles from the directing stations became
very steep when the ships were over the South of England,
and consequently the calculation of their positions was less
accurate.

Another very painful set-back for navigation by airships occurred
in January, 1918, when owing to the spontaneous combustion of one
of the airships in Ahlhorn, the fire spread by explosion to the"
remaining sheds, so that four Zeppelins and one Schiitt-Lanz
machine were destroyed. All the sheds, too, with one exception,
were rendered useless.

After this the Fleet had, for the time being, only 9 airships at
its disposal. From the autumn of 1917 onwards, the building of

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Airship Attacks

airships had been restricted, because the material necessary for the
building of aircraft was needed for aeroplanes for the army. From
that date only one ship was placed on order every month. But even
this did not prevent us from repeating our attacks on England from
time to time, though we had to be careful to incur no further losses,
so as not to be without airships for scouting which was so
important for the other activities of the Fleet.

On August 5, 1918, the airships of the Navy attacked England
for the last time. Captain Strasser was on board the "L70," the
latest ship, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander von Lotznitzer.
He did not return from this journey ; his ship was the only one of
those that took part in the raid that was shot down over England.
Thus this leader followed his comrades who had preceded him and to
whom he had always given a glowing example.

The value of airships as a weapon has been much called into
question .

In the beginning of the war, when seaplane-flying was quite
undeveloped, they were indispensable to us. Their wide field of
vision, their high speed, and their great reliability when compared
with the possibilities of scouting by war-ships, enabled the airships
to lend us the greatest assistance. But only in fine weather. So the
Fleet had to make its activities dependent on those of the airships,
or do without them.

A weakish fleet needs scouts to push as far in advance as pos-
sible ; scouts, too, which can make observations without being driven
off. The airships could do this. The danger from aeroplanes only
arose later, and was never very serious at sea ; but over the land it
was extremely unpleasant. Although as a rule an airship can mount
more quickly than an aeroplane, yet it has far less chance of hitting
its opponent. Ultimately the airships were forced up so high that
it was beyond the power of human endurance (altitudes of more
than 6,000 m.). That meant the end of their activities as an attack-
ing force. But for far-reaching scouting they retained their im-
portance and their superiority to other aircraft, for they can remain
in the air much longer and are independent of assistance from other
ships. But the bigger they grew the rarer grew the opportunities
for them to go on expeditions, because of the difficulties of getting
them out of the sheds, and later on of their landing.

We have no reliable information as to the results of their attacks.
They were the first war-engines which scared the English out of
their feeling of security on their island, and they forced them to

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

organise a strong defence. To judge by this, their visits must
have been regarded as a very considerable menace.

It was our business to make as much use as possible of our
superiority in airships, and to increase their efficiency so that fear
of them might be a contributory cause in inducing England to make
peace possible.

Such an ideal of perfection can only be attained if it is persever-
ingly sought in spite of the set-backs we endured, and although the
opposition we had to overcome was increasingly great.

That is the right warlike spirit — not to give in, but to redouble
one's efforts as our airship men did in an exemplary way.

We may probably look upon the military career of the airship
as over and done with. But the technical side of airship navigation
has been developed in such a high degree by our experience in war,
that airship traffic in peace times will derive great advantages from
it, and the invention of Count Zeppelin will be preserved as a step
in the progress of civilisation.

212

PART III

The U-Boat Campaign

CHAPTER XIII

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN.

OUR fleet was built for the protection of German interests at sea ;
its object was quite definitely a defensive one. This was proved
in its construction ; its main strength consisted in battleships and
torpedo-boats which were meant exclusively for naval battles. There
were so few cruisers that they barely sufficed to scout for a fleet on
the move. Both in numbers and in construction they were unfitted
to threaten the trade of the enemy ; they could not touch English
world-trade, because the British Isles formed a barrier in the North
Sea. We had no naval bases abroad. Thanks to English policy,
in this war a hostile fleet ran little risk in attacking ours, though
it was built as a defence against such attacks. England had secured
the co-operation of the next strongest land and sea Powers, and could
count on the benevolent neutrality of the United States of America,
until they, too, sided with our enemies. Nevertheless, England
forbore to risk her superior fleet in battle, and her naval policy in
the war was confined to this : to cut Germany off from all sup-
plies by sea, and to starve her out by withholding food and raw
materials.

On October 2, 1914, the British Admiralty published a warning
that it had become necessary to lay a large minefield at the entrance
of the Channel into the North Sea; this was 1,365 square sea-
miles in extent. It left free a narrow channel near the English coast,
which was only passable within British territorial waters. On
November 2, 1914, the whole of the North Sea was declared to be
in the War Zone. Any ships which crossed it other than by routes
prescribed! by the British Admiralty would do so at their own peril,
and would be exposed to great danger from the mines laid in these
parts and from warships which would search for suspicious craft
with the greatest vigilance. This was the declaration made by
the British Government. The provisions of the Declaration of
London of 1909 had not been ratified by England at the time, and
she therefore did not consider herself bound by any international
laws which would have made it possible to get articles of trade

3I 5

Germany's High Sea Fleet

through neutral countries into blockaded Germany. The result
of the measures adopted by the British Government were as follows :

i. All import trade into Germany both by land and sea was
strangled, and in particular the importation of food was made im-
possible, because the distinction between absolute and relative con-
traband was done away with. Even the importation of goods that
were not contraband was prevented, by taking them off the ships on
the plea that contraband might be hidden in them; then when
they were landed, either they were requisitioned or detained on the
strength of some prohibition of export so that they had to be
sold.

2 . The neutral states in order to obtain any oversea imports for
themselves were forced by England's demands to forbid almost
all export of goods to Germany. The British Government even
demanded the cessation of trade in free goods and their own produce
between these countries and Germany, threatening to treat the neutral
country as an enemy if these demands were not complied with.

3. In neutral countries, especially in the United States of
America, whole industries were forced to stop all trade with Germany.
In addition to this, the neutral countries of Europe were compelled
to set up organisations which controlled all the trade of the country,
and thereby placed it under the control of England. Persons and
firms who did not comply with the regulations were cut off from
sea trade, because all cargoes addressed to them were detained under
suspicion of being destined for the enemy.

4. Free trading of neutral merchant vessels on the North Sea
was made impossible when that was declared to be in the War Zone,
because every ship that did not follow the instructions of this
declaration was exposed to the risk of destruction. In this way all
shipping was forced to pass through English waters and so to submit
to English control. Winston Churchill, at that time First Lord of
the Admiralty, openly expressed the aim of the British Government
in his speech at the Guildhall on November 9, 1914. He said the
British people had taken as their motto, "Business as usual during
alterations in the map of Europe," and they expected the Fleet, on
which they had spent so much care and money, to make it possible
for them to adhere to this motto, and the Fleet was at the moment
about to do so. It was very difficult at the beginning of war to
estimate the full effect of the pressure exerted by sea power. The

216

The U-Boat Campaign

loss suffered was obvious and easily computed ; the loss they inflicted
was often invisible, or if it was visible its extent could not be deter-
mined. The economic stringency of the blockade required time to
attain its full effect. They saw it then only in the third month.
They must have patience and consider it in the sixth, the ninth, the
twelfth months; then they would see the success which would be
achieved gradually and silently, which meant the ruin of Germany
as surely as the approach of winter meant the fall of the leaves from
the trees.

The attitude of the English Fleet was absolutely in keeping with
this declaration. They avoided battle or any attempt to destroy the
German Fleet. They thought they could force Germany's submis-
sion without any fear that the English Fleet might forfeit its
superiority to the other fleets of the world. Their strategy also gave
their fleet certain tactical advantages if we should seek to join battle
in those waters which it had selected for its stand. From this posi-
tion the English Fleet was enabled to carry out the system they had
planned of watching the approaches to the North Sea and the routes
which lead to Scandinavia, and at the same time most effectively to
protect this system from German attacks emanating from the Bight.

The English plan, however, was based on the further assumption
that the Fleet would be able effectually to protect English trade. They
probably counted upon the life of our cruisers in foreign waters being
a short one, and reckoned that only in exceptional cases auxiliary
cruisers would evade the watch in the North Sea and get out. These
might temporarily disturb trade, but could never have any decisive
effect. The English were not mistaken in this assumption ; and in
their certainty of controlling the seas, without any regard to the rights
of neutral countries from whom they were not likely to meet with
serious opposition, they took such measures as were best adapted to
cut off Germany. When they declared the War Zone they dropped
the old idea of a blockade, because mines and submarines made it
impossible to carry out a regular blockade effectively. So far as
the Englishman was concerned, that was the end of the blockade,
and he proceeded to introduce an innovation which, to his idea,
was suited to the times, and therefore justified; nor did he trouble
in the least about the protest of neutrals.

To English ideas it is self-understood that naval warfare is
directed towards the destruction of enemy trade, and equally so that
all means that can promote this end are right. Their practicability

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

was founded on the might of the English Fleet, from which neutral
protests rebounded unheeded. This war has made it clear that the
neutrals were mistaken when they thought that they could demand of
that great Sea Power, England, the same rights that she had secured
by treaties when she herself had been neutral. These rights of
neutrals are nothing but pretensions which a mighty Sea Power would
like to turn to its own advantage if on some occasion it should not
be one of the belligerents and should wish to carry on its trade
regardless of whether one of the parties at war should suffer thereby
or not.

This was typical of the relations between us and America. Of
course, the semblance of right must be maintained, and for that
purpose any catchword! which happens to appeal most to the people
is made use of.

In this war it was the " dictates of humanity " which had to bolster
up American trade interests. No State, not even America, thought
it against the dictates of humanity to build submarines for war pur-
poses, whose task it should be unexpectedly to attack warships and
sink them with all on board. Does it really make any difference,
purely from the humane point of view, whether those thousands
of men who drown wear naval uniforms or belong to a merchant ship
bringing food and munitions to the enemy, thus prolonging the war
and augmenting the number of women and children who suffer
during, the war?

What England considered to be maritime law is most clearly
seen by the layman in her attitude towards the Declaration of
London. On the invitation of the British Government there was
a conference in connection with the Second Hague Peace Conference
in 1909 by which a number of rules were drawn up, the signatory
Powers — amongst them England, France, Russia, the United
States, Germany and others — "had agreed in the statement that
the rules drawn up in the Declaration were in all essentials in con-
formity with the generally accepted principles of International Law."
England had not ratified this treaty owing to the veto of the House
of Lords because it did not take British interests sufficiently into
consideration. She therefore had the formal right not to abide by
these rules, but at the same time she ran counter to the principles
of International Law recognised by every State. On August 20,
1914, the British Government announced that it had decided to
accept the Declaration of London in general, but with certain changes
and additions that it considered absolutely imperative in order to be

318

The U-Boat Campaign

able to carry out operations at sea effectively. Here with touching
ingenuousness it is stated that the Englishman considers himself
bound by law only in so far as it does not hinder his operations,
and that he will allow himself such deviations as will ensure the
effective execution of his plans. That meant that he contravened
the right of neutrals to send any goods to Germany and put obstacles
in the way of such trade by every means in his power. The Neutral
States even had to give an undertaking to consume all food received
from overseas in their own countries and not to make use of foreign
imports to set free a like quantity of home-grown food for transport
into Germany. Anyone who wished to defend himself by means
of remonstrances or protests in law was foredoomed to defeat owing
to this brutal policy of might; but unfortunately this was the form
our own policy had taken.

Moreover, we looked in vain for sympathy from the neutrals.
America declared that if England ignored International Law that
did not give us the right to pursue a course contrary to International
Law to which America would be expected to submit. On the con-
trary, she demanded for her citizens the right to travel anywhere
by sea unmolested. If we did not refrain from the counter-measures
we had announced, which she considered contrary to the dictates
of humanity, she would hold us responsible. Such a peremptory
tone was not employed towards England. And why should it have
been ? The Englishman was only too glad of the visits of American
ships, for they brought him everything that he badly needed. No
disturbance of trade was to be expected from him, for he would have
thereby injured his own interests and could, therefore, never be in
the awkward position of running counter to the dictates of humanity
as understood by America. How the efforts of Americans to tighten
the screw of hunger on our people could be reconciled with humanity
is a question that can only be explained by the peculiar maxim of
the Anglo-Saxons that "business " has nothing to do with it.

When the starvation of Germany was recognised as the goal the
British Government were striving to reach, we had to realise what
means we had at our disposal to defend ourselves against this danger.
England was in a position to exert enormous pressure. We could
not count on any help from the neutrals. Without exception they
had submitted to England's will, though they had not all sought
their advantage in it as Norway and America had done. As we
have explained in the preceding chapters, in view of the attitude of
the English Fleet, our Fleet with its smaller numbers, and as it was

219

Germany's High Sea Fleet

constituted at the outbreak of war, could not hope to score a decisive
success by means of which German trade might revive and British
trade be at the mercy of our cruisers. The assumption that we
might have done this is Utopian and does not take into account the
subsidiary means of controlling sea traffic which would still be left
to England, even if her war Fleet proper were badly damaged.

The help of such neutrals as were left in this war would not
have afforded us sufficient security to enable us to maintain our
economic life, so long as imports from overseas were lacking, even
if they had been in a position to treat us in a more friendly manner
after their spines had been stiffened by a severe English defeat at
sea. iWe could only escape from this tight corner if we could find
the means of exerting a still more stringent pressure upon English
trade and so force England to yield. The U-boat might rescue us,
because the protection which the English afforded trade was powerless
against this weapon.

A military and political problem of the utmost importance thus
arose : Germany was in possession of a weapon which would render
the English Fleet ineffective and was capable of upsetting England's
whole plan of starving us out. It was only when the effectiveness
of these boats under the pressure of war had proved to be far beyond
all expectations that it became clear that the U-boat could attain
such importance as a weapon in naval warfare. The closest under-
standing between the political leaders and the Naval Command was
requisite for the use of this weapon. The first considerations were
of course those concerning Maritime Law.

It would take too long to reproduce here all the legal discussions
that took place on this question. The novelty of the weapon
demanded new methods which the opposition considered unjustifiable
and which they, of course, opposed with the greatest vigour, since
they were contrary to their interests. But there was no doubt that
the English conduct of the war had given us the right to use
retaliatory measures, especially since they had shown by example
that it was a simple law of necessity imposed by war, to make use
of the means at one's disposal "in order to carry out operations at
sea effectively."

The submarine was a weapon of war adopted by every state.
This gave us the right to make use of it in the manner to which,
owing to its peculiar nature, it was best adapted. Any use of it
which did not take this peculiar nature into account would be non-
sensical and unmilitary. The U-boat's capacity for diving made it

220

The U-Boat Campaign

specially suitable for war on commerce, because it could appear
unexpectedly and thereby cause fear and panic and scare away trade,
while at the same time it could escape the pursuit of the enemy. The
fact that it could travel under water made the new weapon
particularly promising. If it sank merchant vessels, including their
crews and any passengers, the blame would attach to those who
despised our warnings and, open-eyed, ran the risk of being
torpedoed, in exactly the same way as the crews of those steamers
that would not submit to English dictation, and in spite of the English
warnings, took the risk of crossing the areas where mines were
laid.

Was the audacity of the merchant seamen to prevent us from
seizing a weapon on the use of which our fate depended ? Certainly
no legal considerations could stop us from pursuing this course,
but only political considerations as to whether we were strong enough
to disregard unjustified protests. It was imperative to make the
most of the advantages arising from the submersibility of the boat,
otherwise the weapon would be blunted at the start and bound to
be ineffectual. The U-boat must constitute a danger from which
there was no escape. Neither watchfulness nor speed could afford
ships sufficient protection. That was the consideration on which
the conclusion was based, that, as the loss of ships increased, trade
with the British Isles must ultimately cease. The submersibility
of the boats would also leave the enemy in doubt as to the number
of boats with which he had to wrestle; for he had no means of
gaining a clear idea of the whereabouts of his opponent. One single
successful U-boat that had made a route dangerous might produce
the impression that two or more had been at work. For it is human
nature to exaggerate unknown dangers. The target of attack
presented to the U-boats by English trade, spread all around the
British Isles, was vulnerable at every point of the coast. Therein
lay a great advantage as compared with the conduct of war against
trade as carried on by cruisers. They had to seek the open sea
where there was little traffic in order to escape pursuit; the
U-boat on the contrary could frequent the neighbourhood of the
coast where all traffic met, and could escape pursuit merely by
diving.

All these considerations had led to the same suggestion being
made at one and the same time from the most varied sections of
the navy — that our conduct of naval warfare must follow the example
given by England, and be directed towards the destruction of com-

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

mercial traffic, because in that way we can hit England in a vital
spot. The U-boat will serve as a suitable weapon for this purpose.

In November, 1914, the Leaders of the Fleet laid this suggestion
before the Chief of the Nayal Staff, Admiral von Pohl, advancing
the following arguments :

"As our coast is not blockaded, our trade with neutrals, in so
far as it does not involve contraband, might continue in the usual
way. Nevertheless all trade on the North Sea coast has ceased.
England exerts strong pressure on our neighbours to put a stop to
all trade between them and us in goods which we need for the
conduct of the war. Their most vigorous efforts are directed towards
preventing the import of food from neutral countries. This does
not apply merely to food imports destined for the troops; England
wants to starve our whole nation. In this she overrides all rules
of International Law, as food is only conditional contraband and
only liable to stoppage, therefore, when intended to assist in the
conduct of the war. According to the provisions of the London
Conference, conditional contraband can only be stopped when it
is shipped direct to the enemy country. If it be sent via a neutral
country, e.g. Holland, it is not permissible to stop it. In spite of
this a large number of steamers carrying food, oil, metals, etc., to
neutral countries have been held up on the way, although it had
not been ascertained with certainty that their further destination was
Germany.

"As England is trying to destroy our trade it is only fair if we
retaliate by carrying on the campaign against her trade by all
possible means. Further, as England completely disregards
International Law in her actions, there is not the least reason why
we should exercise any restraint in our conduct of the war. We
can wound England most seriously by injuring her trade. By
means of the U-boat we should be able to inflict the greatest injury.
We must therefore make use of this weapon, and do so, moreover,
in the way most suited to its peculiarities. The more vigorously
the war is prosecuted the sooner will it come to an end, and countless
human beings and treasure will be saved if the duration of the war
is curtailed. Consequently a U-boat cannot spare the crews of
steamers, but must send them to the bottom with their ships. The
shipping world can be warned of these consequences, and it can
be pointed out that ships which attempt to make British ports run
the risk of being destroyed with their crews. This warning that
the lives of steamers' crews will be endangered will be one good

22Z

The U-Boat Campaign

reason why all shipping trade with England should cease within
a short space of time. The whole British coast, or anyway a part
of it, must be declared to be blockaded, and at the same time the
aforesaid warning must be published.

"The declaration of the blockade is desirable in order to warn
neutrals of the consequences. The gravity of the situation demands
that we should free ourselves from all scruples which certainly no
longer have justification. It is of importance too, with a view
to the future, that we should make the enemy realise at once what
a powerful weapon we possess in the U-boat, with which to injure
their trade, and that the most unsparing use is to be made of it."

Such action was suggested on military grounds. As was only
natural, the political leaders were filled with grave doubts on account
of its probable effect upon neutrals. The Imperial Chancellor sent
a reply to the Admiralty on December 27, 1914; in this he summed
up his reflections on the subject and declared that there was nothing
from the legal point of view to be urged against the U-boat
campaign, but that the decision must depend upon military and
political considerations as to its advisability. The question was
not whether it should be done, but when it could be done without
ruining our position. Such a measure as the U-boat blockade would
react detrimentally upon the attitude of neutrals and our imports;
it could only be employed without dangerous consequences when
our military position on the Continent was so secure that there
could be no doubt as to the ultimate outcome there, and the danger
that the neutrals would join our opponents might be regarded as
out of the question. At the moment these conditions did not exist.

This answer shows that the importance of this matter was not
fully recognised or appreciated.

It was not a question of whether the Navy might make use of
a new and peculiar weapon in order to make the conduct of war
at sea more effective and many-sided ; the question was whether the
gravity of the situation had been truly appreciated. The Imperial
Chancellor's answer culminated in the remark : First the war on
land must be successful ; then we can think of attacking England.

Enemies on all sides ! That was the situation. Could the war
on land alone rescue us from the position, or war at sea as carried
on heretofore? How could we increase our efforts so as not to be
defeated? Simple and straightforward reflection on this question
pointed to the U-boat campaign against commerce as the way out.
Of course it was our duty thoroughly to weigh its political con-

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

sequences, its practicability from the military point of view, and its
chances of success on a careful estimate of English economic con-
ditions. But the study of these points ought to have preceded the
war. It was neglected then because no one foresaw that a fight
with England would mean a fight against her sea traffic with all
the consequences it would entail. For who anticipated that we could
possibly be in a position to inflict as severe an injury on English
trade as that which we must expect to receive from the effects of
the English blockade? It is no reproach to anybody not to have
foreseen this. On the contrary, such aggressive ideas were quite
foreign to our naval policy. In the course of the world-war, under
the necessity of defending ourselves against the nations opposed
to us, when we recognised the magnitude of the disaster which
England had planned for us then, and then only, we descried a
prospective possibility of winning freedom. It was lucky for us that
our naval policy made it possible for us to carry out this plan ; that
we could pass from the state of defence, in which the enemy would
cheerfully have allowed us to go on stewing, to an offensive; that
we not only possessed this weapon in our naval armament but that
we also had the men to use it, men with sufficient technical knowledge
and the necessary courage; and lastly that the U-boats could rely
on the security of their bases which the Fleet was called upon and
ready to maintain.

The prospect was one of overwhelming magnitude, for it meant
neither more* nor less than the realisation of Germany's demand
for the freedom of the seas. If we compare the importance of this
undertaking with the manner of its execution we are filled with bitter
disappointment over the lack of farsightedness and resolution
amongst those with whom the ultimate decision lay; and with
deep regret for the great and heroic sacrifices that were made
in vain.

Thus the U-boat campaign became almost entirely a question
of politics. It was originally suggested by the Navy for military
reasons ; for it was the Fleet that had to bear the brunt of English
pressure at sea, and it was the Fleet's duty to neutralise the effect
of that pressure, which was very definitely directed against our
economic life. Considering the strength of the English Fleet and
its strategy, it was impossible to remove this pressure directly, but
all the same the U-boat had proved to be a weapon with which we
could inflict direct injury on English economic life, notwithstanding
the protection which the Fleet afforded it. Economic life in

224

The U-boat Campaign

England was almost entirely dependent on shipping, and so there
was a prospect of our inflicting such material injury upon that island
State that it would be unable to continue the war ; four-fifths of the
food of the country and all raw materials it needed, excepting coal
and half of the iron ore, had to be imported by sea. Neutral
shipping also took part in supplying these imports. That is why
the U-boat war against English trade became a political question,
because it might do very considerable injury to the interests of
countries which so far were not involved in the war.

There is such an enormous literature on the subject of the
economic as well as the legal conditions, that I shall content myself
with an account of the political developments of the U-boat campaign
and of its military realisation as it affected us in the Fleet.

The suggestion made by those in command of the Fleet to
inaugurate a U-boat campaign against commerce was adopted by
the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, von Pohl, in the form of a
declaration of a War Zone which was published on February 4, 1915,
of which the wording was as follows :

notice in the imperial gazette (Reichsanzeiger)

1. The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including
the whole of the English Channel, are herewith declared to be
in the War Zone. From February 18, 1915, onward, every
merchant ship met with in this War Zone will be destroyed, nor
will it always be possible to obviate the danger with which the
crews and passengers are thereby threatened.

2. Neutral ships, too, will run a risk in the War Zone, for
in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordained by the British
Government on January 31, and owing to the hazards of naval
warfare, it may not always be possible to prevent the attacks
meant for hostile ships from being directed against neutral
ships.

3. Shipping north of the Shetland Islands, in the eastern
part of the North Sea, and on a strip at least 30 nautical miles
wide along the Dutch coast is not threatened with danger.

Chief of the Naval Staff,

(Signed) v. Pohl.

This declaration was made with the consent of the Government,
which sent a memorandum to the Powers affected, in which it was

22

5

* Germany's High Sea Fleet

clearly indicated that the declaration referred to the use of U-boats.
The idea of declaring a blockade of the whole British coast, or
individual ports, had been dropped. In declaring a War Zone we
were following the English example. The characteristic of a
blockade had always been that it must be rendered effective. But
the number of boats at our disposal at that date could not be con-
sidered sufficient for such a purpose. The blockade of individual
ports would not have fulfilled the object of spreading consternation
amongst the whole English shipping community, and would make
il easy for the English to take defensive measures if these could be
confined to certain known areas.

Unfortunately, when they declared the War Zone, those in
authority could not bring themselves to state in so many words that
all shipping there was forbidden. Such a prohibition would not
have been in accordance with the Chancellor's ideas as expressed
at the end of December in the memorandum stating his doubts of
the political wisdom of the move. This new declaration represented
a compromise. We know from Grand- Admiral von Tirpitz,
Secretary of State to the Imperial Admiralty, that he was given no
opportunity to influence this decision. This Is all the more
incomprehensible, because he had to furnish the necessary material,
and therefore should have had the casting vote as to whether the
scheme were practicable or no. There seems to be no particularly
valid reason why the announcement should have been hurried on
in this way, except that perhaps Admiral von Pohl wanted to close
the discussions with the Foreign Office by publishing this declara-
tion before Jie took up his new post as head of the Fleet, to which
he had already been appointed. This undue haste proved very
awkward for him in his new position when he realised that the
U-boats could not act in the way he had planned, on account of
the remonstrances of the neutral States. He found himself obliged
to protest against the orders issued for these reasons, orders which
endangered the vital interests of the U-boats.

The success of this declaration of a War Zone depended upon
whether the neutrals heeded our warning and refrained, for fear
of the consequences, from passing through the War Zone. If they
did not wish to lose the advantages accruing to them from their sea
trade with England they had to take the risks.

The memorandum issued by the Government had characterised
our action as a retaliatory measure against Great Britain, because
the latter conducted the war against German trade in a manner

226

The U-boat Campaign

which ignored all principles of International Law. It then
proceeded :

"As England has declared the waters between Scotland and
Norway to be part of the War Zone, so Germany declares all the
waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English
Channel, to be in the War Zone, and she will combat hostile ship-
ping in those parts with every weapon at her disposal. For this
purpose, from February 18 and onward, she will seek to destroy
every hostile merchant ship which enters the War Zone, and it will
not always be possible to obviate the danger with which the persons
and goods on board will be threatened. Neutrals are therefore
warned in future not to risk crews, passengers and goods on such
ships. Further, their attention is drawn to the fact that it is highly
desirable that their own ships should avoid entering this zone.
For although the German Navy has orders to avoid acts of violence
against neutral ships, so far as they are recognisable, yet, in view
of the misuse of neutral flags ordained by the British Government,
and owing to the hazards of warfare, it may not always be possible
to prevent them from falling a victim to an attack directed against
an enemy ship."

Our U-boats received orders to adhere to the following rules while
conducting their campaign against commerce :

"The first consideration is the safety of the U-boat. Con-
sequently, rising to the surface in order to examine a ship must
be avoided for the sake of the boat's safety, because, apart from
the danger of a possible surprise attack by enemy ships, there is
no guarantee that one is not dealing with an enemy ship even
if it bears the distinguishing marks of a neutral. The fact that a
steamer flies a neutral flag, and even carries the distinguishing
marks of a neutral, is no guarantee that it is actually a neutral
vessel. Its destruction will therefore be justifiable unless other
attendant circumstances indicate its neutrality."

This attitude was all the more justified because the object of the
whole enterprise was to make use of the U-boats to compensate us,
since, owing to our geographical position, it was impossible for
our surface ships to touch English world commerce. A perceptible
effect of the campaign against commerce could only be achieved

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

if the peculiarities of the U-boat were taken into consideration,
as they were in the instructions issued to them. The U-boat, as a
special weapon in the war upon sea-borne trade, was to carry out
the blockade in the War Zone. Its strength lay in the difficulty
of perceiving an under-water attack, and it had to make use
of this in the interests of self-preservation. You do not
demand of an aeroplane that it should attack the enemy on its
wheels.

The danger which the neutrals ran arose from the difference in
their attitude towards the two declarations of a War Zone made
by England and by Germany. Never did a single ship, not even
an American, defy the British order, and thereby test whether, in
an extreme case, England would have carried out her declaration
of a War Zone by the exercise of violence. On the contrary, the
neutral ships voluntarily followed the routes prescribed by the English
Admiralty, and ran into British ports. In our case the neutrals,
despite all warnings, tried to break through again and again, so
that we were forced to carry out our declaration in such a way that
the threatened danger became a reality.

The assumption that the neutrals would accept our attitude
without protest was not fulfilled. The United States especially
raised very decided objections, accompanied by threats. In view
of the attitude they observed towards England they could not
contradict the statement that the new conditions of naval warfare
formed a reason for new laws; but they made use of the maxim
that the dictates of humanity set limits to the creation of new laws.
That was equivalent to saying that human life must be spared under
any circumstances, a demand which the U-boat is not always able
to fulfil, owing to its very nature. This is an extraordinary example
of the Anglo-Saxon line of thought. You may let old men, women
and children starve, and at the same time you insist that they must
not be actually killed, because the English blockade of the North
Sea could be carried out in such a manner that the ships only needed
to be taken into port and not sunk.

It appears very curious to-day that the possibility of such objec-
tions was not foreseen and their consequences carefully examined.
Owing to such objections our Government was faced with the follow-
ing alternatives : Either it must retract its declaration of a War
Zone, or, in carrying out activities in the War Zone, should con-
sider the neutrals, and in so doing gravely diminish the chances
of success, if not destroy them altogether. Once we had shelved

228

The U-boat Campaign

the question of our moral right to carry on the U-boat campaign,
because of the American demands made in the name of humanity,
it became increasingly difficult to take it up again later in an in-
tensified form, if this should prove necessary; for if there were
need of an amelioration of the military situation, which the U-boat
campaign could have brought about, then we must expect that the
politicians would object on the grounds that the employment of
this weapon would only make the general situation worse.

That is the key to the continued opposition of the Imperial
Chancellor to the initiation of a mode of warfare which could have
dealt an effective blow at England. He had made it impossible from
the very start. For in their answer to the American protest our
Government said that they had announced the impending destruction
only of enemy merchant vessels found in the War Zone, but not
the destruction of all merchant shipping, as the American Govern-
ment appeared erroneously to believe; and they declared that they
were furthermore ready to give serious consideration to any measure
which seemed likely to ensure the safety of legitimate neutral ship-
ping in the War Zone.

This recognition of legitimate shipping was in direct contradiction
to the intentions of the Naval Staff. It is not clear why the
declaration of the U-boat campaign should have been made so
hastily, if the political leaders had not the will to carry it through.
But there had to be a clear understanding on this point, if we
intended to institute a U-boat campaign at all. One almost is
tempted to think that this was a feeler to see if the neutrals would
tamely submit to our action. But the consequences which a refusal
must entail were far too serious. The form of the announcement of
February 4 made it possible for our diplomats to maintain their
declaration, and at the same time, in the conduct of the campaign,
to grant the neutrals the immunity which they demanded. This
restriction was forced upon the U-boats, and thus the U-boat cam-
paign was in fact ruined.

The Note could not have been worded with greater diplomatic
skill if we had wished not to carry out the will of our leaders
responsible for the conduct of the war, but rather to protect the
interests of our enemies, which in this case were identical with those
of the neutrals.

Before the date fixed for the opening of hostilities had arrived,
two telegrams were received by the Fleet on February 14 and 15.
They ran as follows :

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

i. "For urgent political reasons send orders by wireless to
U-boats already dispatched for the present not to attack ships
flying a neutral flag, unless recognised with certainty to be enemies."

2. "As indicated in the announcement on February 2, H.M.
the Emperor has commanded that the U-boat campaign against
neutrals to destroy commerce, as indicated in the announcement of
February 4, is not to be begun on February 18, but only when
orders to do so are received from the ' All Highest.' "

Thereupon the head of the Fleet telegraphed to the Naval
Staff:

" ' U 30 ' already in the neighbourhood of the Irish Sea. The
order only to destroy ships recognised with certainty as hostile
will hardly reach her. This order makes success impossible, as
the U-boats cannot determine the nationality of ships without ex-
posing themselves to great danger. The reputation of the Navy
will, in my opinion, suffer tremendously if this undertaking, publicly
announced and most hopefully regarded by the people, achieves
no results. Please submit my views to H.M."

This telegram reflects the impression made upon Admiral von
Pohl, as head of the Fleet, by the receipt of the two orders, which
so utterly contradicted the hopes he had placed on his declaration
of a War Zone. And it also proved how unwilling the Admiral
himself was to demand such action from the U-boats. But the
doubts which had arisen among our political leaders as to the wisdom
of risking America's threatened displeasure continued to hold sway.
I do not intend to question that their estimate of the general situation,
combined with our capacity to carry on energetic U-boat warfare,
justified their doubts; but then it was a grievous mistake to allow
such a situation to arise, for it blocked the way for an unrestricted
U-boat campaign in the future.

On February 18 instructions in conformity with the new con-
ditions were issued to the U-boats with regard to their course of
action. They ran as follows :

"1. The U-boat campaign against commerce is to be prosecuted
with all possible vigour.

"2. Hostile merchant ships are to be destroyed.

230

The U-boat Campaign

"3. Neutral ships are to be spared. A neutral flag or funnel
marks of neutral steamship lines are not to be regarded, however,
as sufficient guarantee in themselves of neutral nationality. Nor
does the possession of further distinguishing neutral marks furnish
absolute certainty. The commander must take into account all
accompanying circumstances that may enable him to recognise the
nationality of the ship, e.g. structure, place of registration, course,
general behaviour.

"4. Merchant ships with a neutral flag travelling with a convoy
are thereby proved to be neutral.

"5. Hospital ships are to be spared. They may only be attacked
when they are obviously used for the transport of troops from
England to France.

"6. Ships belonging to the Belgian Relief Commission are like-
wise to be spared.

"7. If in spite of the exercise of great care mistakes should be
made, the commander will not be made responsible."

On February 22 the U-boats were to begin their activities on
these lines. In these instructions the Naval Staff had been obliged
to conform to the declaration which the Imperial Government
had made to America, explaining its conception of the conduct
of the campaign against trade in the War Zone, although they
had had no opportunity of expressing their doubts of the possibility
of carrying out these instructions in practice.

The activities of the U-boats were made much more difficult
because, for the time being, all goods conveyed to the enemy in
neutral bottoms reached him without obstruction, and their successes
were thereby reduced to a third of what they would otherwise have
been; for that was the extent to which neutral shipping was engaged
in the commercial traffic with England. Further, neutrals could
not be scared out of trading with England, because they knew by
the declaration made to America that activities in the War Zone
would be attended with less danger than had been threatened. Our
intention of pursuing a milder form of activity was confirmed to
Holland when, after the sinking of the steamer Katwyk, popular
opinion in Holland grew very excited, and our Foreign Office
assured the Dutch Government in the following Note that an attack
on a Dutch merchant vessel was utterly foreign to our desires :

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Germany's High Sea Fleet

"If the torpedoing of the Katwyk was actually the work of a
German U-boat the German Government will not hesitate to assure
the Dutch Government of its profound regret and to pay full com-
pensation for the damage."

Besides the neutral ships, many enemy ships by disguising them-
selves with neutral distinguishing marks could get through with
their cargoes in safety if the U-boat was not able to set its doubts
on the subject at rest. This became very noticeable when the arming
of steamers, which had meanwhile been carried out, had been added
to the misuse of flags, and the U-boats were exposed to great danger
in determining the nationality of ships.

All these circumstances contributed to lessen the results. Our
enemies acted in an increasingly unscrupulous manner, especially
when bonuses were offered for merchant vessels which should sink
U-boats. A particularly crude case was that of the British auxiliary
cruiser, the Bar along, whose crew shot down the whole crew of
"U 27 " (Commander, Lieut. -Commander Neigener) when they were
swimming defenceless in the water and some of whom had taken
refuge on board an American steamer.

Regardless of all added difficulties, our U-boat crews devoted
themselves to their task. Trying to achieve the greatest possible
results, they nevertheless avoided incidents which might be followed
by complaints, until on May 7 the sinking of the Lusitania, the
English liner of 31,000 tons, aroused tremendous excitement.

The danger which England ran, thanks to our U-boats, was
shown in a lurid light; the English Press expressed consternation
and indignation. It was particularly striking how the English
Press persisted in representing the loss of the Lusitania not so much
as a British, but as an American misfortune. One must read the
article in The Times which appeared immediately after the sinking
of the Lusitania (8/5/1915) to realise the degree of hypocrisy of
which the English are capable when their commercial interests are
at stake. Not a word of sympathy or sorrow for the loss of human
life, but only the undisguised desire (with a certain satisfaction) to
make capital out of the incident in order to rouse the Americans
and make them take sides against Germany.

They were not to be disappointed in their expectations. In an
exchange of Notes, which lasted until well into July, the Americans
demanded the abandonment of the U-boat campaign because the
manner in which we used this weapon to destroy trade was in prac-

232

The U-boat Campaign

tice irreconcilable with America's demand that her citizens should
have the right in the pursuit of their lawful business to travel by
sea to any spot without risk to their lives in so doing. We expressed
our willingness to abandon this use ol the U-boat if America could
succeed in inducing, England to observe International Law. But
this suggestion met with no success. The U-boat campaign was,
however, further hampered by an order not to sink any big passenger
steamers, not even those of the enemy.

On August 19, 1915, a further incident occurred when the steamer
Arabic was sunk by "U 24 "; although the boat acted in justifiable
self-defence against a threatened attack by the steamer, yet the
prohibition with regard to passenger boats was made more stringent,
for the order was given that not only large liners, but all passenger
steamers must be warned and the passengers rescued before the ship
was sunk. On this occasion, too, when the answer to the objections
raised by America were discussed, the Chief of the Naval Staff,
Admiral Bachmann, was not allowed to express his views. Conse-
quently he tendered his resignation to His Majesty, which was
duly accepted. Admiral von Holtzendorff was appointed in his
place.

In consideration of the small chances of success, the U-boat
campaign off the west coast of the British Isles was abandoned.
The Chief of the Fleet, Admiral von Pohl, also asked to be released
from his office if this last order concerning the passenger ships
were insisted on, because he could not take the responsibility of
issuing such instructions, which could only be carried out at great
risk to the U-boats, in view of the fact that so many losses had
occurred since the first limiting order had been published; further,
he held it to be impossible to give up the U-boat campaign, which
was the only effective weapon against England that the Navy pos-
sessed. His objections to the limitation of the U-boat campaign
were dismissed by the remark that he lacked full knowledge of the
political situation.

Though the U-boat campaign west of England was given up,
it was not stopped entirely, for subsequent to March, 1915, a U-boat
base had been established at Zeebrugge, and another in the
Mediterranean. "U 21 " had been sent under Hersing's command
in April, 1915, to assist our warships which were engaged in the
defence of the Dardanelles, and this had given proof of the great
capacity of our U-boats. Consequently the newest boats, "U 33 "
and "U 34," were sent to Pola, the Austrian Naval Base, in order

233

Germany's High Sea Fleet

to carry on the U-boat campaign in the Mediterranean. The seces-
sion of Italy (May 27, 1915) to our enemies gave our boats there
a new field of activity, because practically all steamer traffic in these
waters was carried on under enemy flags, and complications with
neutrals were hardly to be feared.

Thus the U-boat campaign dragged on, though with but moderate
success, to the end of the year. Yet it managed to deal wounds to
English sea trade which exceeded in gravity anything that the island
State had ever thought possible. The total sinkings from February
to August amounted to 120,000 tons. Further results were :

September, 136,000 tons.
October, 108,000 tons.
November, 158,000 tons.
December, 121,000 tons.*

Before the U-boat campaign oversea traffic to and from England
had hardly been seriously reduced. Although the cruiser campaign
carried on by the Emden, the Karlsruhe and 1 the Kronprinz Friedrich
Wilh&lm and the Prinz Eitel-Friedrich had had a disturbing, effect,
yet no decisive results could be achieved owing to the lack of oversea
bases. The rise in freights was still moderate, and on the whole
the Englishman hardly suffered at all. There was no question of
want anywhere, and tihe rise in prices was slight. The U-boat cam-
paign, however, changed British economic conditions fundamentally.
Freights rose considerably. In May, 1915, they were double what
they had been in January; in January, 1916, they had risen on an
average to ten times the amount they had been before the war
(January, 1914). Wholesale prices, of course, followed this move-
ment, and though imports had not decreased so much that there was
any talk of want, yet the U-boat campaign had led to a scarcity,
because the demand, so much increased by the needs of the army,
was greater than the supply.

Towards the end of the year the lack of tonnage began to be
felt acutely, and it became clear that this lack was the chief difficulty
that England had to face as a result of U-boat warfare. In January,
1916, the new Chief of the Naval Staff handed in a memorandum
in which he subjected British economic conditions to a thorough
examination, and drew the following conclusions from his
investigations :

* These figures indicate gross tonnage.
234

The U-boat Campaign

i. The U-boat campaign of last year, gradually increasing its
weapons but hampered by growing restrictions of a non-military
nature, dealt a blow to a new economic entity hitherto little affected
by the war and capable of strong resistance. By means of a scarcity
which was mostly felt in a considerable rise in the price of important
foodstuffs as well as of manufactured goods and raw materials, it
reduced England's commerce to such an extent that serious economic
and financial injury is apparent in all directions. This injury has
aroused a feeling of considerable anxiety in England, where it was
felt that a vulnerable spot was threatened ; moreover, it was calculated
gradually to make England inclined for peace. The effect wore off
as soon as England was certain that for reasons due to considerations
of a non-military nature the U-boat campaign would not be
continued.

2. The economic changes set up by the U-boat campaign have
persisted, though for the most part in a milder form. Towards the
end of 19 1 5 lack of transport reduced British sea-traffic to such an
extent that the difficulties due to the interruption in British foreign
trade were rendered more acute by the steady rise in the price of
imports. Market prices followed suit. The financial situation, too,
became disquieting owing to the drain on the country caused by the
military and political situation.

3. A new U-boat campaign would be undertaken under much
more favourable circumstances than that of February, 1915, because
the amount of tonnage still available for British imports and exports
cannot stand much further diminution, as in that case the transport
of essential goods will suffer, and because England has been robbed
of the better part of her power of resistance by shortage, rise in
prices and financial overstrain. Moreover, a new U-boat campaign
has such weapons at its disposal that it is in a position to achieve
considerably more from a military point of view than last year's
campaign, for though the enemy has increased his defensive power
the U-boats are equipped with a number of new technical
improvements.

4. If on this basis the U-boat campaign has to be carried on
with the same restrictions of a non-military nature as last year no
doubt England's economic, and consequently also her financial,
position will be further damaged. But it cannot be assumed with
ariy certainty that in this way England will be forced to make peace,
partly because of the many difficulties of carrying out a U-boat

2.IS

Germany's High Sea Fleet

campaign with such a limitation of its specific activities, and the
consequent greatly increased possibilities of defence, but especially
because, judging by last year's experience, the effect of terrorising
shipping is to all intents and purposes lost.

5. But if a new unlimited U-boat campaign is inaugurated 1 on
the principle that all shipping in the War Zone may be destroyed,
then there is a definite prospect that within a short time, at most six
months, England will be forced to make peace, for the shortage of
transport and the consequent reduction of exports and imports will
become intolerable, since prices will rise still more, and in addition
to this England's financial position will be seriously threatened.
Any other end to the war would mean grave danger for Germany's
future economic life when we consider the war on German trade that
England has planned and from which she could be deterred only
bj such a defeat as the U-boats could inflict.

6. The United States are not in a position to lend England
effective aid against a new U-boat campaign by providing her with
tonnage. In view of the ever-increasing burdens imposed by the
war, it is not to be supposed that the United States will afford
England financial support for an indefinite period. Such support
would, moreover, be of no avail in an unrestricted U-boat campaign
against English trade, as it could not prevent a scarcity of essential
goods or make it possible for the English to carry on their export
trade.

The proposal made by the Chief of the Naval Staff in January,
1916, to start an unrestricted U-boat campaign was based on the
following estimates of success :

(a). From the beginning of the U-boat war in 1915 till the
end of October of that year in the War Zone round England
one or two steamers, averaging 4,085 tons, were sunk daily by
each U-boat; this does not include steamers of less than 1,000
tons. It could, therefore, be assumed that in the future each
U-boat would sink ships amounting to at least 4,000 tons daily.
If it is reckoned that in a month only four stations are continu-
ously occupied — a very low estimate in view of the increase in
the number of U-boats during 1915 — then you get a total of
16,000 tons a day, or 480,000 tons a month, in the War Zone
round England.

236

The U-boat Campaign

(b). In the Mediterranean in the second half of the year
1915 an average of 125,000 tons of shipping was sunk every
month. Assuming that traffic did not materially fall off, as a
result of the U-boat campaign, and that in the course of the
summer of 1916 the number of stations in the Mediterranean
would be further increased, the same result might be counted
on; that is, 125,000 tons per month.

(c). The amount of tonnage destroyed by mines had averaged
26,640 tons a month. The same number could be assumed for
the future. This would bring the total result per month up to
631,640 tons, which would mean a complete loss of 3,789,840
tons in six months. But the effect of this loss upon English
trade and economic conditions must be measured by a multiple
of this figure, because every lost ship would affect imports and
exports, and would, moreover, have made several journeys in
six months. The total tonnage of the English Mercantile Fleet
at the outbreak of war amounted to 20 million tons in round
numbers. Judging by the rise in prices which became manifest
a few weeks after the opening of the U-boat campaign, an idea
can be formed of what the effect would be if more than a third
of England's total tonnage were completely lost, when it is
considered that England is dependent on it to supply her
manifold wants and keep up her widely extended business
connections. There could then be no question of "business
as usual."

But the Imperial Government rejected the admiral's suggestion.
So the Chief of the Naval Staff resolved to content himself
with a kind of payment on account, which consisted in treating all
armed enemy merchantmen as warships. But he did not give up
all hope of soon being able to take up the U-boat campaign in its
intensest form.

When in January, 1916, I took over the command of the Fleet
I considered it my first task to ascertain what weapons against
England lay at my disposal, and especially to make sure whether,
and in what way, the U-boat campaign against English trade was
intended to be carried out. On February 1 the Chief of the
NavaJ Staff assured me that the unrestricted U-boat campaign
would be inaugurated on March 1. All preparatory work for the
operations of the Fleet were based on this assumption. As early

237

Germany's High Sea Fleet

as February n the officers in command of the Fleet received the
order as to the treatment of armed merchant vessels. According
to this order enemy merchantmen armed with guns were to be
looked upon as warships, and to be destroyed by all possible means.
The commanders were to keep in mind that mistakes would lead
to a break with neutral Powers, and therefore the sinking of a
merchant vessel on account of its being armed might only be
proceeded with when the fact that it carried a gun had been
positively ascertained. In view of the warning to neutrals, which
was to be conveyed through diplomatic channels, this order was not
to come into force until February 29.

The Government again issued a memorandum about the treat-
ment of armed merchantmen. In this they explained at length that
in view of the instructions issued by the British Government, and
of the consequent conduct of English merchantmen, enemy merchant
ships that were armed no longer had the right to be regarded as
peaceful trading vessels. The German Government notified neutral
Powers of this state of affairs, so that they might warn their people
in future not to entrust their persons or their fortunes to armed
merchantmen belonging to any of the Powers at war with the
German Empire. After this explanation no neutral State could
demand that its citizens should be entitled to protection if they
travelled on armed enemy steamers into the War Zone.

We expected that in these circumstances there would be fewer
difficulties in carrying out the U-boat campaign, while paying due
consideration to neutral shipping. But if, as the Chief of the
Naval Staff had told me, it had been decided to open the
unrestricted U-boat campaign on March 1, it was not clear why
this declaration relative to the treatment of armed steamers should
have preceded it. My suspicion that the date of March 1 would not
be adhered to was confirmed on the occasion of H.M. the Emperor's
visit on February 23, of which I have given an account in an earlier
chapter. The Emperor shared the political doubts which the
Government had advanced, and wished to avoid a break with
America. This announcement of the Government had received the
assent of the Naval Staff, which was responsible for the war
at sea, and so of course those in command of the Fleet had to submit
to the order to resume the campaign against English trade with a
few U-boats.

We would try this first and await the result. Judging by the
assurance given me, I took it for granted that the Government had

238

The U-boat Campaign

learnt a lesson from the events of 1915, and that it would not again
give way if objections were raised, but would on the contrary then
proceed with the intensified form of U-boat warfare. We had
far greater means at our disposal now to give emphasis to our
threats.

I should like to point out here that those in command of the
Fleet had no right to exercise a decisive influence on the conduct
of the war, but the Chief of the Fleet, being responsible for the
execution of orders, could make representations if he found the
conditions imposed on him too disadvantageous. Added to this,
the Fleet had only some — about half — of the U-boats at its disposal ;
the rest were in part attached to the Naval Corps, and in part
under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic ; those in
the Mediterranean took their orders direct from the Naval Staff.
But the problem of the U-boat campaign was so closely connected
with the combating of the English Fleet — our own Fleet's main
task — that it became a matter of the greatest importance in its effect
on the decisions of the Navy. I therefore thought it my duty to
point out the difficulties which would arise in our conduct of the
war in every sphere, if the U-boat campaign were prosecuted on
principles that were militarily unsound; all the more so as I was
accountable to the U-boats under my orders, if they were assigned
to tasks which would in the long run entail their destruction without
their having achieved the success which they promised to do if
rightly wielded as a weapon.

From this point of view I endeavoured to combat the tendency
to give way, which the Chief of the Naval Staff betrayed when
dealing with political objections, although in a long and well-
thought-out memorandum he, as the proper representative of the
naval fighting forces, had shown that unrestricted U-boat warfare
was the best and safest means we possessed to subdue England
and generally to bring the war to a successful close.

On March 4 the decisive session at General Headquarters took
place, and the Chief of the Naval Staff informed me of the
result as follows :

"For military reasons, the unrestricted U-boat campaign against
England, which alone promises full success, must begin without fail
on April 1. Till then the Imperial Chancellor must set in motion
all political and diplomatic machinery to make America clearly
understand our position, with the aim and object of securing our
freedom of action. Up to that date the U-boat campaign shall be

239

Germany's High Sea Fleet

carried on against England as effectively" as possible in conformity
with the orders issued on March i ."

The following considerations were the means of bringing about
this decision at the discussion on March 4 :

"The general military situation is good. East and west we hold
the territory that we have victoriously won. No serious danger is
to be apprehended from America so long as our U-boats and Fleet
remain afloat. Austria is effectively repulsing Italy's attempts at
attack ; Bulgaria has a firm hold on Serbian territory ; the Salonika
campaign is doomed to come to a standstill ; the Russian offensive
against Turkey has come to a stand on the Erzerum — Trebizond
line ; the English expedition in Mesopotamia has ended in a heavy
defeat; Egypt is threatened from the direction of Syria and by the
Senussi, which means that a considerable British army of defence
must be kept there. Latterly, too, military forces have had to be
sent to Ireland. No essential change in the favourable general
military situation is to be expected, nor on the other hand is there
any prospect of a decisive victory of all our forces.

"From the economic point of view the fact that we are cut off
from all imports from overseas and neutral countries becomes
increasingly apparent; even a good harvest cannot bring security
for the future, as long as England's policy of violence, whose
object is to starve us out, is not stopped. Thus the economic
conditions are very different from the military. Our opponents
can hold out longer than we can. We must, therefore, aim at
bringing the war to an end. We shall not be mistaken in assuming
that an injury inflicted on England, which induces her to regard
the conclusion of peace as better business, can force the others to
peace as well. England can only be injured by war on her trade.
The only means to inflict this injury is a ruthless U-boat campaign,
the effects of which England will not be able to withstand for more
than six or eight months if she. cannot get assistance from others
than her present Allies. Ruthless U-boat warfare will not only
inflict damage on England; neutral shipping will also feel the full
brunt of it, and cargoes and lives will be imperilled. The small
neutral States must give in and are willing to do so : that is, to
stop trade with England. America opposes this manner of waging
the U-boat campaign, and threatens us with war. From a military
point of view, and especially from the standpoint of the Fleet, we
might well risk this war. But economically it would fatally

240

The U-boat Campaign

aggravate our situation. Such a rich and distant country could
stand the war for ten years or more. But it would afford our flagging
opponents very considerable moral and material support which would
enable them, including England, to hold out for a longer period.
Our aim, which is to bring the war to an end within a short time,
would be farther than ever from realisation, and Germany would
be exposed to exhaustion.

"As the present military situation is not such as to force us
to stake everything on one throw of the dice, our superiority in the
field must be maintained, and at the same time our diplomatists
must do all in their power, first to prevent us from making new,
dangerous enemies, and then to find ways and means of sowing
discord among our present enemies and thereby open a prospect for
a separate peace. If we succeed in keeping friends with America,
and at the same time, by concessions in our manner of conducting
the U-boat campaign, can induce her to exert strong and effective
pressure on England, so that the legitimate trade of neutrals with
the belligerents is re-established^ then we shall obtain the economic
aid which will enable us to maintain our favourable military situation
permanently, and so to win the war. A break with America
certainly affords us the tactical advantage of ruthless U-boat warfare
against England, but only under conditions that will prolong the
war, and will certainly bring neither relief nor amelioration to the
economic situation. Should the attempt to keep America out of the
war fail, it will still be our lot to face these conditions. We cannot
take the responsibility of neglecting to make this attempt, for the
sake of a few hundred thousand tons of enemy shipping that we
might sink during the time the attempt is being made."

These attempts met with no success whatever; certainly not
within the period set aside up to April i. Neither was the assumption
fulfilled that we might exert pressure upon England through the
agency of America, so as to re-establish legitimate trade with
neutrals, and thereby obtain the economic aid which would enable
us to maintain our favourable military situation permanently. As
soon as this was recognised we were confronted with the necessity
of drawing the inevitable conclusions, and of beginning the economic
war against England in its intensest form. Otherwise the dreaded
state of affairs spoken of at the session of March 4 would become a
reality, and our opponents Would be able to hold out longer than
we could if no change occurred in the economic situation. The

Q 241 **

Germany's High Sea Fleet

dullest must have been forced into some recognition of this, when
on April 20, in connection with the Sussex incident, America
presented her threatening Note.

The date of April i had passed, and still the unrestricted U-boat
campaign had not been started. But the leaders of the Fleet had
no special reason for urging an early start, as the U-boats then at
sea had not gathered sufficient experience on the basis of which
we might make counter proposals.

On March 24, 1916, the steamer Sussex, with 300 passengers
on board, among them being a number of American citizens, was
torpedoed in the Channel while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe.
So far as German observation went, it was not made clear at first
whether the steamer had been hit by a U-boat, or had struck a
mine. Certainly a ship had been torpedoed on that day and in
that neighbourhood, but the German commander, judging by the
circumstances and the appearance of the ship, took it for a mine-
layer of the new "Arabis" class. The American Government took
occasion, in consequence of this incident, to send a very sharp Note
to the German Government, protesting against the wrongfulness
of the submarine campaign against commerce. It threatened to
break off diplomatic relations with Germany if the German Govern-
ment did not declare the abandonment of its present methods of
submarine warfare against passenger and merchant vessels, and
see that it was carried out.

As a result of this Note, presented on April 20, 1916, our
Government decided to give in and sent orders to the Naval
Staff to the effect that submarine warfare was henceforward to be
carried on in accordance with Prize Law. This order reached the
Fleet by wireless telegraphy when it was on the way to bombard
Lowestoft. As war waged according to Prize Law by U-boats
in the waters around England could not possibly have any success,
but, on the contrary, must expose the boats to the greatest dangers,
I recalled all the U-boats by wireless, and announced that the
U-boat campaign against British commerce had ceased.

On April 30 I was informed by the Naval Staff that His
Majesty approved of the interruption of the U-boat campaign
against commerce ordered by the Commander of the Fleet, and he
directed that the U-boat weapon should meanwhile be vigorously
used for military purposes. The order to resume the U-boat
campaign against trade would be given when the political and
military situation should demand it.

242

The U-boat Campaign

Having U-boats at my disposal for military purposes gave me
the desired opportunity of extending the operations of the Fleet,
and it was owing to this circumstance that the Fleet had occasion
on May 31 to meet the English Fleet in battle near the Skagerrak.
To my idea the moral impression which this battle left on the neutral
nations created a most favourable atmosphere for us to carry on
the war against England by all possible means, and to resume
the U-boat campaign in all its intensity. I took the opportunity of
submitting this view to H.M. the Emperor, when he visited the
Fleet at Wilhelmshaven on June 5.

In May the Naval Staff had again begun to try to persuade
the leaders of the Fleet to change their mind and resume the U-boat
campaign in accordance with Prize Law, so as to be able to inflict
at least some injury on England. But as even the regulations as
to the treatment of armed steamers had been rescinded, I refused to
contemplate a resumption.

In June, soon after the battle, the Naval Staff again
returned to this subject, and on June 20 invited me to
state my point of view in order to incorporate it in a memorandum
to be presented to the Emperor. I replied that in view of
the situation I was in favour of the unrestricted U-5oat campaign
against commerce, in the form of a blockade of the British
coast, that I objected to any milder form, and I suggested that, if
owing to the political situation we could not make use of this, our
sharpest weapon, there was nothing for it but to use the U-boats
for military purposes. A few days later the Chief of the Naval
Cabinet thought to persuade me to change my attitude. He wrote
me the following letter on the subject, dated June 23, from General
Headquarters :

"The Chief of the Naval Staff has given me your letter to
read on this subject; its conclusions may be summed up in the
words, ' Either everything or nothing.' I can fully sympathise with
you in your point of view, but unfortunately the matter is not so
simple. We were forced, though with rage in our hearts, to make
concessions to America, and in so doing to the neutrals in general,
but, on the other hand, we cannot wholly renounce the small
interruptions of trade that it is still possible for us to carry out, which
are proving of considerable value, too, in the Mediterranean. It is
the thankless task of the Chief of the Naval Staff to try and
find some way of making this possible in British waters as well.

243

Germany's High Sea Fleet

And it is my opinion that the Chief of the Fleet should assist him
in this as far as in him lies, by bringing about a compromise
between the harsh professional conception of the U-boat weapon
and the general, political and military demands which the Chief of
the Naval Staff has to satisfy. Of course, to that end it is
necessary that the Chief of the Fleet should unreservedly acknow-
ledge the decisions of the All Highest with regard to the limitation
of the U-boat campaign, as the result of the most serious deliberation
upon the military, political and economic situation. This is, of
course, merely what is to be expected of him as a soldier. And
further, that he should pledge himself to make use of the U-boat
as a weapon, despite the limitations imposed, in order in the first
place to injure, or at least continually to threaten, the import trade
of England. I do not take it upon myself to offer any suggestions
on the way in which such use can be made of the U-boats, especially
as I know it is a far more difficult matter near the English coast
than it is in the Mediterranean.

"What I ask of you is merely this : that you should personally
try to arrive at some understanding with the Chief of the Naval
Staff which will lead to some positive result, and by so doing put
cin end to a situation in which His Majesty might be forced to issue
commands instead of merely approving ; as, for instance, if he should
order so many more U-boats to be given up for use in the
Mediterranean, as offering a more fruitful field for the U-boat
campaign against commerce.

"In conclusion, I should like to remark that for my part I still
believe in the possibility of a ruthless U-boat campaign. The
conflict between America and Mexico, the growing bitterness of the
neutrals on account of England's blockade, increasingly good
prospects for the harvest, and last but not least our successes on
both fronts — all these are matters which tell in favour of such use
of our U-boats, without involving us in an uncertain political
adventure.

"(Signed) v. Muller."

I replied that nothing more could be expected of me than that
I should express my honest conviction, especially as it was in
connection with new and far-reaching decisions to be taken by the
Emperor that my opinion on the subject was asked.

On his visit on June 30 the Imperial Chancellor gave me the
impression that he had not the slightest intention of employing

344

The U-boat Campaign

against England all the weapons at our disposal, but also that
he would not give his consent to an unrestricted U-boat campaign,
so as not to be faced with fresh troublesome incidents. The course
of events hitherto had shown that America interfered on England's
behalf as soon as the U-boat campaign began to have perceptible
results. For ever so long America had systematically prevented
us from using our most effective weapon. Our attitude gave our
people the false impression that, despite America's objections, we
were still going to use our U-boat weapon with all our might.
The people did not know that we, pledged to the nation by our
big talking, were only pretending to carry on the U-boat campaign,
and America laughed because she knew that it lay with her to
determine how far we might go. She would not let us win the war
by it. So we did not wield our U-boat weapon as a sword which
was certain to bring us victory, but, as my Chief of the Staff, Rear-
Admiral von Trotha, put it, we used it as a soporific for the feelings
of the nation, and presented the blunt edge to the enemy. Gerard
was right; he never wanted a war between America and Germany
— but he wanted our defeat. That suited his book ever so much
better.

If we review the course of development of our policy from
January, 1916, we find that it had zigzagged in the following
manner :

1. On January 13, 1916, the Naval Staff declares: If the U-boat
campaign is to achieve the necessary success it must be carried on
ruthlessly.

2. On March 7, 1916 : Decision of His Majesty's, passed on
by the Naval Staff : For military reasons the inauguration of
the unrestricted U-boat campaign against England, which alone
promises full success, is indispensable from April 1 onward.

3. On April 25, 1916: We are to carry on the war against trade
absolutely according to Prize Law, consequently we are to rise to
the surface and stop ships, examine papers, and all passengers and
crew to leave the ship before sinking her.

4. On June 30, 1916: The Imperial Chancellor informs the
Commander of the Fleet that he personally is against any unrestricted
form of U-boat campaign, " which would place the fate of the
German Empire in the hands of a U-boat commander."

5. At the same time a proposal from the Chief of the Naval
Staff : The war against merchant ships to be carried on in the
following manner : They are to be approached under water to see

245

Germany's High Sea Fleet

whether they are armed; if they are not armed, the boat is to rise
to the surface at a safe distance, examine papers, and sink the ship
when the crew is in safety.

All these impressions induced me, when I wrote my report of
the Battle of the Skagerrak for the Emperor, to conclude by again
pointing out most emphatically the necessity of taking up the
unrestricted U-boat campaign at once, unless we wanted to give up
all hope of defeating England. Now Admiral von Muller's letter
seemed to imply that the Emperor disapproved of my urging this,
whereas I was able to ascertain later that His Majesty, far from
appending any disparaging remark to the conclusion of my report,
had actually appended a note of approval to it, and had acquiesced
in my report as a whole.

We should have begun the U-boat campaign in January, 19 16,
as the Chief of the Naval Staff proposed, or at latest imme-
diately after tihe Battle of the Skagerrak, when, to my idea, the
circumstances were particularly favourable. That we failed to do
so fatally affected the outcome of the war. Thanks to the number
constructed in 1915, we had a sufficiency of U-boats. We lost
valuable time that year, when our nation's power of resistance
was much greater than in 1917, when we were almost at our last
gasp, and we were forced, after all, to seize the weapon which
promised to prove our salvation. And in the course of this year
England was able systematically to develop her defence.

The remainder of 1916 was taken up with similar discussions
between the Naval Staff, Fleet and Government. The Chief of
the Naval Staff endeavoured to persuade the Ministry to sanction
the unrestricted U-boat campaign, and, on the other hand, urged
the Fleet to agree to the boats resuming the war against commerce
in a milder form. I was convinced that, if the leaders of the Fleet
had given way in this matter, the worst would have happened —
just what we most had to try and avoid, viz. that we should really
have carried on a sort of pretence campaign to act as a soporific to
the feelings of the people, and we should have presented the blunt
edge of our weapon to the enemy.

At the beginning of the year 1916 the Chief of the General Staff
of the Army, von Falkenhayn, had also strongly advocated our
embarking on an unrestricted U-boat campaign, because he had
realised that our only hope of future salvation lay in overcoming
English resistance. In the autumn of 1916 Field-Marshal von
Hindenburg took over the Supreme Command of the Army, to save

246

The U-boat Campaign

the serious situation which had arisen in the war on land. At that
time there was under discussion a new demand on the part of the
Chief of the Naval Staff to resume the U-boat campaign with
full intensity. At the meeting of September 3 at General Head-
quarters in Pless, at which the matter was considered, the following
were present : the Imperial Chancellor, the Field-Marshal, General
Ludendorff, Admiral von Holtzendorff, Admiral von Capelle, as
Secretary of State of the Imperial Ministry of Marine, the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, the Secretary of State,
Helfferich, and the War Minister, Wild von Hohenborn. The out-
come of the proceedings was that, after consulting all who were
concerned in the question of the U-boat campaign, they unanimously
declared that the decision must for the time being be postponed,
because the general situation, and especially the military situation,
was by no means clear, and they resolved that the final decision
should lie with General Field-Marshal Hindenburg.

I took occasion after that to send the Chief of the Staff of the
High Sea Fleet to General Headquarters, to consult with General
Ludendorff, and they agreed upon the following :

1. There is no possibility of bringing the war to a satisfactory
end without ruthless U-boat warfare.

2. On no account must a half-and-half campaign be started,
which could not achieve anything of importance, but involved the
same military dangers, and would probably result in a new limita-
tion for the nation.

3. The U-boat campaign should be begun as soon as possible.
The Navy is ready.

4. The separate treaties with the Northern States, who had re-
ceived considerable concessions in the matter of exports to England,
must be cancelled with all speed, so that we can act without
interference.

5. In no circumstances must there be any yielding.

The Chief of the Staff returned from this conference under the
impression that the question of the U-boat campaign could not be
in better hands than in those of the Chief of the General Staff of
the Army. I was able to confirm this view later, when on Novem-
ber 22 I had occasion myself to discuss the question at General
Headquarters with the Field-Marshal and with General Ludendorff.

247

Germany's High} Sea Fleet

The military situation in the autumn had led to a postponement
of U-boat activity, so as to avoid complications in the War Zone
round England; the only injury to commerce at the moment was
that inflicted on ships in the Mediterranean. That is why the U-boat
campaign was extended to Northern waters — to sink supplies which
were sent via Archangel to the Russian seat of war.

The refusal of our peace proposals in December brought about
a new situation in the U-boat war. Our enemies had given us
clearly to understand that they would accept no peace of under-
standing. This led to the decision to open the unrestricted U-boat
campaign on February i, 1917. The Chief of the Naval Staff,
with the approval of the General Field-Marshal, succeeded in bring-
ing about this decision, in which the Imperial Chancellor acquiesced.
So on that date the most effective period of our war against England
actually began. On December 22, 1916, the Chief of the Naval
Staff had again, in a detailed memorandum, given explicit reasons
for adopting this form of campaign. He summed up his arguments
as follows:

" 1. A decision must be reached in the war before the autumn
of 191 7, if it is not to end in the exhaustion of all parties, and
consequently disastrously for us. Of our enemies, Italy and France
are economically so hard hit that they are only upheld by England's
energy and activity. If we can break England's back the war will
at once be decided in our favour. Now England's mainstay is her
shipping, which brings to the British Isles the necessary supplies
of food and materials for war industries, and ensures their solvency
abroad.

"2. The present state of the tonnage question, which has already
been described in detail, may be summed up as follows : Freights
in the case of a large number of important articles have risen
tremendously, some of them to ten times and more what they were
before. From many other indications we can conclude with certainty
that everywhere there is a shortage of tonnage. We may with safety
assume that English shipping still amounts at the moment to
20 million tons, gross tonnage. Of this at least 3.6 million tons
are requisitioned for military purposes, and half a million tons are
occupied in coast traffic; about 1 million tons are under repair or
temporarily unfit for use; about 2 million tons are taken up in
supplying the needs of England's Allies; so that for her own supplies
at most 8 million tons are available. Computations based on statistics

248

The U-boat Campaign

of traffic in English ports gives an even smaller result. According
to that, from July to September, 1916, English shipping amounting
to only 6^ million tons, gross tonnage, was engaged in traffic to
England. Other shipping going to England may be estimated at
900,000 tons of enemy — ' non-English ' — ships, and a good 3 million
tons of neutrals. Taking it all round, the shipping which supplies
England amounts to only 10^4 million tons, gross registered tonnage,
in round figures.

" 3. The results achieved hitherto in the war on shipping justify
us in assuming that further activities in this direction promise
success. But in addition to this, the bad harvests in wheat and
produce all over the world offer us a quite unique opportunity of
which it would be sinful not to take advantage. North America
and Canada will, in all probability, be able to send no more grain
to England after February, so the latter will have to draw her grain
supplies from the distant Argentine; and as the Argentine can
spare very little, owing to a bad harvest, it will have to come all
the way from India, and to an even greater extent from Australia.
The fact that the grain has to come from such a much greater
distance involves the use of 720,000 more tons of shipping for grain
carrying purposes. It practically comes to this, that until August,
1917, of the io24 million tons at their disposal % million are required
for a purpose for which they were never needed before.

"4. Such favourable conditions promise certain success to an
energetic blow, dealt with our full force against English shipping.
I can only repeat and emphasise what I said on August 27 : ' Clearly
what we must do is to bring about a decision in our favour by
continuing to destroy shipping,' and, further, ' It is absolutely un-
justifiable from the military point of view not to make use of the
weapon of the U-boat.' I do not hesitate to assert that, as matters
now stand, we can force England to make peace in five months
by means of the unrestricted U-boat campaign. But this holds good
only for a really unrestricted U-boat campaign, not for the cruiser
warfare formerly carried on by the U-boats, even if all armed
steamers are allowed to be torpedoed.

"5. Basing our calculations on the former monthly results of
600,000 tons of shipping sunk by unrestricted U-boat warfare, and
the expectation that at least two-fifths of neutral sea traffic will at
once be terrorised into ceasing their journeys to England, we may
reckon that in five months shipping to and from England will be
reduced by about 39 per cent. England would not be able to stand

249

Germany's High Sea Fleet

that, neither in view of post-war conditions, nor with regard to
the possibility of carrying on the war. She is already confronted
with a shortage of food which forces her into attempting the same
rationing measures that we, as a blockaded country, have had to
adopt in the course of the war. The existing conditions with which
such an organisation will have to reckon are very different and
incomparably less favourable in England than here. The necessary
authorities do not exist, and the people in England have not been
educated to submit to such coercion.

"For another reason it would not now be possible to institute
a uniform reduced bread ration for the large population of England.
It was possible in <iermany at a moment when the sudden reduction
in the bread ration was counterbalanced for the time being by
supplies of other food. They have missed that opportunity in
England, and nothing can recall it. But with about three-fifths
of her former shipping she cannot continue her food supply without
a steady and vigorous reduction in the consumption of wheat, while
at the same time she has to keep up her war industries. In the
accompanying memorandum I have refuted in detail the objection
that England might have enough grain and! raw materials in the
country to be able to carry on through this period of danger until
the next harvest. Added to this, the unlimited U-boat campaign
would mean an immediate shortage of fats, since she would be cut
off from imports from Holland and Denmark ; and one-third of her
total imports of butter come from the latter country, while all the
margarine comes from the former. Further, it will mean that the
lack of wood and iron ore will be intensified, because the import
of wood from Scandinavia will be threatened, while at the same time
the imports of iron from Spain will be jeopardised. That will mean
an immediate reduction in coal production, because the necessary
wood will not be forthcoming; the same is true of iron and steel,
and consequently of munitions, which are dependent on both.
Finally, it will at length give us the desired opportunity of attacking
the supply of munitions from neutral countries, and by so doing
relieve our army.

"As opposed to this, cruiser warfare waged by U-boats, even if
armed steamers were not exempt from sinking, would result in re-
ducing shipping to England by one-fifth of 400,000 tons, or about 18
per cent, of the present monthly traffic, that is less than half of what
would result from the unrestricted U-boat campaign. Judging by
our experience up to date, we cannot assume that if the armed

250

The U-boat Campaign

steamers were not exempt there would be a perceptible increase in
the sinking of tonnage, which in the last two months amounted to
about 400,000 tons a month. So far as one can see, any such
increase would only serve to counterbalance the losses which must
be expected to grow in number as the arming of the ships
proceeds.

"I am quite clear on the point that the loss of one-fifth of British
shipping would have a very serious effect on their supplies. But I
think it out of the question that, under the leadership of Lloyd
George, who is prepared to go to all lengths, England could thereby
be forced to make peace, especially as the above-mentioned effects
of the shortage of fats, wood and iron ore, and the continued influence
on the supply of munitions would not come into play at all. Further,
the psychological effects of panic and fear would be lacking. These,
which can only result from unrestricted U-boat warfare, I hold to
be indispensable conditions of success. Our experiences at the
beginning of the U-boat war in 1915, when the English still believed
we were in earnest about continuing it, and even in the short U-boat
campaign of March and April, 1916, proved how potent these effects
were.

"A further condition is that the declaration and commencement
of the unrestricted U-boat war should be simultaneous, so that there
is no time for negotiations, especially between England and the
neutrals. Only on these conditions will the enemy and the neutrals
be inspired with ' holy ' terror.

"6. The declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare will confront
the Government of the United States with the question whether
they are prepared to draw the logical conclusions from the attitude
they have hitherto adopted towards the use of U-boats or not. I am
most emphatically of opinion that war with the United States of
America is such a serious matter that everything must be done to
avoid it. But, in my opinion, fear of a break must not hinder us
from using this weapon which promises success. In any case, it is
desirable to envisage the consequences least favourable to us and to
realise what the effect on the course of the war will be if America
joins our enemies. So far as tonnage is concerned this effect can
only be very small. It is not probable that more than a small frac-
tion of the tonnage belonging to the Central Powers which is lying
in America, and perhaps also in neutral ports, will be quickly avail-
able for voyages to England. By far the greater part of it can be
damaged to such an extent that it would be useless during the first

251

Germany's High Sea Fleet

months, which will be the decisive period. Preparations for this
have been made.

"Nor would crews be immediately available for them. Decisive
effects need not be anticipated! from the co-operation of American
troops, who cannot be brought over in considerable numbers owing
to the lack of shipping ; similarly, American money cannot make up
for the shortage of supplies and tonnage.

" The question is, what attitude America would adopt if England
were forced to make peace. It is improbable that she would decide
to carry on the war singlehanded, as she lacks the means to make a
vigorous attack on us, and her shipping would meanwhile be dam-
aged by our U-boats. On the contrary, it is probable that she
would associate herself with the peace concluded by England so as
to return to healthy economic conditions as soon as possible.

"I have therefore come to the conclusion that we must have
recourse to unrestricted U-boat warfare, even at the risk of war with
America, so long as the U-boat campaign is begun early enough
to ensure peace before the next harvest, that is, before August i ; we
have no alternative. In spite of the danger of a break with America,
an unrestricted U-boat campaign, begun soon, is the right means to
bring the war to a victorious end for us. Moreover, it is the only
means to that end.

"7. The situation has improved materially for us, since in the
autumn of 1916 I declared that the time had come to strike a de-
cisive blow against England. The failure of the harvests all over
the world, together with the effect of the war on England up to the .
present time, once more give us a chance of ending the war in our
favour before the new harvests are reaped. If we do not make the
best of this, the last opportunity as far as man can tell, I see no other
possibility than exhaustion on both sides without our being able
to end the war so that our future as a World Power is secured. In
order to achieve the necessary effect in time the unrestricted U-boat
campaign must begin on February 1 at the latest.

" I beg your Excellency to inform me whether the military situa-
tion on the Continent, particularly as regards the States which are
neutral, will permit of this date being fixed. I require a period of
three weeks to make the necessary arrangements.

"(Signed) v. Holtzendorff."

There is no doubt that the Chief of the Naval Staff, although
we in the Fleet had no special knowledge to that effect, must have

252

The U-boat Campaign

made known to the Cabinet the same views which he described in so
much detail in his memorandum to General Field-Marshal von
Hindenburg, viz., that it was high time to start the unrestricted
U-boat campaign. In this quarter, though, he seems to have met
with greater difficulties, so that he once more appears to have been
inclined to compromise. When the orders regarding the date of
the opening of the campaign failed to reach the Fleet in the middle
of December, the time for which the admiral had announced them,
and when, in reply to my inquiries, I received evasive answers, I
feared that a new obstruction had arisen. I therefore sent Captain
von Levetzow to Berlin to make inquiries. He was given to under-
stand in an interview with Admiral von Holtzendorff on January 4
that for the moment he could only obtain permission to sink armed
liners. A Note on this subject was ready and about to be dispatched
to America. Again there was the danger that we should pursue
exactly the same course as a year ago, a course which had led to
such miserable results. I had commissioned my representative to
warn them emphatically against this. He had occasion on January
8 to be received by the Imperial Chancellor and to point out to him
the inadequacy of such a middle course which was bound to give
offence and would be wrecked if America offered objections. The
difficulty of determining whether a steamer were armed or not would
seriously compromise the success of the undertaking. The Chan-
cellor went the very same evening to Pless, where the decisive session
took place the following day when the Chief of the Naval
Staff insisted on the necessity of the step, as explained in his
memorandum to the Field-Marshal, and convinced His Majesty
as well.

On January 9 the officer commanding the Fleet received two com-
munications at short intervals. The first stated that from February 1
onward all merchant ships as soon as it had been positively ascer-
tained that they were armed were to be attacked forthwith. Up to
that date only armed cargo boats were to be sunk without warning.
This meant that after February 1 passenger ships also would be
subject to submarine attack. The second telegram contained an
order sent by the All Highest to the Chief of the Naval Staff
to the following effect :

"I command that the unrestricted U-boat campaign shall begin
on February 1 in full force. You are to make all necessary prepara-
tions without delay, but in such a way that neither the enemy nor

253

Germany's High Sea Fleet

neutrals can obtain early information of this intention. The funda-
mental plans of operation are to be submitted to me."

It struck me as odd that an order to proceed against armed
steamers should be issued on February i while the unrestricted
U-boat campaign was to start on the same day. The only explana-
tion I could think of was that the aforementioned Note concerning
the treatment of armed steamers from February i onwards had
already been sent to the American Government, and that it was too
late to stop it being delivered. The American Government would
certainly be surprised if, after receiving such an announcement in
the first half of January, it were informed a few weeks later (February
i) of the intensification of U-boat warfare. But it would make a vast
difference to America whether the fundamental right of neutrals to
send ships to the blockaded area was conceded, or as unrestricted
U-boat war demanded, all shipping in those parts was exposed to
destruction. It seems, judging by later communications, there was
some idea of asking, the American Government to mediate; if this
was so the adoption of two such different attitudes on the U-boat
question, one following the other in such quick succession, must
have an awkward effect. Nothing was made known to the Naval
Staff, nor to the officers commanding the Fleet (who certainly were
not directly concerned in such matters), of any negotiations which
were in progress at that time and which might have been unfavour-
ably affected by the declaration of the unrestricted U-boat campaign.
When later on I took over the duties of Chief of the Naval Staff
I found no record that any letter from the Imperial Chancellor had
been received before the actual commencement of the unrestricted
U-boat campaign on February i asking for a postponement so as
to make a last attempt to avoid this extreme measure. I am con-
vinced, too, that if Admiral von Holtzendorff had had any knowledge
of the matter he would have told me of it when he handed over
affairs to me on our change of office, if not before. Owing to his
severe illness in the summer of 1918 he never had an opportunity of
making any statement on this question.

"With the unrestricted U-boat campaign we had probably em-
barked on the most tremendous undertaking that the world-war
brought in its long train. Our aim was to break the power of
mighty England vested in her sea trade in spite of the protection
which her powerful Fleet could afford her. Two and a half years
of the world-war had passed before we addressed ourselves to this

2 54

The U-boat Campaign

task, and they had taxed the strength of the Central Powers to the
uttermost. But if we did not succeed in overcoming England's will
to destroy us then the war of exhaustion must end in Germany's
certain defeat. There was no prospect of avoiding such a con-
clusion by the war on land ; nor could we assume that America's
definitely unneutral attitude towards us would change, or that by her
mediation any peace could be obtained with satisfactory results for
us, since Wilson's proposal to act as mediator in a peace in which
there should be neither victors nor vanquished had been so brusquely
refused by our enemies.

In such a situation it was not -permissible to sit with folded hands
and leave the fate of the German Empire to be decided by chance cir-
cumstances. All in a position of responsibility felt it incumbent
upon them to suggest any means that offered a prospect of warding
off the impending disaster. An opinion from the military point of
view as to the chances of success in war upon enemy sea trade had
been expressed; it was based on the statistics of tonnage sunk in
previous years. In this respect expectations were far surpassed in
the coming year. But the effects of this blow dealt to English com-
merce could not be. foretold in the same way. It was immediately
obvious that a reduction of the English mercantile fleet by a third,
or even a half, must have a catastrophic effect on English economic
conditions, and make England incline towards peace.

The Naval Staff had made a point of carefully examining the
economic conditions with the help of experts and had recorded the
results of their researches in a number of detailed memoranda, which
they had submitted to the responsible Imperial officials. These re-
searches had included the complicated problems of traffic for military
purposes as well as for the needs of civilians by land and sea; sup-
plies for the whole country as well as for the troops in the various
theatres of war ; the food supply of the nation ; distribution of goods ;
home production ; stores controlled by the State and rationing.
Moreover, all these inquiries and the considerations they gave rise
to had to be carried out in unfamiliar circumstances due to the war.
Further, an estimate had to be made of the probable direct and
indirect effects of all these conditions on the psychological state of
the people. The conclusions based on these researches were drawn
up in outline so as to give some idea of the probable effects, and
they confirmed the general impressions gathered from the beginning
of our war on trade that success was certain to crown our efforts if
we pursued this course. We had no alternative but to attack our

255

Germany's High Sea Fleet

enemy by trying to destroy his economic strength, since all his
efforts were directed towards crushing ours. Now, as never before,
it depended on which of us could hold out the longer.

In every great effort, if you want to develop it to its fullest
strength, you must have the conviction that you can defeat your
opponent. That is why the U-boat campaign required the support
of all classes that expected the victory of our Fatherland. Every
doubt of its success must strengthen the enemy's view that we would
soon tire.

But the political leaders had already done all in their power to
undermine confidence ; and their fear that this kind of warfare might
assume forms which would burden us with new enemies had affected
timid souls, and it was bound to have a depressing effect if doubts
of the final outcome were allowed to appear; should expectations
not be fulfilled exactly within the periods mentioned by the
Naval Staff. The enemy took full advantage of the discourage-
ment thus aroused, when these people despaired of attaining the
desired end ; his courage and resolution to hold out were strengthened
by it. It is a great pity that the calculations of the Naval Staff
were published throughout the country; they had assumed the
success of the U-boat campaign within a fixed period of time, and
were meant for a narrow circle only. Many who would have held
out but for this disappointment lost courage, realising that we had
no choice and must bear the privations until success, which could
not fail to come ultimately, was achieved. If the calculations of
the Naval Staff had fixed too early a date for the effects, and
it had taken a much longer time until England could not stand
any further destruction of her merchant ships, even then no other
choice would have been left us but to make use of these means.
The refusal of our peace proposal had so clearly demonstrated
the enemy's desire to destroy us that no one would have been
prepared, in view of the general situation at the end of the year 1916,
to accept a humiliating peace.

The strategic offensive passed definitely to the Navy on
February 1, 1917. U-boats and the Fleet supplemented one another
to form one weapon, which was to be used in an energetic attack
on England's might. Our Fleet became the hilt of the weapon
whose sharp blade was the U-boat. The Fleet thus commenced its
main activities during the war to maintain and defend the new form
of warfare against the English Fleet.

The English defence consisted in combating the U-boats in home

256

The U-boat Campaign

waters, and to this we could oppose nothing but the skill of the
U-boats in evading the enemy. This skill never failed to the very
end, although our losses grew heavy.

Our enemies had to go farther to defend themselves against
the danger, and had to try to crush it at its source. Only our Fleet
could make such efforts fruitless. It had to be in a constant state
of readiness to meet the English Fleet in battle ; there was no other
way. It expected this battle, and had to maintain its strength as
much as possible, so as to be fit to cope with the enemy. That is
why our Fleet might not weaken itself in view of this last demand
that would in all probability be made upon its strength. It found
plenty of continued and exacting occupation in combating the means
that England had devised to prevent the U-boats from getting out.

The conduct of the U-boat campaign was less a question of the
number of boats than one of their peculiar qualities — their invisibility
and their submersibility. The former enables them to attack un-
expectedly, the latter to escape the pursuit of the enemy. It goes
without saying that more can be achieved with ioo boats than with
20. But when the Naval Staff was considering the prospects
of a U-boat campaign the first question was to determine the
minimum number of boats that would suffice. Moreover, the U-boat
campaign's effect was not confined to that of actual sinkings; it
did much by disturbing and scaring away trade. Its results were
soon perceptible, as it became necessary to regulate traffic according
to the ports and districts threatened by U-boats for the time being.
Very considerable disturbances in supply and delivery must have
been caused, if it suddenly became necessary to alter all the arrange-
ments for traffic, e.g. if railway transport had to be shifted, when
ports on the south or west coast of England received no supplies from
abroad, because all the ships had to be taken to ports in the north
and east.

The number of boats we were able to use in the war against
commerce at the beginning of 1915 was about 24; for the first months
the new boats built just about covered the losses. It had also become
necessary to provide several boats for the U-boat school, so that
crews could be trained for the many new boats that were being built.
With these 24 boats it was only possible to occupy permanently
three or four stations on the main traffic route of English commerce.
The tonnage sunk during the whole year of 1915 equalled the
tonnage sunk in only six weeks when the unrestricted U-boat
campaign was opened. In view of the attitude of conciliation

* 257

Germany's High Sea Fleet

adopted towards the complaints of neutrals, it was premature to
begin the U-boat campaign in 1915. It would have been better
to wait until the larger number of boats, resulting from the intensive
building of 1915, guaranteed a favourable outcome — and then to
have persisted in the face of all objections. Had there been no
giving way in 191 5, the right moment to start the campaign —
the beginning of 191(3 — would not have been missed.

258

CHAPTER XIV

OUR U-BOATS AND THEIR METHOD OF WARFARE

IN the year 1916, up to the time of the Battle of the Skagerrak, the
following additions had been made to the U-boat fleet : 38 large
U-boats, 7 large submarine minelayers, 34 U-B-boats. Two large
submarine minelayers, 3 U-B-boats and 3 U-C-boats had still to
undergo steam trials; 53 large U-boats, 10 large submarine mine-
layers, 27 U-B-boats and 66 U-C-boats were under construction.
Since the outbreak of war we had lost 21 large U-boats, 1 large
submarine minelayer, 6 U-B-boats, 7 U-C-boats, and 2 U-B-boats
had been handed over to the Bulgarian Government. The dis-
tribution of all the U-boats was so arranged that half were under
the orders of the Admirals of the Fleet, and of the rest one half
were stationed in the Mediterranean, while the other half, the last
quarter, were assigned to the Naval Corps in Flanders. For the
sake of quick construction the new types of so-called "U-B "-boats
and "U-C "-boats had been introduced, in addition to the main
type of large U-boats similar to "U 19," the first one fitted with
Diesel engines.

The chief characteristics of the different types were as follows :
"U 19," surface displacement, 650 tons; highest speed on the
surface, 12 knots; under water, 9 knots; number of torpedoes, 9, of
50 cm. calibre. Improvements were made in the type. From "U40 "
onwards the displacement was raised first to 700 tons, and from
"U 80" onwards to 800 tons, the speed was raised to 17 knots on
the surface, the number of torpedoes increased to 12, and from
"U90" onwards to 16. The torpedo of 50 cm. calibre had an
explosive charge of 200 kilos. The first large submarine minelayers
were not armed with torpedoes. They had a displacement of 760
tons, a surface speed of 9.5 knots, and under water 7.5 knots; they
carried 34 to 36 mines.

Of the U-B-boats, at first a small number with a displacement
of 125 tons was built for use in Flanders, with four torpedoes, speed
of 8.5 knots on the surface and 5.5 knots under water. The U-B-boat
was then enlarged to 500 tons, with a speed on the surface of 12.5
knots and of 7 under water.

259

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The U-C-boats were of a type designed both for minelaying
and firing torpedoes. At first only a small number of these was
built, with a displacement of 150 tons; ultimately the boats had a
displacement of 400 tons, speed of n knots on the surface and 6.5
under water. They carried 18 mines and could take four torpedoes.

At the beginning the U-boats were armed with one 5 cm.
gun as a defence against enemy submarines. But as their use was
developed in the war, such various demands were made upon them
that their armament had to be increased. One or two guns of
8.8 cm. were placed on the U-boats, U-B-boats, and the U-C-boats;
the submarine cruisers were in part armed with a gun of 15 cm.
calibre.

The majority of the large U-boats was assigned to the Fleet
for use in the blockaded area west of England. The length of their
trips was 21 to 28 days, but this was also dependent on the amount
of ammunition used when the boats had found a favourable oppor-
tunity to fire their torpedoes soon after leaving port. The big
minelayers were also under the command of the Fleet, and could
be sent on distant expeditions — to the White Sea or to the
Mediterranean.

The U-B-boats, being rather smaller, had proved to be very
handy and quickly submersible, although they could not remain so
long at sea. They were, therefore, mainly assigned to the base in
Flanders, as were the U-C-boats, of which a small number, how-
ever, was at the disposal of the Fleet and used for laying mines on
the east coast of England. The distribution of the boats among the
various bases was carried out according to the facilities the latter
had for repairing the boats on their return from expeditions. The
large amount of technical apparatus in a U-boat required very care-
ful overhauling and repair on her return from an expedition ; also
the damage due to the voyage or to enemy attacks had to be repaired.
Generally speaking, after four weeks at sea a boat would need to lie
in the dockyard for the same length of time for repairs. The
Imperial dockyard at Wilhelmshaven had been enlarged and was the
chief place to which the U-boats of the Fleet were sent for repair.
The docks at Kiel and Danzig were needed for other purposes;
the bases at Zeebrugge and Pola were used at first mainly for over-
hauling the boats. Until these dockyards had been altered so as to
be able to undertake more extensive work the boats which belonged
there had to return home for important repairs.

When the U-boat campaign was opened on February 1, 1917,

260

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

there were 57 boats already in the North Sea. The officer command-
ing the Baltic district had eight assigned to him, the Naval Corps
in Flanders had at its disposal 38, and the stations in the Mediter-
ranean 31 U-boats of different types. The favourable experiences
of the commercial U-boat U-Deutschland had led to the construction
of U-cruisers, of which the first series had a displacement of 1,200
tons, which was later on raised to 2,000 and more. When they could
no longer be used for trade purposes the commercial U-boats were
taken over by the Navy and altered for use as warships. They were
fitted with two guns of 15 cm. calibre and two torpedo tubes, and
could carry about 30 torpedoes in accordance with the extended
period during which they could be used on cruises, cruises which
reached as far as the Azores and lasted up to three months. With
this fleet of U-boats the Navy was well equipped to do justice to the
task assigned to it, although England had used the whole of 1916 to
develop her defence. The sinkings of the year 191 7 prove this.
They were :

781,500 tons

885,000 ,,

1,091,000 ,,

869,000 ,,

1,016,000 ,,

811,000 ,,

808,000 ,,

672,000 ,,

674,000 ,,

607,000 ,,

702,000 ,,

632,000 ,,

680,000 ,,

689,000 ,,

652,000 ,,

614,000 ,,

521,000 ,,

550,ooo ,,

420,000 ,,

... 440,000 ,,

The enemy's defence consisted, firstly, in directly combating the
U-boats, and, secondly, in special measures which England adopted

261

February,
March,

19

J:

April,
May,

1:

June,

j)

July,

August,

September,

October,

n

November,

ji

December,

>)

January,

February,

March,

191

April,
May,

June

July,

August,

September

Germany's High Sea Fleet

to counterbalance the loss of tonnage. The first impediment our
U-boats had to overcome — I am speaking of the activities of the
U-boats assigned to the Fleet (the same applies to the Flanders
boats), whereas those in the Mediterranean mostly worked under
less difficult conditions — lay in the minefields blocking the North
Sea. To deal successfully with these the Fleet had had to create a
special organisation. In addition to the actual mine-sweepers, whose
work it was to keep certain paths through the belt of mines clear,
special convoying flotillas had been formed, fitted with mine-
sweeping apparatus, which accompanied the U-boats along the routes
that had been cleared, till they reached the open sea, and met them
at the same spot on their return from their fields of operation to
take them safely home again. When attacking steamers the boats
had to reckon with their armament, for in spite of the large number
of guns required and the crews to man them, nearly the whole
of the English Merchant Fleet — at any rate all the more valuable
steamers — was armed.

As a further defence, besides the destroyers which were excellently
suited to this purpose and were armed with depth charges, a large
number of new kinds of boats with shallow draft had been built
especially to combat the U-boats. Nets and all sorts of wire entangle-
ments hindered the U-boats in their work near the English coast.
The so-called "Q "-boats, intended to serve as traps for submarines,
were specially fitted out; they presented the appearance of neutral
ships, and on the approach of the U-boat let fall their disguise and
attempted to destroy it with guns and explosives. The practice of
gathering considerable numbers of British merchantmen together
and convoying them added greatly to the difficulties the U-boat
encountered in achieving success; these ships were protected
according to their size and value either by light craft or by bigger
warships.

During the first months of the U-boat campaign I never missed
an opportunity of hearing the story of his experiences and adventures
direct from the lips of the commander of a returning U-boat; and
thus I had opportunity to form an idea of the perseverance, courage
and resolution of these young officers who won my highest
admiration for the seamanship and the calm intrepidity, which they
succeeded in communicating to the crew as well. It is a splendid
testimonial to the spirit of the Navy that all who could possibly be
considered suitable for the U-boat Service, both officers and men,
rushed to offer themselves. Even older Staff officers, in spite of

262

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

their many years of service, begged to be taken as commanders of
U-boats, even if they had to serve under a flotilla commander
younger than themselves.

The three half-flotillas into which the U-boats of the Fleet had
been formed at the beginning of the war developed in time into
four flotillas. Their commanders were : First U-Flotilla, Com-
mander Pasgnay; Second U-Flotilla, Commander von Rosenberg;
Third U-Flotilla, Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann (Walter);
Fourth U-Flotilla, Commander Pranse. I should like to mention
in connection with these Lieutenant-Commander Bartenbach, who
was at the head of the U-flotilla in Flanders, who so often supported
the enterprises of the Fleet with his boats. In an exemplary manner,
despite all obstacles, he directed the difficult operations of the Flan-
ders boats, against which the British defence was particularly
heavy. All who served with him were animated by a spirit of
comradeship and readiness for action, which had the most refresh-
ing and grateful effect upon anyone who spent any time with them.
The Chief Director of the U-boats under the command of the
Fleet was Captain Bauer; he himself took part in the fighting ex-
peditions of the U-boats in the blockaded- area round England, in
order to be able to form his own opinion of the circumstances in
which the boats under his command had to operate. It is his great
merit that he recognised the capacity of the U-boat and brought it
to that degree of efficiency to which its later successes are due.
.When, later on, owing to the increasing activity in construction,
the number of U-boats grew to such an extent that their organisation
far surpassed that required for a squadron and demanded a corre-
sponding increase in authority, Commodore Michelsen, who had
hitherto commanded the torpedo-boats, was placed at the head.
His great knowledge and experience of the department of torpedoes
designated him as particularly suitable for this post, and he com-
pletely fulfilled all expectations in this respect.

The U-boat service was the one which suffered the heaviest
losses of the Navy ; the number of boats lost on fighting expeditions
amounted to 50 per cent. Altogether 360 U-boats and U-boat
cruisers were employed in the U-boat campaign, of which 184 were
lost in the course of their enterprises. This high percentage of losses
was for the most part due to the defence of the enemy, which grew
more and more vigorous, as he tried to get the better of the U-boat
danger by the use of all sorts of dodges and methods; yet a large
proportion is ascribable to the fact that our U-boat commanders

263

Germany's High Sea Fleet

could not resist the temptation, when sinking a steamer, to save
the lives of those on board as far as possible, even though they so
often met with disappointment.

I should like to illustrate the difficulties encountered by our
U-boats by a few instances, quoting the official reports concerning
them. But it would be impossible to do all the commanders equal
justice, for they vied with each other in meeting the dangers which
their difficult business involved, and with which the public are
already familiar through various popular writings.

The journey to America of the "U 53 " is a splendid testimonial
to the perseverance of the crew and the high quality of the material.
On September 1 1 this U-boat received orders to lie off the American
coast about the time when the U-merchant boat Bremen was ex-
pected to arrive at New London (North America), in order to search
for and attack enemy ships which, in all probability, would be wait-
ing there for the submarine merchantman. After completing this
task, the boat was to call at Newport, Rhode Island, but was to
leave again after a few hours at most, so as to give the American
authorities no excuse or occasion to detain her. There was to be no
replenishment of supplies, with the possible exception of fresh
victuals. If no enemy warships were met with, she was to carry
on commercial war according to Prize Law off the American
coast.

On September 17 the boat started on her outward voyage from
Heligoland. In the North Sea she had very heavy weather. There
was a S.S.W. gale and such high seas that the men on watch on the
conning tower of the boat were up to their necks in water all the
time.

The supplies of the boat had had to be increased so as to make
the voyage possible. Four ballast tanks were altered for use as fuel
tanks, so that the oil supply was increased from 90 cb. m. to 150
cb. m.; the supply of lubricating oil of 14^ cb. m. was considered
sufficient for the voyage. Added to this, there was the increase in
fresh water and food supplies, so that the boat's draught was increased
by 40 cm. So far as her sea-going qualities were concerned, her
commander reported that the boat rode very steadily on the whole,
but that every sea went over her upper deck, even when the force of
the wind was only 4; from almost every direction spray flew over
the bridge. Consequently for those on duty on the bridge, the
voyage, especially at first, was a tremendous strain. The commander
did not think that the officers and petty officers would be able to stand

264

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

it (the rubber suits that had to be worn almost daily for the first
fortnight were not watertight), and he would have turned back if
the weather had not improved soon after September 24.

The route for the voyage out had been chosen to run from the
most northerly point of the Shetland Islands, which they passed
on September 20, straight to the Newfoundland Bank, so as to
remain on the northern side of the usual belt of low barometric
pressure. Weather conditions were uncertain and changeable. There
was often a very high and very steep swell, in which the boat
pitched heavily. They, however, experienced following winds nearly
all the time, which were favourable for the journey. After reaching
the Newfoundland Bank, the boat was carried vigorously to the
west by the Labrador current. On the whole the health of the crew
was good, until they were nearing the Newfoundland Bank. Then
a number were attacked with headache and sickness, which is said
to be a common occurrence in these parts.

On October 7 the boat lay before Long Island Sound. No war-
ships were encountered. At 3 p.m. the commander entered the
harbour of Newport, Rhode Island, accompanied by an American
submarine, which had joined him on the way, and there he paid
official visits to Admiral Knight and the commander of torpedo-
boats, Admiral Gleaves. He wrote in his diary :

"The former received me very coolly, and said that the Bremen,
as far as he knew, had been sighted about 10 days before between
Newfoundland and New York. [That was not correct, as the Bremen
never reached America.] Admiral Knight obviously thought it most
desirable that the ' U 53 ' should leave again the same evening. If
I had not announced that such was my intention, I think I should
have been given a pretty broad hint on the subject.

"Admiral Gleaves was very friendly and much interested; he
inquired about all particulars of the voyage. The adjutants of both
admirals returned my visit. At 4.30 P.M. Admiral Gleaves himself
came to inspect the boat. I took him over her, as, earlier in the day,
I had done several young officers. More than anything else the
Diesel engines roused envious admiration. Many officers came on
board with their ladies, as did civilians, reporters, and one photo-
grapher. The crew received all sorts of little presents. At 5.30 p.m.
we weighed anchor. Proceeded to sea at 6.30 p.m. Trial dive.
Course, Nantucket Lightship; 270 revolutions — equivalent to 9
knots."

265

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Nantucket Lightship was reached on October 8 at 5.30 A.M. Very
clear, calm weather prevailed. The commander decided to examine
the merchant traffic outside territorial waters and to wage cruiser
warfare.

At this meeting-point of so many trade routes, the boat was able
to stop seven steamers in the course of the day, and after the crews
had in every case left the ship, she sank the British steamer Strath-
dene from Glasgow (4,321 tons), the Norwegian steamer Chr.
Knutsen (3,378 tons) with gasolene destined for London, the British
steamer Westyoint (3,847 tons), the Dutch steamer Blommersdyk
(4,850 tons), whose whole cargo consisted of absolute and conditional
contraband. According to an American certificate, the Blommersdyk,
before reaching her destination, was to call at Kirkwall (in the
Orkney Islands, a British examining station for merchant steamer
traffic). In his log the commander reports as follows :

"Meanwhile, in this narrow space besides the two steamers —
there was an English passenger boat as well, the Stefano, from
Liverpool, 3,449 tons, which had already been stopped and was dis-
embarking her crew — and the ' U 53 ' sixteen American destroyers
had assembled^ so that we had to manoeuvre with the greatest care.
While I was towing, back the boat of the Blommersdyk, which had
brought the officer with her papers, ' U 53 ' got so near an American
destroyer that we had to reverse with both engines to avoid a collision.
We cleared one another by about 50 m. When reversing, I cast my
tow loose, and her crew did not return to the Blommersdyk at all,
but went straight on board a destroyer. I had told the officer that
the crew would be given twenty-five minutes in which to disembark
— till 6.30 p.m. To make sure that no one should be hurt, he was
to haul down, his flag to show that no one was left on board. Then
I approached the passenger steamer to examine her papers, or, in
case she had not yet lowered a boat, to dismiss her forthwith out of
consideration for the passengers. I had already given orders for
the signal, ' You can proceed,' when I realised that the steamer had
been abandoned and all on board accommodated on an American
destroyer. I then returned to the Blommersdyk. By means of a
siren and calling through a megaphone I made sure that no one was
left on board. A destroyer which lay very near the steamer was
asked by Morse signal to move away a little, so that the ship might
be sunk. This the destroyer did at once. Hit with torpedo, a depth
of 4 m. in hold 4. The steamer was then sunk by a second torpedo."

266

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

The passenger steamer Stefano was then also sunk. At 10.30
p.m. the boat began her return voyage. Though it would have
been very desirable to extend our activities off the American coast
as long as possible, yet any further delay would have endangered the
whole enterprise because of the fuel supply ; for during the short
stay at Newport, the boat, in accordance with the general instructions
issued to her, had taken in no supplies of any kind. For the return
voyage we counted on a consumption of fuel of 60 cb. m., and a
certain reserve was allowed in the event of head winds and storms.
That this precaution was necessary is proved by the fact that although
the weather as far as the Shetlands was very favourable, the boat
arrived at Heligoland with only 14.5 cb.m. of fuel. For the return
voyage the longer route via Fastnet Rock was chosen. In so doing,
the unsettled weather conditions that had been encountered in the
higher latitudes on the voyage out were avoided; also on this
southern side of the belt of low barometric pressure there was less
fear of head winds than in the north. After waiting twenty hours at
the S.E. corner of the Newfoundland Bank to weather a storm, the
boat proceeded with little delay as far as the Hebrides, passing
through an area of high pressure (770 mm.) accompanied by a steady
west wind. The route then followed was round the Shetland Islands.
On October 28, at 3 p.m., the boat entered the harbour at Heligoland.
It had covered a distance of 7,550 sea miles and had only stopped
once for two and a half hours in Newport. When the boat arrived
at Wilhelmshaven next day, I was able to assure myself by personal
observation that all her crew were in excellent condition. They
might well be proud of their eminent, seaman-like, and technical
achievement.

Let us follow this same Lieut.-Commander Rose on his "U 53 "
on a cruise, during which he waged war according to Prize Law,
as still had to be done in January, in pursuance of the instructions
issued, before the introduction of the unrestricted U-boat campaign.
I will quote his log, omitting what is not of general interest : —

"January 20th, 1917. — Left Heligoland. Wind east, force 8,
cloudless, clear. Route via Terschelling Lightship to Nordhinder
Lightship.

"January 21st. — Sank to the bottom, 38 m. Conversation (by
submarine telephone) with 'U55.' 6.30 P.M., dark, starless night,
wind east, 3-4. Started on normal course.

"January 22nd. — 11 A.M. Sank French sailing ship Anna (150

267

Germany's High Sea Fleet

gr.t.) by thirteen rounds of gun-fife; cargo, road-metalling. 9 P.M.,
South of Lizard Head. ' U 55 ' reports station. As the presence
of U-boats in the Channel is thereby betrayed, tried to report on
own station and intentions (valuable for ' U 55 '). Immediately
after heard very loud British convoy signals and then the warning,
' German submarine 37 miles south of Lizard.' That could only
apply to ' U 53.' 11.40 p.m., south of the Wolf Rock, two ships with
many lights, little way, and changing courses at a distance of about 6
sea miles from one another. Apparently guiding ships to show
entrance to Channel. After prolonged observation, steered west
between the two.

"January 23, 12.5 a.m. — A big cargo steamer approaching with
a course of 90 degrees. At some distance behind several lights;
probably one of the expected convoys. Two officers of mercantile
marine who are on board think the ship to be British of about
4,500 gr.t. She is fully laden. Started attack on surface. At first
attempt a miss, at second a hit, port amidships. The steamer stops,
sinks lower, gets a list, keeps on burning blue lights, then lowers
boats. Left soon as further action impossible. Did not observe the
sinking of the badly damaged ship. Passed several guardships with
different lights. One of them on a course towards the scene of
disaster. Let her searchlight play there for a short time. The
guiding ships have gone on or put out their lights.

"6.40 a.m. — A steamer with bright lights and funnels lit up steers
a zigzag course. She seems to be waiting. Sent Morse message to
steamer in English. She is Dutch, with oilcake for Rotterdam.
Dismissed steamer before dawn.

"2 p.m. — Avoided a ' Foxglove ' (new type of British U-boat
chaser) and the steamer accompanying it.

"11 p.m. — Avoided a guardship. She carried steamer lights on
forestay to appear bigger.

"January 24. — 12 midnight. A smaller steamer, arranged for
carrying passengers, steers 200 degrees. Flag illuminated, but not
recognisable. Obviously a neutral. Sheered off.

"7 a.m. — A steamer, course 250 degrees, approached, pretend-
ing to be a French outpost ship. She is a neutral tank steamer.
Sheered off.

"8.30 a.m. — Wind east, but swell; cloudy in parts, visibility good.
Dived on account of an airship approaching from the east; it may
be a captive balloon broken loose. Voyage under water to the neigh-
bourhood of Ushant (French island at the western end of the Channel).

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Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

"2 p.m. — Wind east, force 7-8. Rose to surface.

"3.15 p.m. — Small sailing ship in sight in southerly direction.
Owing to high seas, no opportunity to attack.

"10 p.m. — Wind east, 6-7, swell. Absolutely impossible to fire
at night. A lot of water comes over. Dived. Voyage to
presumptive meeting, place near Ushant.

"January 25, 6.30 a.m. — Wind south-east, force 7-8, posi-
tion Ushant, 50 sea miles to east. Hove to. Waiting off Ushant.
A small sailing ship about 30 sea miles west of Ushant. Left her
unmolested because of heavy sea. Not possible to fire at night
because of high seas. Visibility bad, therefore dived for night
journey.

" January 26. — Weather unchanged. Dived for night journey.

"January 27, 3 a.m.— Wind east, force 8. Visibility bad. Snow
from 11 a.m. Boat rolls more and more. Depth 34 m. Position not
fixed. Stood out to sea at low speed.

"5 p.m. — North of Ushant. Wind, force 10,* swell. Sighted
large steamer of about 200 tons, so far as can be seen, armed fore
and aft. Gave way, as impossible to fire at the time and no improve-
ment in weather to be expected for next few hours. Steamer going
slow; was painted grey. Apparently one of bigger guardships.
Dived for night journey.

"January 28, 8 a.m. — Came to surface, north of Ushant. Wind
E.S.E., force 6.

"6.30 p.m. — Inspected Spanish steamer Nueva Montana, of San-
tander, 2,000 gr.t., from under water, then stopped her with shot.
Cargo, iron ore to Newcastle. Crew on board took boats in tow.
Set fire to three explosive bombs in engine-room. Steamer sinks
slowly, deeper and deeper. As all buoyancy chamEers are con-
nected, her sinking only a matter of time. When last seen, the swell
was pouring over the after part of the ship. Took crew as far as
12 sea miles west of Ushant; left boats there.

"January 29, 7 a.m. — Danish steamer Copenhagen; cargo, coal
from Newcastle to Huelva. Examined and dismissed.

"6 p.m. — Steamer Algorta, 2,100 gr.t., from Segund with iron
ore for Stockton. Inspected from under water, then stopped by shot.
Took crew in tow. Sank steamer with four explosive bombs.

"10.15 P - M - — Cast off boats in neighbourhood of medium-sized
steamer steering about 240 degrees. Called up steamer by star shell.

Force 10 is a heavy gale. Force of wind indicated according to Beaufort's
scale, from o = calm to 12 = hurricane.

2fig

Germany's High Sea Fleet

" January 30. — Course, 340 degrees. Intend activity for next two
days in neighbourhood of Stilly Isles. Nothing in sight. At dusk,
south of Stilly Isles, steamed on towards Lizard, distance 8 sea
miles. Encountered no commercial traffic, only guardships south-
west and west of the Scillys.

"January 31, 9 a.m. — Stopped Dutch steamer Boomberg, about
1,600 gr.t. Coal from Cardiff for Las Palmas; dismissed her.

"10 a.m. — Stopped Spanish steamer Lorida, about 1,600 gr.t
Cargo, coal from Cardiff to Cadiz. Dismissed her.

"2.30 p.m. — Stopped Norwegian steamer Hickla, 524 gr.t. Cargo,
pit props for Cardiff. Set steamer on fire. Crew sails for Stilly
Islands.

"5.30 p.m. — Stopped a smallish steamer, steering 175 degrees,
coming from astern. Steamer returns fire at 80 hectometres from gun
of at least 8 cm. calibre. Her shots fall short, but are well' aimed.

"6 p.m. — Ceased gunfire after about forty rounds. Distance in-
creased to bounds of visibility, then tried to keep touch at full speed.
In dusk steamer gets out of sight and cannot be found again.

"11.50 p.m. — Weather calmer, bright moon. Clear. Stopped
Danish motor-boat Falstria, about 4,000 gr.t., from Far East -via
Dartmouth. Ship in order; ship dismissed.

"February 1. — West of Ushant. Steamed all day over field of
search ; nothing in sight.

"February 2, 5 a.m. — Attacked with bronze torpedo a large fully-
laden steamer, about 2,000 t., steering 170 degrees. No marks of
neutrality. Hit amidships. Steamer stops; lights go out. No
movement or work discernible on deck. After half an hour steamer
still afloat. Will probably sink, as she is badly damaged.

"4 p.m. — Near Bishop Rock stopped a French old square-rigged
schooner, Anna Maria, from St. Malo, about 150 gr.t., by using
signal ' Abandon ship.' After a time the mate came on board
in a little rowing boat without a keel. The crew try with boots
and cups to keep the boat more or less dry. In consideration of
the impossibility of rescuing the crew in this boat, the ship was
allowed to continue her journey. The mate gave a written promise
in the name of the crew not to go to sea any more during this war.
The cargo of the ship consisted of salt and wine.

"February 3. — West of the Scillys. Wind east, force 2. 8 a.m.,
stopped Norwegian steamer Rio de Janeiro, 2,800 gr.t. Wheat,
linseed, oil cakes, tan for Copenhagen and Christiana. Steamer
dismissed.

2JTO

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

"n a.m. — Submarine attack on American steamer Housatonic,
2,443 t. Then rose to surface and stopped steamer. Cargo 3,862
tons of wheat from New York for London. Fired bronze torpedo
from first tube to sink steamer. The torpedo slips half out of the
tube without leaving it. It starts to go, and we can hear the
engine running slowly. The boat is stopped. Watertight doors
closed. After some time detonation under the boat, without any
turmoil of water or column of smoke. The torpedo has left the
tube and obviously sunk and exploded at the bottom, at a depth
of no m. A few rising air bubbles indicate that the airchamber
must have separated 1 owing to pressure as the depth of water in-
creased. Steamer sunk by bronze torpedo from 4th tube. Took
boats in tow and handed them over to a guardship which was called
up by two shots. When retreating from the guardship, which
came up at once, we met ' U 60. ' ' U 60 ' dives. I intend to draw
the guardship past ' U 60.' Guardship sheers off, rescues crew of
American boats which ' U 53 ' asked her by wireless to do. ' U 60 '
dives. Exchange of reports with ' U 60. '

"February 4, 12.5 a.m. — With gunfire and explosive bombs
sank French barque AimSe Marie, from St. Servant, 327 gr.t. ;
cargo, salt and wine for home port. Crew rows to Scilly Isles.
Owing to the extraordinary lightness of the night, avoided darkened
guardships. Meeting and exchange of reports with ' U 83.'

10 a.m. — Sank with two explosive bombs schooner Bangpuhtis,
from Windau, 259 gr. t., and ballast from St. Nazaire for Cardiff.
Crew sails for Scilly Islands.

"4 p.m. — Examined Norwegian three-master Manicia, 1,800 gr.t.,
from Rosano with linseed for Rotterdam, and dismissed her. Ship
at sea since December 1.

"February 5, 12.30 a.m. — Wind east, estimated force, 5-6.
Surface attack on steamer on which all except navigating lights
are out, no lights as distinguishing marks, estimated at 3,000 gr.t.
Armament cannot be discerned. On attacking became convinced
that size of steamer has been over-estimated. When sheering off
recognise Swedish distinguishing marks. Stop steamer by white
star-shell and Morse lamp signals. Steamer answers no signal
and makes no other sign. After a time steams at full speed out
to sea. Stopped anew by two shots. She does not answer Morse
signals. Circled round steamer till dawn. By daylight found she
was steamer Bravalla, 1,519 gr.t. By flag-signals she announced
her port of destination as Liverpool, cargo, nuts. If sunk at that

271

Germany's High Sea Fleet

spot crew would have been lost. Impossible to tow boats owing
to high seas. Therefore gave steamer signal ' Follow.' Further
signals giving exact instructions as to behaviour when ship was
to be sunk later on, were cut off because as soon as she understood
the first words ' I am going to sink you,' she hauled down the
answering signal and took no further notice. On the way I had to
force the steamer to obedience again, as she tried to sheer off. The
sea gradually decreases. Shelter owing to neighbourhood of land
perceptible. A guardship is sighted. Signal to Bravalla, ' Abandon
ship.' She does nothing. Not till four minutes later, when the
gun is trained on her, does she hoist the answering signal. A
shot before her bows, then one in her forecastle. Steamer lowers
boats. Ceased fire. When the boats had hove to, opened fire
again. Difficult to aim owing to rolling of boat and target. There
is a very heavy hail squall. Steamer hit several times, but does
not sink. Although no one is left on board the engines keep going
with fewer revolutions. Guardship approaches to a distance of about
40 hectometres, opens fire : dived. Sank steamer by a torpedo,
guardship meanwhile rescued Swedish crew."

And so on. These extracts should suffice to show under what
difficulties the boats worked so long as they had to consider the
neutrality of steamers, and it also shows how many opportunities for
sinking ships in the blockaded areas were lost.

To illustrate other kinds of U-boat activities in the restricted
U-boat campaign, we will quote from other logs. The first extract
is from the log of a U-C-boat that had orders to lay mines along
the east coast of England.

"December 13, 1916— Various vessels to be seen ahead, among
them one lying with lights out, which I took to be a destroyer.
Dived to avoid danger. Broke through guard-line under water.

"9.25 a.m. — Rose to surface. Continued journey on surface.
Sighted several steamers which, coming from the south, seemed
to be making for the same point as I. It gradually grew very
misty, which made it impossible to fix position. Presumed we were
near land, as the sea grew calm, the water was dirty yellow in
colour, and there was a strong smell of coal dust. After diving
quickly several times to avoid steamers, continued under water
270 degrees (course west).

"1 p.m. — Sighted strong surf on starboard bow. A wall was

272

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

dimly visible above, and over that a big factory, with several
chimneys. At the same time the boat touched the bottom at 10 m.
Reversed course, and 1 as I was quite uncertain of ship's position,
resolved to rise to surface to get my bearings above water. Hardly
opened hatch of conning tower when I see about 600 m. to port
at 2.14 p.m. a large destroyer with three funnels and two masts,
passing at about 20 knots on a course N.N.W. She seemed to have
appeared quite suddenly out of the mist and not to have seen me
yet. Dived to 16 m.

"2.20 p.m. — As many steamers were in sight and visibility still
bad, gave up intention of finding ship's position. Lay at the
bottom, 23 m. water. Boat lay very unsteady; repeatedly heard
the noise of screws above me.

"5 p.m. — Dusk. Northerly swell. Rose to 10 m. As it was
getting dark and no ships were to be seen, rose to surface to
re-charge and pump in air; stood out to sea a bit.

"5.42 p.m. — Several steamers coming from direction of land
towards me. Dived.

"6 P.M. — Very dark night. Rose to surface as darkness had
fallen completely. The steamers were coming from west by south.
So I concluded that the entrance to the harbour must be in the
direction from which they came. The course led towards a darkened
light, which now and then sent a ray up vertically. On approaching
I see the end of the breakwater. The pilot thought he could
recognise this as the entrance to the Tyne. As the night was
very dark I decided to go close up to the breakwater. First I made
for the northern breakwater; just before reaching it I turned to star-
board so as to get a bit farther north. In so doing the boat ran
aground north of the northern breakwater. Both engines reversed
full steam. Boat slipped off.

"6.42 p.m. — Turned hard-a-starboard to 160. Close to the end
of the northern breakwater the first mine dropped. Then turned
slowly to starboard so as to get as near as possible to the southern
breakwater. When this was in sight at a distance of about
80 — 100 m., turned sharply, let the last mine fall and stood out to
open sea, go degrees (course east)."

How much more difficult it was for our U-boats to attack when
the steamers travelled in convoys, appears from the following extract
from the log of "U 82," commanded by Lieutenant-Commander
Hans Adam :

"September 19, 1917, 3.19 p.m. — I shot past the bows of this
s 273

Germany's High Sea Fleet

steamer towards steamers 4 and 5. Steamer 4 I hit. Steamer 2 had
hoisted a red flag, which was probably to announce the presence of
the boat ; for several torpedo-boats make for the steamer. As there
was no chance of firing from the only remaining usable tube (stern
tube) I dived. The destroyers dropped about 10 depth charges;
one burst pretty near the stern. The attack was rendered very
difficult by the bad weather, swell, seaway 5 and rain squalls. The
success of the attack was due to the excellent steering under water.
Made off noiselessly to S.E. under water.

"4.45 p.m. — Rose to surface. I try to come up with the convoy
again, as it is still to be seen. But a destroyer forces me under
water again.

"6.37 p.m. — Rose to surface. Two destroyers prevent me from
steaming up. Owing to heavy seas from S.E. it is impossible to
proceed south so as to get ahead of them. Moreover, sea and
swell make it impossible to fire a torpedo. Therefore gave up
pursuit."

On July 19 and 20, 1918, two of our U-boats encountered a new
and valuable steamer, the Justitia, of 32,120 tons, which was very
strongly protected on account of its value, and which would
accordingly be very difficult to sink. The account of the attacks of
the two boats, "U-B64" and "U54," is given below. "U-B64"
met the steamer on July 19 and damaged her severely, while "U 54 "
encountered her the next day when she was being towed into port
and finished her off.

As the steamer Justitia, being new, was not on the register on
board the U-boat, and the number of such large steamers is small,
they thought she was the German steamer Vaterland which the
Americans had rechristened Leviathan.

"July 19, 1918. 3.50 p.m. — Two destroyers in sight, course 320
degrees (N.W.). Behind the destroyers a convoy. Boat situated
straight before them. Attack prepared for double shot at steamer
(3 funnels, 2 masts) situated in the middle of the convoy, which
numbers about 12 steamers. Protection by destroyers and submarine
chasers in large numbers. Convoy zig-zags. Shortly before the
shot the steamer turns towards the boat, therefore only stem shot
possible. Distance 350 m.; hit behind the bridge port side.

"4.33 p.m. — British steamer Justitia, 32,120 tons in ballast.
Dived. There follow 35 depth charges, that are well placed.

"5.20 p.m. — Depth 11 m. Steamer has stopped, blows off a lot
of steam; apparently hit in boiler or engine. Many destroyers to

274

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

protect her. Counter course for attack. Destroyers pass over the
boat several times.

"6.15 p.m. — Double shot from tubes 1 and 2; distance a, 000 m.
Hit midships and astern, port side of steamer, which has stopped.
Dived. 23 depth charges which follow immediately on shot.

"7.3 p.m. — Rose to 11 metres depth so as to be able to look
through periscope. Steamer has a list to por-t and is much down by
the stern. Started new attack. As destroyers about all the time,
cannot show periscope often. In the meantime, the steamer has been
towed on a southerly course by large tugs. Steamer towed about
3 — 4 knots. With course 180 degrees (south) went ahead under water.
"9.48 p.m. — Fired from tube at distance 900 m. Hit on port side.
Dived. On a course o degrees (north). 11 depth charges. Made
off, as battery exhausted.

"10.33 p.m. — Depth 11 m. Steamer being towed. List has in-
creased, also lies lower in the water.

"11.23 P - M - — -Came to surface. Charged batteries. Reloaded
bow tubes with two torpedoes.

"11.50 p.m. — After the four hits, the steamer must undoubtedly
go down. It is only a matter of time until the last watertight doors
give way. Towing against the sea must make her engine break
away soon.

"July 20, 1918. — Before the North Channel (Irish Sea). Kept
touch during the night, so as to be sure of observing sinking. As
the condition of the steamer grew steadily worse, the course of the
tow was altered towards morning to the south for Lough Swilly.
Surface attack by night impossible because it was too light.

"4 a.m. — As it was pretty dark and there was a jumble of ships,
it was particularly difficult to get in right position for attack. Before
'U-B64" was ready to attack, steamer was towed along again.
Position very far aft. Steamer lay considerably lower. Batteries
not in a condition for me to follow under water.

"5.37 a.m. — Depth of 11 m. Steamer lies athwart with consider-
ably greater list.

"8.40 A.M. — Rose to surface. It could now be ascertained that
the depth charges had badly damaged oil bunkers, so that the boat
left a broad track of oil. Steamer at the moment out of sight. Wire-
less messages to boats in the neighbourhood.

"n a.m. — Steamer sighted to port on course 180 degrees. Hardly
possible for her to reach the coast. Steamer with heavy list can
barely be moved.

'75

Germany's High Sea Fleet

"11.30 a.m. — Observed two high, clear columns of water, closely
following one another, behind steamer; must come from two tor-
pedoes. In boat detonation of 35 depth charges was heard.

"2.15 p.m. — Steamer sunk. On looking round ascertain that many
protecting vessels, with steamer's lifeboats in tow, are making for
land. Other craft have rushed to the floating debris; Made off.
Many destroyers in pursuit of me."

" U 54," which fired two torpedoes at the Justitia on July 20 at
1 1 .20, reports further :

"11.32 a.m. — In the hail of depth charges that became more in-
tense after the detonation of the first torpedo, of course no further
detonation could be heard in the boat. After 122 seconds, the petty
officer telegraphist noted the second hit through the submarine
receiver. As I had only 2,200 amperes in the battery, I could not
possibly make a further attack. I went down for half an hour and
found bottom at 59 m. 20 minutes after the shot the British depth
charges ceased to explode.

"12.30 p.m. — Rose from bottom till I could use periscope on
northerly course. Round about me, near by, many guardships.
I immediately dived again. As I assumed they were following me
with submarine sound receivers, I remained under water; continued
till the large ship was safe. I proceeded north, then altered course
to N.W. and then to west.

"3.51 p.m. — Rose to surface. The boat had 50 mm. pressure.
As letting off air took too long, I ordered the helmsman to open the
conning-tower hatch. The helmsman was blown out, and the central
conductor which has a sail attached below, was blown against my
arm and crushed it against the top of the conning-tower. The pain
was so great that I fainted for a moment. When I heard that the
helmsman saw a number of ships, I crept on to the conning-tower
and saw that south and astern was full of vessels. I attributed this
activity to myself and dived away again, as I could no longer risk
being seen.

"6 p.m. — Rose to surface. Far in the south a smoke cloud. I ran
farther west, and as soon as my batteries were pretty well charged
I sent wireles messages to all U-boats giving course and possibilities
of attack on Vaterland. There was no object in my following any
longer, as I could not have caught her up before the North Channel.

"July 21. 10.45 A.M. — U-boat in sight; ascertained to be

276

Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

'U-B64.' Approached within hailing distance. From exchange of
experiences I learnt that the day before, at 2 hr. 30 mins. 4^ sec,
' U-B 64 ' saw the Vaterland sunk by my shot, capsising on port
side."

In conclusion, here is the description of a fight which "U84,"
commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Rohr, had with a steamer
which kept her guns hidden and hoped by deceiving the U-boat
to be able to surprise and sink her :

"February 22, 1917. 1.50. — Tank steamer, about 3,000 tons,
with course 250 degrees, in sight. Dived. Torpedo fired from
second tube; missed by 700 m. ; had underestimated way. Steamer
turns upon counter course. Went down. Rose to surface. Stopped
her with gunfire. Steamer stops, blows off steam, crew leave the
ship in two boats.

"2.30 p.m. — Approached under water. No armament. Boats,
about 8 — 10, are away from steamer.

"2.49 p.m. — Rose to surface near boats which still try to pull away
from U-boat.

"2.49 p.m. — Steamer opens fire from four guns. Dive. Con-
ning-tower hit five times : one shot through the bridge, one above
the aerials, the third (4.7 cm.) goes through the conning-tower,
explodes inside, nearly all apparatus destroyed. Second officer of
the watch slightly wounded. Fourth shot smashed circulating water
tubes; fifth shot hit a mine deflector. Abandoned conning-tower.
Central hatch and speaking tube closed. As the conning-tower
abandoned, the boat had to be worked from the central space below
the conning-tower. The lifeboats throw depth charges to a depth
of 20 m. Switch and main switchboard held in place by hand.
Electric lamp over magnetic compass goes out. Boat is top-heavy
and oscillates round the transverse axis [because the conning-tower
was filled with water]. A number of connections between the con-
ning-tower and hull do not remain watertight. Owing to short
circuit the following fail in quick succession : gyro-compass,
lamp-circuit [for lighting], main rudder, means of communication,
forward horizontal rudder jams. In spite of being 14 degrees down
by the stern and engines going full speed, the boat sinks by the bows
to 40 m.; compressed air. To get rid of the water, rapid expulsion
of air to 20 m. to 16 degrees to load aft. Tank No. 1 gets no
compressed air. All hands in the bows to avoid breaking surface.

277

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Torpedo coxswain and No. i (petty officer) even counter-flood for-
ward. Boat falls 8 degrees by the bow, and sinks to 35 ra. depth.
Compressed air on forward tanks.

"Meanwhile the spray (from leaks in the conning-tower) is
kept off the electric apparatus by sail-cloth, waterproofs, flags, etc.
The watertight auxiliary switchboard is the saving of the boat. Boat
sinks down by the stern again and threatens to break surface.
Steering under water no longer possible.

"3.10 p.m. — 'Compressed air on all tanks. Starboard electric
engine breaks down. To the guns, clear oil motors, full speed
ahead ! "■

The commander decided, as the boat could not remain under
water, to rise to the surface and chance fighting the steamer.

"The steamer is 35 hm. off and opens fire at once. Shots all
round the boat. One 7.5 and one 4.7 cm. shell hit the upper deck
forward of the boat's 8-8 cm. gun. Second officer of the watch
receives other slight wounds. Replied to fire, unfortunately with-
out telescopic sight as the conning-tower is still full of water.
Distance quickly increases to 50 hm. Then the steamer follows
slowly. To starboard a destroyer which opens fire at 80 hm. ;
shots fall short. Put on cork jackets. The intention is to con-
tinue gunfire till the boat can be sunk in the neighbourhood of a
sailing vessel 8 sea miles away, to save the crew from a Baralong
fate.

"3.17 p.m. — The destroyer is a 'Foxglove,' but cannot steam
faster than the boat. At about 75 hm. replied to fire. The ' Fox-
glove ' soon begins to try and avoid shots ; is hit twice, and
increases the distance. Her guns only carry about 75 hm.

"3.20 p.m. — Conning-tower can be made watertight; boat cleared;
ammunition for gun cleared; except conning-tower, all damage can
gradually be repaired. Course 165 degrees. The ' Foxglove ' follows
in our wake. Steamer lost to view. At a pinch the boat can dive,
but leaves a heavy oil track behind her. If no destroyer comes
before night, the boat can be saved.

"6.50 p.m. — The ' Foxglove ' has approached to 70 hm. and opens
fire again. Return fire : hit. Enemy sheers off and falls back to
over 100 hm.

"8 p.m. — Twilight. Pursuit out of sight. On account of oil
track zig-zag course. Run into another oil track, turned to port
and gradually on course of 240 degrees."

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Our U-boats and their Method of Warfare

The boat then began her return journey and reached home
without further incident.

I myself had occasion to inspect " U 84 " after her return from
this expedition. I realised that it was little short of a miracle that,
in spite of such heavy damage, she reached home. It was chiefly
due to the assurance with which the commander handled his boat,
the perfect co-operation of the whole crew in these trying circum-
stances, and the excellent practice made by the gunners, in con-
nection with which it must be remembered that the height of the
platform of a U-boat, on which the gun is mounted, is only 2 m.
above the water-level, and that aiming is thereby rendered far more
difficult. Lieutenant-Commander Rohr is, unfortunately, one of the
many who have not returned from their voyages.

It would take too much space to quote extracts from other U-boat
experiences, or to mention the names of all those who particularly
distinguished themselves. Wherever in this war heroism is spoken
of, it applies without exception to our U-boat commanders and
their crews.

279

CHAPTER XV

ACTIVITY OF THE FLEET DURING THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

BESIDES the direct support of the U-boats which operated from
home bases, the Fleet supplied almost the whole personnel re-
quired to commission the new boats. It was particularly important for
the U-boats to have technical men who were well trained in seamen-
ship. The commanders had to be officers who had sufficient experi-
ence to navigate and handle the boats without assistance in the most
difficult circumstances. That meant a big demand for officers of
the watch, because they, by age and seniority, were best fitted for
such service. The Fleet had to train men to take their places, so
younger officers were promoted to be officers of the watch, and the
training of midshipmen was accelerated. The substitutes for the
latter were taken direct on board and received their training as naval
cadets with the Fleet. This entailed a very extensive shifting of
all ranks which was bound to have a deleterious effect upon the
efficiency of the ships.

The project of a raid with the Fleet to the Hoofden in Maroh,
1917, to attack the convoy traffic between England and Holland,
never materialised. The weather had been uninterruptedly bad up
till March 11. By that time the clear nights were over, which were
a necessary preliminary condition for the enterprise. The weather
prospects grew worse, so that we could not rely on scouting from the
air. A cruiser raid by night had also to be given up, because it was
reported from Heligoland that the wind (E.S.E., force 7 — 9)
threatened to become worse.

The second leading ship of the torpedo-boat fleet was sent with
Flotillas VII and IX to the Baltic for training in mine-sweeping, as
the mine-sweeping divisions did not suffice for the work of escort-
ing the U-boats as well as that of clearing the routes of mines. I
considered, too, that Fleet manoeuvres were necessary, so that the
new commanders might become familiar with handling their ships
in co-operation with the rest of the Fleet. I could leave the defence
of the North Sea for the time being to the cruisers, as it seemed
improbable that the enemy would make an attack on the Bight.

280

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

Meanwhile, the battleship Baden had been made ready as Fleet-
Flagship, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had embarked
in her. Flotillas III and IV could be spared from the North Sea,
while the Fleet was at manoeuvres in the Baltic, and were sent to
Flanders, where they could be put to better use, by carrying on the
war in the Channel from Zeebrugge.

The number of mines laid in the North Sea by the enemy grew
steadily greater. Almost daily we suffered losses among the mine-
sweeping craft, while among the ships used to escort the U-boats in
their passage through the mine-fields there had been so many losses
that in March the Fleet had only four such vessels at its disposal.
The Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy was asked to raise
the number to twelve again, so that they might suffice for the needs
of the Fleet by working in four groups of three.

While the battleships were at squadron practice in the Bight
of Heligoland on March 5, the Kronprinz and the Grosser
Kurfiirst collided and suffered damage which in the case of
both ships took several weeks to repair; before these were com-
plete any considerable enterprise for the Fleet was not to be
thought of.

While the Fleet was practising in the Baltic, on March 21, the
cruiser Moewe reported her return in the Kattegat, and entered Kiel
on the 22nd. During her cruise of four months she had sunk or
captured twenty-seven ships, amounting to 123,444 tons gross regis-
tered tonnage. One of the prizes, the Yarrowdale, had been brought
into Swinemunde on December 31, 1916, and had conveyed news
of the success of the Moewe, from whom we had heard nothing since
she left at the end of November, 1916. The safe return of the
successful ship was greeted with great joy.

On March 29 the outpost boat Bismarck, leading ship of the
special group commanded by Lieutenant Schlieder, ran on a mine
and sank ; only three of the crew could be saved. Their smart com-
mander also lost his life. He had won great credit by driving
submarines out of the Bight.

To illustrate the demands that the U-boat campaign made upon
the Fleet, I quote below from the log of the High Sea Fleet, begin-
ning with May 9, 1917 :

"May 9, 1917. — Wind and weather in the German Bight, E. to
N.N.E., force 3 — 4 ; weather fine and clear. Seaplane scouting in the
Inner German Bight without result. Mine-sweeping according to

281

Germany's High Sea Fleet

plan. Scouting Division IV protects the operations in the west.
During mine-sweeping operations of the Ems outpost flotilla, the
Mettelkamp strikes a mine north of Borkum and sinks.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

" Returned from long-distance trips : ' U 82,' ' U-B 22,' ' U-B 21,'
and ' U 93.' ' U 93 ' proceeded to sea on April 13, and up to April
30 sank 27,400 tons. On April 30 had a struggle with a U-boat
trap (iron-masted schooner), in the course of which the commander,
Lieutenant-Commander Vohr von Spiegel, the helmsman, and one
petty officer were hurled overboard, and three men were badly
wounded. The boat, badly damaged, unable to dive properly, and
deprived of its wireless, is brought into List by Lieutenant Ziegler.
' U 46 ' is escorted to the north. ' U 58 ' reports position among
mines accomplished ; two steamers sunk, three damaged, in 1 degree
longitude west ; a great deal of convoy traffic.

" May 10. — Scouting by our seapTanes without result. No air-
ship observation. Mine-sweeping according to plan. Scouting
Division IV protects mine-sweeping operations in the west. H.M.S.
Hindenburg commissioned.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

'" U-C 76/ while shipping mines in Heligoland harbour badly
damaged by mine explosion and sunk. Among the missing is the
commander, Lieutenant-Commander Barten. Salvage-boat Oberelbe
goes from the Ems to Heligoland to give assistance. ' U-C 77 ' back
from long-distance expedition ; ' U 46 ' has passed the danger zone ;
' U 30 ' proceeded to the North via Terschelling.

"May 11. — Wind E., force 4 — 5. Seaplane scouting; nothing sus-
picious. No airship observation owing to easterly wind. Mine-
sweeping according to plan. The half-flotilla occupied in sweeping
mines from the route to the west, in following up a barrier of mines,
has got north of its prescribed route. New mines are observed; and
the leading boat of the 5th Half-Flotilla of mine-sweepers strikes a
mine and sinks. Four men are missing. Among them the com-
mander of the Half-Flotilla, Lieutenant-Commander Beste. As it
has now been ascertained that the English have barred the approach
from Horns Reef from N.W. by mines, the officer in command has
received orders to lay mines which will bar the approach from north-
east and from the west, so as to deprive the English of this meeting-
point, which we can do without. A furthef barrier of mines north

282

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

of Tyl Lightship is to bar the way to mining operations against
Nordmannstief. At night a group of barrier-breakers goes along
the U-boat route down the Dutch coast to the west, and another
group to the north.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

"' U 30 ' passed danger zone ; ' U 58 ' back from long-distance
trip; ' U 93' enters Wilhelmshaven towed by 'V 163.'

"May 12. — Wind E., force 6. Seaplane observation without
result. Observation by airships impossible owing to weather con-
ditions. Mine-sweeping only carried out to small extent owing to
heavy sea. Scouting Division IV takes over protection of operations
in the west. In the course of the morning, the two barrier-breaking
groups return from night voyage. No incidents. A boat of the
North Sea outpost flotilla reports an enemy submarine ; set the tor-
pedo-boat half-flotillas at my disposal to search ; submarine ' kite '
exploded; result doubtful.

"May 13. — Wind N.W., force 2. Mine-sweeping according to
plan. Scouting Division IV on patrol in the west. At night the
officer commanding the division, with the auxiliary minelayer Senta,
lays the barrier of mines at Horns Reef and north of the Tyl Light-
ship according to orders.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

"' U33 ' leaves for long-distance trip in the west, and ' U-C41 '
for the Bell Rock.

"May 14. — Wind E. to N.N.E., force 3. For protective scout-
ing ' L 22 ' goes up to the west ; * L 23 ' to the north. Mine-sweep-
ing according to plan. Scouting Division II goes for protection of
operations in the west to the Osterems. Thunderstorm, 6 p.m. The
Staff of the Fleet embarks in H.M.S. Baden. High Sea Fleet war-
ships clear. Scouting Division II., with two torpedo-boat leaders,
assemble in the course of the evening in Schillig Roads, for the
intended manoeuvres in the Bight on May 15. No communication
from ' L 22 ' since report that she had risen. Thunderstorms in the
west. It is possible that she has taken in her wireless mast and can
send no message. In the late afternoon thick fog over the whole
Bight, consequently not possible to have search made by seaplanes
or surface craft. Seaplane No. 859 noted an explosion and a cloud
of smoke at 9.50 a.m.

"7.40 p.m. — The leader of the airships reports that according to
telephonic information from Borkum this observation is very prob-

283

Germany's High Sea Fleet

ably connected with the loss of ' L 22.' A telegram arriving at night
from the Admiralty confirms this statement. The probability is that
on account of the thunderstorm ' L 22 '- had to remain below the level
where the gas would completely fill the cells, and was shot down
by British warships.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

"11.40 P.M. — Orion, one of the 3rd Mine-Sweeping Flotilla,
reports that ' U 59,' which was being convoyed out to sea, and the
mine-sweeper Fulda, have struck a mine and sunk. Outpost boats
of the List Division, the mine-sweepers of the flotilla, and the
17th Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla are sent out to meet the Orion. The
boats receive orders at the same time to pick up 'U-C51 ' and
'U-C42,' which are west of Horns Reef on their return journey.
' U-C 44 ' and ' U-C 50 ' put out to sea to the west on a long-distance
trip. 'U-C 51,' on return journey, reports position. Operations
among mines completed; about 4,000 tons sunk; travels 5 knots only
(nature of her damage not made out owing to defective wireless).

"May 15.— Wind N.N.W., force 2—3. ' L 16 ' and ' L 37 ' go up
for aerial observation. Thick fog forces them to return. Slight visi-
bility at times only. The tactical manoeuvres in the Bight are there-
fore postponed to the 16th ; the First Leader of the Torpedo-Boats
reports that some of the 1st Torpedo-Boat Flotilla, with auxiliary
engines, have broken down, and that the rest are not fit for use
outside the Bight. Consequently the 1st Torpedo-Boat Flotilla
is instantly dispatched to Kiel for repairs. The officer in com-
mand had sent ' U 59 ' to take note of the place of the accident ;
the List Division of the North Sea Outpost Flotilla, a pump steamer,
and a tug, to assist the Orion; and a torpedo half-flotilla to control
the U-boat route out to sea. The reports of the boats sent to assist
do not give a definite idea of the degree of danger to be apprehended
from enemy mines in the north. While trying to get into com-
munication with ' U 59 ' by tapping, the outpost boat Heinrich
Rathjen strikes a mine and sinks; missing, one petty officer and
three men. Officer in command receives orders for the time being
to stop the work of breaking through the belt of mines in the west,
and to clear or test the U-boat route out to sea in the north, with
all craft at his disposal. In view of the interruption of the work
of breaking through in the west, any considerable enterprise of the
Fleet must be postponed. I therefore decide, in order to make use
of the time immediately after the evolutions, to send Squadron III,

284

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

and, on the return of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II, Torpedo-Boat
Flotilla V to the Baltic for manoeuvres. Both are badly in need of
training.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

'"U-C 42' and 'U-C51' return from long-distance trips.
'U-C41,' which put to sea on May 11 for the west coast, had to
break off expedition owing to engine trouble.

"May 16. — Wind N.E. to N.N.W., force 3 — 6. Seaplane observa-
tion without result. Airship observation impossible owing to fresh
north-east wind. Tactical manoeuvres by the High Sea Fleet in the
Bight of Heligoland. On completion, sent Squadron III to the
Baltic. In the absence of Squadron III, Squadrons I and IV to
take outpost duty in turn. H.M.S. Kaiser sent to Kiel harbour for
repairs. The officer in command of the Scouting Divisions to dis-
cover the cause that led to the loss of ' U 59 ' has ordered mine-
sweeping flotilla to test and clear Squares 132, 117, 133, 116. One
torpedo-boat half-flotilla is to sweep Squares 134 — 84. The
auxiliary mine-sweeper flotilla is to mark the spot of ' U 59's '
accident and try to get into communication with ' U 59 ' by tapping.
In the course of these operations, ' M 14 ' strikes a mine, and in
the attempt to save ' M 14,' Torpedo-boat No. 78 does likewise.
Both boats sink. The attempts to get into communication with
' U 59 ' must consequently be abandoned.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

" In the night, ' S 27 ' of the Ems Outpost Flotilla strikes a mine
and sinks while convoying ' U 86 ' on a long-distance trip to the
west. ' U 86 ' thereupon returns with the rest of the convoy to
Borkum Roads. Wireless reports received : ' U 62 ' left on April
21, position; in April 10,000 tons sunk; in May, 13,000; on April
30 captured commander of U-boat trap ' Q 12.' ' U-C 55 ' left
April 28 for west coast, position. 'U4o' left May 5. Mine-
sweeping operations completed, two explosions heard, nothing sunk.
' U 21 ' left April 19, position; 13,500 tons sunk ' U-C 49 ' left
May 2, position ; mines laid, 3,365 tons sunk.

"May 17. — Wind E. to E.N.E., force 3 — 6. No airship observa-
tion. Seaplane scouting without result. Reports hitherto received
about the mines laid by the enemy south of Horns Reef do not yet
give a clear idea of the condition of affairs. It seems as if new
enemy mines were lying south of the Senta barrier, direction east
to west. Consequently, all efforts must be made to clear up the

^5

Germany's High Sea Fleet

situation and keep this important waterway clear. It is once again
apparent how short we are of mine-seekers and sweepers. We shall
therefore once again approach the Admiralty and demand that the
' M-boats ' (new mine-sweepers) that have been allocated to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic, should be handed over to the
High Sea Fleet. As a substitute, we will offer boats of the North
Sea Outpost Flotilla or trawlers of the Auxiliary Mine-sweeping
Flotilla. To make the position of the lightship at List more reliable
and easier from the point of view of navigation, a buoy will be
placed to mark the position which will be occupied at night by an
outpost boat. Further, to help the U-boats on their outward voyage,
a number of outpost boats are to cruise continually west of the
position of the lightship. During the night two groups of barrier-
breakers go out, one to the north and one from the Ems to the
west.

" U-BOAT CAMPAIGN

" ' U-C 49 ' and ' U-C 41 ' back from long-distance trip ; ' U 86 *
leaves under convoy for Flamborough Head; via Bruges comes a
wireless report that ' U-C 75 ' has sunk 3,500 tons and the English
warship Lavender. Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla XVII puts to sea to
meet the damaged ' U-C 40 ' and to bring her home through the
subsidiary waterway of Nordmannstief ."

And so it went on from day to day. Owing to the pressure of
the demands made upon them during the war, the organisation of
the mine-sweepers was developed in the following manner :

At the beginning of the war three mine-sweeping divisions
existed and were stationed at Cuxhaven. Of these, Divisions I and
III took up their activities in the North Sea and Division II in the
Baltic. Each division consisted of a leading boat, eight sweepers
and two — increased to four later — buoy-boats. (The buoy-boats
marked the channels swept by the mine-sweepers for the groups of
larger ships that followed.) The boats were without exception small,
old torpedo-boats, of the class ' V 30 ' and ' 80.' Their speed was
17 — 18 knots with a draught of 2.7 m., their armament one 5 cm. gun.
In command of the flotillas were Commanders Bobsien and Wolf-
soin ; later the North Sea Auxiliary Mine-sweeper Flotilla under
Commander Walter Krah was added. It consisted of trawlers and
small torpedo-boats.

At the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916 the small old tor-

286

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

pedo-boats were gradually replaced by the "A "-boats and/'U"-
boats which had been built during the war. The "A "-boats had
a speed of 23 — 25 knots, a draught of 1.9 to 2 m., a displacement of
210 to 345 tons and an armament of two 8.8 cm. guns. The "M "-
boats had a speed of 16 knots, draught 2 to 2.2 m., displacement
450 to 520 tons, armament three 8.8 cm. or two 10.5 cm. guns.

On September 1, 1916, the Mine-sweeper Divisions I and III
were divided into the 1st and 2nd, and 5th and 6th Half-Flotillas
respectively. On October 6, 19 16, what had hitherto been Mine-
sweeper Division II was divided into the 3rd and 4th Mine-sweeper
Half-Flotillas. These Half-Flotillas were still grouped under their
original Flotillas.

In May, 1917, Mine-sweeper Flotillas I and III were both aug-
mented by a third half-flotilla, consisting of " M "-boats.

In June, 1917, Mine-sweeper Division II with the parent
ship Ammon and ten motor-boats left the Baltic and joined the
North Sea warships. These motor-boats ("F "-boats) have a speed
of 11 knots, draught 1 m., length 17.5 m., displacement 19 tons,
and an armament of one machine gun. Later on, in January,
1918, the Mine-sweeper Divisions III and IV formed the 3rd Mine-
sweeper Flotilla. Mine-sweeper Flotilla II was also augmented
by a third Half-Flotilla — No. 9. The Auxiliary Mine-sweeper
Flotilla of the North Sea was denominated from the beginning of
1918 onwards Mine-sweeper Flotilla IV, and the trawlers of which
it originally consisted were for the most part replaced by new mine-
boats. All the mine-seekers and mine-sweeper groups were then
placed under the command of one officer, and Captain Nerger,
well known as the commander of the auxiliary cruiser Wolf, was
appointed to this post after his return from his cruise. Further
formations were : Mine-sweeper Division II, consisting of the
parent ship Ammon and twelve boats, and the Mine-sweeper Flotilla
VI, one leading boat and two half-flotillas, consisting of an "M "-
boat as parent ship, six boats, eleven " U-Z "-boats (small, fast
motor-boats) and three large motor-boats. The " F-M "-boats (shal-
low draught "M "-boats) had a speed of 14 knots, draught 1.3 m.,
displacement 170 tons, length 40 cm., and an armament of one 8.8 cm.
gun. The "U-Z "-boats when towing their apparatus had a speed
of 18 knots, draught 1.5 m., displacement 20 tons, length 26 — 30 m.,
and an armament of one 5 cm. quick-firing gun.

At the time the Armistice was concluded the following boats
were available for the mine-sweeping service in the North Sea :

287

Germany's High Sea Fleet

17 torpedo-boats, 27 "U "-boats, 71 "M "-boats, 4 "F-M "-boats,
23 trawlers, 58 motor-boats, and 22 " U-Z "-boats, 4 parent ships and
a repair ship, whereas at the beginning of the war there were only
33 small, old torpedo-boats available.

At the beginning of the war we had three forms of mines, with
a charge of from 70 to 150 kilos, capable of use at a depth of from
90 to 115 m. The newest of these existing types of mines could
ultimately be used at depths of 345 m. During the war the fol-
lowing types of mine were added: 1. A defence mine against
submarines, with a charge of 20 kilos and effective to a depth of
95 m. ; 2. A mine in the form of a torpedo that could be shot out
of a U-boat travelling under water, with a charge of 95 kilos,
effective to a depth of 200 m.; 3. A mine to be laid by U-C-boats
with a charge of 120 to 200 kilos, effective to a depth of 365 m.
The U-C-boats could carry 12 to 18 mines; 4. A mine for the
first big minelayers which, however, was not made after the con-
struction of the U-C-boats.

Mine-sweeping tackle was improved to such an extent that the
area swept increased from 45 to 300 m.; the depth to 30 m.; and
the speed of sweeping, when the new boats were used, to 15 knots.

As a defence against mines — in the first place for the mine-
sweepers, and later destined for all classes of ships — special apparatus
was invented. This was attached to the bows and was intended to
cut the mine-cables before the boat struck the mine. It was found
of great use.

For defence against submarines a depth charge was made which
could be thrown from a boat on to submerged submarines. The
charge weighed about 50 kilos; it was detonated under water by
an adjustable time fuse.

In addition to this there was a submarine "kite" with an ex-
plosive charge of 12 kilos. It was towed' by boats on a cable which
served at the same time to indicate the direction of the current.
It was electrically exploded as soon as the "kite," while being towed,
struck a submarine.

To keep off submarines nets of various kinds were made, which
were moored to buoys to bar the submarine's path, and lighter nets,
provided with gas buoys, which indicated the path of the boat and
the spot where it had broken through if a submarine ran against
the net.

The convoy service for U-boats demanded large numbers of
light craft; about 100 torpedo-boats and smaller steamboats were

«88

10°

PLAN OF THE MINEFIELDS IN THE GERMAN BIGHT

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

used for this purpose. They were divided into two convoy
flotillas :

i. Commanded by Commander Faulborn, consisted of three
half-flotillas, each comprising two groups of five torpedo-boats.

2. Commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Hoppensledt, con-
sisted of six half-flotillas, each of ten to twelve steamboats.

The mine-sweepers and convoying craft deserve great credit for
making it possible for the U-boats to carry out their campaign.
They suffered many losses which would otherwise have been inflicted
on the U-boats. That, however, did not prevent them from per-
forming their dangerous service year in and year out with the
greatest trustworthiness in spite of the inclemency of the weather.
The officers and men of this service surpassed all others in the
Navy in their intrepidity and skill as seamen.

The most successful part of the activities of the Fleet fell to
the lot of the U-boats; the battleships, together with the cruisers
and torpedo-boats, and especially the mine-sweepers, assisted in
overcoming the enemy's defence. Their efforts were primarily
directed against the belt of mines which England had laid in the
North Sea to prevent our boats from getting out. The accompanying
plan shows how the Bight was made to bristle with mines.

It was impossible, in view of its great extent, to clear the whole
area. We barely had sufficient ships to ascertain where mines were
laid. Our efforts were confined to getting two or more paths through
the mines, and keeping them clear; one to the west, following the
coast, one in the middle between Terschelling and Horns Reef, one
to the north along the Danish coast. This last had the advantage
of making it easier for the U-boats to find their way home on their
return, as they could feel their way' to the coast of Jutland while
they were still outside the area sown with English mines, and seek
the route that had been cleared, which led along the coast into the
Bight. The route off the Dutch coast was the shortest for those boats
which chose the Channel passage to get to their station west of
the British Isles. It certainly was the shortest route, but also the
most dangerous, because of the strong defence in the Channel, and
the various obstacles there in the shape of nets and mines. These
cleared paths had to be so wide that the boats could find them even
in bad weather, when they were unable to determine their position
with accuracy; and also they had to be wide enough to allow
freedom of movement to the auxiliary boats which accompanied the
mine-sweepers ; for the mine-sweeping operations were in all proba-
T 289

Germany's High Sea Fleet

bility observed by the English submarines, and if the cruisers in
the auxiliary groups had only been able to move slowly up and
down in the narrow area they would have presented an easy and
welcome target. Consequently we tried to keep a large basin free
of mines, situated to the rear of about the middle of the belt, so that
it lay in a central position for all the routes. Even this did not
guarantee absolute safety, so the boats were always accompanied
by an escort capable of clearing away any mines which might after
all be encountered.

In July, 191 7, the English had extended the area which they had
announced to be mined, to the north up to the latitude of Hanstholm
(north-west coast of Jutland), in the west as far as four degrees longi-
tude east, in the south to 53 degrees latitude north. By this means
the path which had to be kept clear by the boats of the High Sea
Fleet was lengthened at the narrowest point by 20 to 25 sea miles.

Up to the end of June, 191 7, despite months and months of
work, the mine-sweepers at our disposal had not succeeded in
breaking through the old danger zone. The demands which, in
consequence, were made upon the U-boat convoys — which had to
take the U-boats through the mined area into free water — naturally
impeded the actual mine-sweeping. In case of need, recourse might
be had to the torpedo-boat flotillas, but, after all, they represented
material as valuable as that which they were to protect ; and in par-
ticular the new boats had too much draught to pass through the
mine-sown areas except at great risk. (The lighter the draught
the less the danger 'for the mine-sweepers, in the construction
of which this point was particularly considered). The new boats
constructed in the last months hardly made good the losses,
and the number fixed by the commanders of the Fleet as the
minimum required had not been attained. These clear routes were
not needed for the U-boats alone, but also for communication
between Rotterdam and the Elbe and Ems respectively. In the
middle of July, 15 to 20 steamers lay at Rotterdam waiting for the
word that they might safely cross. It was the Fleet's duty to
guarantee that the waterway along the coast was free and to convoy
the ships with outpost craft to safety.

In spite of all the difficulties we managed to prevent anything
from stopping the U-boats from going out. There were altogether
very few days when for safety's sake we had to avoid the direct
route into the North Sea and take the roundabout way through
the North Baltic Canal and the Kattegat. The small loss of time

290

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

was of no importance compared with the increased safety; that was
thereby gained. As the boats could replenish their fuel supply
in Kiel, they were able to stay in their field of operation for com-
paratively a long time. But it was not unknown to the English
that our boats used this way to get out, especially later when the
U-cruiser flotilla had been formed at Kiel; these boats mostly
took the route through the Kattegat for their outward and return
voyages. That forced 1 the Fleet to extend its mine-sweeping to
the Kattegat, and to take counter measures when the English
mines were laid from Skagen across to the Swedish coast.

It is obvious on what a large scale English mine-laying was
carried on, when it is considered that they set about mining the
whole of the North Sea between the Shetland Islands and Norway.
As we learnt afterwards it was chiefly American mines that were to
be used and American craft to do the work. If they had really
succeeded in sowing mines sufficiently thickly in that area the
Fleet would have found it an exceedingly difficult task to clear
the necessary gaps there. However, the great depth of the water
in this part of the North Sea made it possible for U-boats
to avoid the barrier by travelling at a sufficient depth below the
surface. So far as we could ascertain, we suffered no losses in
U-boats from these mines.

The boats, when going out, and before their return, reported
their position, so that the commanders of the Fleet and the officers
in command of the U-boats knew for certain that the first difficulties
had been overcome, and that the boat was making for her actual
field of operation ; or, as the case might be, was on the homeward
voyage after accomplishing her work. Thus it was possible to
establish with great accuracy in what period of time boats that
were missing^ must have met with misfortune.

The Fleet considered it its most important task to place all its
strength at the disposal of the U-boats on their outgoings and in-
comings, so as to protect them from the dangers of this part of their
voyage. Plenty more awaited them which they would have to
cope with alone, once they were in their particular sphere of activity.
This was essentially the point of view of the mine-sweepers; they
suffered ever greater losses, yet did all that was possible to take
upon themselves the main dangers that threatened the U-boats.

In August, 1918, H.M. the Emperor announced his intention
to visit the Fleet. Shortly before his visit there had been signs of
insubordination among the crews of some of the ships of Squadron

291

Germany's High Sea Fleet

IV. (Prinzregent Luitpold and Friedrich der Grosse) ; this bore
the character of mutiny, but thanks to suitable measures taken by
the officers it was nipped in the bud before it had assumed con-
siderable dimensions or had injured the efficiency of the ships.
Inquiry into the matter, however, revealed that behind these com-
paratively unimportant outbreaks there lay a movement which must
be taken very seriously, and which had as its aim the forcible
paralyzing of the Fleet as soon as the political wire-pullers deemed
the moment ripe. The judicial inquiry established the fact that
there was a connection between the members of the Independent
Social Democratic Party and the leaders of the movement in the
Fleet. Their first aim was to get a sufficient number of the crews
to allow their names to be put on lists which were to prove at the
forthcoming. Congress at Stockholm that the crews at the front had
grown weary of fighting and were ready to join in the political
movement. This movement aimed at bringing the war to an end
in all countries by overthrowing the existing forms of government.
Very cleverly had the leaders sown discontent on certain ships;
they had made the most of supposed abuses, especially in the
rationing, and had not even shrunk from influencing their com-
rades by threats of forcible measures. The whole network of the
plot was laid bare and those who had stirred up the trouble were
punished. In certain cases the court-martial pronounced sentence
of death, which was carried out so far as the most guilty parties
were concerned. Most of those implicated had not realised the con-
sequences of joining the organisation; to many it had not even
been explained. Compared with the total numbers of the crews,
those who had joined the movement were very few.

The great danger which lay in this unrest, stirred up in the
Fleet by conscienceless agitators, could not be overlooked. Condi-
tions on the big ships in particular unfortunately provided fruitful
soil for such activities, as the crews were all the time in close
communication with their homes and could, therefore, not be kept
immune from the prevailing depression. These men performed the
same service on the big ships all the year round, and they lacked
the refreshing stimulus of meeting the enemy in battle. On the other
hand, they had a daily supply of newspapers and pamphlets which
teemed with war weariness and the condemnation of our war leaders.
Thus it was unhappily possible to influence their views and make
them forgetful of their duty.

The Secretary of State for the Navy arrived in Wilhelmshaven

292

The Fleet during the U-boat Campaign

on August 17, the day before the Emperor embarked. I made earnest
representations to him that it was the duty of the Government to
protect the Fleet from this Socialistic organisation, as otherwise the
efforts of the officers to shield the men from these disastrous in-
fluences would be of no avail. Admiral von Capelle was very doubt-
ful whether it was possible, with the sentiments then prevailing in
the Reichstag, to call the leaders of a party to account for their
political agitation which, so far as it was subversive of order, was
carried on with the greatest circumspection. But he quite admitted
the gravity of the situation and promised to see that the necessary
protective measures were taken by the Imperial Government. He
spoke to His Majesty to that effect the next day, after I had reported
these incidents in the Fleet to him. Unfortunately at the discussions
in the Reichstag, which followed shortly afterwards, it appeared
that the Government was not sufficiently firm to take radical measures
and secure the consent of the majority of the people's representatives
to them.

The Fleet had to depend entirely on its own efforts to shield the
crews from the devastating influences which were brought to bear
upon them. The best distraction certainly was active warfare. The
crews had never refused to obey the call of this necessity; courage
and the joy of battle still prevailed in their old, original form . They
were so deeply rooted in the character of the German people that
they could not cease at the first onslaught from without.

The influence of enemy propaganda was turned to account by
the Independent Social Democratic Party to achieve its own ends.
It could be counteracted to some extent but not entirely removed,
and its disastrous effects were apparent later. There is a widespread
view that the crews had justifiable grounds for complaint in the
differentiation in treatment between the officers and men; this is
totally unfounded. Service on board makes at least the same de-
mands on the officers, and indeed much greater demands, than on
the majority of the members of the crew. On watch and on every
other form of service, the proportionate number of officers is em-
ployed with every group of men, and they have no alleviations as
compared with the crew; on the contrary, they are much more
exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and far greater demands
are made upon their vigilance when at sea. Even in the unpleasant
process of coaling, all the officers cooperate, and there is no dif-
ference then between them and the men in respect of their "get-up"
and their unavoidable condition of dirt. This practice, introduced

293

Germany's High Sea Fleet

in time of peace to attain the greatest- possible efficiency in coaling,
was of necessity continued during the war, when the unpleasant work
of filling the coal -bunkers had to be undertaken much oftener.

His Majesty embarked in the flagship Baden, and took his first
trip to sea during the war. On this occasion, he visited the Island
of Heligoland to inspect the fortifications and harbour works there.
He landed again at Cuxhaven, where he spoke to the crews of the
mine-sweeper flotillas, and was able to confer decorations upon some
of the leaders and crews who had had a brush with enemy destroyers
a few days before, in which they so successfully warded off the
attack that we did not have to record the loss of a single boat.

294

CHAPTER XVI

THE CONQUEST QF THE BALTIC ISLANDS AND THE
CAPTURE OF HELSINGFORS

IN September, 1917, after the taking of Riga, the Supreme Army-
Command asked for the co-operation of the Fleet to conquer the
Baltic Islands. This offered a welcome diversion from the monotony
of the war in the North Sea. The Navy's task was to take a landing
corps, consisting of a reinforced infantry division, under the orders
of the General Officer of the 23rd Regimental Command, to Oesel,
and to land them there.

The right flank of the landing troops had to be protected from
the sea by quickly sending ships to the Gulf of Riga; and the
attack on the bridgehead of Orissa on the Island of Oesel, to make
it possible to cross to the Island of Moon, had to be supported with
all the means at our disposal. So long as the Straits of Irben were
commanded by the heavy enemy guns at Zerch, the bays of the
Island of Oesel in the Gulf of Riga were useless for landing. Con-
sequently, the Bay of Tagga was chosen for the troops' disembarka-
tion. This is the only bay in the north or west of Oesel that can
hold a large number of transports and offer them protection From the
west winds which prevail there in the autumn.

After the warning example of the landing of the Franco-British
army in Gallipoli in the spring of 1915, the attempt to carry the
war on land overseas by the help of the Fleet had to be made with
the greatest care, and such strong defensive measures were taken
that a reverse appeared to be out of the question. We had to prepare
ships for the transport of 23,000 men, 5,000 horses, and much
material.

The warships had to clear the approaches of mines, so that none
of the transports with the troops on board might be lost, also to
send flying-men to find out the position of the enemy before-
hand, so as to ascertain the most favourable circumstances for the
landing, which had to be a surprise. The Russians had recognised
the danger which threatened them, and had tried to ward it off
by placing batteries on Cape Handsort and Ninnast, at the two

295

Germany's High Sea Fleet

entrances to Tagga Bay. Heavy batteries had been strongly built
on the peninsula of Sworbe, in the south of Oesel, some time
previously.

The warships set aside for this undertaking were placed under
the orders of Vice-Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, the Commander
of Squadron I . He had a special Staff for the occasion, made up of
officers of the Fleet and Admiralty Staffs. Captain von Levetzow
was nominated Chief of the Staff; the battle-cruiser Moltke was
the flagship.

Under the orders of Admiral Schmidt were : Squadron III —
Vice-Admiral Behncke : Battleships Konig, Bayem, Grosser Kur-
fiirst, Kronprinz and Markgraf; Squadron IV — Vice-Admiral
Souchon : Battleships FriedricK der Grosse, Konig Albert, Kaiserin,
Prinzregent Luitpold and Kaiser; Scouting Division II, under
Rear-Admiral von Reuter : Second and third class cruisers Konigs-
'burg, Karlsruhe, Numberg, Frankfurt, Danzig and the light
cruisers of the Baltic Fleet, Kolberg, Strassburg and Augsberg, under
Vice-Admiral Hopman. Commodore Heinrich was in command
of the following torpedo-boats, he himself being on board the second-
class cruiser Emden: Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II (Commander
Heinecke) with 10 boats; Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VI (Commander
Tillesen) with a half-flotilla; Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VIII (Com-
mander Nieden), with u boats; further, the 7th Torpedo-Boat Half-
Flotilla; the 13th Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla; Torpedo-Boat Flotilla
IX (Commander Hundertmark) the latter with 1 1 boats ; besides these
6 U-boats of the Kurland U Flotilla (Lieut.-Commander Heinrich
Schott); Mine-Sweeper Flotilla II (Lieut-Commander Doflein);
the Mine-Sweeper Division IV, and a half-flotilla of mine-seekers
that numbered a little more than 60 motor-boats. In addition to
these there was Captain von Rosenberg's flotilla, who had at his
disposal 72 boats — trawlers, and other craft of similar size. Nineteen
steamers were requisitioned as troop-transports, the tonnage of
which amounted to 153,664 tons.

The enterprise was first mooted on September 12. On October 9
the troops embarked; on October 11 the transport fleet put to sea
under the protection of the battleships and small cruisers. The pre-
paratory work of mine-sweeping had been delayed by the bad
weather during the end of September and beginning of October,
so that those in command waited with impatience for operations
to start.

This delay was an advantage for the transports, as it enabled

296

The Conquest of the Baltic Islands

us to drill the troops in embarkation and disembarkation, which
materially facilitated the landing afterwards. The number of
steamers was not sufficient to transport the troops and all the
baggage in one journey; two echelons had to be formed. This
circumstance also made it advisable not to start the expedition until
the mine-sweeping operations in the Irben Straits were nearing their
close, so that the second echelon might be transported in safety to
Arensburg without running risks from submarines.

The manifold preparations for the embarkation of the troops
and for carrying out the operations on land in conjunction with the
Fleet had been completed, and there had been the most exemplary
harmony between the leaders of the Army and those of the Navy.
Thanks to them, the conquest of the islands of Oesel, Moon and
Dago was carried out according to plan, with the most perfect
success.

On October 10 everything was in trim; the fleet of transports
lay ready in the naval port of Libau to proceed to sea; the Moltke,
with Squadrons III and IV, lay in the Bay of Danzig, behind the
peninsula of Hela; the small cruisers and torpedo-boats were at
Libau.

The battleships were to silence the batteries at the entrance to
the Bay of Tagga before the landing was effected, as well as to
force the passage of the fortified straits between the islands of Dago
and Oesel, and of Soelo Sound, which leads into the Kassar Wick.
It was necesssary to command the Kassar Wick, which owing to
the depth of the water can only be used by torpedo-boats, so as
to secure the passage to Moon from the north, and to prevent
Russian warships from leaving the Gulf of Riga and making for
the north.

The batteries of the Bay of Tagga were attacked by Squadron III
and the Moltke; Squadron IV was to destroy the batteries on
Sworbe. It was important to land an advance guard in Tagga Bay
as soon as possible after the silencing of the batteries in the north,
so as to occupy the coast-line and thereby ensure the safe passage
of the main transport fleet. The warships and the transports left
harbour on the morning of October n. The night journey through
the mine-field passed without incident. The lightships placed by
the Rosenberg Flotilla marked the track that the search flotilla had
reported clear of mines. It was not until towards midnight that
a check in the advance occurred, which threatened to be critical ;
the leading squadron had approached so closely to the mine-sweeping

297

Germany's High Sea Fleet

flotilla that speed had to be slackened. At first the delay was
accepted, but finally it was realised that by slackening speed the
punctual landing of the advance guard would be jeopardised and
at the same time the element of surprise, which underlay the whole
undertaking, threatened to be lost. Consequently Admiral Schmidt
gave orders to the mine-sweepers to remove their gear and make
room for the Fleet; he preferred taking the risk of negotiating the
rest of the passage without the security afforded by the mine-sweepers
to endangering the success of the whole enterprise. Fortune
favoured this decision, for the Fleet succeeded without accident in
reaching the positions from which the bombardment was to take
place. They passed through a gap in the belt of mines right in
front of the Bay of Tagga, the existence of which was only de-
finitely ascertained later on. While taking up their positions to
bombard the batteries on the Sound of Soelo, the Bayern and the
Grosser Kurfiirst struck mines, which, however, did not hinder
them from completing their task.

At 5.30 a.m. the landing was begun. It was a complete surprise
to the enemy, and met with little opposition, which was quickly
overcome by the fire of the torpedo-boats, supported by the troops.
The disembarkation of the advance troops which were on board the
ships of Squadron III, was carried out by the motor launches of
the ships and three small steamers, one of which was the Corsica.
The leader of the Torpedo-Boat Flotilla steamed ahead with his boats.
The batteries at Hundsfort and Ninnast were quickly silenced and at
8 a.m. in the hands of our troops. The Toffri battery on the southern
point of Dago was destroyed by the Bayern and the Emden, Com-
modore Heinrich's flagship. At 6.45 A.M. the transports received
orders to enter the bay, and the disembarkation was proceeding apace
at 10 a.m. On entering the bay, the steamer Corsica struck a mine.
She was run aground and her crew taken on board by torpedo-boats
and landed. This incident showed us that the main part of the
Fleet must have passed in safety through a gap in the belt of mines.

The second part of the Fleet's activities consisted in quickly
penetrating into the Kassar Wick, and invading the Gulf of Riga.
On the very day of the landing, Captain von Rosenberg, with his
flotilla, had pushed through the Sound of Soelo, and so proved that
it was navigable for torpedo-boats. Under the command of Com-
modore Heinrich the boats of Flotilla II and of the 12th and 13th
Half-Flotillas then drove the enemy back into the Moon Sound. In
this they were supported and covered by the fire of the Kaiser and

298

The Conquest of the Baltic Islands

the Emden, which lay before Soelo Sound. On this occasion,
October 14, the destroyer Grom was captured and a gunboat was
Sunk. We suffered no losses in battle, but three boats were
damaged and.one was sunk by mines. In many cases boats ran
aground in these badly surveyed waters, and in so doing injured
the blades of their propellers.

The boats of the Rosenberg Flotilla established communication
with the bridgehead at Orissa, and this was maintained until the
troops had crossed. The flotilla brought bread and munitions
to the pioneers, and later on undertook their transport across to
Moon.

It was impossible for our light craft to push on into Moon Sound
from the Kassar Wick, on account of the heavy guns of the Russian
battleship Slava, which bombarded them from the south; conse-
quently Moon Sound had to be taken from the south. For this
purpose we had first to destroy the fortifications of Zerel. This
task was assigned, on October 14, to the officer commanding Squad-
ron IV, with the battleships Friedrich der Grosse, Konig Albert,
and Kaiserin. The Russian batteries opened fire on them, and our
ships returned it until darkness fell. The next morning the Russians
had abandoned the position and destroyed the batteries. The land-
ing troops had meanwhile continued their march towards Sworbe
and Onesa. It was imperative that our ships should quickly pene-
trate into the Gulf of Riga, so as to hold the Russians on the Island
of Oesel and prevent them from crossing to Moon. The mine-
sweeping operations in the Straits of Irben, conducted by Vice-
Admiral Hopman, had made good progress by October 13, although
they were under the fire of the batteries at Zerel, and came upon
belt after belt of mines. But when there was danger that the
Russians might retire too soon to Moon and thence to the main-
land, the passage to Arensburg had to be forced. Vice-Admiral
Behncke, commanding Squadron III, received orders to support
Admiral Hopman 's light craft in this undertaking. Thanks to the
energy of the officers, he carried these orders out with a celerity that
surpassed all expectations. When Sworbe fell on the morning of
the 16th, our warships lay before Arensburg, and on the evening of
the same day before the southern extremity of Moon Sound. In this
way our warships had completely surrounded the Island of Oesel,
and made it impossible for the enemy, who had been driven by our
troops to the south-east of the island, to escape by water.

On the morning of October 17 Moon Sound was reached; the

»99

Germany's High Sea Fleet

batteries there were destroyed, the Russian ships driven off to the
north, and the Russian battleship Slava sunk. This success deserves
the highest appreciation ; it was gained under difficult conditions,
in waters bristling with mines. The officer commanding Squadron
III particularly commended the conduct of the mine-sweepers, who
worked admirably under heavy fire.

While the commanding officer of Squadron III forced Moon
Sound from the east, Admiral Hopman, with the Kolberg and the
Strassburg, penetrated the Little Sound, ready to render the Army
the assistance it required for crossing. In the night of October
17-18 our troops crossed to Moon, and this island, too, was sur-
rounded by our ships on the east, south, and north-west. It was
no longer possible for the enemy to escape to the mainland.

As the operations had been so successful, we proceeded to take
Dago, which had not been included in the original plan. The
Rosenberg Flotilla landed 300 men on the southern point of Dago,
and occupied a bridgehead there for the subsequent landing of an
infantry regiment. It maintained its position against attack until
the troops arrived. For the conquest of Dago 3,700 men, 500 horses,
140 wagons, and a field battery with munitions were landed, and the
landing party from the flotilla was withdrawn.

After Tagga Bay had been cleared of mines, an essentially
necessary proceeding, the Fleet still had to perform the task of
cutting off the Russian retreat from the north part of Moon Sound.
Up till then this had been left to the U-boats. They received orders
when Squadron III invaded the Gulf of Riga, to assemble before
Moon Sound and to attack any Russians who should attempt to get
out. " U-C 58 " torpedoed the armoured cruiser Bogatyr, and
" U-C 60 " sank a transport steamer. It was not till October 18
that the torpedo-boats could be withdrawn from the Kassar Wick,
and the necessary mine-sweepers liberated, both being needful for
the protection of big ships.

On October 17 Squadron IV, with Scouting Division II, two
torpedo-boat half-flotillas, and the necessary mine-sweepers, was
to push forward to the northern exit of Moon Sound. But the
weather made mine-sweeping impossible. Consequently the advance
through the mine-fields north of Dago could not be earned out.
Five boats had simultaneously reported that the enemy was retiring
to the north, so it followed that the whole of Moon Sound must be
clear of hostile craft ; the enterprise was therefore abandoned. The
damage that the large ships would probably have sustained from

300

The Capture of Helsingfors

mines was out of proportion to anything that might have been
gained by pushing on farther.

This completed the operations of the Fleet. The conquest of
the islands attained by this co-operation of the Army and Navy
represents a military achievement which was as unique as it was
successful. The Navy is especially proud of it, as it gave them an
opportunity of lending valuable aid to the Army.

The departure so far east of such a large portion of the Fleet,
and its sojourn there for several weeks, was bound to give us a
definite idea as to whether the English Fleet would feel called upon
to interfere in this enterprise, or to take advantage of the absence
of the ships to make a strong advance in the North Sea. In the
latter case we should have had to take the risk of our remaining war-
ships in the North Sea being able to ward off an attack that would
probably aim at destroying the U-boat base at Wilhelmshaven, or
the airship sheds on the coast. On the other hand, if the English
Fleet had decided to make a demonstration on a large scale against
the Baltic, we should have been forced either to abandon the enter-
prise in the east, or to oppose the English with very small forces
in the west of the Baltic. But the English Fleet did not deem it
desirable to pursue either course to divert us from the conquest of
the Islands.

The fact that our Main Fleet was thus occupied presented a
favourable opportunity for us to make an advance with light craft into
the northern waters of the North Sea, since under the circumstances
the enemy would least expect it. We, therefore, dispatched the
light cruisers Brummer and Bremse to harry the merchant ships
plying between Norway and England, or, should none be met with
there, to extend the expedition to the west coast of the British Isles.
This enterprise will be described later.

THE CAPTURE OF HELSINGFORS

Once again our Fleet had occasion to support our Army in the
east, when, after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, urgent cries for help
against the Russian Red Guards were raised by the Finnish Govern-
ment. A special division was formed under the command of Rear-
Admiral Meurer, which consisted of the battleships Westfalen
and Rheinland (to which the Posen was added later), a number of
light cruisers, mine-sweepers, as well as barrier-breakers, ice-
breakers, and outpost ships. They were to convoy seventeen

301

Germany's High Sea Fleet

steamers to the Finnish coast, and to establish a base for them on
the Aaland Islands. The chief difficulty of the undertaking lay in
the fact that there was so much ice.

On February 28 the voyage to the north was begun, and on
March 5 the ships anchored off Eckero on the Aaland Islands. One
ice-breaker was lost owing to a mine explosion.

It turned out that the ice made it impossible for ships to approach
the Finnish coast from the Aaland Islands at that time of the year,
and the advance had to be made in a direct line from the south.

On April 3 our ships appeared before Russaro, the strongly-
fortified island before the harbour of Hango on the south-west coast
of Finland. The Russians declined to oppose us, so that it was
unnecessary to fight and demolish the fortifications; the landing of
the Baltic Division could proceed without difficulty. From this
point they set out on their march to Helsingfors. The warships
were to penetrate into the harbour of Helsingfors from the sea; it
had been a strongly fortified base of the Russian Fleet.

On April 12 the ships entered Helsingfors, and landed their
troops under cover of their guns; there was heavy street fighting
with the Red Guards in the town. At the threat of a bombardment,
the latter ceased their resistance and capitulated, so that about 2,000
prisoners fell into the hands of the Navy. The taking of the city
brought timely relief to an advance guard of troops which had
penetrated into the town and was very hard pressed.

When the Baltic Division itself arrived, the Navy had to safe-
guard the lines of communication between Helsingfors and Reval.
According to the treaty stipulations, the Russian Fleet retired into
the inner Gulf of Finland to Kronstadt, and thus there was no longer
any necessity for the presence of our battleships, as our Baltic light
craft seemed to suffice for the assistance of the Baltic Division in
their task of liberating Finland.

On April u the battleship Rheinland, which had remained near
the Aaland Islands, ran on the rocks in a fog, when she was going
to Danzig to coal ; her situation at first seemed very grave, but the
bad leak she had sprung was successfully stopped, and the ship was
got off and taken into Kiel Harbour. The repairs were so extensive
that the Rheinland was of no further use for war purposes.

As help to the Finns in their need could only be taken by sea,
and as such help must be immediate if if was not to be too late to
be of any avail, the liberation of Finland was only possible if we
could succeed in overcoming the difficulties presented by the ice,

50a

The Capture of Helsingfors

which made operations by sea impossible. A further hindrance was
that the battleships had to make a way for themselves, and that no
previous sweeping of mines could take place. Admiral Meurer's
energy succeeded in overcoming all the hindrances which were due
in part to the ice conditions and in part to the difficulties of naviga-
tion in these rock-infested waters. The Navy regarded it as a par-
ticularly beautiful and elevating task to render timely help to the
seafaring nation of the Finns.

303

CHAPTER XVII

OUR LIGHT CRAFT IN ACTION, AND ADVANCE OF OUR FLEET
TO THE NORWEGIAN COAST

CRUISER ACTION ON NOV. 17, 1917

TO obtain information as to British mines and nets outside the
belt of mines on the line Horns Reef — Terschelling, so-called
test-trips were devised. The object of these test-trips was to ascertain
the whereabouts of these barriers, and having done so to find means
of circumventing them. Having, as a result of these test-trips,
gained a clear idea of the situation of the various barriers (consisting,
of belts of mines), the next thing was to determine which of them
should be cleared away. Every test-trip group comprised mine-
seekers and sweepers with their tackle for finding mines, behind
them went torpedo-boats with U-boat "kites," with which to locate
nets; these were followed by barrier-breakers, and light cruisers
with seaplanes for scouting. Heavy warships protected the test-trip
groups on routes that were known to be free of mines.

Such a test-trip had been decided upon for November 17, 1917.
LedbyRear-Admiralvon Reuter,the 6th Mine-Sweeper Half-Flotilla,
2nd and 6th Auxiliary Mine-Sweeper Half-Flotillas, the 12th and
14th Torpedo-boat Half-Flotillas, Barrier-Breaking Division IV
and the cruisers of Scouting Division II were to search from
about the centre of the line Horns Reef — Terschelling in the direction
north by west. Ships of Squadron IV, which was on outpost duty,
were to be sent to cover the group. Squadron Commander Vice-
Admiral Souchon chose for this task the Kaiserin and Kaiser, with
the commander of the Kaiserin, Captain Grasshoff, in charge.

Rear-Admiral von Reuter ordered his group to assemble at 7 a.m.
at a pre-arranged meeting point. The commander of the Kaiserin
reported that at 7 a.m. he would lie west of Heligoland. Airship
scouting was impossible, and the cruisers had been unable to take
the seaplanes on board in good time because of the thick weather.
Of the seaplane stations on land only Borkum was at first able to
send out scouts. Towards 8 a.m. the test-trip was assembled at the
point of departure, excepting the 2nd and 6th Auxiliary Mine-Sweep-
ing Half-Flotillas.

304

Our Light Craft in Action

As the latter could only be a few thousand metres behind,
the leader of Scouting. Division II determined to fetch them up
with his flagship Konigsberg. He had just left his division when
it was attacked from the N.W. by guns of large and medium calibre.
The western horizon was very misty; the type of attacking ship
was very hard to make out at first. In the east it was clearer;
probably therefore our own ships showed up distinctly. The wind
blew with a force 2 — 3 from the W.N.W. ; the sea was slightly
rough. The leader of Scouting Division II on board the Konigs-
berg arrived. Scouting Division II, under the command of the
senior officer, Captain Hildebrand in the Niirnberg, advanced
against the enemy on a N.W. course, so as to protect the mine-
sweepers. The torpedo-boats struck out N. and N.W. and put
a smoke screen between the enemy and the mine-sweepers. "V45,"
Lieutenant-Commander Lossman, making use of her favourable
position, attacked the enemy at a distance of 40 — 60 hm. The mine-
sweepers let go their tackle and steamed away to the east developing
smoke-clouds.

With this the most urgent part of their work achieved, the
cruisers and torpedo-boats under heavy enemy fire — range about
130 hm. — started on a south-easterly course, developing smoke and
steam-clouds which made the screen between the enemy and the
mine-sweepers denser. The enemy, with the exception of a few
torpedo-boats, turned aside from the mine-sweepers in their way east-
ward and followed the more valuable cruisers. Owing to the smoke-
and steam-clouds developed by the latter, he was obliged to steer
towards the southern wing, that is to the windward, of our cruisers,
so as to get a better chance of observation for his guns. These
movements which, according to irreproachable observations and
bearings, were carried out by hostile cruisers of the "Concord"
class with a speed of 33 knots, increased the distance between them
and the mine-sweepers. Visibility astern was, of course, very much
reduced for our cruisers. The large enemy ships did! not go beyond
the windward edge of the smoke screen, as owing to the danger from
mines they tried to keep within the limits of the waters through
which we had passed. They were, therefore, only visible for a few
seconds at a time; it was impossible to get absolutely reliable ob-
servations of their composition and strength. No doubt light craft
were in advance on the windward side of the large enemy ships,
apparently also on the lee side.

All took part in the firing. Our cruisers lay in the midst of

u 3°S

Germany's High Sea Fleet

well-aimed salvos, of medium and heavy calibre. With great skill
they avoided being hit by steering a zigzag course without damaging
the effect of their own gun-fire. Our batteries replied energetically
and with good results.

At 9.24 a.m. explosions resulting from our gun-fire occurred on
two of the hostile battle-cruisers. One of them thereupon sheered
off. About the same time our light cruiser Pillau forced an enemy
destroyer that she had hit to retire from the fight. The leader of
Scouting Squadron II hoped by going at full speed to separate the
enemy light craft from the big ships, and so to get a chance to
attack the former, but this hope was not fulfilled; the large ships
were able to keep pace.

The U-boats of the Auxiliary Mine-Sweeping Flotilla had mean-
while steamed on in the direction E.S.E. At 8.50 a.m. they had
a fight with the northern group of enemy destroyers at a range of
90 hm. After three hits had been observed on the destroyers, the
enemy sheered off. Our U-boats again came under fire from 9.5 a.m.
to 9.30 a.m., apparently from a leading torpedo-boat; after that they
were no longer molested and returned to port. Several U-boats
noticed that an English destroyer came to a standstill and that
another drew alongside of it. This observation was confirmed later
on by a seaplane which reported that it had seen one destroyer
being towed by another.

The 6th Mine-Sweeping Half-Flotilla had steamed off to the east.
It also came into conflict with the northern group of enemy
destroyers at a range of 70 to 75 hm.; an advance of 3 destroyers
brought the latter to within 10 hm. The English destroyers scored
no hits; ours claimed one for certain. At 9.40 a.m. the enemy
destroyers retired. Mine-Sweeping Flotilla VI then returned to
port without any further molestation from the enemy. It is not
clear why the enemy destroyers did not make better use of their
superior armament and speed to destroy our weak mine-sweepers
completely .

The fight of the cruisers, in loose echelon formation on a south-
easterly course, brought them into the neighbourhood of the trawlers
and the 2nd and 6th Mine-Sweeping Half-Flotilla, which at the
beginning of the conflict had made off to the south-east at full speed.

The cruisers nearest to them, the Nurnberg and the Pillau, threw
smoke bombs to protect them, and the 14th Torpedo-Boat Half-
Flotilla also helped to envelop the mine-sweepers in smoke. The
enemy destroyers, which had already come pretty near, sheered off

306

Our Light Graft in Action

from the smoke. The mine-sweepers steamed off in an E.S.E.
direction and were not molested by the enemy. It is possible that
the latter suspected poison gas in the smoke.

At 9.50 A.M. destroyers approached Scouting Division II to make
a torpedo attack. Judging by bearings and distances, the attack
was doomed to failure from the first. The enemy scored no hits.
At the same time Admiral von Reuter ordered our torpedo-boats
to attack. The boats advanced to the attack in a running fight,
scattered as they were. It was not possible to collect for a closed
attack owing to the speed at which the fight moved on. Altogether
six torpedoes were fired; no hits were recorded with absolute
certainty. At any rate the enemy cruisers turned off sharply for
the time being, and in so doing unavoidably afforded our light
cruisers a welcome alleviation. The Konigsberg and the Frankfurt
also fired torpedoes; no result was observed.

At 10.30 a.m. the battleships Kaiserin and Kaiser hove in sight.
Admiral von Reuter tried by holding an easterly course to draw
the enemy after him through the belts of English and German mines,
so as to get him between our battleships and our cruisers. He would
then only have been able to get away to the north and the north-west
through the belt of mines. If he chose this route in preference to
a retreat to the west he was pretty certain to suffer losses by striking
mines. The battleships, which owing to the smoke and steam could
not overlook the situation clearly, and did not rightly interpret the
signals made by the Konigsberg, steered on a N.W. course towards
the approaching ships in action, unable at first to distinguish friend
from foe. Scouting Division II then determined to try to join up
with the battleships. The latter meanwhile had opened fire on the
light cruisers of the "Concord" class. The Kaiserin quickly got
the range, and a hit was observed on the leading cruiser. Thereupon
the hostile ships sheered off. When Admiral von Reuter went to
turn with the Konigsberg and pursue the enemy along a north-
west course, he was still under fire, and a shell hit the Konigsberg,
causing a serious bunker fire.

With this shot the firing suddenly ceased. The action was over.
The enemy ran away at full speed to the N.W. In the meantime
the Hindenburg and the Moltke, which on receipt of the news that
an engagement was in progress had followed the other two battle-
ships, had reached the scene of action; probably their appearance
induced the enemy to break off the engagement. Our boats which
started in pursuit did not succeed in getting into touch with the

307

Germany's High Sea Fleet

enemy again. An advance with Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VII, under-
taken the same night, met with no result either. Torpedo-Boat
Flotilla II, which had advanced to the Hoofden the night before
and was just returning thence to the Bight, could not be sent in
chase owing to lack of fuel.

So far as could be ascertained at such a distance and with the
smoke that was developed, the following ships were engaged on
the enemy side: 4 battle-cruisers (2 "Lion" and 2 "Courageous"),
and 6 to 8 light cruisers of the "Concord," "Caroline" and
"Arethusa" classes, as well as 16 to 18 destroyers. According to
seaplane observations, confirmed by other reports, behind these
cruisers and outside the Horns Reef — Terschelling line there were
other heavy righting ships — at least one battleship squadron which,
however, did not dare to enter the belt of mines, while the enemy
cruisers kept in a straight line where our ships had passed and thus
obtained some security from that danger.

The following hits were observed from our ships : five on the
enemy battle-cruisers, six on the light cruisers, and seven on- the
destroyers. Our cruisers were hit by two heavy shells, one of which
was a 38 cm., and by three 15 cm. It was remarkable what little
damage the 38 cm. shell caused in the Konigsberg. It passed
through all three funnels of the ship, went through the upper deck
into a coal bunker — the inner wall of which it burst ; there it exploded
and caused a fire. The fragments of this shell were picked up and
its calibre determined. This proved to us that the English had
built a new class of cruiser armed with a 38 cm. gun. The great
speed of the ships was extraordinary. So far as the somewhat
doubtful observations of our cruisers went, they had only two
turrets, one fore and the other aft. The fact that a battle-cruiser
felt obliged to sheer off on being hit by one of our light cruisers
seems to indicate that its armour cannot have been very strong;
probably weakened to allow of the high speed that was aimed at.

The losses on our side were: 21 killed, 10 seriously wounded,
and 30 slightly wounded. The only ship that fell a victim to the
enemy was the outpost steamer Kedingen which was stationed as
a mark-ship at the point of departure of the test-trip. The English
directed the fire of their 38 cm. guns on this little boat, so that the
crew had to go overboard. She was captured undamaged by the
English and carried off.

Our light cruisers amply fulfilled their duty of shielding the
mine-sweeping groups and drawing fire upon themselves. Their

308

Holding up Convoys

relative strength, when compared with the enemy, unfortunately
made it impossible for them to achieve a greater success, especially
as the two battleships came to their support so late. This induced
us in subsequent similar undertakings to make the support groups
stronger and to send them forward, as far as the mine-fields would
permit of such a course. The demands thus made upon the battle-
ships of our outpost section increased considerably. The field of
operation of the mine-sweepers extended 180 sea miles to the north
and 140 miles to the west of the Jade. Work at such distant points
was impossible without strong fighting support.

As a rule one-half of these support ships were placed immediately
behind the mine-sweepers, and the remainder about 50 sea miles
farther back. On days when air-scouting was possible, only half
of the outpost-ships were required, but when air-scouting was
limited all the outpost forces took part in the operations. In the
neighbourhood of the Amrum Bank an anchorage was made secure
from submarine attack and surrounded by nets. Here the support
ships for the operations in the north could anchor, and thus avoid
the long return journey to the Jade or the necessity of cruising about
at night and burning unnecessary fuel. But this anchorage was
not ready for use until the summer of 1918.

HOLDING UP CONVOYS

While the Fleet was busy with the conquest of the Baltic
Islands the light cruisers Brummer and Bremse received orders to
make a raid on the traffic route between Lerwick, in the Shetland
Islands, and Bergen, the object being to inflict damage on English
trade by surface craft as well as by U-boats. In the event of
their encountering nothing there they were to push on at their own
discretion to the west of the British Isles into the Atlantic, as far
as their fuel supply would allow. These two cruisers had joined the
Fleet in 1916 and had originally been constructed in German
shipyards as mine-layers for the Russian Government; they were
distinguished for high speed. Their engines were adapted for coal
or oil fuel. They carried a 15-cm. gun. The mine-laying apparatus,
with the exception of the dropping-gear, had been removed so as
not to hinder the ships on their cruises. While our other light
cruisers could accommodate but 120 mines on deck, when they
carried them for a special expedition, the Brummer and the Bremse
were capable of taking thrice that number. The addition of these

309

Germany's High Sea Fleet

two cruisers was a very welcome reinforcement, and made it possible
to form two scouting groups of light cruisers (II and IV) with
modern ships of approximately the same speed, after the alterations
of the other light cruisers had been completed and they had received
a 15-cm. gun instead of their 10.5-cm. guns, which were too weak.

It was known that neutral merchant vessels assembled in convoys
to travel under the protection of English warships, and therefore
they might be regarded as enemy vessels, since they openly claimed
English protection so as to benefit the enemy and consequently to
injure us. Interruption of this traffic was intended to heighten the
effect of the U-boat campaign. Apart from depriving the enemy
of the supplies he awaited, it would place him under the necessity
of affording better protection to the neutral shipping placed at his
service, for which more warships would be required; these, again,
would have to be taken from among those occupied in the war on
U-boats. iWe might also anticipate that the success of such attacks
would have a terrorising influence.

On putting out to sea the cruisers were delayed for a day, because
the mine-sweepers who accompanied them found mines in their path,
but at dawn on October 17, 1917, they lay in the middle of the
fairway Lerwick — Bergen, and before day broke they encountered a
convoy of ten steamers under the protection of two or three warships.
At the head of the formation, which was in a double row, was the
destroyer Strongbow, and when she recognised our cruisers as enemy
ships she advanced smartly to the attack and was sunk after a few
shots had been exchanged.

The steamers had stopped when they realised the position they
were in, and began to lower boats in which the crews might find
safety. A second British destroyer, the Mary Rose, had first made
off to the north when the fight began, but changed her mind and
returned, after about 20 minutes, to the ships under her protection.
She also attacked our cruisers and was sunk after a short fight. The
steamers were then sunk as they passed at a short distance, which
enabled the shots to be placed on the water line. As two of the
steamers had been able to get away in time on noticing the attack,
the care of the crews in the boats could be left to them, for our
cruisers had to consider their own safety on the long return journey.
A. further extension of the cruise offered no prospect of success after
this incident.

It was to be foreseen that this action would occasion a great
outcry among those that had suffered, if only to divert attention

310

Holding up Convoys

from the humiliating fact that German cruisers had appeared in
the Northern waters supposed to be completely under English
control. If in this starvation war, introduced by the English, the
neutrals worked against the German nation and so openly assisted
the enemy as to place themselves under the protection of his
warships, they must take the consequences of their action. To what
an extent they regarded themselves as being on the side of the
enemy is shown by the fact that some of these neutral steamers
carried guns on the forecastle which they did not hesitate to use.

If England wanted to demand the right to enjoy undisturbed
supplies, thanks to the complaisance of the neutrals, or to the
pressure brought to bear on them, no one could expect us to look
on with folded hands until English sea power had completed its
work of destroying our nation by starvation. The counter-measures
which this necessitated .must recoil upon England as the originator
of this form of warfare.

The effect of such action had to be heightened by a speedy
repetition of a similar attack. The next time Torpedo-Boat
Flotilla II was chosen, which comprised our biggest and fastest
torpedo-boats. A half-flotilla was to attack the convoy traffic near
the English coast in the so-called "war channel," while at the same
time the other half-flotilla was to go to the Bergen — Lerwick route.
Flotilla II (Commander Heinecke), accompanied by the light cruiser
Emden (the ship substituted for the one of the same name that
Captain von Muller had commanded), left early in the morning
of December n, at a speed of 19 knots. The weather was clear,
sea smooth. At 4 p.m. the half-flotillas parted at the north-east end
of the Dogger Bank, and the Emden remained behind.

The 3rd Half-Flotilla went north, the 4th steered for a point on
the English coast 25 sea miles north of Newcastle. At 6 p.m. a
wireless message was received that a convoy with destroyers would
leave the Firth of Forth for the south between 8 and n p.m. On
account of this message the leader determined to go. up the "war
channel " to the north, about as far as Berwick, so as to meet the
enemy on this part of the route between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m. According
to other English wireless messages received, there were in the Firth
of Forth 8 British cruisers, in the Tyne some destroyers, and in
the Humber 2 destroyers with various guard-boats. This, however,
did not hinder the leader of the flotilla from pursuing his purpose.
Towards 2.30 p.m. on December 12, 1917, before the flotilla had
turned into the "war channel," a steamer of about 3,000 tons was

3"

Germany's High Sea Fleet

sighted coming at a distance of about 25 nauticaT miles from the coast ;
it was sunk by a torpedo. The crew of the steamer took to their
boats. As the flotilla approached closer to the coast the beacons
they expected to see were not visible, so that they could not find
their way between the Fame Islands and the land. To have gone out
to sea and so round the islands would have meant missing the convoy,
so the half-flotilla turned southwards in the direction of the mouth
of the Tyne. Although the course ran only 3' to 4 nautical miles from
the coast, nothing was to be seen of the land or any towns. It was
very misty near the coast. At 4.45 a.m. a steamer with very great
draught came into sight on the port bow ; her size was estimated
at 5,000 tons. This ship was steering on a southerly course down
the "war channel," and was sunk by a torpedo; the crew took to
the boats. A quarter of an hour later four small steamers came in
sight; obviously they were the convoy boats which had already
indicated their presence by wireless messages, and were now on
the point of entering Tynemouth. Two of them were destroyed
by gunfire, the other two escaped because our torpedo-boats were
looking around for larger steamers or destroyers that might be in
the neighbourhood. As nothing further was found, the boats
started on their return journey at 6 a.m. At 5.15 p.m. they rejoined
the Emden, which had waited at sea for the flotilla.

The half-flotilla under Lieutenant-Commander Hans Holbe had
continued on a northerly course after separating from the others on
the previous day. The farther north they went the worse the weather
became. Towards 10 p.m. there was a heavy swell and a strong
freshening wind from the south. The next morning, at 4 o'clock,
speed had to be reduced first to 15 and then to 12 knots, because
heavy seas came up from the north-west. It was impossible to fire
a gun or a torpedo. The leader of the half-flotilla had to give up
his plan and steered towards Udsire on the Norwegian coast, so as
to be able to fix his position and then to try and catch a convoy
announced from Drammen. At 7 a.m. he sighted Udsire. As the
barometer fell no lower and the seas seemed to be decreasing, he
once more turned upon a northerly course, which, however, had to
be abandoned again at 11 A.M., because in the sea then running he
could only make a speed of 9 knots. The boats, therefore, once
more turned south, intending to stay out of sight of land by day
and to approach the coast by night, expecting to meet some merchant-
men there. In the course of the morning one boat developed a
leakage in the condenser. But the commander of the half-flotilla

312

Holding up Convoys

decided to keep the boat with him and reduce the speed of all his
boats to 25 knots, preferring this to sending the boat back home
alone from such a great distance.

While he was steaming along on a southerly course, at 12.30 p.m.
a convoy of six steamers came into sight which was protected by
two destroyers and four trawlers. It was going from Lerwick to
Norway on an easterly course.

The destroyer Partridge, which was ahead of the formation on
the port side, steamed towards our half-flotilla and came under fire
at 1 o'clock. The destroyer Pellew, which was on the starboard
side, had steamed ahead full speed, and the Partridge joined her.

\ \ \

RlctrUtge..•■' \

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M-\) \ \ \

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sf \ s/

Gelerteug

P«U*» *•»._ _Jj

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The Attack on the Convoy

The British destroyers left the convoy and the four trawlers to their
fate; probably with the idea of drawing our boats away from the
latter, and of fighting them. The fire of the British destroyers was
not very effective. The fight was carried on at a distance of 50 hm.
till the Partridge, after a shot in her main steam-pipes, could not
continue. She tried to carry on the fight with her torpedoes, but
one torpedo stuck in the tube which had been damaged by gunfire;
a second torpedo, fired at short range at our boat "V 100," hit, for
the shock was distinctly felt in the boat, but it did not explode.
While three boats of our half-flotilla took up the fight with the two
destroyers, the fourth boat (which could only travel at 25 knots)
was sent to destroy the convoy. The destroyer Pellew, pursued by
the leader of the half-flotilla, succeeded — thanks to her superior
speed — in getting out of sight in a squall of rain, and escaped to
the land. Four officers and forty-eight men of the Partridge and

313

Germany's High Sea Fleet

the trawlers, which were all sunk, were taken on board as prisoners
of war, as well as 23 civilians. Our casualties were three wounded.
The convoy consisted of one English, two Swedish, two Norwegian
and one Danish merchant steamer. The shipwrecked men of the
latter refused to come on board our boats; of the others some
consented to come on board, and then the steamers were all sunk.
The whole affair was over in three-quarters of an hour. Owing to
the high seas, it cost a lot of trouble to get the English on board
when they were floating about in the water, having taken refuge
on rafts. The half-flotilla then started on its return journey round
Skagen, as a weather report announced stormy weather in the North
Sea, and so reached Kiel Harbour. This repeated interference with
merchant traffic, which had shown the insufficiency of the protection
afforded by English convoys, had the desired result, and compelled
the employment of stronger forces.

Information obtained by U-boats was to the effect that American
ships were pressed into service for this purpose; they were
recognisable by their masts. This confirmed statements received
from other quarters that the English Fleet was receiving support
from the Americans in the War Zone of the North Sea. Thus there
was little further prospect of our light craft being able to destroy
any more convoys. Stronger forces would have to be employed for
this purpose. This led to an expedition of the Fleet in April, 1918.

AN EXPEDITION OF THE HEINECKE TORPEDO-BOAT FLOTILLA

In February, 1918, Flotilla II was confronted with a new problem,
which it solved brilliantly. The Naval Corps in Flanders had
sent a request to the commanders of the Fleet begging them to
destroy the English light-barrier which had just been instituted
between Dover and Calais. In the last months the enemy had, with
much expenditure of material, tried to make these Straits impassable
for our U-boats. According to the reports of the boats, there were
net barriers between Cape Grisnez and Folkestone, and farther south
between Boulogne and Dungeness. The nets were guarded by a
large number of vessels which, by means of searchlights and
magnesium lights, formed a very effective light-barrier all night
long. This made it very much more difficult for our U-boats to
get through unmolested, and the Straits were actually almost
impassable. The forces in Flanders alone were not able to deal a
sufficiently effective blow to this Anglo-French barrier to the

3M

The Heinecke Torpedo-boat Flotilla

Channel. For this undertaking the commanders of the Fleet chose
the strong boats of the Heinecke Flotilla, which was sent direct
from the German Bight without first touching the coast of Flanders,
so as to make sure of surprising the enemy.

On the day of the enterprise Flotilla II was to be off Haaks
Lightship at 5.30 p.m. and thence proceed in close formation as far
as the northern end of the Channel by the Sandettie Bank; there
the two half-flotillas were to separate ; one led- by the Flotilla Com-
mander was to attack the barrier west of Varne Bank, and the other
was to attack east of that point. When the attack was over they
were to enter Zeebrugge Harbour, take in a fresh fuel supply, and
start the return journey to the German Bight the same night.

Owing to bad weather the enterprise, originally planned for
February 7, was postponed to the 13th. In the meanwhile the route
the boats were to have followed had been made impracticable by
new English mine-fields, and they had to go close by the Frisian
Islands, thereby running the risk of being seen early in the evening
trom Dutch territory and their advance being reported'. Con-
sequently the misty weather on February 13 was not unwelcome.
Flotilla II managed to pass along the mine-swept route at
Terschelling with the help of the land, without having been able
to see any landmarks; but when it arrived off Haaks Lightship it
had to give up the attempt because of the fog; the boats would
have had to travel at high speed to reach their goal in time, and
this was impossible in the foggy weather. The flotilla anchored
during the night north of Norderney. The next day, February 14,
it started again in very clear weather. So as not to betray his real
goal, the Flotilla Commander set out from Helder on a westerly
course ; when out of sight of land he steered south, and, after dark-
ness had fallen, down the Dutch coast as far as the Schouven Bank.
At the Hook of Holland one of the boats had to be sent back to the
German Bight owing to defects in the condenser. In the night of
the 15th at 12.30 a.m. the two half-flotillas separated according to
plan north-east of the Sandettie Bank. The group led by Captain
Heinecke was to circumvent the first and more northerly barrier
near the English coast, and begin by attacking the southern barrier
presumed to be off Dungeness, and then on his return roll up the
northern barrier from the Varne Bank to Folkestone. The latter,
being a light-barrier, could be seen from far off. On approaching it,
it became clear that it consisted of a large number of craft, anchored
or moored to buoys, which were placed right across the fairway,

3*5

Germany's High Sea Fleet

not in one line, but in echelon in a broad band. These boats lit
up the fairway all the time with searchlights, and from time to
lime, about every quarter of an hour, they threw magnesium lights
overboard which, floating down the tide for minutes at a time, lit
up the vicinity for a distance of two or three miles, so that it
was almost as light as day. In and out among these a lot of boats
moved without Tights, armed trawlers, submarine chasers and motor-
boats, to attack any U-boat that might come. At the north-west
end of the barrier a searchlight, apparently placed on land between
Dover and Folkestone, threw a steady beam of light in the cross
Channel direction. In these circumstances it was impossible to
get round the barrier, and the Flotilla Commander determined to
make a direct attack. He first made for a large boat placed about
the middle of the barrier with a specially bright revolving search-
light; this he sank from a distance of 300 m. It was an old cruiser,
or a special boat of the "Arabis" type. After this the group first
swept round to the north-west and then went more slowly along
the barrier in a more or less south-easterly direction. In a short
time they sank 13 of these guardships, including a U-boat chaser
with the number "1113," a small torpedo-boat and two motor-boats,
one of Which had come up in order to fire a torpedo; these were
all sunk at close range by gunfire.

The enemy was taken completely by surprise. Several of the
boats sounded their sirens, clearly under the impression that they
ivere being attacked in error by their own ships. No warning was
given, and a considerable time elapsed after we had opened fire
before all lights were put out. This may have been due to the
fact that the big ship that was sunk first had been in command of
the whole, or else the ships on guard may have been used to hearing
gunfire owing to the frequent fights with U-boats. An attempt to
take prisoners had to be abandoned, because owing to the swift tide
it proved too dangerous for our ships to go alongside the sinking
boats that were in part moored to buoys. The whole affair lasted
from about 1.30 a.m. till about 2.30 a.m. Owing to the lateness of
the hour it was out of the question to attack the other barrier
supposed to lie farther south, from which, however, no lights or
searchlights were seen, and so the return journey was begun.

Meanwhile the other half-flotilla had turned towards the southern
end of the barrier, and first made for Cape Grisnez. Again one of
the boats developed a leakage in the condenser, but the commander
of the half-flotilla could not dismiss the boat and had to reduce

316

The Heinecke Torpedo-boat Flotilla

the speed of the other boats to that of the defective one. Off Calais
the group encountered the first guardship, lying close to the coast,
a large, armed trawler, and, taking her by surprise, sank her by
gunfire. Steering west, they met a number of other boats which
were using searchlights and magnesium lights. In several cases
the supply of magnesium lights on the guardships caught fire owing
to the shots. In this part of the barrier, too, it was some time before
the boats realised that the enemy was among them, and retired to
the west. Altogether this torpedo-boat half-flotilla sank twelve
armed guardships and two motor-boats.

At 2.40 a.m. the half-flotilla started upon the return journey. At
3.30 A.M. the stern lights of six English destroyers were sighted
ahead. Owing to his unfavourable position with regard to the
enemy and the reduced speed of the one boat, which left him with
only two boats that were quite intact, the commander of the half-
flotilla was forced to avoid a fight. He turned off and did not reply
to the enemy's signal. The latter at first followed in the wake of
the half-flotilla, but after altering his course a few times was lost
to view. On making for Zeebrugge the torpedo-boat " G 102 " struck
a mine about 12 nautical miles from the harbour entrance; two com-
partments filled with water, but the boat was able to reach the
harbour without assistance. Three men were killed through this
mishap. These were the only casualties of the expedition.

After replenishing their supply of oil fuel in Zeebrugge the
flotilla began its return journey in the evening of the same day and
reached home without further incident. The damaged boat was
temporarily repaired in Flanders, and followed a few days later. The
flotilla's success was due to the completeness of the surprise.
Besides the direct damage inflicted on the enemy by the sinking of
so many boats that were of value to him, we accomplished our aim
of breaking the barrier across the Calais — Dover Straits through
which our U-boats were again able to pass for the time being. A
scouting trip carried out the following day by the torpedo-boats of
the Naval Corps showed that the guard had been completely
withdrawn.

The demands made on the skill of the officers commanding these
boats were very great, as it was difficult to distinguish things clearly
because of the gunfire, and particularly because of the smoke on
the water from the magnesium lights. The gun-layers did excellent
work in shooting down the fast motor-boats which, owing to their
speed, could only be discerned at the last moment, but were always

317

Germany's High Sea Fleet

knocked out by the first shot. It was a great help to the expedition
to be able to break the return journey by running into Zeebrugge,
because otherwise the voyage would have had to be made by daylight,
and in that case the English would probably have made an attempt
to cut our boats off.

ADVANCE OF THE FLEET TO THE NORWEGIAN COAST

When the portion of the Fleet that had been sent east had
returned from the conquest of the Baltic Islands, some weeks elapsed
before the ships and torpedo-boats had had the damage repaired that
they had suffered from mines and from running aground. The
winter months brought no change in the activities of the Fleet, which
were directed towards supporting the U-boat campaign.

In the spring of 1918, when our army was attacking in the west,
English interest was bound to centre in the Channel. Through
agents, through the aeroplane service in Flanders, and through fol-
lowing the enemy's wireless messages, we ascertained that he had
materially reinforced the warships protecting his transports, and that
large ships had been sent to the Channel, and parts of the crews of
the Grand Fleet had been sent to reinforce those of the light craft
in the Channel. On the other hand, the enemy had carefully im-
proved the convoy traffic between England and Norway since the
successful raids of the Brummer and the Bremse, and of the boats
of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II. Our U-boats had learnt that the
steamers were assembled there in large convoys, strongly protected
by first-class battleships, cruisers and destroyers. A successful
attack on such a convoy would not only result in the sinking of much
tonnage, but would be a great military success, and would bring
welcome relief to the U-boats operating in the Channel and round
England, for it would force the English to send more warships to
the northern waiters. The convoys could not be touched by light
craft. But the battle-cruisers could probably, according to informa-
tion received, deal with all exigencies likely to arise if they could
have the necessary support from the battleship squadrons.

So far as could be made out convoys mostly travelled at the
beginning "and middle of the week. Consequently Wednesday,
April 24, was chosen for the attack. A necessary condition for
success was that our intentions should be kept secret. It was
enjoined upon the officers in command of the subordinate groups to
use their wireless as sparingly as possible during the expedition,

" 318

Kreuzer 24 iv.ig. n

*-t -

Expedition to the Norwegian Coast

Germany's High Sea Fleet

which was to extend beyond the Skagerrak up to the Norwegian
coast. On the pretext of manoeuvres in the Heligoland Bight all
warships at our disposal were assembled on the evening of the 22nd
in the Schillig Roads. Here the officers in command of the various
groups were informed of our intentions and received their orders.
The plan was to attack the convoy with the battle-cruisers, the light
cruisers of Scouting Division II, and Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II under
the leadership of the officer commanding the Scouting Divisions,
Admiral von Hipper, while the remainder of the ships took up a
position from which, in case of need, effective support could be given
to the cruisers. All other flotillas were to remain with the main body
of the Fleet. Torpedb-Boat Flotilla V could not be included, as its
radius of action was too small. The commander of this flotilla,
Commander von Tyszka, was entrusted with the conduct and pro-
tection of the convoy service through the mine-fields south-west and
west of Horns Reef.

To ensure safety of progress through the mine-fields in prepara-
tion for this enterprise, protective barriers had been placed about 70
sea miles west of Horns Reef, running from north to south. The
area between Horns Reef and this protective barrier was to be the
starting-point of the expedition. The U-boats that had recently put
to sea had received orders to seek opportunities for attack off the
Firth of Forth and to report all warships and convoys that were
sighted.

On the 23rd at 6 a.m. the various groups put to sea, Admiral von
Hipper leading with the Scouting Divisions I and II, with the Second
Leader of the torpedo-boats and Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II ; following
him came the main body of the Fleet in the following order : Scout-
ing Division IV, Squadron III, the Flagship of the Fleet, the First
Leader of torpedo-boats, Squadron I, Squadron IV, and with the
main body Torpedo Flotillas I, VI, VII and IX. Immediately after
they left the Jade a heavy fog descended. As far as List the way was
clear ; from there it led through enemy mine-fields ; to get through
these it was necessary for the Fleet to be accompanied by mine-
sweepers, and therefore a certain amount of visibility was needful —
at least two miles. At first we were able to proceed at 14 knots.
But when, at 11.30 a.m., we reached the entrance to the mine-field
and visibility was only 100 metres, we had to anchor. Half an hour
later it cleared up ; one could see three to four nautical miles, and the
expedition could proceed. The journey through the mine-fields
passed off without a hitch. When darkness fell the boundary had

3 2 °

The Advance to the Norwegian Coast

been reached, and the mine-sweepers could be dismissed. The poor
visibility had so far favoured the enterprise. The enemy line of
submarines on guard round the German Bight seems to have been
broken through, if indeed it was occupied at all.

During the night it cleared up; daybreak brought fine, clear
weather. At 8 a.m. the Moltke reported to the High Sea Com-
mander : " Grave damage, speed four knots, position about 40 sea
miles W.S. W. of Stavanger." All haste was made to reach the
scene of the accident; the Strassburg, the foremost ship in the line
of advance, was detached to the Moltke, and the battleship Olden-
burg made ready to tow. At 10.40 a.m. the Moltke was sighted;
soon after von Hipper appeared from the N.W. with his two
Scouting Divisions. He had detached the Moltke at 6 a.m. to the
main body of the Fleet. At that time she could still do 13 knots.
He had not received the message that she was reduced to four knots.
When towards 9 a.m. he received the news that the Moltke couldl not
move and that the Flagship had not made out the signal — which,
however, was a mistake — he decided to go to her assistance himself.
He sent no report to the main body of the Fleet owing to the orders
that the use of wireless messages should be reduced as much as pos-
sible. He had the more reason for this course because when he
turned he was already in the northern part of the convoy route, and
thanks to the clear weather he could see that for the time being
nothing was in sight, and that any approaching convoys would not %
escape him if he made a fresh advance later. As the Moltke had now
been taken charge of by the main body the Admiral received orders
to advance again to the north. On this second occasion he searched
the convoy track as far as the 60th degree of latitude but sighted
nothing.

At about 11.45 a.m. the Moltke was taken in tow by the Olden-
burg. The manoeuvre was carried out without a hitch in the shortest
possible time. The main body of the Fleet with these two ships then
set out on the return journey; their speed was 10 knots. There were
two routes open to us; the one led through the Kattegat, the other
straight into the German Bight. By choosing the former the Fleet
would presumably have avoided a meeting with the English Fleet
which had time to come up and oppose us, as we could only go at a
slow speed in order not to leave the Moltke in the lurch. But the
road through the Kattegat was very roundabout, and in addition
the passage through the Belt would have been very difficult for the
damaged ship, and in order to protect the tow all our ships would
v 321

Germany's High Sea Fleet

have had to return through the Little Belt. This was undesirable
for two reasons, firstly, on account of the Danes, and secondly
because it might provoke the English to lay mines in the Kattegat.
This latter proceeding might be very unpleasant for our U-boats,
and I decided, therefore, to return through the North Sea into the
Bight in spke of the possibility of being attacked by superior forces.
Meanwhile the following condition of affairs had been discovered
on board the Moltke. The inner propeller on the starboard side had
been flung off (the ship had four propeller shafts) ; the turbine had
raced, and before the machinery for stopping it could act the training
wheel had flown to pieces. Fragments of the wheel had penetrated
the discharge pipe of the auxiliary condenser, several steam exhaust
pipes, and the deck leading to the main switch-room. The central
engine-room and the main switch-room were immediately flooded
owing to the damage to the auxiliary condenser, while the wing
engine-room made water rapidly. Salt water penetrated into the
boilers, and the engines gradually ceased to work. Through a curious
chain of circumstances an accident to a propeller, slight enough in
itself, had brought the ship completely to a stand, so that it was
powerless to move. Two thousand tons of water had flowed into the
ship before a diver succeeded at length in closing the valves which
controlled the flow of water in and out of the auxiliary con-
denser. It was not till then that they got the water under control.
In the afternoon the port engines were able to run at Half speed; but
for the time being there was no guarantee that they would continue
to run. The ship would have to be towed right into the Bight, and the
highest speed attainable by the tow was 1 1 knots. At this rate of
progress we could not reach the belt of mines west of Horns Reef
before dawn the next day.

Information received from the Naval Staff at 2 p.m. concern-
ing the times of arrival and departure of convoys indicated that we
had not been lucky in our choice of a day to attack them. Apparently
the convoys from England to Norway had crossed the North Sea on
the 23rd.

At 6.30 p.m. we received a wireless message from a U-boat that
eleven enemy cruisers were about 80 miles behind us. But
probably the U-boat had mistaken the cruisers that were following
us under Admiral von Hipper for those of the enemy.

At 8.50 p.m. the towing cable of the Oldenburg broke, which
entailed a delay of an hour. For the night the tow was left at the
end of the line. At 11 p.m. Admiral von Hipper had approached to

322

The Advance to the Norwegian Coast

within 30 nautical miles of the main Fleet. At dawn all the ships were
together. The enemy was nowhere to be seen. The journey through
the belt of mines was accomplished according, to plan. Mine-
sweepers met and convoyed the Fleet back in the same manner as
on the outward journey. One mine-sweeper, "M 67," struck a
mine and sank ; most of the crew were saved.

Off List the Moltke was cast loose, and was able to proceed at a
speed of 15 knots. About an hour after she had been cast loose, at
7.50 p.m., she was attacked by a submarine 40 nautical miles north of
Heligoland and was hit amidships on the port side. She could not
avoid the torpedo, but was able to turn towards its course so that it
struck at a very acute angle. The injury did not prevent the ship
from entering the Jade under her own steam.

Unfortunately the expedition did not meet with the success hoped
for. The opportunity of joining issue with our Fleet was not made
use of by the enemy, although by the wireless messages which had
to be sent owing to the accident to the Moltke he must have known
of the presence of our ships. The bringing in of the Moltke under
such unfavourable conditions of sea and weather as arose during the
night of the return journey was an eminent military achievement,
especially the part played by the Oldenburg (Commander, Captain
Lohlen) which towed her, and the work done in stopping the leak
by the men on board the Moltke deserves great praise.

This expedition was unfortunately the last which the Fleet was
able to undertake.

323

CHAPTER XVIII
THE NAVY COMMAND

AT the end of June, 1918, Admiral von Miiller, the Chief of the
l Emperor's Naval Cabinet, informed me that Admiral von Holt-
zendorff 's state of health made it improbable that he would be able to
hold the post of Chief of the Admiralty Staff much longer. In this
event His Majesty had designated me as his probable successor.

This information released me from the ob'ligatipn that had
hitherto prevented me from suggesting, a change of organisation
in the department which had directed the conduct of the war at sea.
The system was a failure, was not very popular in the Navy, and
our success was less than we had a right to expect. I could not very
well recommend myself as head of this department, all the more so
as the command of the Fleet involved personal danger, and I did not
care to avoid this by getting a position on land. Even the very
frank discussions which had taken place between the Chief of the
Naval Staff and myself had not resulted in the full satisfaction
of the demands of the Fleet. My personal relations with Admiral
von Holtzendorff enabled me to speak to him without reserve. We
had grown pretty intimate by serving together on the same ships at
different times. We were thrown together at sea for the first time in
1884 — 86 on board the cruiser Bismarck, the flagship of Rear- Admiral
von Knorr, when we went to West Africa, East Africa and the South
Seas to visit our colonies there. After that I was navigating officer
in 1895 — 96 in the cruiser Prinz Wilhelm, which Holtzendorff, a
commander at the time, commanded on a cruise to the Far East.
Later on he offered me the post of Chief of the Staff of the High Sea
Fleet, which I held for two years, 1909 — 11, under his command as
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. On all these occasions I had!
learnt to appreciate his personality and his capacity as a leader.
For this reason I was grieved at the particular cause for the change,
but as the spell was broken I urged the Chief of the Naval Cabinet
to accomplish it in any case.

I had no occasion to complain of undue influence or limitation
of the Fleet by the Chief of the Naval Staff. But his position
was not clear ; he seemed to us to yield too much to political pressure.

324

The Navy Command

The conduct of the U-boat campaign was typical of it. Even at
this moment there were serious differences of opinion as to the
way it should be carried on. The forces of the Navy were scattered
over the various theatres of war, and the Commanders of the Fleet
could not see any necessity for this. The Fleet formed a sort of
reservoir which was to satisfy all demands for personnel. Naturally
there was great opposition to any withdrawal of personnel from
the Navy, unless it was clearly conducive to the main aim of the
war. But that aim could only be achieved by the Fleet and the
U-boats, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet felt himself
responsible for this.

There was no post of command superior to his, where full
responsibility could be taken for the success of the conduct of war
at sea. For the Naval Staff was not a Supreme Command, but
an organ of the Emperor as the Supreme War Lord, which
could not be bothered with details of the conduct of the war. The
relation of the Naval Staff to the Navy was not the same as
that of the Supreme Army Command to the Army on land. If, for
instance, a plan of campaign in Roumania is carried out successfully,
that is essentially to the credit of the Supreme Army Command,
for it correctly estimated the strength and capability of troops
and leaders, and set them a task proportionate to their abilities. In
the war at sea the Naval Staff apportioned the existing ships
and boats to the different fields of operation— the Baltic, the North
Sea, or Flanders, the Mediterranean or foreign parts, and had to
leave the officers in command there to act independently in accord-
ance with their general instructions. On land the Supreme Com-
mand permanently controlled the war operations; this was not the
case at sea. If the Fleet had been defeated in battle, no one would
have dreamt of making the Naval Staff responsible, but only
the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. But there was need of some
body which should regulate the distribution of forces with a view
to some definite end, and not leave the success of naval activities to
the individual admirals in command in the different theatres of war.

The U-boat campaign had further complicated matters, because
all independent officers in command had U-boats assigned to them,
and the Chief of the Nayal Staff had even placed certain of
them, e.g. the U-cruisers, under his own immediate command.
There was need of exchange among the different groups. The
development ought to be regulated on uniform lines, and the ex-
periences gained by the individual commanders in their boats,

325

Germany's High Sea Fleet

including those who specialised on the technical side, ought to be
made of benefit to all. Finally, the personnel of all the new boats,
at any rate all the officers and petty officers, had to be drawn from
the Fleet.

That meant that the Chief of the Naval Staff must be in-
cluded in the number of those commanders who were directly
responsible for the conduct of the war. We felt the lack of a
Supreme Command whose orders must be unhesitatingly obeyed.
Our organisation in peace time had not foreseen this. In the year
1899 the Supreme Command of the Navy had been done away with,
because at that time two powerful authorities, generally pulling
in different directions, were detrimental to the development and
building up of the Navy. The Secretary of State, von Tirpitz,
did not feel able successfully to carry through the policy requisite
Tor the steady development and growth of the Fleet unless it
corresponded in every particular with his own convictions. The
result was that the Naval Staff, which was all that was left
untouched when the Supreme Command of the Navy was abolished,
had been thrown into the shade, and the men appointed as Chiefs
of the Staff were not for the most part such as would, in case of
war, have the authority of chosen leaders, who had proved 1 their
ability as commanders of the Fleet.

When the Supreme Command ceased to exist the commanders
of the Fleet demanded more and more independence. They did
not pay any attention to strategic questions in peace time; tactics
and development gave full occupation to their activities. The Fleet
commanders' chief responsibility in the war lay in the apportion-
ment of the most important units of the sea forces, for the aim
of naval warfare is to deal the enemy Fleet a destructive blow.
Success depends mainly on the skill of the leader. He must be
thoroughly familiar with the handling and the capabilities of his
weapon — the Fleet. How to bring about the encounter with the
enemy must be left to him. Neither the place nor the time can
be fixed beforehand. For in contradistinction to the war on land,
the position and strength of the enemy are unknown.

Consequently it was thought that more or less indefinite general
directibns would suffice, which the Naval Staff had to suggest
and transmit to the Fleet as orders from the Emperor, based on
the Staff's strategic considerations. This had been a mistake. The
organisation which had appeared useful for the building up of the
Fleet in peace time hampered the ability of the Fleet in war. The

326

The Navy Command

war at sea grew too extensive to be carried on under the personal
guidance of the Emperor, as it should have been in view of the
relation of the Supreme Naval authorities to one another. Politics,
technical matters, and strategy were all closely connected in this.
The war against commerce also, which we had to adopt, influenced
our relations with the neutrals. Technical considerations were in-
volved in the decision as to whether we were to build submarine
or surface ships, but this again was dependent on the course of our
Nayal strategy.

When it was realised that England did not intend to put matters
to the test in a battle, then the time had come to institute a Supreme
Command; all the more so when, towards the end of 19 14, the
views of the Commanders of the Fleet, the Naval Staff and the
Secretary of State upon the course we should pursue were all
divergent. Energetic measures should then have been taken to
provide the Navy with the leadership it required. Grand-Admiral
von Tirpitz himself was the most suitable person, for the Fleet
would have willingly subordinated itself to him, although he lacked
actual experience in handling it. That, however, was not a point
of the greatest importance, as the Fleet Commander had that ex-
perience. The point was to co-ordinate and make use of all the
forces which could contribute to the achievement of the Navy's aim.
The fact that the Grand Admiral was not appointed Supreme
Commander of the Navy was no doubt in part due to the differences
between him and the Chancellor. These grew more acute owing
to our vacillating policy in the U-boat campaign. When Tirpitz
was no longer allowed to exercise his influence in all-important
questions touching the conduct of the war, and he was not con-
sulted as to the decision with regard to the U-boat campaign in
March, 19 16, he, who had worked so admirably in organising our
Fleet, felt compelled to resign.

As the war was prolonged it became more difficult to provide
personnel and material for all the new exigencies; our warfare
extended to far distant parts, and there was a danger of diluting
the forces collected in the Fleet. The harder our task became, the
more the difficulties that were put in our way. There was delay
in the repair of ships and U-boats, in the delivery of new vessels,
in the fulfilment of urgent demands and improvements. The
Auxiliary Service Law was not calculated to increase the power of
sprodfaction of the workpeople, and this also suffered from the
deterioration in food. It cost endless trouble to obtain from the

327

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Army Command technical workmen who were badly needed.
Naturally urgent Army needs had the preference. But convincing
representation of the needs of the Navy might have met with
success in many cases, for goodwill and understanding were
certainly not lacking in the sister service.

Between the Admiral in command of the Naval Corps, the
officer in Supreme Command of the Baltic, and the Fleet, absolute
understanding and the most friendly spirit prevailed whenever help
was asked for. But that was a lengthy way of arranging matters,
and was an insufficient substitute for a Supreme Command that
could overlook the whole situation and give orders accordingly.

The gradual decline in the monthly sinkings accomplished by
the U-boats filled one with anxiety. Many a U-boat with a splendid
and experienced commander did not return. The new commanders
had to gain experience under considerably less favourable conditions.

Day by day the commanders of the Fleet noted! down the
positions of every single U-boat; its departure and return were
followed with care and suspense. All our thoughts centred on
finding ways and means to keep up the standard of their achieve-
ments and to increase them. There was never a day when we
were at sea that the commanders of the Fleet did not discuss this
with the officer in command of the U-boats and his Staff of picked
professional men. We felt that we were responsible for the attain-
ment of such an end to the war as had been promised to the
German people, and that we could achieve it by this means alone.
The Fleet was animated by one sole idea — we must and will succeed.
Every single vessel, battleship, torpedo-boat, minesweeper, cruiser
and airship, with their crews— all were permeated with the gravity
and importance of this task which I impressed on officers and men
on every occasion. New forces must be found which would under-
take to complete the work, which threatened to be a failure when
handled as hitherto by the Naval Staff and the Naval Cabinet.

A change of Secretary of State (Admiral von Capelle) seemed
also very desirable. It was not to be expected that a man who was
convinced that he had done all that was humanly possible would
pledge himself, without reserve, to carry out new proposals which
would bring him into opposition with his previous conduct of affairs.

It had taken six months of urging, from July, 1917, to December
of the same year, before a central organisation for U-boats — the
U-boat Office, demanded by the Fleet Command — had been in-
stituted. Such was the delay in carrying out demands or suggestions

328

The Navy Command

as the case might be — whether they referred to personnel, armament,
or technical matters pertaining to ship-building and so on; the
working of the different departments was inadequate for the needs
of the times.

Though I was bound to the Fleet by such close ties, yet I was
ready to take over the post of Chief of the Naval Staff, provided
that in that capacity I should have definite powers of command.
The Chief of the Naval Cabinet objected that the Emperor would
never consent to give up the Supreme Command — a point on which
I never insisted — but his doubts were not justified. For the Emperor
■consented to the request without hesitation. It was of course under-
stood that the Supreme War Lord should be informed of the general
trend of matters and of important projects, and that his consent
should be obtained thereto. The practice hitherto followed of giving
orders in the Emperor's name on matters outside His Majesty's
sphere of interest was rather derogatory to the dignity of the
Imperial Supreme Command. This incident proves how little
foundation there was for some reports as to the Emperor's attitude,
reports which emanated from those in his immediate entourage, and
easily led to unpleasant decisions being kept from him.

I had such an experience when commanding the Fleet in
January, 1917. The matter in question was the design of a new
first-class battleship. I happened to be in Berlin for a consultation
at the Admiralty, and the Emperor had commanded my presence
when the Secretary of State made his report, the Chief of the
Naval Staff also attending. The Secretary of State brought two
designs for the projected ship, a so-called battleship-cruiser; that
is to say, a ship which should combine the qualities of both kinds
of ship — gun-power, power of resistance and speed.

Unless such a ship were of gigantic dimensions none of these
qualities could be fully developed. This was the reason why up
till then two distinct types had been built ; the cruiser, with powerful
guns, and high speed attained at the expense of its power of resist-
ance, and the battleship, with the most powerful guns, and great
powers of resistance at the expense of its speed.

The Emperor had repeatedly stated that he considered it necessary
to merge these two types in one ; hence these designs. The principle
of the ship uniting all these qualities was to be accepted, but a
choice was to be made between the two designs for carrying this
into effect. The Chief of the Naval Staff and the Secretary of
State were of opinion that the Emperor would not budge from what

329

Germany's High Sea Fleet

they supposed to be his attitude towards the matter, and they urged
me to submit to it. But I had expressed myself to the contrary
beforehand, and I repeated my arguments. The Emperor was soon
convinced by our war experiences that we must continue to have
two types of fighting ships with different speeds, and the Secretary
of State thereupon received orders to have new designs made on the
old lines that had proved successful — much to the gratification of
his Chief Constructor.

Nor was it ever my experience that the Emperor rejected
unpleasant information. In the two months of September and
October, 1918, the unfavourable reports far outnumbered all others;
His Majesty always received them with the greatest calm and
common sense.

If I had foreseen the rapid development of events I would have
preferred remaining with the Fleet rather than organising the conduct
of the war at sea, for my plans never reached fulfilment. Nor do
I think it impossible that I might have succeeded in making the
Fleet obey my orders and exert its full powers at the eleventh hour.
My only excuse for this lack of foresight lies in the fact that my
observation of the spirit of the crews was based on the undiminished
readiness to undertake any warlike enterprise which they had always
shown up to then, and further that no hint of the widespread dis-
integration in our domestic conditions ever reached the leaders of
the Fleet from any reliable political source, just as little as it reached
the Admiralty later on.

On July 28 I was summoned to General Headquarters at Spa;
Admiral von Holtzendorff had again, on the advice of his doctor,
asked His Majesty to relieve him of his post, and his request had
been granted. At the same time a decision was to be reached as to
whether the U-boat campaign should be extended to America. The
Naval Staff had urgently recommended the declaration of a
blockade of the American coast, as this was a necessary preliminary
to carrying out a successful U-boat campaign. As the chief ports
concerned all lay on a strip of 300 nautical miles in length, it was
thought that it would be easier to get at the traffic there. The troop-
ships^ — the immense supplies that went from America to the Western
theatre of war, and the large amount of coast traffic from South to
North America were to be attacked there.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made strong objection
to the declaration of this blockade. If Chile and the Argentine were
thereby also induced to join the Entente, Spain would follow, and

33°

The Navy Command

that was the only country that still protected German interests
abroad. Quite apart from the political reasons urged by the Foreign
Secretary, I did not think it probable that any good could result
from extending the war to the American coast; for the declaration
of a blockade entailed vigorous and decisive warfare. We could not
count on stationing more than three boats there until the end of the
year. No great success could be expected from that, especially as
there was the added risk of the long voyage out. Moreover, to carry
the war over to America would open prospects of an extension of
the war that were out of proportion to our strength. Ours was a
war of defence in Europe. America's interference in this quarrel
was contrary to all her best traditions. No doubt there were a great
number of intelligent Americans who did not approve of America's
taking part, when they calmly and impartially considered the circum-
stances that had led to the world-war. Perhaps they remembered
their own subjection — the manner in which England, their Mother
Country, had deprived them of freedom, and how they had fought
for their independence and successfully gained it with German
assistance. If American troops were injured off the French and
English coasts that was but the inevitable result of American
interference in European quarrels.

But the feeling against us in that country would be very different
if we began an enterprise which we had not the power to carry
through successfully, and which must have an unnecessarily
irritating effect. Three U-boats off the American coast could effect
no essential amelioration in the results of our U-boat campaign.
The decision in that campaign would be reached simply and solely
by reduction of tonnage, and it must be sought in the main blockade
area round England.

The officer commanding the U-boats was quite of my opinion that
every possibility of adding to the achievements in this area must
be made use of. From all the seas ships crowded to the British
Isles. It was easier to deal an effective blow there than to follow
the far-reaching trade routes, and try to attack them at their points
of departure. And if an American transport now and then fell a
victim to a U-boat on setting out from the American coast, that would
not ward off the danger which threatened us from that source. It
would be very easy for the transports to get through the dangerous
strip near the coast by night, or to gain the open sea at any time
under protection. We had learnt in the Franco-British blockaded
area, where all the trade routes of the oceans meet, how difficult it

33 1

Germany's High Sea Fleet

was to pick out the transports from among all the other shipping for
attack. If, for that purpose, we directed our main attention to the
southern ports of France, as had been tried several times, the traffic
was simply diverted as soon as the U-boat danger became manifest,
and our U-boats were stationed there in vain, and achieved no
results in the war against commerce. It was only by concentrating
our activities on the main area round England that we could ensure
success by sufficiently intensifying the ever-growing lack of means of
transport, the effects of which were evident in so many directions.
The French ports were not, however, left unmolested, and the mine-
layers in particular were busy there. The increase in the number
of seaworthy and efficient U-cruisers that could stay at sea for months
ought to bring more success in our activities against English convoy
traffic. They were able to seek the convoys far out at sea, to keep
in touch with them, and call up a considerable number of U-boats,
as soon as their sphere of activity was reached. Hitherto the attempts
at co-operation between the smaller U-boats without U-cruisers had
been a failure because of the lack of suitable boats to lead them.

We had long desired to apply to the U-boat war the principles
of scouting and keeping in touch, which were applied by the surface
warships. Now we had the opportunity to do so, and we must not
let it slip by diverting the boats suitable for this purpose to a far
distant field of operations. That was the decisive factor which
induced me to oppose the declaration of a blockade of the American
coast, and the scheme was accordingly abandoned. The Supreme
Army Command did not care what means the Navy used, so long
as it achieved success. Their desire to have more transports sunk
could only be realised by raising the total number of sinkings. The
U-boat must attack whatever happened to come within range of her
tubes. Naturally the enemy protected the transports especially well,
and took 'them through the danger zone at times which were most
awkward for the U-boats.

The greater the number of steamers sunk the more likelihood
there was that a transport would be sunk. We should more quickly
attain our end with the U-boat campaign by keeping the blockaded
area round England and the coast of France under the greatest
possible pressure than by extending the blockaded area to include
the American coast.

August ii was the date fixed for me to take over the affairs of
the Naval Staff. Before that I had to take leave of the Fleet.
I had to hand over the command to my successor and make all

332

The Navy Command

preparations for the organisation of the conduct of the war at sea.
Admiral von Hipper had been chosen as commander of the Fleet.
His great experience in matters appertaining to the Fleet, his
efficiency in all the tactical situations in which he had found himself
with his cruisers, seemed to point to him as the most suitable person
to whom I could confidently hand over the weapon from which I
never thought to be separated in this life. The signs of faithful
affection shown to me by the Fleet made my parting no easier, but
I hoped to be able to continue to serve it in my new position. I felt
the parting from my Staff especially keenly. The Chief of the Staff,
Rear-Admiral von Trotha,, on this occasion again showed his un-
selfishness by giving up some very important colleagues to assist
me in the Navy command. The former Chief of the Department of
Operations in the Fleet, Commodore von Levetzow, who had mean-
while been promoted to the command of Scouting Division II, had
placed himself at my disposal as Chief of my Staff.

I took from the Naval Staff the necessary personnel for my
command under the supervision of a Special Chief of Staff, and
transferred them to General Headquarters where it was possible to
keep in constant touch with the Emperor and the Supreme Army
Command, as this seemed most desirable to me in view of situations
which demanded prompt decisions. As a substitute for the Chief
of the Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral Friedrich von Biilow was
appointed to supervise matters in Berlin, which dealt mostly with
reports, the supply of personnel and material, and political affairs.
That did not entail any real change in the organisation, but only
a regrouping of the Naval Staff for the purpose of the war. The
fundamental improvement lay in the powers of command that the
Chief of the Naval Staff was allowed to exercise in the "conduct
of the war."

On August 12 I went to the General Headquarters of the General-
Field-Marshal to introduce myself to him in my new capacity and
to consult with him and General Ludendorff upon the situation and
further plans for the conduct of the war. Both officers were much
impressed with the gravity of the events which had occurred on
August 8, and had placed our war on land definitely on the defensive.
They both admitted that the main hope of a favourable end to the
war lay in a successful offensive of the U-boats, and General
Ludendorff promised, in spite of the great lack of personnel in the
Army, to do his utmost to help to develop it further.

Until the necessary accommodation for my Staff had been found

333

Germany's High Sea Fleet

at Spa, and they could move there, the business of the Naval
Staff was concerned with the new regrouping, and initial preparations
were made for the extension of the U-boat campaign that had been
planned. The results of the last months had shown that the
successes of individual U-boats had steadily decreased'. This
reduction in successes was due mainly to the stronger and more
perfect measures of defence taken by the enemy, and also to the loss
of some of the older and more experienced commanders. Taking
into consideration the then rate of U-boat construction, we had to
expect, in spite of the steady increase in the number of U-boats, that
the figures of the monthly sinkings, which had already diminished
to 500,000 .tons, would be still further reduced, judging by thef
reports as to building, it was to be feared that within a short time
the newly-constructed tonnage would be greater, than the amount
sunk. The success of the U-boat campaign might thereby be greatly
diminished. A mere defensive could not help us to tolerable peace.
It was, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to develop our only
means of an offensive with all the strength at Germany's disposal,
so as to attain our goal — a tolerable peace. In view of the Peace
Conference, it seemed also advisable for us to have a strong weapon
in the shape of U-boats with which we could bring pressure to
bear on our enemies.

But if we wanted to achieve great things with the U-boat cam-
paign then the whole industrial power of Germany must be at our
disposal for the accomplishment of our task. I had got into
communication with the principal controllers of industry, and at a
conference with them and the Imperial Ministry of Marine had
drawn up the following figures as the indispensable minimum for
the increase in U-boats*:'

In the last quarter of 1918 per month 16

first ,, „ 1919 „ „ 20

second,, „ 1919 , „, 25

third „ „ 1919 „ ,, 30

When I asked the U-boat Office why in January, 191 7, when the
unlimited U-boat campaign was decided on, more boats were not
ordered to be built than was actually the case I received the
following answer :

"As a result of the decision in favour of an intensified U-boat
campaign no orders for boats on a large scale were placed. In

334

The Navy Command

February, 1917, only the following were ordered!: 6 U-boats of the
normal type, 45 U-B-boats, and 3 commercial boats. The large
order for 95 U-boats was not giyen till June, 1917."

No definite information as to the reason for this building policy
was forthcoming, but it was certainly strongly influenced by the
opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff that the boats would
achieve their effect within a definite period of time, and that .the
existing U-boats would suffice. Moreover, in the Imperial Ministry
of Marine the opinion prevailed that the capacity of the workmen
for production was no longer to be depended upon.

After the U-boat Office had been instituted on December 5, 1917,
120 boats were placed on order the same month, and in January,
1918, a further 220 boats. During 1918 the monthly return of the
boats supplied was still influenced by the earlier building policy :

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September .

3 boats

6

8

8
10
12

9

8

10

With these numbers the losses were covered, but no noticeable
increase in the actual total of boats was achieved. We needed a
greater number of new boats than an average of eight a month in
order to raise the monthly amount of tonnage sunk to more than
500,000 tons. To a further question as to whether it would have
been possible for the U-boat Office to get a larger number of boats,
and if so from what quarter, I received the following reply :

"The U-boat Office exerted itself unceasingly to obtain a larger
number of boats and had only been able, with the number of work-
men assigned to it, to provide for a monthly supply of 23 boats up
to the end of 1919. The hindrance lay in the supply of workmen
Although the War Office did everything possible, and the U-boat
Office never ceased to urge its needs, it was not possible to obtain a
sufficient supply of workmen from the Supreme Army Command,
either in regard to numbers or quality."

33S

Germany's High Sea Fleet

A telegram from the Supreme Army Command! in June, 1918,
gave the following reason for refusal :'

"I learn from the War Office that the Imperial Ministry of
Marine has demanded the immediate supply of 2,200 stilled work-
men for the Imperial shipyards at Danzig, Wilhelmshaven, and
their Reiherstieg shipyard in Hamburg, and a further supply of
nearly 900 skilled workmen for October <i . The Army cannot afford
to be deprived of any more workmen; the people at home must
supply the Army with more and more men, but cannot by a long
way cover the demand caused by losses. The most urgent need of
the hour is the supply of more men for the Army. Consequently it
is improbable that the country will be able to spare skilled workmen
from among those employed at home. Therefore I earnestly beg
that you will carefully examine the supply of workmen now at your
disposal, and that you endeavour to manage as far as possible with
them. I also beg you to consider the possibility of employing, skilled
labour from neutral countries and the occupied territories (Reval,
Libau, etc.)."

As Fleet Commander, when on several occasions I tried to effect
improvements in the position of the Imperial shipyards by a better
supply of workmen, I met with a refusal on the ground that the
necessary workmen could not be produced ; and I had the impression
that there was not a sufficiently close understanding between the
higher Navy Commands in Berlin and the Supreme Army Com-
mand, and that in consequence the needs of both could not be so
adjusted as to assure the attainment of the great end for which
both were working. That was the decisive reason why I established
myself at General Headquarters, so that by my constantly keeping
in touch with the Supreme Army Command all the resources of
the country, both in men and material, might be applied to such
work as would be of the greatest possible benefit.

When the centre of gravity of the war moved to the west as a
result of the events of 1918, there was no reason why those in charge
of the conduct of the war at sea should remain in Berlin, and thereby
give up all possibility of close co-operation. The plans of the
Supreme Army Command must be made to include all possible
advantages to be derived from the war at sea, and full use must
be made of them. If they admitted that the U-boat offensive could
gain a decisive success, then the Army could very well spare some

336

The Navy Command

workmen for the needs of the Navy. This was the stage we had
reached owing to the force of circumstances. Of course, the Navy
must first of all give up every man that could be spared for the
construction and commissioning of U-boats. That could only be
done if the Navy Command took ruthless action.

Despite the menacing situation on our Western Front, the First
Quartermaster-General drew the necessary conclusions, as soon as
it had been proved to him that it was within the range of possibility
to carry out the new U-boat programme if we could depend on
obtaining 40,000 to 60,000 workmen. For the next few months a
considerably smaller number would suffice to ensure the more rapid
delivery of the boats now under construction.

To supply the men for the new U-boats we had to draw to an
even greater degree than before upon the existing personnel of
the Fleet, and had to take the necessary steps at once for training
the commanders and officers of the watch for U-boat service, for
it took several months for them to become familiar with the
technical apparatus of the boats and acquire the necessary skill in
marksmansh ip .

All U-boats at the time in home waters, as well as the U-cruisers,
were placed under the control of the Fleet. In this way the officer
commanding the U-boats gained the necessary influence over the
training of the whole U-boat personnel, and he had the support
of the Fleet in picking out suitable men. For the Fleet now bore
the chief responsibility for the carrying out, and consequently for
the success of, the U-boat campaign.

In place of the Secretary of State Admiral von Capelle, who
had retired, Vice-Admiral Ritter von Mann-Tiechler, hitherto head
of the U-boat Office, was appointed Secretary of State of the Imperial
Ministry of Marine, in view of the fact that the chief task of this
office now lay in furthering the construction of U-boats; and the
building of reinforcements for the surface warships, which could
no longer exercise any influence on the success of the war, was
either given up or postponed, so that our entire capacity in ship-
building was devoted to this one task.

Immediately after September 10, when I and my Staff had moved
to General Headquarters, an opportunity occurred of proving, the
advantages of the close personal exchange of ideas, when a decision
had to be made as to the handling of the Spanish question.
Influenced by the Entente, the Spanish Ministry seemed inclined
to abandon the correct attitude of strict neutrality which the Spanish
w 337

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Government had hitherto maintained; for they made demands
arising from the U-boat campaign which were plainly in the interests
of the Entente. The Spanish Government made a claim to seize
an equivalent amount of tonnage from among the German merchant
vessels in their harbours for eveiy Spanish ship sunk in the
blockaded area. We were ready to give compensation in kind for
ships sunk outside the blockaded area, and so as not to distress
Spain by a lack of supplies, we were willing to compensate at
once and not make the payment dependent on the inquiry as to
whether the ships had been justly or unjustly sunk, leaving that to
the Arbitration Court. But we had to repudiate most energetically
the demand for compensation for ships sunk in the blockaded area,
because otherwise the other neutrals would quite justifiably have
made the same claim, and the successes of the U-boats would have
been illusory. It would have been nonsensical for us to have given
up our own ships in compensation for those which we had justifiably
sunk. It was a question altogether of 875,000 tons of German
shipping which in this way would have passed automatically into
neutral trade that went to England, and we should have derived
not the slightest advantage from it. On the contrary, there was
the danger that these ships would also be victims of our U-boats.

Another proposal of the Foreign Office was equally impracticable ;
this was to the effect that Spain should send her ships under convoy
through the blockaded area, and that these convoys should be free
from attack of our U-boats. Verbal discussions between the
Supreme Army Command, the Foreign Office, and the Navy
Command soon produced unanimity as to the attitude to be adopted
towards Spain, by which, without departing from our fundamental
principle that the blockaded area must be maintained, we should
not incur the risk of making Spain side with our enemies. The
discussions carried on for weeks among the authorities in Berlin
had led to no result. But the claims that were then raised were
but the regrettable consequence of the conciliatory attitude formerly
adopted in this direction, an attitude which could only lend such
encouragement to just claims that it was difficult to refuse them
without a danger of serious conflicts.

On September 16 and 17 I visited the sea-front in Flanders and I
was much impressed with the excellence of the measures taken by
the commander, Admiral von Schroder, for defence against a land-
ing of the enemy. I also became acquainted with the arrangements
for the U-boat base at Bruges. The value of this position consisted

338

The Navy Command

in the flank protection it afforded, which had become necessary since
the fighting front extended to the coast. So that this position could
not be taken in the rear by the landing of troops, the whole stretch of
coast from Nieuport, at the mouth of the Yser, up to the Dutch
frontier had been strongly fortified. Zeebrugge, which was con-
nected with Bruges by a deep sea canal, was a U-boat base. As
any attack on this strong position would in all probability be made
mainly from the sea the occupation of these coastal fortifications had
been assigned to the Navy. The land defence on the extreme right
wing of the front, closely connected as it was with the coastal
defences, had also been undertaken by the Navy, which had formed
regiments of able seamen. The English recognised the great strength
of the position,, and had not dared hitherto to risk battleships
in the bombardment of the harbour and locks. They had built
special craft for this purpose, monitors with shallow draught, and
armed with a gun of heavy calibre, but these had not once succeeded
in inflicting serious damage, though they had made many attempts.
The naval base which had in time developed at Bruges became such
a thorn in the side of the English that they did not grudge the
enormous sacrifices they made in the various attempts in Flanders
to break through our front in this sector.

They only attempted once, on April 22 and 23, 1918, to block
the sea canal at Zeebrugge and the harbour of Ostend, and so make it
impossible for our U-boats to get out. But this attempt was a failure.
The attack, which was made with great pluck under the protection of
artificial fog, found our guards at their posts. Two old light
cruisers, that had penetrated as far as the mouth of the canal, were
sunk before they reached their actual goal — the lock gates, which
were uninjured. It was found possible for the U-boats to get
round the obstruction, so that connection between the harbour at
Zeebrugge and the shipyard at Bruges was never interrupted eyen
for a day.

Another cruiser, the Vindictive, whose commander had succeeded
with great smartness and seamanlike skill in laying alongside the
Mole, landed a detachment of 400 marines, who were ready on
the deck with scaling ladders; but this enterprise also met with no
success. After suffering heavy loss, he was Obliged to withdraw;
only 40 men had been able to get on the Mole, where all, with the
exception of one captain and 12 men, were killed in a fierce fight.

The Brilliant and the Sirius, which were dispatched against
Ostend at the same time, did not attain their object, but stranded

339

Germany's High Sea Fleet

in flames east of the Mole, An English submarine succeeded in
reaching the bridge of the Mole at Zeebrugge, and in blowing up the
framework, so that for a time the outer end of the Mole was dis-
connected from the land. The object was to cut off the garrison
on the Mole from all assistance from land, but this, tqo, was a
failure, thanks to the courage of those in command of the guard.

Complete safety from such surprises is impossible of attainment,
-for it is difficult for those in the coastal fortifications lying farther
back to be in time to overcome ships which come at night through
the mist. But we had to count on a repetition of such attempts.
The defences of the Mole therefore were strengthened so that a fresh
attempt would probably have met with as little success. We did
not lay mines farther out to sea to stop vessels from approaching,
for this would have endangered our U-boats.

Although at the time there were no signs that a land attack
was imminent, in view of the general situation, we had to reckon
with the possibility that the defences which our land front afforded
to the U-boat base might be broken through, because we had very
slight reserves at our disposal. All the more so when the enemy
realised that for the next period of the war we intended to concen-
trate mostly on our U-boat offensive. The loss of Bruges would
have been a very disagreeable blow to the U-boat campaign; especially
as the assistance we received from the shipyard there, employing
7,000 workmen, would no longer have been at our disposal. The
U-boats, however, could have set out from the North Sea, so that
at a pinch we could have got over the loss.

Hitherto the U-boats in Flanders had been responsible for 23
per cent, of the total results. They had sunk 3,342,000 tons in all,
which does not include sinkings due to mines.

On my return on September 18 I had a conference with General
Ludendorff on the subject of the danger with which the position
in Flanders was threatened. I was informed that the situation at
the front would probably make an abandonment of the position
in Flanders necessary. Under the arrangements made by the Naval
Corps such a withdrawal would take eight to fourteen days if the
valuable supplies of war material and shipyard fittings were to
be saved. The Supreme Army Command could not undertake to give
warning in good time, and as the danger did not appear imminent,
the Navy Command decided to take the risk of losing this material
(in case a hurried retreat were necessary) so as to carry on the U-boat
campaign from Flanders as long as possible. The Supreme Army

34o

The Navy Command

Command undertook to inform us in good time of any indications
which might point to the necessity of abandoning the position.
We took care not to increase the stocks there, but only to keep
them up to the level that was absolutely needful.

In the course of September the discussions with employers of
industry and the shipyards were continued, to ascertain whether it
would be possible to carry out the extended programme of U-boat
construction. On September 24 the Ministry of Marine informed
the Naval Command that the possibility of carrying it out had, on
the whole, been established.

In view of the greater importance that now attached to the
U-boats, seeing that they were to give a favourable turn to the end
of the war, I suggested to His Majesty that he should visit the
U-bobt School at Kiel. His Majesty accordingly left General
Headquarters on September 23 for Kiel, and on the 24th he inspected
first the torpedo workshop, and then the establishment of the Im-
perial shipyards, which had been very considerably enlarged for
the purposes of the U-boat war.

At the beginning of the war the torpedo factory at Friedrichsort
had been the only place where our torpedoes were manufactured;
but during the war the engineering works (formerly L. Schwartz-
kopff) in Berlin, which in earlier years had also manufactured
torpedoes, was converted into a torpedo factory, as were other
works as well. Under the direction of the Chief of the Torpedo
Factories, Rear-Admiral Hering, the enormously increased demand
for the manufacture of torpedoes was fully satisfied, so that the
supplies of the Fleet and of the torpedo-boats were kept at the re-
quisite level. Moreover, they succeeded in making considerable
improvements. The ships of Squadron II (" Deutschland " class)
and the older torpedo-boats built at the same time, were still armed
with torpedoes which had a charge of 120 kilos of gun-cotton, a
range of 2,200 m. and a speed of 24 knots. But most of the ships
now carried a torpedo of 50 cm. calibre with a range of 10,300 m.,,
and a speed of 28 knots. In the newest ships, like the Baden and
Bayern, the range was still greater, as much as 16,500 m. with a
speed of 25^ knots and the calibre was increased to 60 cm. The
explosive charge of these newest torpedoes was 250 kilos of a material
that had three times the explosive power of gun-cotton.

The U-boat School was established at Eckernforde. Its object
was to familiarise the new U-boat crews with the handling of their
boats and their armament, and especially to train them in marksman-

34i

Germany's High Sea Fleet

ship. The crews of all newly-commissioned boats were first sent to
the U-boat School for a time to obtain practice in the military tasks
with which they would be confronted. The Bay of Eckernforde was
particularly suitable for diving practice, because of its uniformly great
depth. Moreover, in consequence of its remote situation, there was
little traffic there, and it was not, like Kiel Harbour, shut in by
barriers, the passage of which always entailed a certain loss of time.
In the large basin of Kiel Bay, which lay before the school,
practice attacks on a large scale and in war conditions could be
carried out. Special convoys were formed which were surrounded
by guardships on the English model ; the ships were painted in the
manner which in course of time had been adopted by English ships
to deceive the marksmen at the periscope. The ships were painted
in all sorts of extraordinary colours, so as to deceive the observer,
both as to the size and the course of the steamer, and hence to lead
to bad aim in shooting.

At the time there were over 200 officers in training there, who
were to find employment on U-boats as commanders and officers of
the watch. The school was conducted by Commander Eschenburg,
who succeeded remarkably well in imparting an excellent training
to the men of the U-boats which were so precious to us, and ensur-
ing the greatest possible number of hits with the torpedoes they
carried. He achieved this in spite of the small number of boats at
his disposal, because, of course, everyone was eager to make use of
really well-equipped boats at the front.

The impression which His Majesty received of his visit of inspec-
tion was reflected in his address, before he departed, to the assembled
commanders on board the school ship. He was clearly deeply
conscious of the gravity of the task he had to impose on this band
of courageous and self-sacrificing men, when he expressed his con-
viction that the Fatherland would not be disappointed in the hopes
that must be put in the U-boat commanders. Involuntarily one
thought : Morituri te salutant. None of us had the vaguest notion
that the situation in the war on land was such that the cessation of
all hostilities would soon be urged, and that in a few weeks the
U-boat campaign would be abandoned.

On the return journey to General Headquarters, via Berlin, we
received news, the day after starting, that the Bulgarian Front had
broken down. This roused the gravest fears as to the steadfastness
of our other Allies, and meant that our southern front was en-
dangered. This news induced His Majesty to proceed to Spa on

342

The Navy Command

the morning of September 29 after staying for a short time in
Cassel.

On the journey to Spa I met the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and he informed me that the situation had become extremely
serious, and that a decisive conference with His Majesty as to what
further measures should be taken was to be held that very morn-
ing. Although I expressed to him my desire to take part in this
Conference, I was not present, and only learned in the afternoon
what had taken place. General Ludendorff informed me that the
Supreme Army Command had announced to His Majesty that the
situation demanded the immediate initiation of negotiations for an
armistice and peace. The Chancellor would deal with the
consequences arising therefrom Which would affect home politics.

We had no detailed conversation on the subject. I knew what
the feelings of the General must be. After years of glorious battles
to be confronted with this result as the end of those activities that
he had pursued with such an iron will ! I therefore contented myself
with such information as immediately concerned the Navy.

The points to be considered were the withdrawal from Flanders
and the carrying out of the big U-boat programme. To retain
Bruges for the U-boat campaign was not to be thought of. On the
other hand, General Ludendorff was in favour of keeping to the plan
of strengthening the U-boat weapon. The threat it contained might
be useful for securing the armistice desired by the Army, as it would
be useful in case of a refusal, when all our powers would be strained
to the utmost.

Thereupon I at once went to His Majesty to secure his consent to
our withdrawing from the U-boat base in Flanders, and our adher-
ing to the design of building more boats. His Majesty gave bis
consent.

Considering the very grave decisions which the Emperor had had
to face this day, His Majesty's bearing was admirably calm and
steady. When the questions relating to the Navy had been disposed
of, he spoke to me somewhat as follows :

"We had lost the war. He had hoped that God would ordain
otherwise, and he hoped that the German nation would stand by
him loyally. The Army and the people had behaved splendidly,
but unfortunately the politicians had not. The Imperial Chancellor
had informed him that he must go. His Majesty, therefore, had
requested Count Roeden and the Chief of the Cabinet, von Berg, to
suggest a new Chancellor. It would be difficult to find the right

343

Germany's High Sea Fleet

man. The new Ministry would have to be formed on a broader basis,
and representatives of the parties of the Left would have to be
admitted to it."

The same evening orders were sent to the Naval Corps to abandon
Flanders as a U-boat base, and to carry out the evacuation
according to plan ; the Supreme Army Command would reckon on
the evacuation of Flanders step by step; for the present there was
no intention of giving up Antwerp.

A meeting had been arranged for October i in Cologne, with
representatives of industry and of the shipyards. The Secretary of
State of the Imperial Ministry of Marine, Ritter von Mann, and
Colonel Bauer, representing the Supreme Army Command, also
attended. Everyone agreed that it would be possible to carry out
the extended U-boat programme, so long as the requisite number of
workmen, amounting to 69,000 altogether, was forthcoming ; these
men were chiefly wanted in the shipyards. For the year iqi8 only
15 to 20,000 men were asked for. There was no lack of the raw
materials required, but such materials as had hitherto been used for
other purposes, e.g. bridge-building in Roumania, would henceforth
not be available for work of that character.

The representative of the Supreme Army Command declared that
the Army was ready to further the undertaking with all the means
at its disposal.

I did not feel myself called upon to make any statement on the
changed situation on the Army front, but I pointed out that all
those in charge of the conduct of the war were unanimous in their
desire for us to adhere to this plan, whatever events might occur on
the Army front, for the collapse in the South-East might well have
serious consequences for us.

On October 5 the new Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden,
sent a Peace Note to the President of the United States, and a Com-
mission for Armistice negotiations was set up by the Navy Command,
which was to deliberate with the Commission appointed by the
Supreme Army Command under the chairmanship of General von
Gundell. Rear- Admiral Meurer was appointed chairman of the
Naval Commission, and Captains Vanselow and Raeder and
Lieutenant-Commander Kiep were added to it.

In an interview that I had with General Ludendorff on October 6
to determine the general lines on which our common deliberations
should be conducted, I asked him what concessions the Supreme
Army Command was prepared to make in order to obtain the Armis-

344

The Navy Command

tice, saying that I presumed that these would not go so far as to
make it impossible for us to resume our arms in case of need.
General Ludendorff fully confirmed this. The Supreme Army Com-
mand would consent to an evacuation of the occupied territory in
the West by stages, and would accept as the first stage the line
Bruges — Valenciennes, and as the second a line from Antwerp —
to the Meuse west of Namur. The Supreme Army Command could
not accede to a demand to give up Metz to the enemy. The Imperial
Chancellor had wished to make further concessions, but had agreed
to the Supreme Army Command's proposal in view of the technical
difficulties involved.

The important question for the Navy was whether the U-boat
campaign was to cease during the Armistice. As the Foreign Office
declared that without this concession no armistice could possibly be
concluded, I declared my readiness to stop the U-boat campaign
during the Armistice, but emphasised the point that in return for
this we must obtain other concessions in the shape of the return of
valuable shipping lying in neutral ports and supplies of raw material
and food. The continuance of the blockade would be unfair if we
stopped the U-boat campaign.

As regards the disposal of the Naval Corps, the following plan
was arranged : those sections which could be employed in the field,
viz. the regiments of able seamen and marines, as well as the
transportable batteries of the marine artillery, were to be placed at
the disposal of the Army ; all the other men were to return to the
Navy.

Thus the Naval Corps in Flanders ceased to exist. It had
been instituted under the leadership of Admiral von Schroder on
September 3, 1914, and played an honourable part in the taking
of Antwerp on October 10, 1914. The General Command had its
headquarters at Bruges. The infantry of the Naval Corps con-
sisted of three regiments of able seamen and the marines. The latter
in particular had played a distinguished part in the great battles in
Flanders in 1916 and 1917. The sea-front was guarded by regiments
of marine artillery. Thirty guns of the heaviest calibre had been set
up there, among them five of 38 cm., four of 30.5 cm., and besides
them a large number of quick-firing guns of from 10.5 to 21 cm.
calibre. Hitherto they had repelled every attack from the sea.

The U-boat flotilla in Flanders was first established on March 15,
1915. As many as 37 U-boats had belonged to it at one and the
same time. The great results attained by this flotilla were achieved

345

Germany's High Sea Fleet

at the expense of heavy losses ; no other flotilla suffered such losses,
and against it the enemy's most vigorous defence was directed.

In addition to this, two flotillas of large torpedo-boats and many
mine-sweepers had been active off Flanders. They had made their
mark in numerous night raids on the coast of the English Channel,
and the bombardment of fortified places like Margate, Dover and
Dunkirk ; they had also been continually occupied in clearing away
the barriers laid by the English to prevent our U-boats from coming
out. Among the torpedo-boats the losses due to mines and bombs
dropped by flying men were appreciably higher than those in the
other theatres of war.

The evacuation of the shipyard at Bruges and the establishments
at Zeebrugge had been carried out according to plan and without
interference. The ships had returned through the North Sea to
Wilhelmshaven ; eleven large and thirteen small torpedo-boats; all
U-boats excepting four had already been dispatched to the North
Sea and had arrived there without incident. Four other torpedo-
boats, which required some repairs before being ready for sea, were
to follow within the next few days. Four U-boats and two large
torpedo-boats had to be destroyed as they were not in a condition
to be transported. In the shipyard at Ghent there were three large
torpedo-boats whose condition made it impossible to take them into
the North Sea. These were to be taken to Antwerp and either blown
up or interned in Holland. The fast torpedo motor-boats which had
distinguished themselves as lately as August by a successful raid
on Dunkirk, had gone to Antwerp and were sent on from there by
rail to Kiel. The sea-planes of the Naval Corps had made their
way by air back to the North Sea. The aeroplanes and the rest
of the Naval material that was capable of employment in the
field went over to Army Command IV. Of the heavy guns on the
sea-front only ten 29 cm. guns running on rails could be transported;
all the others had to be blown up when the batteries were evacuated.

Just as the retirement on our West Front resulted in the aban-
donment of the base in Flanders, so events in the Balkans led to
a withdrawal of our forces there as soon as the Turks concluded a
separate peace, and we could no longer dispose of the U-boat bases
in the Adriatic.

The battle-cruiser Goeben was the last reserve in the defence of
the Dardanelles. Turkey had our promise that the ship should be
handed over to her after the war. Therefore there could be no
question of withdrawing the ship until there was danger of her falling

346

The Navy Command

into British hands. The Imperial Chancellor had admitted that this
must be avoided for the sake of our military reputation. Conse-
quently the officer in command in the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral
von Rebeur-Paschwitz, had received orders to send the Goeben to
Sebastopol if her further stay in Constantinople would be of no use.

Some of our naval mechanics stationed at Sebastopol had tried
to make seaworthy the warships which the Russians had handed
over to us in accordance with the terms of the treaty, but they met
with great difficulties owing to the neglected condition of the ships.
Among these were the battleship Volya and several torpedo-boats
and mine-sweepers which we wanted put in order to assist in the
transport of large numbers of troops that were to be taken across
the Black Sea from the Caucasus and Southern Russia to Rou-
manian ports. But the development of events in Turkey was such
that the idea of keeping the Goeben was abandoned. In order to
secure better armistice conditions for the transport of our troops
fighting in Syria, our Government decided to hand the Goeben over
to Turkey. The English had made this one of the main conditions,
so as to be able to get possession of the ship.

In the Mediterranean our U-boats were busy until well on into
October; at the same time all preparations were made to evacuate
Pola and Cattaro in good time. The officer in command there,
Captain Piillen, was left to decide as to this on his own responsibility.
On October 28 the boats that were ready for sea began their journey
home to Germany.

Altogether there were 26 of them there, of which 10 had to be
blown up because they could not be made ready in time.

The further continuation of the U-boat campaign, if it should
appear desirable, was thus dependent on the home bases — in the
North Sea and the Baltic — and from these points it could have been
directed against the shipping off the French coast and round the
British Isles. In this case the whole strength of the U-boats could
have been concentrated on this one main object.

The new Government formed at the beginning of October, under
Prince Max of Baden as Imperial Chancellor, had approached
President Wilson with a request for the conclusion of peace; at the
same time they had undertaken to secure the cessation of hostilities
as quickly as possible, and to obtain acceptable conditions of peace.
But the manner in which they addressed themselves to this task,
and their attitude during the negotiations, did not lead to the
desired goal. The ever-increasing desire of our enemies to reduce

347

Germany's High Sea Fleet

our power of resistance till we were helpless was manifest in these
negotiations. If the Government had determined to put a stop to
the unduly exorbitant demands in good time, they might have
secured important turning points in our fate, as the Imperial Chan-
cellor had promised in his opening speech on October 5. On that
occasion he concluded as follows :

" I know that the result of the peace proposals will find Germany
determined and united, ready to accept not only an honest peace
which repudiates any violation of the rights of others, but also for
a struggle to the death which would be forced on our people through
no fau% of their own, if the answer which the Powers at war with
us make to our offer should be dictated by the desire to annihilate
us."

The decisions which the Government reached, and the information
and advice supplied by the proper military quarters, may be
summarised as follows :

To our first request for mediation with a view to peace, sent on
October 5 ; on October 8 we received the answer :

"No armistice negotiations so long as the German armies remain
upon enemy soil."

On October 12 the reply from our Government :

"We are prepared to accept the enemy's suggestions for
evacuation, in order to bring about an armistice."

Wilson's next Note of October 14 contained the demand :

"Cessation of U-boat hostilities against passenger ships and
change of the form of Government in Germany."

The German Government's reply of October 21 :

"U-boats have received orders which exclude the torpedoing of
passenger ships, and with regard to the form of Government : The
responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor to the representatives of
the people is being legally developed and made secure."

Thereupon the answer from Wilson on October 23 :

"Only such an armistice can justifiably be taken into considera-
tion as will place the United States and the Powers allied to them

348

The Navy Command

in a position which will make it possible for them to enforce the
fulfilment of dispositions that shall be made, and make it impossible
for Germany to renew hostilities. Further, the demand that the
Monarchy shall be abolished is plainly expressed, otherwise peace
negotiations cannot be contemplated, but complete surrender will
be demanded."

The attitude of the Supreme Army Command was responsible for
the acceptance of the first demand for the evacuation of occupied
territory, and it had signified its agreement with the text of our reply
in our Note of October 12. No decisive influence could be exerted
by the fears of the Navy regarding the danger which would threaten
our industrial relations and also our U-boat base in Emden with
the withdrawal from the Western Front ; for the Army was unable
to give any guarantee that it would be able to hold the Western
Front in its then advanced position. That was the immediate
reason why an armistice was needed. In order to satisfy this need,
the Navy had agreed to stop the U-boat war during the Armistice,
although the enemy would derive the most advantage from that,
if at the same time the English blockade were not raised or con-
siderably loosened.

But Wilson's new claim on October 14 went much further, for
the demand that passenger boats should be spared must result
in practice in the cessation of the U-boat campaign. Wilson, how-
ever, did not offer in return to cease hostilities, but had declared
that he would not enter upon negotiations if this preliminary con-
dition were not fulfilled by us. In so doing we should lay aside our
chief weapon, while the enemy could continue hostilities and drag
out the negotiations as long as he pleased.

It was to be expected that the Government would agree to spar-
ing the passenger steamers, for this concession seemed insignificant.
But its consequences might be very serious, for, according to former
experience, if the U-boats were again reduced to cruiser warfare,
their effectiveness was lost, and so far as one could see, it would be
impossible, if hostilities continued, for us to resume the unrestricted
U-boat campaign. The following, therefore, was the attitude adopted
by the Navy to the new Note : "Sacrifice the U-boat campaign if —
in return — our Army obtains an armistice; otherwise, we strongly
disadvise compliance."

On October 16 I had occasion to visit the new Imperial Chan-
cellor and to communicate my views to him, which he seemed to

349

Germany's High Sea^Fleet

understand and share. He invited me to the conference of the War
Cabinet which was to take place the next morning in the Imperial
Chancellor's palace, when General Ludendorff would report on the
military situation upon which the Government had decided to make
their attitude to Wilson's Note depend.

The statements made on this occasion as to our powers of re-
sistance were calculated to weaken the unfavourable impression of
those made on September 29. The answer to be sent was discussed
on broad lines. We were unanimous on the point that the accu-
sations of inhumanity, etc., must be repudiated. The devastation
of districts that were to be evacuated was a consequence of the war,
so was the killing of non-combatants who went on ships into the
blockaded areas. It should be suggested to the President that he
should put an end to the horrors of war on land and sea by effecting
an immediate armistice, and that he should clearly state his con-
ditions. Germany was not prepared to accept conditions which
would dishonour her. The fact was also emphasised that the tone of
our answer Would have a great influence upon the -moral of the people
and the Army.

It would now become manifest whether the President intended to
negotiate honestly on the basis of his Fourteen Points, or whether
he wanted to make our military situation worse than was permissible
by prolonging the negotiations unduly and by constantly increasing
his demands. In the latter case, the German people must be ready
to take up the fight for national defence and continue it to the
death. Such was the lofty mood of the members of the Government
and their military advisers at the end of the session.

The next day I had occasion to report to His Majesty at Potsdam ;
he had already been informed by General Ludendorff of the outcome
of the conference. Confident that the Government would not alter
the decision arrived at on October 17, General Ludendorff had re-
turned to General Headquarters. I considered it necessary to obtain
the Emperor's approval for the further actions of the Fleet in case,
for any reason, we should after all be forced to abandon the U-boat
campaign, either temporarily or permanently. In these circum-
stances the obligations imposed on the Fleet by the necessity for
protecting the U-boats would disappear. If hostilities at the Front
continued, it would be neither possible nor permissible for the Fleet
to look on idly; it would have to try and relieve the Army to the
best of its abilities. His Majesty agreed that in this case the Fleet
would have freedom of action.

35°

The Navy Command

At the conclusion of my interview, a remark made by the re-
presentative of the Foreign Office, Counsellor of the Legation von
Griinau, had struck me as odd. He had asked my Chief of Staff,
Commodore von Levetzow, who accompanied me, whether there could
not be a statement in the Note to the effect that the U-boat campaign
would in future be conducted on the lines of cruiser warfare. Ac-
cording to that, the Foreign Office had not adopted the view that the
cessation of the U-boat campaign was to be offered in exchange for
the Armistice. I therefore determined to stay in Berlin so as to
make sure that the text of the reply Note was in accordance with
the decisions made on October 17.

On October 19 the War Cabinet deliberated upon this Note pre-
pared by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Solf. Con-
trary to what had been agreed upon on October 17 it contained the
sentence :

"The U-boat campaign will now be carried on upon the prin-
ciples of cruiser warfare, and the safety of the lives of non-
combatants will be assured."

The Vice-Chancellor, von Payer, opposed this draft most vigor-
ously, as it was equivalent to an admission that our actions hitherto
were contrary to law. "The U-boat campaign," he said, "must not
be abandoned; the Navy must not stop fighting before the Army.
Moreover, the whole tone of the Note misrepresented the feeling in
the country." The Secretaries of State, Groeber and Erzberger,
spoke to the same effect.

I made a counter-proposal based on the principle that the U-boat
campaign must only be sacrificed in return for the Armistice. It
ran as follows :

"The German Government has declared its readiness to evacuate
the occupied territories. It further declares its willingness to stop
the U-boat campaign. In so doing it assumes that the details of
these proceedings and the conditions of the Armistice must be judged
and discussed by military experts."

The majority of the representatives of the Government were in
favour of the point of view defended by von Payer and myself, and
Dr. Solf received instructions to draff a new Note to this effect to
be laid before the Cabinet at its afternoon session.

Before this took place, the Ambassadors, Count Wolff Metter-
nich, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, and Dr. Rozen, were invited

3Si

Germany's High Sea Fleet

to express their views; the representatives of the Navy were not
present. Their statements very soon brought about a complete
change in the views of the Cabinet. They now urged that the
U-boat campaign should be sacrificed without any return being
demanded. The new draft Note unconditionally consented to spare
passenger ships.

I again emphatically expressed my grave fears with regard to
this dangerous concession, pointing out that by omitting to fix any
time-limit they made it possible for Wilson to prolong the negotia-
tions, while the U-boat campaign must, as a fact, cease, and the
pressure upon the Army would continue. By conceding this we
should admit that we had hitherto acted wrongfully, and would set
free hundreds of thousands of people in England who had so far
been bound by the U-boat campaign. But I did not succeed in
getting my view accepted; even the telegram sent to the Imperial
Chancellor by the Supreme Army Command that they could not
in any circumstances dispense with the U-boat campaign as a
means of obtaining an armistice could not alter the decision of
the Cabinet. They were all firmly convinced that they could not
justify themselves before the German people if negotiations with
Wilson were broken off, and that this would be inevitable if we did
not unconditionally concede what was demanded of us.

The form of the Note determined at an evening session contained
the sentence :

" In order to avoid anything that might make the attainment of
peace more difficult, at the instigation of the German Government
all U-boat commanders have been strictly forbidden to torpedo
passenger ships."

I declared to the War Cabinet that if we were loyally to carry
out this concession, all U-boats sent out to make war upon commerce
must immediately be recalled.

I required the consent of the Emperor to issue this order. As
His Majesty was convinced of the serious military consequences,
he used his personal influence to try and induce the Imperial Chan-
cellor to alter the decision of the Cabinet. But the Emperor did
not succeed in making the Chancellor change his opinions, so that
His Majesty then informed me through the Deputy Chief of the
Ministry of Marine that the Imperial Chancellor had represented
the situation as such that the U-boat campaign must be abandoned.

352

The Navy Command

An attempt on my part to make the Imperial Chancellor at
least put a time limit for the concession in the Note in the same
manner became fruitless. He declared that we were not in a
position to make conditions, and the Navy must bow to the inevitable
and at all costs avoid provocative incidents. I assured the Chan-
cellor that we should do our best and that all U-boats should be
recalled from the campaign against commerce. This decision as to
the limitation of the U-boat campaign was very important because
the further operative measures of the Navy Command depended
upon it; the High Sea Fleet must again now obtain complete free-
dom of action.

So long as hostilities continued at the front, and there was for
the present no indication of their ceasing, the Navy must not remain
entirely inactive, while the attacks of the enemy on our Western
Front grew ever fiercer, unhindered by any fear of U-boats. A
success at sea must have a favourable influence upon the terms of
peace, and would help to encourage the people; for the demands of
the enemy would depend on the powers of resistance that we were
prepared to oppose to them, and upon the consideration whether
their own power was sufficiently great to enforce their demands.
Anything that would impair their power must be to our ad-
vantage.

The U-boats liberated from the commercial war materially in-
creased the Fleet's power of attack, and by choosing the point of
attack wisely it was highly probable an expedition of the Fleet
might achieve a favourable result. If the Fleet suffered losses, it was
to be assumed that the enemy's injuries would be in proportion, and
that we should still have sufficient forces to protect the U-boat
campaign in the North Sea, which would have to be resumed if
the negotiations should make imperative a continuation of the
struggle with all the means at our disposal.

On October 21, when the Note had been dispatched to President
Wilson, the U-boats received orders of recall, and my Chief of
Staff, Commodore von Levetzow, was commissioned to inform
the Fleet Command in Wilhelmshaven of the course of the
negotiations, and to take to them the order of the Navy Com-
mand : "The forces of the High Sea Fleet are to be made ready
for attack and battle with the English Fleet." The Commander-in-
Chief of the Fleet, Admiral von Hipper, had already drawn' up plans
for such a proceeding, as its necessity was foreseen. A plan directed
against the English Channel received the preference and my assent ;

J? 353

Germany's High Sea Fleet

it was to be carried out as soon as possible. The execution, however,
had to be delayed for a few days owing to necessary preparations;
the U-boats had to be sent to their stations, and the cruisers fitted
out with mines to be laid along the enemy's probable line of ap-
proach. The Fleet was finally assembled! for this enterprise in the
outer roads of Wilhelmshaven on October 28,

Meanwhile, at noon on October 24, President Wilson's reply had
been made known, and this quite clearly demanded complete capitu-
lation. Animated by the same views as the Supreme Army Com-
mand I went with my Chief of Staff together with the General
Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff (on the former's invitation)
to Berlin, in order to be on the spot in case we were wanted for
the deliberations arising from the new situation. We could
not imagine that the Government could do otherwise than
reply to this new demand of Wilson's by a direct refusal,
consonant with the honour of the nation and its power of resist-
ance.

Immediately on their arrival in Berlin in the afternoon of the
25th, the General Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff had been
sent for by the Emperor. At this interview General Ludendorff
received the impression that the Emperor would adhere to the
suggestions of the Government, so that all that was left to us was
to discover from the Vice-Chancellor, von Payer (the Imperial Chan-
cellor himself had fallen ill), what decisions the Government would
take.

This interview took place in the evening of the 25th, but its
results were entirely negative. In spite of the most urgent argu-
ments on the part of General Ludendorff, which the General Field-
Marshal and I endorsed, it was impossible to convince von Payer
that our national honour and our honour as soldiers made it im-
perative that we should refuse Wilson's exorbitant conditions. The
Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff declared they would hold the
Western Front through the winter. It was in vain. Herr von Payer
would not believe Ludendorff's assertions; he wanted to hear the
opinion of other generals at the front. But, above all, he had
lost all faith in the powers of resistance of the people and the
Army.

The discussion had to be broken off without result, as the Vice-
Chancellor could not be moved to make any concessions. Even
when asked if, when the full conditions — in so far as they were tanta-
mount to capitulation— came into force, the people would not be

354

The Navy Command

called upon to make a last struggle, Herr Payer only answered :
"We must first see what the situation would then be."

At an interview the next morning, granted by His Majesty to
the Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff, the latter tendered his
resignation, which the Emperor accepted.

The Government's answer to Wilson's latest demand was as
follows"?

"The German Government has duly noted the reply of the
President of the United States. The President is aware of the
fundamental changes that have taken place and are still taking place
in the German Constitution. The peace negotiations will be carried
on by a Government of the people, in whose hands the decisive power
actually and constitutionally lies. The military forces are also subject
to it. The German Government, therefore, looks forward to the
proposals for an armistice, which shall lead to a peace of justice, such
as the President has defined in his utterances."

The expectation that the negotiations would take a favourable
course, as the Government seemed to imagine, was doomed to disap-
pointment. General Ludendorff 's prophecy was amply fulfilled; he
predicted that if we continued to yield, the end must be disastrous,
because the Government had neglected to steel the will of the people
for a supreme effort.

But we suffered the bitterest disappointment at the hands of the
crews of the Fleet. Thanks to an unscrupulous agitation which had
been fermenting for a long time, the idea had taken root in their
minds that they were to be uselessly sacrificed. They were en-
couraged in this mistaken belief, because they could see no indication
of a will to decisive action in the bearing of the Government.,
Insubordination broke out when, on October 29, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Fleet was making preparations to weigh anchor for
the planned attack. As always, the intentions and aim of the
expedition had been kept secret from the crews, until they were at
sea. The mutiny was at first confined to a few battleships and
first class cruisers, but it assumed such dimensions on these ships
that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet thought it incumbent upon
him to desist from his project. By seizing the agitators and im-
prisoning them in the meantime in Wilhelmshaven, he hoped that
the ships could be calmed down. The crews of the torpedo-boats
and the U-boats had remained thoroughly loyal.

355

Germany's High Sea Fleet

The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet reported these events to
the Navy Command on November 2, saying that they were due to
a Bolshevist movement, directed by members of the Independent
Social Democratic Party, on board the ships. As a means of agita-
tion, they had made use of the statement that the Government wanted
peace and the officers did not. Every provocation of the enemy by
attacks of the Fleet would hinder the peace ; that was why the officers
wanted to continue the offensive. The officers wanted to take the
Fleet out and allow it to be annihilated, or even annihilate it them-
selves.

Since October 29, when the first signs of dissatisfaction had
become manifest, the movement had continued to spread, so that
he did not think it possible to undertake an offensive with the Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, therefore, detached the indivi-
dual groups, sending Squadron III to the Jade to place them in
the keeping of the commanding officers there.

After that, quiet seemed to prevail again in Wilhelmshaven ;
but when Squadron III reached Kiel, disturbances broke out there
on the evening of November 1. The Governor, Admiral Souchon,
succeeded in preserving order for a little while, but on November 3
the disturbances grew, because they met with no vigorous opposi-
tion. Even the deputies sent by the Government to Kiel could not
achieve any permanent improvement in the situation ; just as little
effect was produced by the proclamation of His Majesty the Emperor
which the Imperial Chancellor now published, and which announced
his complete agreement with the Government. Energetic measures
against the agitators, which might at the beginning have met with
success, were only possible under the protection of strong bodies
of troops which the Ministry of War dispatched. But the troops
proved untrustworthy. Nor did they arrive in sufficient numbers to
produce the desired effect.

I have no official reports of the details of the Revolution which
soon blazed up at all the Naval stations, for the military authorities
were deprived of their power of command. The instructions issued
by the Navy Command to the commanding officers to sink ships
hoisting the red flag were not forwarded. They would, at least,
have been of guidance to such officers who were in doubt as to
what they should do, if they still possessed the power to do any-
thing. Nothing but energetic action on the part of the superior
officers who were on the spot could have saved the situation.
Whether they failed in their duty, or whether the extent of the

356

The Navy Command

movement was underestimated, is an open question. Only when the
history of the Revolution is written shall we get full information on
the point, The evil-doers who picked out the Fleet as the means
by which to attain their ends committed a terrible crime against the
German nation. They deprived it of the weapon which at the deci-
sive hour might have saved us from the fate which now weighs upon
us so intolerably.

r

357

CONCLUSION

'T HAVE no longer a Navy."

X With these words the Emperor repudiated my objections when
on the afternoon of November 9 I urged that if he resigned the
Navy would be without a leader. Deep disappointment sounded in
these words, the last that I heard from His Majesty.

In the evening of the same day the Armistice conditions were
published, among which was the demand for the surrender of the
German Fleet and of all the U-boats. No opposition could be
expected from the Revolutionary Government. It consented to
everything in order to get rid of the hated "Militarism," and deli-
vered the defenceless German people into the hands of its enemies.
A curse lies on the Navy because out of its ranks Revolution first
sprang and spread over the land ; and many who regarded its deeds
with pride are to this day at a loss to know how such a change can
have been possible.

The conditions of life on the large ships, the close quarters in
which the men lived, favoured the propagation of this agitation,
which was spread by ahy and every means. Further, the crews were
most easily exposed to temptation because of their close connection
with the Homeland. But the most important and the decisive cause
was this : the war-weariness of the whole nation, increased by hunger
and all sorts of privations, had become so widespread that even the
righting forces had lost faith in a happy end to the war.

On the day when the German National Assembly accepted that
fatal peace which perpetuates hatred the deed accomplished at Scapa
Flow once more gave evidence of the spirit which inspired the Navy,
as it did the Army, in the days when they rejoiced in battle. How-
ever much we are bowed down, we can still do justice to all the great
things that were achieved. That is the only comfort that we can take
in regarding the dark future that awaits us; it is the foundation-
stone upon which to build up new hopes. The strength which the
German people developed enabled us to withstand the onslaught
of overwhelmingly superior forces for four and a half years, to keep
the enemy out of our own country, to fell the giant Russia, and
even to bring England, who thought herself unassailable, to the

358

Conclusion

brink of destruction ; this strength of ours was so mighty that our
downfall could only be accomplished by extraordinary means : we
had to inflict defeat upon ourselves.

The credit of inventing this expedient belongs to England, and
the surrender of our Fleet appears as the great triumph which her
sea power has won. History will not find much that is worthy of
praise in the way England waged the war at sea ; it may laud her
ultimate success, but not the means by which it was achieved. The
very surrender of our ships is the best proof that we were not defeated
until in the Homeland the will to continue the struggle had been
so sapped by hunger and privation that the people were susceptible
to the poisonous ideas spread by enemy propaganda, of which an un-
scrupulous Revolutionary party made use to attain its selfish ends.
It was England's privilege to extend the war to the economic sphere
in an unheard-of manner. The fight for sea commerce was to lead
to the strangling of the whole German people. For that purpose
violence had to be done to the rights of the neutrals, whose power,
compared with that of the ring of our enemies, was of no avail.
England's policy of alliance placed her in a position to carry out
her plan of starvation, without any fear of a protest from civilised
society. She cleverly diverted attention from the enormity of
her proceedings by simultaneously opening a campaign of lies
about Germany's atrocities and Hun-like behaviour. Widespread
financial operations, moreover, united American with English
interests.

It was the task of our Fleet to defeat the English blockade, or to
neutralise the effects of it by the damage it inflicted on the enemy.
The latter method was chosen. The U-boat proved to be a suitable
means to this end. We must be grateful that the technical develop-
ment of the U-boat had reached such perfection, just in the nick of
time, that these craft could be sent out to such distances and for such
length of time as the war against commerce demanded. Fault-
finding is an objectionable quality of the German. Many a time
he has scorned and belittled the great work of twenty years of build-
ing a Navy which should be able to meet the English Fleet in battle.
The accusations made are false and prove nothing but the ignorance
or the ill-will of those who make them. No doubt our ships had
faults — no naval authorities can make a claim to infallibility — but
they were of absolutely no account compared with the fact that the
material, as well as the spirit and training of the crews, were so
good that our Fleet was able to hold its own against the English.

359

Germany's High Sea Fleet

Only a ship-building industry like that of Germany, which, as the
German Fleet developed, produced such super-excellent ships, could
have helped to supplement our Fleet during the war by the con-
struction of a new U-boat fleet. The reliability of the material,
and the manner in which the boats were built, increased the
courage of the crews who, with full trust in their weapon, could
dare all.

In view of England's plan of campaign, there was no alternative
but to inflict direct injury upon English commerce. We could not
build a sufficiently great number of additional large ships to com-
pensate for the inevitable losses which we were bound to suffer in
the long run in a conflict with the numerically superior English Fleet.
In carrying out their blockade, that Fleet had the advantage of
choosing its field of action in the Northern waters, far removed
from our bases. After their experiences in action, the English left
the southern part of the North Sea for us to deploy in, and con-
tented themselves with warding off the U-boat danger. Through-
out they were forced to be on the defensive. We ought to have tried
earlier what the result of a victory by our Fleet would be. It was
a mistake on the part of the naval leaders not to do so. It was
only after we had been proved in battle that we gained sufficient
confidence to send the U-boats permanently into the North Sea to
wage war on commerce against England, and in the teeth of the
resistance of her Fleet.

The earlier the U-boat campaign was started in full earnest, the
greater was the prospect of being able to go through with it; it
was wrong to wait until the endurance of our people had been tried
to the utmost by the effects of the blockade. The number of boats
at the beginning of 1916 would have been amply sufficient for the
purpose. The success of a U-boat campaign does not depend solely
on the number of the boats, but rather upon their quality and the
skill of their navigators. U-boats of great speed and unlimited
powers of remaining at sea, which could not be caught, would soon
paralyse the sea traffic of an Island State like England. As such
an ideal was not capable of full attainment, the greater number of
boats had to make up for the lack of perfection. The results achieved
fulfilled, and even surpassed, expectation, even though a criminally
long time was allowed the enemy to organise his defence. That we
did not reach the limit of England's endurance in time was due, not
to the ill-success of the U-boats, but to the encouragement which the
enemy found in his hour of need in our political attitude and that

360

Conclusion

of our Allies. Why should he lower his colours when in July, 19 17,
we cried to him : " We want peace," — which in his ears sounded like
"We need peace " — and when we let Austria and our enemies
know that the country could not continue the war longer than
the autumn of that year ? The worse the enemy fared, the more
boldly he bore himself. We, unfortunately, adopted the opposite
attitude.

From the very first a large proportion of the people had been
nervous as to the disadvantageous effects of the U-boat campaign.
This had become a party question, owing to its treatment in Parlia-
ment and the Press. The leading statesman's dislike of it was openly
acknowledged everywhere ; he left the decision to the Supreme Army
Command, who were to fix the date in accordance with the general
military situation, and he put the responsibility on their shoulders.
True, the nation had absolute confidence in the Supreme Army
Command, because the generals in command had earned this con-
fidence. In this question of life and death, too, they formed an
opinion in common with the Naval Staff, and decided upon
action when no other means of breaking the enemy's resistance was
to be found. But to succeed we had need of the confidence and
co-operation of the whole nation, so that they might hold out until
success was ensured. The Reichstag resolution of July, 1917, must
have been viewed by the enemy as a proof that this confidence did
not exist.

From then onwards there was no question of the enemy's yield-
ing. Now, a year after the conflict has ceased, we get indications
from England every day of how hopeless the situation seemed there.
But realising their weakness, they were able to weather the critical
period in the autumn of 1917 by seizing enemy shipping for their
own ends, and they strove zealously to intensify the disintegrating
forces which were at work amongst us. This war has taught us to
what an extent a nation can limit its economic needs. For more
than a year after the conclusion of the Armistice we bore the
burden of the blockade although huge quantities of supplies had to
be left in enemy hands, or were idly squandered, when our troops
retreated.

Our situation would not have been worse had the war continued,
while the enemy would have kept on losing an amount of tonnage
that could not be replaced.

But his will to endure was stronger than ours, for he recognised
the weakness of our Government, whose leaders, unlike those of
x* 361

Germany's High Sea Fleet

the enemy Cabinets, did not have the whole-hearted support of
representatives of the majority of the people.

The World- War was to be a test for the German nation, whether
k could hold its own as a factor of civilisation overseas. The British
tried with might and main to oust it from its position, when the
might of the German Empire was behind it. They felt the danger
that lay in our superior diligence, the excellence of German work,
and the sterling qualities of German education and culture as
compared with the shallow civilisation of the Anglo-Saxons meant
for nothing but effect. Our peaceful penetration was met with
violence. How great they thought the danger is shown by the
mighty efforts of our enemies to crush us.

They have attained their object, because our leading statesmen
at the outbreak of war did not recognise the magnitude of our task,
or — which is worse — looked upon it as beyond our strength. If the
great aim had been rightly realised then, if it had been pursued with
all the forces and strength at our disposal, and if the nation's will
to victory had been continually directed towards it, we might have
been sure of success.

The enormity and baseness of the methods with which our down-
fall had been planned, inflamed the sense of antagonism in our
people to a degree which it could not otherwise have attained. The
nation, however, could not fail to grow weary of its efforts when
the only aim that was left to it after long years of fighting and
Starvation was that of self-preservation ; it was deluded by enemy
craft and wiles into thinking that this could be secured by other
means.

Thus dissension arose at home, and our strength was exhausted
in internecine strife for a phantom of national freedom; and the
only palpable result of all this, brought about by the Revolution,
is the helplessness of that freedom, deprived as it is of the power to
defend itself from foreign aggression.

Toil and labour must start afresh to raise the honour of the
German Navy. In this task the Fatherland) will feel the lack of
many capable men, who cannot live in the straitened circumstances
that have been forced upon us, and who will migrate elsewhere.
But our hopes are centred on these, that they will not deny their
love of home, but will preserve their loyalty to their enslaved
Fatherland and will cherish it in their descendants until the vitality
of Germany, oppressed and overwhelmed as it now is, has won
through to a new development.

362

Conclusion

The Englishman may now think himself entitled to look down
upon us with scorn and contempt, yet in his feelings of superiority
there will always be the sting that he was not victorious in battle,
and that his method of waging war is one that must recoil upon
his own head.

Other World Powers will appear upon the scene who will only
concede a prerogative at sea to him who, as in Nelson's days, can
assert his pre-eminence in open conflict.

363

INDEX

150, 170

121, 122, 123,

179

208
164, 182,

Aaland Islands, 302
Aboukir, sinking of, 58
Acasta, sinking of, 155
Aeroplanes as scouts, 30, 211

loss of five British, 118
Agincourt in Skagerrak Battle,
Ahlhorn, fire at, 210

Zeppelin base at, 207
Air raids, 113, 119, 120
124, 127, 129, 179

effects of, 105, 1 18, 120

general Orders for, 105, 106

influence of weather on, 207

injury to civilians in, 106

London as objective of, 118,

objectives of, 207

on London, 92, 118, 179, 207
Airships as scouts, 30, 135, 141,
185, 197, 205, 211

development of, 203 et seq.

Emperor's order on, 198
Ajax at Kiel, 1914, 3
Albatross, 43

Alcantara, sinking of, 112
Altenbruch Roads as torpedo-boat
101

Squadron II in, 26
America, "dictates of humanity," and,
218, 228

Lusitania, and, 232

proposed blockade of, 330, 331

protest re Sussex of, 130, 242

U-boat warfare, and, 218, 219,
229, 231, 232, 236, 239, 241
251, 252, 254, 255, 349, 350.

352. 353
American warships and convoy duty, 314
Ammon, parent ship to German mine-
sweepers, 287
Amfhion, sinking of, 33
Amrum Bank, minefields off, m, 140
protected anchorage at, 309
protection of, 99
Andes and Greif, 112
Anglo-Dutch convoy, raid planned
197, 198

base,

228,
24S»
35">

on,

365

Antwerp, surrender of, 96

Af-pam, 112

Arabic, sinking of, 233

Arethusa in Heligoland Bight, 46, 50, 51

Ariadne, 44, 52

sinking of, 45, S 3. 54, 55
Armed merchantmen, fight with U-boat,
277-278

orders concerning, 108, no, 238, 253,
2 54

to be treated as warships, 237

U-boat campaign and, 232
Armistice Commission, appointment of,

344
Armistice, President Wilson and, 350
et seq

proposals for, 343, 344, 34 g, 351

publication of conditions of, 358
Army, co-operation of Navy with, 18, 19,

20
Arngast, 49

Attack in Dogger Bank action, 85 (note)
Audacious at Kiel, 1914, 3

sinking of, 61, 62
Augsburg, 59, 296
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, 8
Azores, U-boats at, 261

Bachmann, Admiral, 90, 93, 253

Baden, 195, 280, 283, 291, 341

Balfour, Mr., on German raids, 133,
134

Balkans, evacuation of, 346

Baltic as training area, 5g, 64, 94, 280
Commander-in-Chief in, 18
English submarines in, 66
German cruisers in, 135
German offensive in, 58, 59, 92
German operations in, 10; in 191 7 in,

295 et seq
plan of operations in, 25
possibility of enemy attack in, 20
Squadron III in, 75, 76
Squadron IV in, 90

Baltic Islands, conquest of, 295 et seq

Baralong, 232

Index

Barham in Skagerrak Battle, 143 (note)
Bartenbach, Lieut. -Commander, Chief of

Flanders U-boats, 263
Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, English, in
Skagerrak Battle, 142 et seq., 146,
151, 170, 171, 172
Battle Squadron, Fifth, English, in

Skagerrak Battle, 143
Bauer, Capt., Chief Director of U-boats,
263
on use of U-boats, 34
Bayern, 175, 181, 195, 296, 341

strikes mine in Baltic, 298
Beatty, Admiral, in Heligoland Bight
action, 44
in Skagerrak Battle, 142, 143, 170, 171,

172, 173
on Dogger Bank action, 85 (note)
Behncke, Vice-Admiral, 137, 156, 176, 195,

296, 299
Belgian Relief Commission ships, U-boats

and, 231
Belt, The, mining by Danes of, 21
Berlin, 61

Bethmann-Hollweg, armistice and, 343
dismissal of, 343
U-boat campaign and, 223, 22g, 239,

244. 2S3
Biermann, Commander, Konigin Luise,

33
Birmingham at Kiel, 1914, 3
Black Prince, sinking of, 153, 155
Blitz, 14
Blockade, English Fleet and, 217

results of, 216

Winston Churchill on, 216
Blue her, 4, 15, 38

in attack on East Coast, 70

in Dogger Bank action, 77 et seq.

sinking of, 84, 85
Bodicker, Rear-Admiral, 126

bombardment of Lowestoft and Yar-
mouth and, 128

in Skagerrak Battle, 137, 141, 150
Bogotyr, torpedoing of, 300
Borkum, aerial base at, 99, 201, 304
Braune Bank, 197
Bremen, U-trader, 264, 265
Bremse, 301, 309, 318
Breslau in Mediterranean, 15
Brilliant at Ostend, 339
British Battle Fleet, composition of,
22-24

Bruges as Headquarters of Naval Corps,

345

as torpedo-boat base, 189

as U-boat base, 338, 340

evacuation of, 346
Brummer, 301, 309, 318
Brunsbuttel, as Fleet Base, 101
Bulgaria, collapse of, 342

U-boats for, 259
Bulow, Rear-Admiral von, 333

Capelle, Admiral von, 247, 293, 328

retirement of, 337
Caroline bombed in Humber, 105
Carson, Sir E., as hindrance to peace,

'95
Cattaro, evacuation of, 347
Centurion at Kiel, 1914, 3
Channel Fleet, composition of, 24
Chester, sinking of, 150 (note), 170
Chief of Naval Staff, duties of, 17, 18
. Churchill, Winston, on blockade, 216
Cleopatra, collision with Undaunted, 119

sinks "G 194," 119
Commander-in-Chief of Fleet, authority
of, 17

plan of campaign of, 26

position in battle of, 146

war orders to, 25
Comus, 112

Convoy flotillas for U-boats, 262, 289
Convoys as protection against U-boats,
262, 273

attacks on, 309 et seq, 318 et seq
Coronel, battle of, 67
Cressy, sinking of, 58
" Cressy " class in Skagerrak Battle, 161
Cruiser action after East Coast raid, 71-

73
in November, 191 7, 304 et seq
Cruisers, weakness of High Sea Fleet in,

IS
Curtis plane, excellence of, 100
Cuxhaven as Naval Base, 100
as torpedo-boat base, 101

Danes, mining of The Belt by, 21
Danzig, 44, 45, 55, 88, 296
Danzig Bay as Naval Base, 6
Declaration of London, England and, 215,

216, 218
Defence, sinking of, 153, 155
Depth charges, 262, 274-275, 288

366

Index

Derjflinger, 15

in attack on Scarborough, 70

in Dogger Bank action, 77 et seq

in Skagerrak Battle, 137, 155, 169,

'7S
Destroyer action in Heligoland Bight, 43
et seq
off Horns Reef, 92
Deutschland, 13

in Skagerrak Battle, 137
" Directional stations," 73
Dogger Bank, cruiser action off, 76 et seq.
light cruisers off, 42
proposed concentration of Fleet on, 197
torpedo-boat action off, 107
Dohna, Count zu, Commander of Moewe,

95, 112
Dover, Zeppelin raid on, 179, 209
Dover Straits, defences of, 188
importance of securing, 19
torpedo-boat raid on, 188
Dresden, 15
at Coronel, 67

" E 3," sinking of, 63
"E 9" sinks Hela, 56
East Coast, cruiser raids on, 66, 103,
124 et seq; effect on public of, 133

U-boats off, 196

U-C minelayers for, 260, 272-273
Eckermann, Rear-Admiral, 16
Eckernforde, U-boat school at, 341
Elbe as Fleet Base, 21

minefields at mouth of, 26

removal of lightship from, 31
Elbing, 128

in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 14 1 . l6o » ID2 >
167
Emden, 15, 234

successful cruise of, 58
Emden (new), 296, 298, 299, 311, 312
Engel, Rear-Admiral, 175
England, avoidance of provocation of, 11

boastfulness of, x

Captain Mahan on Sea Power of, ix

declaration of war by, 27

defence against U-boats of, 261 et seq.

favourable treatment of, 26

hypocrisy over war measures of, 106,
107, 232

influence on German war plans of, 19

question of neutrality of, 8
methods of, 359

English Channel, defences of, 188, 189,
28.9, 314

minefields at entrance to, 215

proposed attack on, 353

transport service of, 63, 64

torpedo-boat raid into, 188, 314-318

U-boats in, 267-272, 289
English coast, difficulties of attack on, 21.
English Fleet, advantages in attack of, 21

at Skagerrak Battle, 131 et seq., 170

mobilisation of, 8, 12

probable tactics of, 7, 11, 18, 20, 21,

24. 25
protection of transports, and, 19, 20
tactics of, 34, 37, 39, 73, 89, 217
traditions and advantages of, 11
English Squadron at Kiel, 1914, 3
Erzberger, State Secretary, on Armistice
and U-boat campaign, 351

" F " boats, characteristics of, 287
Falkenhayn, Gen. von, and unrestricted

U-boat warfare, 105, 246
Falkland Islands, battle of, English

public opinion and, 96
Fearless in Heligoland Bight, 46
Finland, German assistance to, 302
Firth of Forth, U-minelayer off, 124

U-boats off, 136, 179, 320
Flanders coast, abandonment of, 340-1,

343, 344
as torpedo-boat base, 179, 187, 281,

3H-3*7> 34°
as U-boat base, 62, 117, 124, 135, 180,
259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 340, 345
Folkestone, Zeppelin raid on, 179
Forstmann, Walter, Lieut. -Commander,

263
" Foxglove," submarine chaser, 268, 278
Frankfurt, 128, 296, 307

in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 166
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, murder

of, 4
Frauenlob, 43, 46

in Skagerrak Battle, 137, 162
Freights, effect of U-boat warfare on, 234
Freya as training ship, 14
Friedrich der Grosse, flagship, 13, 91,
no, 174, 175, 196, 292, 296, 299
in Skagerrak Battle, 136, 148, 153,

'57. i5 8
Friedrichsort, torpedo establishment at,
60, 341

367

Index

Frisian Islands

93
Funke, Rear-Admiral, 13, 74

English minefields off,

"G 116," sinking of, 62

"G 194" sunk by Cleopatra, 119

Gaedecke, Rear-Admiral, 13

General Headquarters, Admiral Scheer

at, 333-337
George V., King, on England's

neutrality, 8
George, Mr. Lloyd, as hindrance to

peace, 195, 251
Gerard Mr., desired Germany's defeat,

245
German Bight, English minefields in,
75, 93. 289
English submarines in, 27, 39, 42, 74,

100, 1 01
German minefields in, 102
night expeditions in, 102
protection of, 28, 38, 98, 99, 102, 130,

196
tactical disadvantages of, 21, 22, 28,
29
German Emperor, Armistice negotiations,
and, 350, 352, 354
as Supreme War Lord, 17, 325, 329
at U-boat school, 341
departure for Norway of, 5
murder of Archduke, and, 4
mutiny in Fleet, and, 293, 356
order against risking battleships of,

192
order on aerial scouting by, 198
report on Skagerrak to, 167
unrestricted U-boat warfare, and, no,

230, 238, 242-3, 253
visits to Fleet of, no, 175, 292
German Fleet, additions to, 97, 195-6
aim of, 97, 213
and North Sea, 20
as supporter of German prestige, 5
aspirations of, 10, n
command of the Baltic, and, 20, 92
co-operation of Army with, 18, 19, 20
English transports, and, 19
enthusiasm for war of, 10
Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and

development of, 17, 18
influence of U-boat warfare on, 199
methods of training in, 14
mutiny in, 292, 355

9',

" U S3,"

368

German Fleet, organisation of, 14, 325
preparedness of, 28, 33, 101, 102
sinking of, 358
surrender of, 358
system of command in, 16
tactics of, 40, 57, 67, 68, 87,

96, 97, 98
training of, 6, 7
visit to Norway, 1914, 5, 8
war preparations of, 9
German National Assembly accepts peace

358
Germany, aspirations to Sea Power of,
x-xi, xii
spirit of, x

starvation of, object of British
Government, 219
Ghent, evacuation of torpedo-boats from,

346
Glasgow, at Coronel, 67
Gleaves, Admiral (U.S.A.), and

265
Gneisenau, 15

at Coronel, 67
G/ieben in Mediterranean, 15
handed to Turkey, 346, 347
Good Hope, sinking of, 67
Goodenough, Commodore, at Kiel, 1914, 3
Grand Fleet at Skagerrak Battle, 151 et
seq.
change in command of, 196
composition of, 22, 23
enlargement of, 196
movements after Skagerrak of, 182 et
seq.
Graudenz, 77

Great Belt mined by Danes, 60
Greif, fight with Alcantara, 112
Grepow, Vice-Admiral, 15
Grom, capture of, 299
Grosser Kurfiirst, 73, i 74l I75j ,8
collision with Kronprinz, 281
strikes mine in Baltic, 298
torpedoing of, 192

Hage, Zeppelin base at, 118, 207
Hague Conference, mines in open sea,
and, 107
Second, Declaration of London, and,
218
Hamburg, 35, 42, 69, 72

in Skagerrak Battle, 138
Hampshire, sinking of, 167, 200

r 95

Index

Hangar, the ideal, 307
Hannover, 13

Hansa, as training ship, 14
Harbours, protection of, 30
Hartlepool, bombardment of, 68 et seq.
Harwich, Zeppelin raid on, 127, 179, 209
Hawke, sinking of, 91
Heinecke, Commander, 296, 311
Heinecke Torpedo-boat Flotilla, raid on

Channel by, 314-318
Heinrich, Commodore, 296, 298
Held, 14

sinking of, 56, 62
Helgoland, 13, 175, 195
Heligoland, as aerial base, 30, 99, 201

as apex of "Wet Triangle," 21

as torpedo-boat base, 101, 187

as U-boat base, 34

defences of, 30

evacuation of population of, 30

German Emperor at, 294

German minefields off, 55, 56

importance of, 102
Heligoland Bight, destroyer action in, 43
el seq.

English minefield in, 199

English submarines in, 42, 43, 44, 62

protection of, 27
Helsingfors, capture of, 301-303
Henkel-Gebhardi, Admiral von, 175
Henry of Prussia, and U-boat warfare,
105

Commander-in-Chief, in Baltic, 9

King George and, 9

visit to High Sea Fleet, no
Hering, Rear-Admiral, Chief of Torpedo

Factories, 341
Hermes, sinking of, 63
Herta as training ship, 14
Hessen, 8, 13

High Sea Fleet, composition of, 13, 14,
195-96

concentration of, in Jade, 10

enlargement of, 6

in Skagerrak Battle, 133 et seq.

increased crews of, 16

movements of, Aug., 1916, 182 et seq.;
May, 1917, 280 et seq.

objective of, 25

organisation of, 14

plan of operations of, 25
regrouping of, 195

scope of Commander-in-Chief of, 16

369

High Sea Fleet, war orders to, 25

weakness in cruisers of, 15
Hindenburg, 196, 282, 307, 333
Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von, Armi-
stice negotiations, and, 354, 355
unrestricted U-boat warfare, and,
190, 194, 246-47
Hipper, Admiral, 13, 138, 320, 322, 332,

353
bombardment of Scarborough and

Hartlepool, and, 68
in charge of protective system, 28
in Dogger Bank action, 77 et seq.
in Skagerrak Battle, 137, 140
Hague, sinking of, 58
Holland, sinking of Katwyk, and, 231,

232
Holtzendorff, Admiral von, 93, no, 253,

247. 254, 33°
memo on unrestricted U-boat warfare

of, 248-252
resignation of, 324
Hoof den, The, 93, 103, 113, 123, 124, 126,

197, 280
Hopman, Vice-Admiral, 296, 299, 300
Horns Reef, destroyer engagement off,

9 2 > 94

German Fleet retires on, 159, 162, 163

minefields off, in, 282, 283
Hospital ships, justification for sinking
of, 62

U-boats and, 231
Housatonic, torpedoing of, 271
Hull, Zeppelin raid on, 113 et seq., 122
Humber, minefield off, 43, 75

U-boats off, 38, 136

Zeppelin raids over, 105, 113 et seq.
" Hunger blockade," 96

Immingham, Zeppelin raid on, 116

Imperial Pilot Service, 31

Indefatigable, sinking of, in Skagerrak

Battle, 142, 163
Independent Social Democratic Party,
mutiny in Fleet, and, 292, 293, 356
Ingenohl, Admiral von, appointed Com-
mander-in-Chief, 6
on war prospects, 8
on U-boats, 39
retirement of, 87
sails for North Sea, 9
Invincible, sinking of, 155, 163
Italy, secession of, 233, 234

Index

Jade, as Fleet Base, 21
German Fleet in the, 10
removal of lightship from, 31

Jammer Bay, English Fleet in, 161^ 165,

i7 2 . *73
Jellicoe, Admiral Lord, as Commander

of Grand Fleet, 22
at Skagerrak Battle, 153, 158 (note),

170, 171, 172, 173
mines in Heligoland Bight, and,

199
on objects of British Fleet, 24
on East Coast raids, 72
on Skagerrak Battle, 169, 172 (note)
on Skagerrak losses, 167
Justitia, torpedoing of, 274-277

Kaiser, 7, 13, 196, 285, 296, 298, 304,

3°7

in Skagerrak Battle, 137
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, alterations in, 4

difficult passage of, 34

English cruisers in, 4

tactical uses of, 20, 92
Kaiserin, 13, ig6, 296, 299, 304, 307

in Skagerrak Battle, 148
Karlsruhe, 234, 296
Katwyk, sinking of, 231
Kiel, as Naval Base, 4

English squadron at, 1914, 3

mobilisation of Fleet at, 9

U-boat school at, 341
Kiel Week, 1914, 3

fraternisation of English and German
officers at, 4
King Edward, sinking of, 112
King George V., at Kiel, 1914, 3
King Stephen and " L 19," 128

sinking of, 128
Kirkwall, examination station at, 266
Kitchener, Lord, death of, 167, 200
Kitchener's Army, 96
"Kite," submarine, 288, 304
Knight, Admiral (U.S.A.), and " U 53,"

265
Kolberg, 14, 44, 70, 77, 78, 296, 300
Koln, 14, 42, 44, 45, 47, S3
Konig, 74, 296

in Skagerrak Battle, 137, 174, 175, 195
Konig Albert, 7, 13, 140, 196, 296, 299
Konigin Luise, sinking of, 33
Konigsberg sinks Pegasus, 58, 296, 305,
3°7> 3°8

Krah, Capt. Walter, Chief of Auxiliary

Mine Flotilla, 100, 287
Krause, Commander, and Imperial Pilot

Servioe, 31
Kronfrinz, 75, 195, 296

collision with Grosser Kurfiirst, 281
torpedoing of, 192
Kronfrinz Friedrick Wilhelm, 33, 234
Krosigk, Vice-Admiral von, 30
Kuhlmann, von, 194

" L 3" as long-distance scout, 30
"L n" after Skagerrak, 164

as scout, 184

raid on Hull by, 113 et seq.

raid on Tyne, Sunderland and
Middlesbrough by, 120, 121

raid on Yarmouth by, 122

raid on Whitby by, 123
"L ij" shot down on Thames, 120
"L 19," King Stephen and loss of, 106,

128
" L 20," loss of, 129

" L 70," loss Of, 211

Landmarks, removal of, 30

Lans, Vice- Admiral von, 9, 13

Lavender, torpedoing of, 286

Laverock, 118

Lee, Civil Lord of Admiralty, on the

Fleet, n
Leipzig, 15

at Coronel, 67
Levetzow, Captain von, 95, 136, 296

Commodore, 332, 351, 353
Libau, bombardment of, 59
Lightships, removal of, 31
Lincoln, Zeppelin raid on, 127
Lion, in Dogger Bank action, 8s (note),
86

in Heligoland Bight action, 44, S3

in Skagerrak Battle, 142
List, aerial station at, 97, 99, 201
Liverpool, Zeppelin raid on, 105
London, air raids on, 92, 94, 118, 207,

208
Lothringen, 8, 13
Lowe, Commander Otto, and wrecked

"L 19," 106
Lowestoft, attempted raid on, 124

et seq.
Ludendorff, General, Armistice, and,

343. 344-34S. 35°. 354. 3SS
on abandonment of Flanders, 340

VO

Index

Ludendorff, General, U-boat warfare,

and, 194, 247, 333, 337
Lusitania, excitement caused by sinking
of, 23a
sunk by " U 20," 193
Liitzow, 15, 126, 134, 196

in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 155, 156,
159, 160, 163, 164, 167 (note)

" M "-boats, German minesweepers, 286
Maass, Rear-Admiral, 13, 42, 53
Magdeburg, wreck of, 59
Mahan, Captain, on English sea power,

ix
Mainz, 14, 42, 44, 45

sinking of, 49-52
Malaya in Skagerrak Battle, 143 (note)
Mann-Tiechler, Vioe-Admiral Ritter von,

337, 344
Markgraf, 74, 175, 181, 195, 296
Marlborough, torpedoing of, at Skagsr-

rak, 158, 166
Mary Rose, sinking of, 310
Mauve, Rear -Admiral, 133, 137, 160, 196
Max of Baden, Prince, Admiral Scheer
and, 349
appointed Chancellor, 344, 347
Armistice and, 345, 352, 353
on Peace Proposals, 348
Mediterranean, German cruisers in, 15
U-boats in, 190, 233, 243, 259, 260,
261, 262, 347
Medusa, sunk by aerial bomb, 118, 119
Merchant ships, armed, neutrals and,

23 8 * 3"

arming of, 262

bonus for sinking U-boats for, 232

convoys for, 311
Meteor, sinking of, 89
Meurer, Rear-Admiral von, 301
Michelsen, 'Commodore, 138, 156, 187, 263
Middlesbrough, Zeppelin raid on, 121
Minefield, Danish, in Great Belt, 60

off Elbe, 26
Minefields, danger to U-boats of, 262

English, at entrance to Channel, 60,
215

English, in German Bight, 75, 93, 199

German, in German Bight, 26, 102

German, off Scotland, ©i

navigation lights round, 31

Russian, in Gulf of Riga, 91
Minelayers, submarine, 200, 259, 260, 288 I

37

Minelaying, in open sea, justification of,
61, 107

operations, difficulty of detecting,
200- 1
Mines, American, in North Sea, 291

defences against, 288

English, in North Sea, 34, 199, 281,
289, 290, 291

English itypes of floating, 27, 93

first effects of, 27

German, off English coast, 43, 60

off Heligoland, 55, 56

German, types of, 288

use against Russia of, 21
Mine-sweepers, new types of, 201

protection of, 200

types and numbers of, German, 288
Mine-sweeping, for U-boats, 262, 289-290

German organisation of, 286-7

new apparatus for, 100, 288

service in North Sea, 100
Moevie, in North Atlantic, 95

Teturn and success of, in, 112, 113

second cruise of, 194, 281
Monmouth, sinking of, 66
Moray Firth, U-boats off, 136
Motor-boats, German, 287
Muller, Admiral von, 324

on U-boat warfare, 243-244, 246
MoltJce, 14, 38, 192, 296, 297, 307

in attack on East Coast, 70

in Doggerbank action, 77 et seq.

in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 155, 175

strikes mine, 321-322

torpedoed, 92, 323
Miinchen, in Skagerrak Battle, 138
Mutiny 14 German Fleet, 292, 355

Nassau, 13, 195

in Skagerrak Battle, 162
Nautilus, 43
Naval Corps, in Flanders, disbandment

of, 345
Naval organisation, German, Admiral
Scheer on, 324
policy, English, objects of, 213
Staff, duties of, 17
treatment of England, and, 26
Navy Bills, provision of, xi, 14, 15
Navy, German, inspires Unity of nation,

176, 177
Nestor, sinking of, 148
Nets, anti-submarine, 288-289

Index

Neufahrwasser, as Naval Base, 6
Neuminster, wireless station at, 181
Neutral flags, English misuse of, 225,
227
Powers, German Note on armed mer-
chantmen to, 108
shipping, dangers of U-boats to, 228
instruction to U-boats and, 227, 230,

231
warning by 'Germany to, 225
Neutrals, armed convoys and, 311
armed merchantmen and, 238, 311
rights of ignored by England, 218,

219
U-boat campaign and, 228, 231
New Zealand, in Skagerrak Battle, 142
Newport (U.S.A.), "U 53" at, 264, 265
Nomad, 148

Norderney, seaplane base at, 201
Nordholz, Zeppelin base at, 117, 207
North Sea, American mines in, 291
Auxiliary Mine-sweeper Flotilla, 287
English control of, 215
English mines in, 34, 281, 289, 290,

291
Naval Stations, Headquarters, of, 30
Seaplane Division, 201
Norway, visit of Kaiser and Fleet to

(1914), S. 8
expedition to coast of, 318 et seq

Norwich, Zeppelin raid on, 127
Nurnberg, 15, 296, 305

Oldenburg, 13, 193, 321, 322, 323

in Skagerrak Battle, 161
Ophelia, hospital ship, capture of, 61
Orkney Islands, examination base in, 91,

266
Ostend, as seaplane base, 201

British attack on, 339
Ostfriesland, 13, 195

In Skagerrak Battle, 137, 15S, 161,
166, 175
Otranto, at Coronel, 67

Pallada, sinking of, 59
Partridge, sinking of, 313
Pass of Balmaha, 92

Passenger ships, justification for sinking
of, 218

Orders to U-boats not to sink, 233

President Wilson and, 349
Pathfinder, sinking of, 58

Payer, Vice- Chancellor von, Armistice

and, 351
Peace proposals, 347, 348

of 1916, 195, 249
Pegasus, sunk by Konigsberg, 58
Pellew, 313

Pleih 14

Philippj Rear-Admiral, Chief of Air Ser-
vice, 201
Pilldu, in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 151, 166,

306
Pohl, Admiral, appointed Commander-in-
Chief, 87
Death of, 94
Strategy of, 88, 89
U-boat campaign, and, 222, 224, 226,

23°. 2 33
Pola, Evacuation of, 347
U-boat base at, 253
U-boats overhauled at, 260
Pommern, 13

Sinking of, 162, 187, 195
Posen, 13, 195, 301

In Skagerrak Battle, 137, 162
Preussen, Flagship, Squadron II, 8, 13,

140
Princess Royal, in Dogger Bank action,
85 (note)
In Skagerrak Battle, 142
Prinz Adalbert, 135
Prinz Eitel-Friedrich, 234
Prinz Heinrich, 69, 135 (note)
Prinzregent Luitfold, 7, 13, 74, i9 6 > 2 9 2 >

296
Protective Zone in German Bight, 28

" Q "-boats, 262

" Q " 12, Capture of Commander of, 285

Queen, sinking of, 188

Queen Elizabeth, in Skagerrak Battle,

143. M7» '48
" Queen Elizabeth " class, in Skagerrak
Battle, 142, 144. '4 6 > '47» I 4 8 » 1 S I >

153. '54. '5 6
Superiority over German ships, of, 97,

181
Queen Mary, in Skagerrak Battle, 142,
163

Ramsay sunk by Meteor, 89
Regensburg, in Skagerrak Battle, 138,

140, 143, 163, 166
Reichstag Resolution, influence of, 361

Index

Reserve Fleet, 15

Reuter, Commodore von, 137, 160

Rear-Admiral, 296, 304, 307
Rheinland, 13, 195, 301

Runs ashore, 302
Riga, Gulf of, Russian minefields in, 91

engagement in, 92, 295, et seq.
Roon, 69, 135 (note)
Rosenberg, Commander von, U-boat

flotilla of, 263, 296, 298
Rosenberg Flotilla, 397, 299
Rostock, 14, 42, 77, 127, 128

In Skagerrak Battle, 138, 140, 160,
162, 167
Russian Fleet, and Baltic, to, 20

Retires to Kronstadt, 302

Santa Elena, as seaplane carrier, 201
Satow, Kt. Hon. Sir E., on minelaying

in open sea, 107
Scapa Flow, English ships leave, 141
sinking of Fleet at, 358
U-boats off, 136, 141
Scarborough, bombardment of, 68, et seq.
Scharnhorst, 15

at Coronel, 67
Scheer, Admiral, appointed Chief of Naval
Staff, 324, 332, 333; Commander-in-
Chief, 94; to Squadron III, 74
as Commander of Squadron II, 6,

•3
at General Headquarters, 333 — 337
at Skagerrak Battle, 136
in command in Baltic, 9
on lessons of Skagerrak, 176-77
Prince Max of Baden and, 349, 350
report on Skagerrak, 168-173
unrestricted U-boat warfare and, no,
178, 230

Scheldt, English warships off, 127, 128,
129

Schillig Roads, battle-cruisers in, 103

Schlesien, 8, 13

Schleswig-Holstein, 13

Schmidt, Vice- Admiral Ehrhard, 15, 90,

*37> »5 8 > IQ 5> 2 9 6 > 29 s
Schroder, Admiral von, in command in

Flanders, 338, 345
Schulze, Captain, Commander of " L II,"

"3

Schiitt-Lang airships, 203, 210
Sea Power, England's abuse of, ix, xiii
Germany and, 18

Seaplane bases, 201

Seaplanes, as protection for mine-
sweepers, 20t

as scouts, 211
Sebastopol, German dockyard at, 347
Serbia, Austrian ultimatum to, 8
Seydlits, 14, 38, 136, 175

in attack on East Coast, 70

in Dogger Bank action, 77 et seq.

in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 166, 169, 175

mined in attack on Yarmouth, 126, 127,
129, 134
Sierra Vent ana, hospital ship, 176
Sirius, at Ostend, 339
Skagerrak, Battle of, 133 et seq.

Admiral Scheer's report on, 168-173

comparative losses at, 162, 167, 168, 177

cruiser engagement in, 141 et seq.

hailed as victory, 174, 175, 177

lessons of, 176-7

night movements in, 159-164

second phase of, 145-49

ships engaged in, 137-140

situation on June 1, 164

third phase of, 149-158
Slava, sinking of, 92, 299, 300
Solf, Dr., Armistice and, 351
Souchon, Vice-Admiral, 296, 304, 356
Southampton, at Kiel 1914, 3
Spain, claim against Germany of, 338
Spee, Count, Commander of cruiser
squadron, 15

and Coronel, 66
Squadron I, composition of, 9, 13

in expedition against Sunderland, 180

in Skagerrak Battle, 140, 145, 147, 159,
160, 161, 162, 172
Squadron II, Admiral Scheer in command
of, 6, 13

Admiral Funke in command of, 74

Admiral Mauve, in command of, 133

as fighting force, 133

based in Elbe, 197

for Baltic service, 9

in Altenbruch Roads, 26

in Skagerrak Battle, 140, 145, 147, 156,
159, 160, 161, 172

preparation for active service of, 31-32

raids on East Coast, 69, 70

refitment of, 64

unfitness of, 187, 195
Squadron III, additions to, 73, 90

Admiral Scheer in command of, 74

373

Index

Squadron III, composition of, 7, 13

in Baltic, 75, 76; in 1917, 297, 300

in Elbe, 91

in expedition against Sunderland,
180

in Skagerrak Battle, 140, 143 (note),
145. 147. r 48, 155, i59» 161, 166

mutiny in, 356

refitment of, 94, 134

sails for North Sea, 9, 76

stranding of " U 20 " and, 192
Squadron IV, disbandment of, 195

formation and composition, 15

in Baltic, 90, 297 (1917)
Squadron V, disbandment of, 195

formation and composition of, 15
Squadron VI, disbandment of, 195

formation and composition of, 15, 16
Stettin, 35, 43, 45, 46, 48, 53, 69

in Skagerrak Battle, 138
Stralsund, 14, 42, 44, 45, 55, 71, 72, 77,

78. 134
Strassburg, 14, 42, 45, 53, 69, 77, 296, 300,

3 21
Strasser, Captain, Commander of Air-
ships, 123, 208, 210

death of, 211

Ordre pour le Merite, for, 209
Strongbow, sinking of, 310
Stuttgart, 42

as seaplane carrier, 201

in Skagerrak Battle, 138
Submarines, English, at Skagerrak, 166

in Baltic, 66

in German Bight, 27, 38, 39, 42, 74,

75. I0 °. 10I > "3°
in Heligoland Bight, 42, 44, 62
protection against, 27
Sunderland, expedition against, 134

el sea.
projected expedition against, 180

et seq.
Zeppelin raid on, 120-1
Supreme Army Command, abandonment

of Flanders, and, 344
Armistice and, 343, 344, 345
evacuation of occupied territory and,

349
increase of U-boats and, 335, 336
Sussex, American protest at sinking of,

130, 242
Sylt, difficult navigation of channel at,

21

Tactics, influence on ^ship-construction
of, 18

Tapken, Rear-Admiral, 13

Terschelling Bank, U-boats off, 136

Thames estuary, U-boats off, 37

" Test trips," 304

" The Grand Fleet, 1914-16," by Admiral
Viscount Jellicoe, 24, 172 (note)

" The Influence of Sea Power Upon His-
tory," by Captain Mohan, ix

" The Skagerrak Gift," 175

The Times, article on Lusitania in, 232

Theseus, 91

Thiiringen, 13, 195

in Skagerrak Battle, 161

Tieze, Captain, commander of Greij, 112

Tiger, in Skagerrak Battle, 142

Tirpitz, Grand Admiral von, dismissal
of, 117
position with regard to fleet of, 17, 93,

3 26 . 3 2 7
U-boat warfare and, 226
visit to High Seas Fleet, 110
Tondern, as Zeppelin base, 207

British attack on hangars at, 118
Tonnage, sunk by U-boats, 257, 261, 335
Torpedo-boats, action off Dogger Bank
of, 107
as submarine chasers, 101, 184, 187
in Skagerrak Battle, 138-9, 144, 145,
147, 149, 151, 153, 154 i5 6 > J57.

159. i°°> l6 3> !72

prize crews and, 134

protection to mine-sweepers and, 201
Torpedo-nets, disadvantages of, 174
Torpedo training, 74
Torpedoes, for submarines, 259

types of, 340
Training, German methods of, 14
Transports and U-boats, 331, 332
Trotha, Rear-Admiral von, 95, 136, 245
Turkey, and Goeben, 346, 347
Tyne, minefield off, 43

Zeppelin raid on, 120, 121
Tyszka, Commander von, 320

Rear-Admiral, 333

" U 9," sinks Cressy, Aboukir

Hague, 58
" U 20," sinks Lusitania, 193

stranding of, 191
" U 21," sinks Pathfinder, 58
" U 22," success of, m

and

374

Index

" U 24 " sinks Arabic, 233

" U 26," sinks Pallada, 59

" U 29," sinks Hawke, 91

" U 30," stranding of, 191

" U S3," operations off U.S.A., 264-7

vessels sunk by, 266
U-boat campaign, abandonment of, 352,
353

armistice and, 345, 349, 351, 33a

as means of winning the war, 360, 361

as political question, 224

defence of, 215 et seq.

Neutral snipping and, 225, 227
U-boat Office, establishment of, 328, 335
U-boat warfare, Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff and, 190, 194, 337

necessity of, 190

restricted, 91, 92, 93, 97, 103, 104, 129,
130, 190, 196; failure of, 233; im-
portance of, 198 ; objects of, 98 ; re-
sults of, 234, 257, 334

unrestricted, 87; commencement of,
in, 230; effects of, 234-257; failure
of, 253; final decisions on, 105, 239,
248; German Emperor sanctions,
no; influence on Fleet of, 199, 328;
reversal of policy of, 108; Scheer
on, 178

zigzag policy on, 245-46
U-boats, achievements of, 25, 257, 261

advantages of, 36, 230-1, 257

and Heligoland, 34

armament of, 260, 261

convoys for, 262

English warships and, 34, 35, 183

extended cruises of, 63, 261, 264-6

failure of, against English Navy, 103

first long cruise of, 35

first losses of, 35

fleet drained of officers for, 195, 202,
280

in attack on Lowestoft, 124

in Mediterranean, 190, 233, 243, 259,
260, 261, 262, 347

losses of, 35, 91, 263, 340

methods of, 259 et seq.

methods of defence against, 262

minimum of new boats required, 324-5

numbers employed, 257, 259, 263

off English coast, 38, 167, 179, 196

organisation of, 263, 337

overhauling and repair of, 260

torpedo capacity of, 259

U-boats, training school for crews of,

341-42

types of, 259

use with Fleet of, 104

von Ingenohl on, 39
U-B-boats, characteristics of, 260
U J C-boats, capacity of, 260

mine carrying capacity of, 288
U-oruisers, capacity of, 261, 332
XJ-Deuischland, 261
U-minelayers, 200
" U-Z " boats, 287
Undaunted, collision with Cleopatra, 119

destroys minelayers, 61

" V 4," sinking of, 162

"V 27," sunk at Skagerrak, 144

"V 29," sunk at Skagerrak, 144

" V 48," sunk at Skagerrak, 155

"V 187," sinking of, 45, 46, 47-49

Valiant, in Skagerrak Battle, 143 [note)

Viktoria Luise, as training-ship, 15

Vindictive, at Zeebrugge, 339

Vineta, as training-ship, 15

Volga, 347

Von der Tann, 14, 38, 77

in attack on Scarborough, 70
in Skagerrak Battle, 138, 142

Wangeroog, destruction of church at, 30
War, as test for German nation, 362

opening days of, 26 et seq.

origin of, ix

outbreak of, 10

why we lost the, 362
War orders to High Sea Fleet, 25
War Zone, declaration by England of,

2I 5
declaration by Germany of, 225, 226,
227
Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, 72
Warrior, sinking of, 153, 155
Wars-pite, in Skagerrak Battle, 143 (note),

163
Weddigen, Lieut. -Commander Otto,
attacks Theseus, 91
sinks Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue, 58
sinks Hawke, 91
West burn, 112
West/alen, 13, 195

in Skagerrak Battle, 161
torpedoing of, 181, 182, 185, 301
"Wet Triangle," The, 21

375

Index

Wettin, 15

Whitby, bombardment of, 70
Zeppelin raid on, 122, 123
White Sea, minelaying U-boats for, 260
W iesbaden in Skagerrak Battle, . 137,

151, 155, 156
Wilfred, sinking of, 27
Wilhelmshaven as Headquarters of North
Sea Naval Stations, 30
as Naval base, 4, 100
Fleet at, 1914, 9
repairs of U-boats at, 260
Wilson, President, 255

Armistioe proposals to, 355
" Fourteen Points " of, 350
German Peace Note to, 344, 347, 348
on U-boat campaign, 349
passenger ships, and, 349, 353
reply of, 354
Wireless " directional stations," 73
Wireless telegraphy, advantages of, 28,

30
Wittelsbach, 15

Wittmundshaven, Zeppelin base at, 207
Wolf, 194

Yarmouth, cruiser
et seq.

raid on, 66, 124

Yarmouth, Zeppelin raid on, 124
Yarrowdale, 281
Yorek, sinking of, 66

Zeebeugge, as seaplane base, 201

as torpedo-boat base, 187, 188, 189,

281, 318
as U-boat base, 253, 260, 339
attack on, 339
evacuation of, 346
Zeppelin raids, 93, 94, 105, 113 et seq.,

119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127,

129, 179, 208 et seq.
effects on British public of, 211
objectives of, 207
success of defensive measures against,

129, 179
Zeppelins, armament of, 204

as scouts, 30, 135, 141, 164, 183, 185,

197, 204
bases of, 207

construction of, 203 et seq.
development of, 203 et seq.
future of, 212
hangars for, 207
increase of, 203
losses of, 203, 208, 210-11
navigation of, 205-6

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